Metal Jeans, Inc. v. State Of California et al

Filing 66

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by Judge Dean D. Pregerson: granting 54 55 for Summary Judgment. For the reasons stated above, Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment are GRANTED with respect to all claims. MD JS-6. Case Terminated. (lom)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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METAL JEANS, INC., a Nevada
corporation,

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Plaintiff,
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v.
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STATE OF CALIFORNIA; JON
RELLES; TODD BARRETT; HOWARD
SOMMERS TOWING, INC., a
California corporation,
Defendants.
___________________________

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Case No. CV 15-02127 DDP (PJWx)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[Dkt. 54, 55]

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Presently before the court are two motions for summary

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judgment, one filed by Defendants State of California, Jon Relles,

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and Todd Barrett (“the State Defendants”), and the other by

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Defendant Howard Sommers Towing, Inc.

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submissions of the parties and heard oral argument, the court

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grants the motions and adopts the following Order.

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I.

Having considered the

Background1

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1

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The following facts are drawn from the State Defendants’
Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law and
Plaintiff’s Disputed Issues of Genuine Issues of Disputed Material
Fact in response to the State Defendants’ statement. Plaintiff’s
objections to the Declarations of Jon Relles, Todd Barrett, Heather
(continued...)

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On April 11, 2014, Defendant Todd Barrett (“Barrett”), a

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California Highway Patrol Officer, noticed a tractor-trailer parked

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on the side of the U.S. 101 freeway.

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hours later, Barrett noticed that the tractor-trailer had not been

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moved.

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no response.

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been issues to a different trailer of a different make, model, and

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year.

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Canadian authorities returned a result that read, in part,

Approximately twenty four

Barrett knocked on the window of the tractor, but received
The trailer bore a California license plate that had

The tractor bore a Canadian license plate.

An inquiry to

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“**Response from Canadian System - Stolen Vehicle File**[.]” Below

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other lines of text, the report read, “**Not on File[.]**” Barrett

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thought this report might indicate that the tractor had been

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stolen.

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Barrett also located a vehicle Identification Number (“VIN”)

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on the trailer (“the first VIN”).

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license plate displayed on the trailer.

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another VIN number (“the second VIN”) elsewhere, on the frame of

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the trailer.

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second VIN, with a “1” in the latter modified to appear as a “T” in

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the former.

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The VIN did not match the
Barrett later located

The first VIN appeared to be an alteration of the

Barrett decided to have the tractor and trailer towed.

CHP Officer Heather Chaldu soon arrived at the scene, followed

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by a tow truck dispatched by Defendant Howard Sommers Towing, Inc.

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(“HST”).

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Barrett attempted to enter the tractor to confirm that nobody was

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hiding or incapacitated inside the sleeping area, and to look for

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evidence that the tractor or trailer had been stolen, or evidence

Before the tow truck impounded the tractor-trailer,

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(...continued)
Chaldu, and Seth Moffitt are overruled.
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that would otherwise explain the tractor-trailer’s prolonged

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presence on the side of the freeway.

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to the tractor cab by breaking the window on the passenger side.

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The sleeping compartment was empty, although Barrett did find

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license plates and registration records for several vehicles,

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including a Canadian license plate that had been issued to the

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trailer.

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wheel blocks.

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Neither Barrett nor Officer Chaldu observed any damage being caused

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Barrett finally gained entry

The trailer was also empty, except for load lock bars and
HST then towed the tractor-trailer to an HST yard.

to the truck during the tow.
Defendent Relles, a CHP Officer, was assigned to investigate

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the tractor-trailer.

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(“Topolewski”) arrived at the CHP office to claim the trailer.

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Relles’ investigation into whether the tractor-trailer had been

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stolen was not complete, so he declined to release the tractor-

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trailer to Topolewski at that time.

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authorities, who preliminarily indicated that the tractor-trailer

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had not been stolen.

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On April 15, 2014, Gary Topolewski

Relles then contacted Canadian

Topolewski told Relles that someone named Matt Cowley had left

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the tractor-trailer adjacent to the freeway.

Relles was unable to

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contact Matt Cowley at the phone number Topolewski provided.

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Plaintiff later acknowledged that Matt Cowley no longer worked for

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Plaintiff at the time the tractor-trailer was left near the

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freeway, and that someone named Roger Ogden was responsible for

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abandoning the tractor-trailer.

