Troy Beemer v. University of Southern California, et al

Filing 83

MINUTES OF Motion Hearing held before Judge Christina A. Snyder RE: Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider the Court's Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 77 . The Court hereby DENIES plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of the Court's 7/24/2017 order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment. Court Reporter: Laura Elias. (gk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 
Title 

“O”

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
CV 15-01458-CAS (SSx)
Date September 18, 2017
BEEMER V. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA ET AL.

Present: The Honorable 
Ingrid Valdes 
Deputy Clerk 

CHRISTINA A. SNYDER 

N/A 

Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Defendants: 

Laura Elias 
Court Reporter / Recorder

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: 

No Appearance 
Puneet Sandhu  
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE COURT’S
Proceedings:  
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Dkt. 77, filed August 4, 2017)

I.

INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND

On February 27, 2015, Troy Beemer initiated this action against the University of
Southern California (“USC”). Dkt. 1. Beemer alleges four claims against USC for (1)
disability discrimination in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.
§794 (“Section 504”); (2) failure to make a reasonable accommodation in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); (3) disability discrimination and sexual
harassment in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51 et seq.
(“Unruh Act”); and (4) gender discrimination in violation of Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681.
Id. The gravamen of Beemer’s complaint is that he faced sexual harassment and
disability discrimination while enrolled in USC’s Nurse Anesthetist program (the
“Program”).
On June 26, 2017, USC filed a motion for summary judgment on all of Beemer’s
claims. Dkt. 70. The Court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment on July
24, 2017. Dkt. 75 (the “Order”). On August 4, 2017, plaintiff filed a motion to
reconsider the Court’s Order granting summary judgment. Dkt. 77 (“MTR”). Defendant
filed its opposition on August 28, 2017. Dkt. 82 (“Opp’n”).
On September 18, 2017, the Court held oral argument, at which plaintiff did not
appear.
Having carefully considered the parties’ arguments, the Court finds and concludes
as follows.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 
Title 

“O”

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
CV 15-01458-CAS (SSx)
Date September 18, 2017
BEEMER V. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA ET AL.

II.

LEGAL STANDARDS

Local Rule 7–18 sets forth the grounds upon which the Court may reconsider the
decision on any motion:
A motion for reconsideration of the decision on any motion may be made
only on the grounds of: (a) a material difference in fact or law from that
presented to the Court before such decision that in the exercise of reasonable
diligence could not have been known to the party moving for reconsideration
at the time of such decision, or (b) the emergence of new material facts or a
change of law occurring after the time of such decision, or (c) a manifest
showing of a failure to consider material facts presented to the Court before
such decision. No motion for reconsideration shall in any manner repeat any
oral or written argument made in support of or in opposition to the original
motion.
C.D. Cal. L.R. 7–18.
Further, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides that the Court may
reconsider a final judgment and any order based on: “(1) mistake, surprise, or excusable
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud; (4) a void judgment; (5) a satisfied or
discharged judgment; or (6) extraordinary circumstances which would justify relief.”
School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th
Cir. 1993). Under Rule 60(b) (6), the so-called catch-all provision, the party seeking
relief “must demonstrate both injury and circumstances beyond [her] control that
prevented [her] from proceeding with the action in a proper fashion.” Latshaw v. Trainer
Wortham & Co., Inc., 452 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2006). In addition, the Ninth Circuit
has confirmed that “[t]o receive relief under Rule 60(b)(6), a party must demonstrate
extraordinary circumstances which prevented or rendered [her] unable to prosecute [her]
case.” Lal v. California, 610 F.3d 518, 524 (9th Cir. 2010). This Rule must be “used
sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice and is to be utilized only
where extraordinary circumstances prevented a party from taking timely action to prevent
or correct an erroneous judgment.” Id. (quoting United States v. Washington, 394 F.3d
1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2005)). Any Rule 60(b) motion must be brought within a reasonable
time and no later than one year after entry of judgment or the order being challenged.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 
Title 

“O”

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
CV 15-01458-CAS (SSx)
Date September 18, 2017
BEEMER V. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA ET AL.

