APB Properties LLC v. Leticia Munguia et al
Filing
12
MINUTE ORDER (In Chambers): ORDER REMANDING ACTION TO LOS ANGELES COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT by Judge Christina A. Snyder. As discussed above, Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this action, and 28 U.S.C. § 1443 removal is improp er. The Court therefore REMANDS this case to the Los Angeles County Superior Court. IT IS SO ORDERED. Case remanded to Los Angeles Superior Court at Stanley Mosk Courthouse, Case number 14U13267. Case Terminated. Made JS-6 (lom) Modified on 2/24/2015 (lom). (mailed 2/24/15)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
‘O’
Case No.
2:15-cv-00250-CAS(JCx)
Title
ABP PROPERTIES, LLC V. LETICIA MUNGUIA
Present: The Honorable
Date
JS-6
February 24, 2015
CHRISTINA A. SNYDER
Catherine Jeang
Deputy Clerk
Not Present
Court Reporter / Recorder
N/A
Tape No.
Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs:
Attorneys Present for Defendants:
Not Present
Not Present
Proceedings:
I.
(In Chambers) ORDER REMANDING ACTION TO LOS
ANGELES COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT
INTRODUCTION
On October 20, 2014 plaintiff APB Properties, LLC (“APB”) filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer in Los Angeles Superior Court against defendant Leticia Munguia
(“Munguia”) and all occupants in possession of the subject property at 1148 S. Fresno
Street, Los Angeles, California. On January 13, 2015, Munguia removed this action to
federal court. Dkt. No. 1. On On January 21, 2015, APB filed an ex parte application
for remand. Dkt. No. 6. On February 2, 2015, the Court, noting the probable lack of
federal jurisdiction, issued an order to show cause why this case should not be remanded.
Dkt. No. 9. Munguia responded to that order on February 17, 2015. Dkt. No. 11. After
considering the parties’ arguments, the Court finds that the case must be remanded for the
following reasons.
II.
DISCUSSION
“The ‘strong presumption’ against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant
always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980
F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). For the following reasons, Munguia has not met this
burden, and remand is required.
A.
The Court Does Not Have Diversity Jurisdiction.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), this Court has original jurisdiction over state law
actions only where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and the action is between
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.
2:15-cv-00250-CAS(JCx)
Date
Title
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February 24, 2015
ABP PROPERTIES, LLC V. LETICIA MUNGUIA
parties of diverse citizenship. In an unlawful detainer action, the amount in controversy
is “the amount of damages sought in the complaint, not the value of the subject real
property.” Litton Loan Servicing, L.P. v. Villegas, No. C 10-05478 PJH, 2011 WL
204322, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2011); accord Ward v. Hernandez, No. EDCV 1301458 JGB (SPx), 2013 WL 5840445, at *3 n.1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2013). Here, the
original complaint pleads damages of $52.60 per day, beginning on November 01, 2014.
Thus, even if complete diversity of citizenship exists, the complaint pleads damages of
less than $5,000, and indeed states on its face that the “amount demanded does not
exceed $10,000.” Dkt. No. 1 Ex. B. Therefore, the Court lacks diversity jurisdiction.
B.
The Court Does Not Have Federal Question Jurisdiction
Whether federal question jurisdiction exists is governed by the “well-pleaded
complaint rule.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Under this rule,
the federal question “must be disclosed upon the face of the complaint, unaided by the
answer.” Gully v. First Nat’l Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 113 (1936). A federal
defense is not part of a plaintiff’s claim. See Metro Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58,
63 (1987) (explaining that a defense “does not appear on the face of a well-pleaded
complaint and, therefore, does not authorize removal to federal court”). Nor can a
defendant’s attempt to add federal counterclaims create subject matter jurisdiction. See
Cal. Equity Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Jiminez, No. 13-cv-1222 JSC, 2013 WL 1748051, at *1
(N.D. Cal. April 23, 2013) (“[A] defendant cannot create federal subject matter
jurisdiction by adding claims or raising defenses.”); Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Sue Lin
Poh, No. C-12-02707 JCS, 2012 WL 3727266, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2012)
(“[W]hether a case arises under federal law does not depend upon matters raised in the
answer or in counterclaims.”).