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inspect the tractor-trailer and confirmed that the trailer’s first

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VIN had been gouged, and thus did not match the second VIN.

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nevertheless decided to release the tractor-trailer to Topolewski

Relles went to the HST lot to

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Relles

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later in the day, and left a message with Topolewski to that

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effect.

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Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges causes of action under 42 U.S.C.

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1983 against for the allegedly unlawful search and seizure of the

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tractor-trailer.

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negligence and conversion.

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judgment.

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II.

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The Complaint also alleges causes of action for
Defendants now move for summary

Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings,

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depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

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together with the affidavits, if any, show “that there is no

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genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled

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to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

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seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the

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court of the basis for its motion and of identifying those portions

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of the pleadings and discovery responses that demonstrate the

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absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

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Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

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the evidence must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See

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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 242 (1986).

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moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it is

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entitled to summary judgment if it can demonstrate that “there is

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an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”

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Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

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A party

See Celotex Corp. v.

All reasonable inferences from

If the

Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to

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the nonmoving party opposing the motion, who must “set forth

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specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”

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Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.

Summary judgment is warranted if a
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party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the

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existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on

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which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”

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477 U.S. at 322.

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that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

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party,” and material facts are those “that might affect the outcome

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of the suit under the governing law.”

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There is no genuine issue of fact “[w]here the record taken as a

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whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

Celotex,

A genuine issue exists if “the evidence is such

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nonmoving party.”

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Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

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Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

It is not the court’s task “to scour the record in search of a

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genuine issue of triable fact.”

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1278 (9th Cir.1996).

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support clearly.

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1026, 1031 (9th Cir.2001).

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file for evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact, where the

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evidence is not set forth in the opposition papers with adequate

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references so that it could conveniently be found.”

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III. Discussion

Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275,

Counsel has an obligation to lay out their

Carmen v. San Francisco Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d
The court “need not examine the entire

Id.

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A.

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“A plaintiff may bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to

Section 1983 Claims

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redress violations of his ‘rights, privileges, or immunities

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secured by the Constitution and laws’ by a person or entity,

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including a municipality, acting under the color of state law.”

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Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004)

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(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

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section 1983, [a plaintiff] must show that (1) [the defendant]

“To state a cause of action under

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acted under color of state law; and (2) [the defendant] deprived

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[the plaintiff] of rights secured by the Constitution or federal

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law.”

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Barry v. Fowler, 902 F.2d 770, 772 (9th Cir. 1990).
“The impoundment of an automobile is a seizure within the

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meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”

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429 F.3d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation omitted).

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Police may seize a vehicle if they have probable cause to believe

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the vehicle is evidence of a crime, even if the vehicle is parked

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in a public place.

Miranda v. City of Cornelius,

United States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482 at 490-91

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(9th Cir. 1985).

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vehicle if there is probable cause to believe that it contains

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evidence of a crime, or when they reasonably believe that someone

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is in need of immediate aid.

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(1999); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978); United States

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v. Rodgers, 656 F.2d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2011); Hopkins v.

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Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 763-64 (9th Cir. 2009).

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“[i]n their ‘community caretaking’ function, police officers may

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impound vehicles that jeopardize public safety and the vehicular

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movement of vehicular traffic.

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. . . depends on the location of the vehicle and the police

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offiers’ duty to prevent it from creating a hazard to other drivers

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or being a target for vandalism or theft.”

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864 (internal quotation and citation omitted).

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Police may also conduct a warrantless search of a

Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467

Additionally,

Whether an impoundment is warranted

Miranda, 429 F.3d at

Defendants contend that Barrett reasonably believed that the

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trailer had been stolen.

“[W]here the material, historical facts

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are not in dispute, and the only disputes involve what inferences

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properly may be drawn from those historical facts, it is

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appropriate for [a] court to decide whether probable cause existed
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. . . .”

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Peng v. Mei Chin Penghu, 335 F.3d 970, 979-80 (9th Cir.

2003).

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It is undisputed that the tractor-trailer had been left

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unattended on the side of a freeway for approximately twenty-four

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hours, that the trailer displayed a license plate that had been

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issued to a different trailer of a different make, model, and year,

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and that the trailer bore two different VINs.2

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argues that Barrett “misread” the first VIN and later stated that

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he entered the “wrong VIN number” when conducting a license plate

Although Plaintiff

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check, that assertion is not supported by the record.

