Havensight Capital LLC v. The Peoples Republic of China et al

Filing 21

ORDER DISMISSING CASE FOR IMPROPER VENUE AND LACK OF JURISDICTION by Judge Dean D. Pregerson. (Made JS-6. Case Terminated.) (lc). Modified on 4/30/2015 (lc).

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1 2 O 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 HAVENSIGHT CAPITAL LLC, a USVI Limited Liability Corporation, 13 Plaintiff, 14 15 v. THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 16 17 Defendant. ___________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 15-01206 DDP (FFMx) ORDER DISMISSING CASE FOR IMPROPER VENUE AND LACK OF JURISDICTION 18 19 Plaintiff asserts several causes of action against the 20 People’s Republic of China (“PRC”). 21 the alleged causes of action appear to arise out of a commercial 22 transaction between Plaintiff and a shoe supplier in China, no 23 defendant other than PRC is named. 24 begun service of process on the PRC via Hague Convention 25 procedures; however, as of the date of this order, the PRC has not 26 returned a certificate of receipt. 27 subsequently filed numerous motions, styled “requests,” for both 28 entry of default by the Clerk of Court and default judgment by the (Compl. generally.) (Id. at 4.) Although Plaintiff has (Dkt. No. 10.) Plaintiff has 1 Court. (Dkt. Nos. 13, 15, 16, 18.) These documents are deficient 2 in numerous ways, some of which are noted on the docket. 3 to addressing those motions, the Court, on its own motion,1 issued 4 an Order to Show Cause (“OSC”) as to venue and jurisdiction, which 5 did not seem apparent on the face of the complaint. 6 The same day, Plaintiff filed an “Ex Parte Application for Show of 7 Cause for Proper Venue,” which the Court takes to be a response to 8 the OSC. 9 I. But prior (Dkt. No. 19.) (Dkt. No. 20.) VENUE 10 In its complaint, Plaintiff asserts that venue is proper 11 “pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) because Defendant is licensed to 12 do trade in the district, and maintains a consulate office in this 13 district, along with other substantial contacts.” 14 As the Court noted in its OSC, § 1603(b) is not a venue statute, 15 but 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f), which deals with venue in actions against 16 foreign states, does permit a case to be brought “against an agency 17 or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in section 1603(b) 18 of this title” if “the agency or instrumentality is licensed to do 19 business or is doing business” in the district where the case is 20 brought. 21 (Compl. at 2.) In its response, Plaintiff argues that venue is proper because 22 “the torts alleged are both against the State itself, and a 23 corporate citizen of the state, which in the case of the Defendant, 24 all commercial entities and actors, are either, agents for, or 25 26 27 28 1 Plaintiff argues that lack of venue is an affirmative defense, to be argued by the defendant. This is not correct; a court is entitled to raise the issue of defective venue sua sponte prior to a defendant’s responsive pleading. Costlow v. Weeks, 790 F.2d 1486, 1487-88 (9th Cir. 1986). 2 1 property of the state.” (Response at 5.) There are two problems 2 with this argument. 3 citizen of the State” as a defendant; thus, the case is not brought 4 against it. 5 states and their agents. 6 suits against agents), with 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f)(4) (venue for suits 7 against states). 8 argument that venue can be proper under § 1391(f)(3) when only the 9 foreign state itself is a named defendant, in this case Plaintiff First, Plaintiff does not name the “corporate The rule in § 1391(f) clearly distinguishes between Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f)(3) (venue for Second, even if the Court were to entertain the 10 has not plausibly alleged that the “corporate citizen” – i.e., the 11 shoe company – is an agent or instrumentality of the PRC. 12 “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” must be “a separate 13 legal person, corporate or otherwise” and either an “organ” of the 14 state or a company in which the state holds a controlling interest. 15 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b). 16 entities in China are not necessarily agents of or owned by the 17 state. 18 Statement (China) (June 2014), available at 19 http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/228504.pdf (discussing 20 both private and state-owned enterprises in the PRC).2 21 has not even named the Chinese shoe company involved, let alone set 22 out facts that would allow the Court to plausibly conclude that it 23 is an agent or instrumentality of the PRC. 24 An Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, corporate See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of State, 2014 Investment Climate Plaintiff The Court concludes that venue is improper. 25 2 26 27 28 The Court takes judicial notice of the facts in the State Department white paper under F.R.E. 201(b). The State Department, as the nation’s expert on foreign business environments, is a source “whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned” on this point. The Court is entitled to take judicial notice on its own. F.R.E. 201(c). 3 1 2 II. JURISDICTION In its complaint, Plaintiff asserts that subject matter 3 jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 4 pointed out in its OSC,3 the correct jurisdictional statute for 5 suits against foreign states is 28 U.S.C. § 1330. 6 to the OSC, Plaintiff argues that jurisdiction exists under § 1330, 7 because this case falls under certain exceptions to the presumed 8 jurisdictional immunity of foreign states under 28 U.S.C. § 9 1605(a)(2)-(5). 