III.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff requests the Court to reconsider its July 24, 2017 Order granting
defendant’s motion for summary judgment.1 MTR at 2. Plaintiff contends there was a
manifest showing of a failure to consider material facts presented to the Court before its
decision. Id.
First, plaintiff argues that the Court should reconsider its Order because defendant
failed to meet its summary judgment burden. Id. To establish a prima facie claim for
disability discrimination, a plaintiff must show:
(1) He qualifies as disabled within the meaning of the applicable statutes;
(2) He was “otherwise qualified” to remain a student in the program, i.e., he
can meet the essential eligibility requirements of the school, with or
without reasonable accommodation;
(3) He was dismissed because of his disability; and
(4) USC receives federal financial assistance (for the Section 504 claim), is a
public entity (for the ADA claim), and/or is a business establishment (for
the Unruh Act claim).
Zukle v. Regents of Univ. of California, 166 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 1999); Cal. Civ.
Code § 51(b). Plaintiff contends that, although the Court stated in its Order that plaintiff
failed to establish the nature of his disability, defendant did not dispute whether plaintiff
possessed a disability that qualified under the Americans with Disabilities Act or section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act. MTR at 2. Thus, despite the Court’s discussion to the
contrary, plaintiff argues that it is undisputed by the parties that plaintiff had a disability
that required accommodations. Id. at 2–3. With respect to the second element of a prima
facie discrimination claim, plaintiff contends that defendant’s statement of facts states
that “USC did not remove Beemer from the Program,” and accordingly, there is no

1

The Court notes that plaintiff makes this request “pursuant to Rule 54(b)” of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 7–18.” MTR at 2. Yet Rule 54(b)
concerns judgment on multiple claims or involving multiple parties. The proper rule
under which plaintiff should make his request is FRCP 60(b), which concerns grounds for
relief from a final judgment order.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 
Title 

“O”

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
CV 15-01458-CAS (SSx)
Date September 18, 2017
BEEMER V. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA ET AL.

dispute as to whether plaintiff was “otherwise qualified” to remain a student in the
Program. Id. at 3 (citing Dkt. 70-2 at 17).
Therefore, plaintiff argues, the only issue that remains is whether plaintiff was
dismissed from the Program based on his disability. Id. According to plaintiff, the Court
mistakenly viewed plaintiff’s written “plan for returning to clinical training” as his
mandate for accommodations for his injuries, because plaintiff subsequently expanded
his request for clinical training to include an additional hospital. Id. The Court accepted
defendant’s assertions that these requests would have resulted in a fundamental or
substantial modification of the Program’s curriculum. Id. Yet, plaintiff contends,
plaintiff was not actually precluded from receiving the clinical rotations necessary to
complete the required cases at the hospitals he requested, and because the facts do not
show that plaintiff had to complete clinical cases within any specific timeframe (even the
ones at Cedars-Sinai Medical Center), defendant could have simply extended the time for
plaintiff to complete the clinical cases at Cedars-Sinai in order to accommodate plaintiff’s
difficulty travelling. Id. at 3–4. Plaintiff argues that defendant gave no evidence that this
accommodation could not have been made. Id. at 4. Accordingly, there were options
available to permit plaintiff to complete the Program without fundamentally altering the
nature of the Program. Id. Defendant’s refusal to make this reasonable accommodation
precluded plaintiff from continuing in the program. Id. Therefore, plaintiff argues,
whether defendant’s failure to allow the reasonable accommodations constructively
dismissed plaintiff from the Program is a fact that is still in dispute. Id.
In response, defendant argues that plaintiff’s motion does not make the required
“manifest showing” of a failure to consider material facts presented to the Court. Opp’n
at 1. Plaintiff does not point the Court to any evidence that the Court did not explicitly
consider in its Order, or evidence that would establish a genuine issue of material fact
that precludes summary judgment. Id.
Defendant contends that plaintiff, for the first time, asserts that there is a genuine
issue of material fact which precludes summary judgment—namely, a new
accommodation that he never sought from defendant, and one that he never alleged at any
point during the litigation or in opposition to the summary judgment motion.2 Id. at 2.

2

Defendant also notes that, by invoking this new modification to the Program,
plaintiff “effectively concedes” that his request to train only at particular hospitals—the

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 
Title 

“O”

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
CV 15-01458-CAS (SSx)
Date September 18, 2017
BEEMER V. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA ET AL.