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at 6:4; Plaintiff’s Disputed Issues of Genuine Issues of Disputed

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Material Fact (“PDIF”) 9.)

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Barrett’s report did not state that he entered a “wrong” VIN.

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Rather, the report states that the trailer bore two different VINs,

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the first of which returned a “no record” result.

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Mark Overland, Ex. 3.) Indeed, Plaintiff does not dispute that the

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first VIN was gouged and altered.

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Plaintiff dispute that Barrett was taught that thieves sometimes

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put the wrong license plate on a vehicle or alter a vehicle’s VIN

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so the vehicle will not return a stolen vehicle report.

(Opposition

Contrary to Plaintiff’s representation,

(PDIF 50, 56.)

(Declaration of

Nor does

(PDIF 11.)

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Plaintiff disputes Defendants’ characterization that the
tractor-trailer was abandoned on the dirt “shoulder” of the
freeway. Photographs taken by HST’s driver indicate that the
tractor-trailer was adjacent to the freeway, approximately 3 or 4
car widths from the nearest lane of traffic. Plaintiff also
disputes that the tractor-trailer was left directly in front of an
“Emergency Parking Only” sign. Both Barrett and Officer Chadhu
stated that the vehicle was parked in such an area. The only
evidence to the contrary is Topolewski’s testimony that he has
never seen an emergency parking sign at that location. Topolewski
was never asked whether he had ever looked at that area in
particular or would have any reason to take note of any signs in
that location. (Overland Decl., Ex. 2 at 44.)
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Thus, even putting aside Barrett’s misreading of the Canadian

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“Stolen Vehicle File” report, Barrett had probable cause to believe

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that the trailer had been stolen.3

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Even if probable cause did not exist to suspect that the

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trailer had been stolen, other exceptions to the Fourth Amendment

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justified Barrett’s actions.

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tractor cab because he was concerned that someone might be in the

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sleeping compartment, either unable or unwilling to respond.

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Although Plaintiff disputes this fact by citation to Officer

Barrett stated that he entered the

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Chaldu’s declaration, that evidence supports rather than

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contradicts Barrett’s statement.

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actions therefore fall under the emergency and exigency

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exceptions.4

(Chaldu Decl. ¶ 5-6.)

Barrett’s

See Hopkins, 573 F.3d at 763.

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Lastly, Barrett’s decision to seize the tractor-trailer was

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justified under the community caretaking exception to the Fourth

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Amendment.

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and of itself implicate the community caretaking doctrine, related

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factors, including whether a vehicle is impeding traffic,

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threatening public safety, or vulnerable to vandalism and theft are

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relevant to whether impoundment is warranted.

Although violation of state vehicle codes would not in

See United States v.

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That probable cause was sufficient to justify the search and
seizure of both the trailer and the tractor. Even though the
tractor was displaying the proper license plate and did not have an
altered VIN, it could have been involved in the potential theft of
the trailer, and indeed contained license plates and registrations
for several different vehicles. The tractor was therefore subject
to seizure as evidence of a potential crime. Bagley, 772 F.2d at
490-91.
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Barrett’s actions fall under these exceptions even assuming
that the standards applicable to a home applies to the tractor’s
sleeping area. See Hopkins, 573 F.3d at 763; Dyson, 1999 U.S. at
466-67.
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Cervantes, 703 F.3d 1135, 1141-42 (9th Cir. 2012); Miranda, 429

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F.3d at 864.

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was abandoned on the side of a freeway.

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trailer was not immediately adjacent to traffic lanes, it was in

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the vicinity of moving traffic.

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Officer Chaldu stated that the tractor-trailer was left in an

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emergency parking area, and Barrett stated that it was blocking an

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emergency parking sign.

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trailer was impeding other motorists’ use of the area both by

Here, there is no dispute that the tractor-trailer
Although the tractor-

Furthermore, both Barrett and

(See n. 1, supra).

As such, the tractor-

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physically occupying the space and by blocking signage advising

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motorists of the area’s intended use.

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been abandoned, the tractor-trailer was a tempting target for

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thieves or vandals.

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Lastly, having apparently

Plaintiff appears to suggest that the community caretaking

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rationale nevertheless does not apply because Barrett could have

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contacted Plaintiff, “whose identity was visible on the tractor.”