Here, the complaint alleges a single state-law claim for unlawful detainer. It is
well settled that “[u]nlawful detainer actions are strictly within the province of state
court.” Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Assoc. v. Suarez, No. 1:11-cv-01225 LJO GSA, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 82300, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 27, 2011); see also Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust
Co.v. Leonardo, No. CV 11-3979 PSG (AJWx), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83854, at *2
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 1. 2011) (“[T]he complaint only asserts a claim for unlawful detainer, a
cause of action that is purely a matter of state law.”). Therefore, the Court does not have
federal question jurisdiction over this action.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.
2:15-cv-00250-CAS(JCx)
Title
JS-6
ABP PROPERTIES, LLC V. LETICIA MUNGUIA
C.
Date
‘O’
February 24, 2015
Civil Rights Removal Is Not Proper.
Munguia argues that removal is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1). To support
removal under that statute, a petitioner must (1) assert “rights that are given . . . by
explicit statutory enactment protecting equal racial civil rights,” and (2) “assert that the
state courts will not enforce that right, and that allegation must be supported by reference
to a state statute or constitutional provision that purports to command the state courts to
ignore the federal rights.” California v. Sandoval, 434 F.2d 635, 636 (9th Cir. 1970); see
Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 792 (1966). “Bad experiences with the particular court
in question will not suffice.” Sandoval, 434 F.2d at 636. “Under § 1443(1), the
vindication of the defendant's federal rights is left to the state courts except in the rare
situations where it can be clearly predicted by reason of the operation of a pervasive and
explicit state or federal law that those rights will inevitably be denied by the very act of
bringing the defendant to trial in the state court.” City of Greenwood, Miss. v. Peacock,
384 U.S. 808, 828 (1966). Moreover, as the Supreme Court has explained:
[R]emoval is not warranted by an assertion that a denial of rights of
equality may take place and go uncorrected at trial. Removal is
warranted only if it can be predicted by reference to a law of general
application that the defendant will be denied or cannot enforce the
specified federal rights in the state courts. A state statute authorizing
the denial affords an ample basis for such a prediction.
Id. at 801. Therefore, for removal to be proper, the denial of rights must “be manifest in
a formal expression of state law.” Id. at 803. “Section 1443(1) will not provide
jurisdiction where allegations of discrimination are conclusory and lacking factual basis.”
Ward v. Hernandez, No. EDCV 13-01458 JGB (SPx), 2013 WL 5840445, at *3 (citing
Bogart v. California, 355 F.2d 377, 380–181 (9th Cir. 1966)).
Munguia alleges that her asserted federally secured rights arise under 42 U.S.C. §§
1981 and 1982. These provisions ensure that all citizens of the United States have the
same rights “as is enjoyed by white citizens” to “make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, [and] give evidence” (§ 1981); and to “inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property” (§ 1982). Although Munguia has pointed to
federally secured rights stated in terms of race, satisfying the first element of the
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.
2:15-cv-00250-CAS(JCx)
Date
Title
‘O’
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February 24, 2015
ABP PROPERTIES, LLC V. LETICIA MUNGUIA
§ 1443(1) test, she has failed to show that she cannot enforce those rights in the state
court.
Munguia alleges that California Civil Code § 2924 “operates as a pervasive and
explicit state law which . . . is designed to deny [persons] their rights, stated in terms of
racial equality, guaranteed by” §§ 1981 and 1982.1 Dkt. No. 11 at 5. Munguia asserts
that the statute “prevent[s] her from raising her federal claims in state court,” and that she
has the basis for a “firm prediction that she will be unable to protect her federal rights in
state court.” Id. at 6 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). However, Munguia
has not carried her burden of showing that the law will deny her rights stated in terms of
racial equality.
Munguia’s legal argument appears to be that, because section 2924 does not
“provide for a judicial action to determine whether the person initiating the foreclosure
process is indeed authorized,” Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 192 Cal. App.
4th 1149, 1155 (2011), that statute is unconstitutional. But plaintiff cites no on-point
legal authority for this position, nor does she tie the alleged constitutional infirmity to
race other than by alleging in a conclusory manner that she “cannot enforce her rights . . .
as a Hispanic woman under the discriminatory laws of the State of California,” Dkt. No.
11 at 12. And there is nothing on the face of section 2924 that suggests that it compels
California courts to apply the law unequally to deny racial minorities their rights.
For these reasons, federal district courts in California have uniformly rejected
similar attempts to remove unlawful detainer actions under § 1443(1) on the basis of
alleged infirmities in section 2924. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Hutchis, No. SACV 13-1256 AG
(JPRx), 2013 WL 4500574, at *1–2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2013) (remanding despite similar
argument that section 2924 somehow commands state courts to ignore federal rights);
Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Perez, No. CV 13-01082 MMM (SHx), 2013 WL 1010535, at
1
That statute governs transfers of interest in property deemed to be mortgages. Cal.