This new accommodation is that, by virtue of a time extension, plaintiff could have
driven to Cedars-Sinai and would have agreed to do so in order to complete his clinical
coursework, despite plaintiff’s assertion that he had a disability that caused him difficulty
driving. Id. Yet plaintiff fails to point to evidence that establishes whether this newly
asserted modification of the Program was reasonable, or would have rendered plaintiff
“otherwise qualified.” Id.
Additionally, defendant argues that the Court did not mistakenly conclude that
plaintiff was not “disabled” within the meaning of the applicable statutes. Instead, after
considering the material facts, the Court stated that plaintiff was unable to provide
evidence to support two of the necessary elements for a prima facie disability
discrimination claim—(1) that plaintiff was dismissed from the program, and (2) that
plaintiff was otherwise qualified to remain in the Program. Id. at 4 (citing Order at 16,
20). The Court specifically concluded, based on the evidence presented, that plaintiff
was not dismissed from the Program. Id. (citing Order at 16). Out of caution, the Court
went on to address plaintiff’s argument that he was unable to return to the Program
because of defendant’s failure to accommodate his disability, and concluded that the
undisputed evidence supported inferences in defendant’s favor that plaintiff was afforded
reasonable accommodations and denied unreasonable ones. Id. (citing Order at 20).
Thus, plaintiff has failed to make a “manifest showing” that the Court failed to consider
material facts with respect to these two elements. Id.
As the Court concluded in its Order, the Court finds that plaintiff was not
dismissed, directly or constructively, from the Program. Order at 16. This fact was
undisputed at summary judgment. Id. at 16. Defendant did not dismiss plaintiff, as
plaintiff was granted medical leave and subsequently failed to enroll in courses or
otherwise return to the Program. Id. at 16–17. Insofar as there may have been a
constructive dismissal because plaintiff was unable to return to the Program, plaintiff
failed to provide evidence to support this assertion. Id. at 16. Plaintiff contended that his
clinical work had to occur at particular hospitals in order to make his commute shorter—
yet he did not provide evidence of his home address, the location of the hospitals, why
other forms of transportation were unavailable, why he could not endure driving, or how
driving related to his disability. Order at 17, n. 10.

basis on which plaintiff has proceeded throughout this litigation—would have resulted in
a fundamental or substantial alteration of defendant’s program and standards.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Case No. 
Title 

“O”

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
CV 15-01458-CAS (SSx)
Date September 18, 2017
BEEMER V. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA ET AL.

Out of caution—if plaintiff was indeed constructively dismissed from the
program—the Court considered the material facts before it as to whether plaintiff was
“otherwise qualified.” Id. at 17–20. The Court observed that the few accommodations
that plaintiff was denied would have required a substantial alteration of the Program, or
would not have permitted plaintiff to meet Program standards. Id. at 18. In the instant
motion, plaintiff argues an entirely new possible modification of the Program—a time
extension that would have afforded him more time to complete the Program. MTR at 3–
4. Plaintiff notes that the Program had to be completed in 24 months, and he contends
that the simple accommodation of extending the 24-month period in which he could
prepare cases at Cedars-Sinai would have accommodated his difficulty travelling. Id.
The Court finds three problems with plaintiff’s new contention. First, if this simple time
extension was an available accommodation to plaintiff, it is unclear why he never raised
it with defendant. Second, if such an accommodation was requested from defendant,
plaintiff fails to state why he never presented the request to the Court prior to its decision
on summary judgment. Instead, plaintiff opposed summary judgment by arguing that he
should have been able to complete the Program at other facilities within a reasonable
driving distance. See Order at 17–22; Dkt. 72 at 4. Third, plaintiff fails to offer any
logical reason as to why he was unable to present the request to the Court at the time of
summary judgment. Therefore, plaintiff fails to demonstrate that there was a “manifest
showing” of failure to consider material facts presented to the Court in its July 24, 2017
order. In addition, plaintiff fails to demonstrate any mistake, surprise, excusable neglect,
newly discovered evidence, fraud, or extraordinary circumstances that would justify relief
from final judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b). See ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d at 1263.
Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration of the Court’s July 24, 2017 order granting defendants’ motion for
summary judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Initials of Preparer

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: 

02 

 IV 

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