Jeannette Martello v. Shelley Rouillard et al
Filing
54
MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) by Judge Christina A. Snyder: The Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's 7/6/2015 Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 47 , 50 . Court Reporter: Not Present. (gk)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
‘O’
Case No.
2:15-cv-01798-CAS(AJWx)
Title
JEANNETTE MARTELLO V. SHELLEY ROUILLARD; ET AL.
Present: The Honorable
Date
July 23, 2015
CHRISTINA A. SNYDER
Catherine Jeang
Deputy Clerk
Not Present
Court Reporter / Recorder
N/A
Tape No.
Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs:
Attorneys Present for Defendants:
Not Present
Not Present
Proceedings:
I.
(IN CHAMBERS) - PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE COURT’S JULY 6, 2015
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
(filed July 22, 2015)
INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND
On March 11, 2015, plaintiff Jeannette Martello, a plastic surgeon, filed this
lawsuit against defendants Shelley Rouillard, in her official capacity as Director of the
California Department of Managed Health Care (“DMHC”), Kimberly Kirchmeyer, in
her official capacity as Director of the Medical Board of California (“Medical Board”),
and Does 1 through 20. Dkt. 1. Plaintiff alleges that defendants’ continued enforcement
against her of California laws prohibiting the practice of “balance billing” in certain
health care contexts violates the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
Specifically, plaintiff alleges that the state laws at issue are preempted by the
federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001, et seq. (the
“ACA”), as well as the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et
seq. (“ERISA”). Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment stating that California’s
prohibition on balance billing is preempted by federal law, as well as a permanent
injunction enjoining defendants from enforcing the allegedly preempted state laws.
In brief, plaintiff is a plastic surgeon whose practice of balance billing patients for
emergency services has been challenged by both the Medical Board and the DMHC in
state administrative and judicial fora.1 After plaintiff violated several cease and desist
1
The Court’s July 6, 2015 order contains a detailed explanation of the practice of
balance billing patients for emergency services—a practice that is illegal under
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CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date
‘O’
Case No.
2:15-cv-01798-CAS(AJWx)
July 23, 2015
Title
JEANNETTE MARTELLO V. SHELLEY ROUILLARD; ET AL.
orders requiring her to stop balance billing patients, the DMHC initiated civil
enforcement proceedings against plaintiff in Los Angeles County Superior Court in 2011
(the “Civil Action”). The DMHC prevailed in the Civil Action in November 2013, and
plaintiff was ordered to pay $562,500 in statutory penalties. In March 2015, the Court of
Appeal for the State of California accepted plaintiff’s appeal in the Civil Action.
During the pendency of the Civil Action, the Medical Board filed an accusation
against plaintiff based, inter alia, on plaintiff’s balance billing practices (the “Medical
Board Action”). In September 2013, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) concluded
that plaintiff had willfully and unlawfully balanced billed patients for emergency
services, revoked plaintiff’s medical license, and ultimately stayed the revocation in favor
of a five year probationary period. Plaintiff subsequently filed a petition for a writ of
mandate in Los Angeles County Superior Court in October 2013, seeking review of the
ALJ’s decision. The Superior Court denied plaintiff’s writ in March 2015, which
plaintiff has the right to appeal.
On April 21, 2015, and May 6, 2015, defendants filed motions to dismiss
plaintiff’s complaint, dkts. 21, 24, 28, which plaintiff belatedly opposed on June 23,
2015, dkts. 32, 33. By order dated July 6, 2015, the Court granted defendants’ motions to
dismiss. Dkt. 42.
In so doing, the Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the instant action
pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Specifically, the Court reasoned that plaintiff
“effectively requests that this Court review the Superior Court’s denial of her writ of
mandate in the Medical Board Action, as well as the Superior Court’s entry of judgment
against her in the Civil Action.” Id. at 11. The Court further reasoned that this
conclusion was not altered by the pendency of plaintiff’s appeals in state court. Id. at 12
(citing Marciano v. White, 431 F. App’x 611, 613 (9th Cir. 2011); Savin v. Savin, No.
ED CV 14-1180, 2015 WL 3619184, at *24 (C.D. Cal. May 5, 2015) report and
recommendation adopted, No. ED CV 14-1180, 2015 WL 3618166 (C.D. Cal. June 8,
California’s Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act of 1975 (“the Knox-Keene Act”),
Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1340, et seq., as interpreted by the California Supreme
Court in Prospect Medical Group, Inc., v. Northridge Emergency Medical Group, et al.,
45 Cal. 4th 497 (2009). See Dkt. 42.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date
‘O’
Case No.
2:15-cv-01798-CAS(AJWx)
July 23, 2015
Title
JEANNETTE MARTELLO V. SHELLEY ROUILLARD; ET AL.
2015); and Rhodes v. Gordon, No. CV 12-2863, 2013 WL 3780378, at *12 (C.D. Cal.
July 16, 2013)).
Alternately, assuming the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in the first
instance, the Court found that abstention pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971) was appropriate. Id. at 13, n.6. Moreover, the Court explained that the it would
grant defendants’ motion on the alternate ground that plaintiff failed to state a cognizable
claim, since plaintiff brought the instant action pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the
U.S. Constitution, which does not provide an implied right of action to private litigants.
Id. at 14, n.6 (citing Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1385
(2015)).
On July 22, 2015, plaintiff filed the instant motion for reconsideration of the
Court’s July 6, 2015 order. Having carefully considered plaintiff’s arguments, the Court
DENIES the motion for the reasons set forth herein.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Local Rule 7–18 sets forth the bases upon which the Court may reconsider the
decision on any motion:
A motion for reconsideration of the decision on any motion may be made
only on the grounds of: (a) a material difference in fact or law from that
presented to the Court before such decision that in the exercise of reasonable
diligence could not have been known to the party moving for reconsideration
at the time of such decision, or (b) the emergence of new material facts or a
change of law occurring after the time of such decision, or (c) a manifest
showing of a failure to consider material facts presented to the Court before
such decision. No motion for reconsideration shall in any
manner repeat any oral or written argument made in support of or in
opposition to the original motion.
C.D. Cal. L.R. 7–18.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.
2:15-cv-01798-CAS(AJWx)
Title
JEANNETTE MARTELLO V. SHELLEY ROUILLARD; ET AL.
III.
Date
‘O’
July 23, 2015
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff contends that the Court should reconsider its July 6, 2015 order for two
primary reasons. First, plaintiff contends that the Court has misapplied the RookerFeldman doctrine to the facts of this case. Local Rule 7–18, however, requires that the
prior decision resulted in a manifest injustice. Moreover, although plaintiff argues that
she did not raise a de facto appeal of the state court judgments, even assuming the merits
of this argument, plaintiff does not appear to challenge the Court’s alternate conclusion
that the Supremacy Clause does not provide a procedural vehicle for her preemption
claim.
Second, plaintiff contends that the Younger exceptions mandate federal
intervention, since the Court overlooked the fact that plaintiff was allegedly assaulted by
an attorney from the DMHC, and California’s ban on balance billing “flagrantly and
patently” violates express constitutional prohibitions. As to the former argument,
plaintiff previously advanced this unsubstantiated allegation. As to the latter, plaintiff’s
earlier briefing concerning the alleged preemption of relevant California law by the ACA
belies any contention that California’s ban on balance billing for emergency services is
“patently” unconstitutional.
In sum, plaintiff has not demonstrated a proper basis under Local Rule 7-18 for
reconsidering the July 6, 2015 order. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.
IV.
CONCLUSION
In accordance with the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration of the Court’s July 6, 2015 order granting defendants’ motions to
dismiss.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Initials of Preparer
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CMJ
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