10 11 However, as the Court In its response The relevant exceptions to a foreign state’s jurisdictional immunity apply to cases: 12 (2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity 13 carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon 14 an act performed in the United States in connection with a 15 commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an 16 act outside the territory of the United States in connection 17 with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and 18 that act causes a direct effect in the United States; 19 (3) in which rights in property taken in violation of 20 international law are in issue and that property or any 21 property exchanged for such property is present in the United 22 States in connection with a commercial activity carried on in 23 the United States by the foreign state; or that property or 24 25 26 27 28 3 Plaintiff argues in its Response that “the burden, here, is on the defendant to make an assertion of an affirmative defense, such as . . . sovereign immunity.” (Response at 11.) This is incorrect. The question of immunity is a jurisdictional question. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a). “If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). 4 1 any property exchanged for such property is owned or operated 2 by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that 3 agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity 4 in the United States; 5 (4) in which rights in property in the United States acquired 6 by succession or gift or rights in immovable property situated 7 in the United States are in issue; 8 (5) not otherwise encompassed in paragraph (2) above, in which 9 money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal 10 injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring 11 in the United States and caused by the tortious act or 12 omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee 13 of that foreign state while acting within the scope of his 14 office or employment; except this paragraph shall not apply 15 to-- 16 (A) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or 17 the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary 18 function regardless of whether the discretion be abused, 19 or 20 (B) any claim arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse 21 of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or 22 interference with contract rights . . . . 23 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a). 24 Plaintiff argues that jurisdiction exists under subsection (2) 25 because Plaintiff alleges that Defendant interfered with a contract 26 “which was made in the Central District of California” and also 27 interfered with other “business” that “also occurred in this 28 district.” (Response at 9.) There are, however, no facts in the 5 1 complaint to show that any of the alleged incidents took place in 2 California. 3 “of” or “carried on . . . by” the foreign state itself. 4 has not plausibly alleged that the PRC has carried on any 5 commercial activity relating to this case. 6 has not been shown or even alleged that the shoe company involved 7 was an agent of the PRC.) 8 9 Moreover, subsection (2) refers to commercial activity Plaintiff (As discussed above, it Plaintiff also argues that jurisdiction exists under subsection (3), because “the alleged tort of unfair business 10 practices affects our commercial property, which is located in the 11 United States.” 12 deals with “property taken in violation of international law.” 13 Plaintiff has not identified the affected property or alleged a 14 taking in violation of any particular international law. 15 Subsection (3) also only covers situations where the property is 16 “present in the United States in connection with a commercial 17 activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state” or 18 “is owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the 19 foreign state.” 20 (Response at 9.) Subsection (3), however, only Nothing of the sort is alleged here. Plaintiff also argues that jurisdiction exists under 21 subsection (4) because “the Plaintiff’s company can be classified 22 as immoveable [sic] property.” 23 oddity of a corporate entity referring to itself as its own 24 property, “immovable property” as used by the statute means real 25 estate within the United States. 26 Mission of India to the United Nations, 446 F.3d 365, 369 (2d Cir. 27 2006). 28 on private property of family members of Plaintiff’s manager,” that (Response at 10.) Apart from the City of New York v. Permanent Although Plaintiff does allege that “Defendant trespassed 6 1 trespass does not appear to be the basis for any of Plaintiff’s 2 causes of action and does not appear to involve Plaintiff’s rights 3 in any real estate. (Compl. at 6.) 4 Finally, Plaintiff argues that jurisdiction exists under 5 subsection (5) because Plaintiff alleges various torts and that the 6 complaint “references damage to corporate property for a specified 7 amount.” 8 can find no claims based on property damage in the complaint; 9 Plaintiff’s claims are all commercial torts, with the possible (Response at 10.) To the contrary, however, the Court 10 exception of the sixth cause of action for extortion. 11 commercial also appear to be based on actions allegedly taken by 12 the Chinese government in China – e.g., failing to respond to 13 Plaintiff’s complaints and censoring phone calls to parties in 14 China. 15 requires not only that personal injury or property damages occur in 16 the United States, but that the tortious act or omission occur 17 here.” 18 Cir. 1989). 19 too, mostly amounts to an allegation of commercial wrongdoing, with 20 the exception of the bizarre allegation, unsupported by any factual 21 specifics, that Defendant “fund[ed] . . . sexual torture of the 22 Plaintiff’s manager,” possibly by shoe company Nike. 23 19.) “The fifth exception applies to non-commercial torts and Sec. Pac. Nat. Bank v. Derderian, 872 F.2d 281, 287 (9th As to the sixth cause of action, for extortion, it, 24 25 26 // 27 /// 28 These /// 7 (Compl. at 6, 1 2 III. CONCLUSION Because the Court finds that venue is improper, and because it 3 cannot discern in Plaintiff’s complaint or response to the OSC any 4 legitimate grounds for subject matter jurisdiction, the complaint 5 is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 6 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 9 10 Dated: April 30, 2015 DEAN D. PREGERSON United States District Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8

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