Civil Code § 2924. “A plaintiff bringing an unlawful judgment claim is entitled to
judgment upon establishing that the property at issue was sold in accordance with
California Civil Code section 2924 and that the requisite three-day notice to quit to
defendant was served as required.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Dimas, No. C-11-05691
JCS, 2012 WL 1424803, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2012)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.
2:15-cv-00250-CAS(JCx)
Date
Title
‘O’
JS-6
February 24, 2015
ABP PROPERTIES, LLC V. LETICIA MUNGUIA
*5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2013) (rejecting “vague and conclusory” arguments that section
2924 “denies [defendant] equal protection of the laws through ‘irrebuttable presumptions
in favor of disclosure,’ and that [defendant] cannot enforce his equal protection rights in
state court”); HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Hatchett, No. CV 11-292 PA (OPx), 2011 WL
776214, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2011) (“There is nothing on the face of California Civil
Code § 2924 which compels California courts to make rulings on the basis of race.
Defendant’s conclusory allegations that the . . . courts and Plaintiff’s attorney are
applying the statute so as to target African Americans are also insufficient to support
removal.”); Aorora Loan Servs., LLC v. Murray, No. SACV 10-306 DOC (MLGx), 2010
WL 1538735, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2010) (finding insufficient argument that
California courts have applied section 2924 unfairly “because they have ‘formulated a
special, local series of customs, practices and policies’ that cause respondents to always
lose in unlawful detainer cases,” where that alleged deprivation was not “tie[d] to
[defendant’s] claim of racial discrimination”).
Mungiua also attempts to support her argument for civil rights removal by
attaching the declaration of Martha Rojas, which summarizes an incident where codefendant Osuna was allegedly mistreated by a California Superior Court judge. Dkt.
No. 10. However, this single anecdote is insufficient to show a pervasive law or policy
which will prevent Munguia from enforcing her civil rights in the state court. As stated
above, the Ninth Circuit has made clear that “[b]ad experiences with the particular court
in question will not suffice” to support removal under § 1443. Sandoval, 434 F.2d at
636; see also Peacock, 384 U.S. at 827 (“It is not enough to support removal under §
1443(1) to allege or show that the defendant’s federal equal civil rights have been
illegally corruptly denied in advance of trial, that the charges against the defendant are
false, or that the defendant is unable to obtain a fair trial in a particular state court.”).
Finally, to the extent that Munguia attempts to base removal not on §§ 1981 and
1982, but on constitutional rights embodied in the First, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and
Fourteenth Amendments, see Dkt. No. 11 at 7, such removal is not authorized by 28
U.S.C. § 1443. The Supreme Court has held that:
the phrase ‘any law providing for . . . equal civil rights' must be
construed to mean any law providing for specific civil rights stated in
terms of racial equality. Thus, the defendants' broad contentions
under the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.
2:15-cv-00250-CAS(JCx)
Date
Title
‘O’
JS-6
February 24, 2015
ABP PROPERTIES, LLC V. LETICIA MUNGUIA
Fourteenth Amendment cannot support a valid claim for removal
under § 1443, because the guarantees of those clauses are phrased in
terms of general application available to all persons or citizens, rather
than in the specific language of racial equality that § 1443 demands.
Rachel, 384 U.S. at 792; see Ward, 2014 WL 5840445, at *2 (citing this portion of
Rachel and rejecting a similar attempt to remove an unlawful detainer action).
In sum, Munguia’s notice of removal and response to the order to show cause do
not support removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1443.
III.
CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit has held that “the district court must remand if it lacks
jurisdiction.” Kelton Arms Condominium Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Homestead Ins. Co.,
346 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003); see 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at any time before final
judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall
be remanded.”). As discussed above, Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over
this action, and 28 U.S.C. § 1443 removal is improper. The Court therefore REMANDS
this case to the Los Angeles County Superior Court.2
IT IS SO ORDERED.
00
Initials of Preparer
:
00
CMJ
2
In her opposition, Munguia also requests that the Court grant a preliminary
injunction or a temporary restraining order. As stated herein, this Court lacks jurisdiction
over this matter, and therefore lacks the authority to grant injunctive relief under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 or any other statute.
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