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(Opp. at 8.)

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trailer did bear a “Metal Jeans” name, logo, and website, the

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pictures do not show any phone number or any other contact

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information, other than the general website address.

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Appendix, Ex. 1.)

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able to track Plaintiff down has no bearing on whether the tractor-

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trailer posed a hazard to community safety at the time it was

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seized. For these reasons, Barrett’s search and seizure of the

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tractor-trailer did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

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Although photographs do reveal that the tractor-

(HST

Further, the fact that Barrett might have been

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims

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against Relles fail because Relles, who investigated the tractor-

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trailer after it had been towed to HST’s yard, did not seize
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anything.

Plaintiff does not respond to this argument.

To the

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extent Plaintiff’s claim against Relles is based upon his search of

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the tractor-trailer inside HST’s yard, the claim has no merit.

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Relles had probable cause to investigate the tractor-trailer as

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evidence of a crime for the same reasons that Barrett had probable

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cause to search and seize the tractor-trailer in the first

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instance.5

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may reasonably search vehicles that have already been lawfully

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impounded.

Further, the Supreme Court has long held that police

See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 371-74

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(1976).

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Amendment claims against Relles, and therefore cites no evidence to

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support the baseless claims.

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Plaintiff’s opposition makes no mention of the Fourth

In summary, there is no evidence in the record to support

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Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims.

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undisputed evidence establishes that Barrett’s search and seizure

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of Plaintiff’s tractor-trailer, as well as Relles’ subsequent

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follow-up search, were permissible under several exceptions to the

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Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.

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Amendment claims fail, the court need not address HST’s argument

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that it is entitled to summary judgment because it was not acting

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under color of law, nor the State Defendants’ arguments that

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Barrett and Relles are entitled to qualified immunity.

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To the contrary, the

Because Plaintiff’s Fourth

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
constitutional claims is granted.

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Plaintiff does not dispute that even though Topolewski
claimed he had not filed a stolen vehicle report, Relles believed
Topolewski or someoneone else at Topolewski’s company might have
filed a false report as part of an insurance fraud scheme. (PDIF
44.) Relles also stated that he believed a third party might have
disputed Topolewski’s ownership. (Declaration of Jon Relles ¶ 6.)
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B.

Conversion

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Under California law, a conversion claim requires (1)

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ownership or right to possession of property, (2) wrongful

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disposition of that property, and (3) damages.

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Assoc., Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d 896, 906 (9th

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Cir. 1992). “In order to establish a conversion the plaintiff must

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show an intention or purpose to convert the goods and to exercise

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ownership over them, or to prevent the owner from taking poesssion

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of his property.

G.S. Rasmussen &

Thus, a necessary element of the tort is an

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intent to exercise ownership over property which belongs to

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another.”

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(1994).

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Collin v. Am. Empire Ins. Co., 21 Cal. App. 4th 787, 405

Plaintiff’s theory of its conversion claim is unclear.

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Plaintiff argues that “the crux of Plaintiff’s claim for conversion

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is Defendant’s (sic) wrongful interference with Plaintiff’s

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property interests in the Truck and resulting damage.”

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9:9-10.)

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pertains to the presence or absence of a refrigerator and

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television inside the tractor.

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Plaintiff cites does not mention any such property.

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Decl., Ex. 2.)

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television in the tractor “at some point,” he had “no idea” when he

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last saw either the television or the tractor prior to recovering

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the latter from the HST yard.

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Ex. 6 at 122-23.)

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driver all stated that they did not see a television or

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refrigerator inside the tractor.

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find that any Defendant converted any such property.

(Opp. at

Some of the evidence to which Plaintiff cites, however,

(PDIF 33-35.)

The exhibit to which
(Overland

Although Topolewski did testify that he saw a

(Declaration of Benjamin Barnouw,

Barrett, Officer Chaldu, and the tow truck

No reasonable trier of fact could

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Nor could any reasonable trier of fact conclude that any

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Defendant converted the tractor-trailer.

There is no evidence that

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any Defendant sought to exercise ownership over the tractor

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trailer.

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evidence that any Defendant “wrongfully” disposed of the tractor

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trailer.

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impermissible under the California Vehicle Code is simply

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incorrect.

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peace officer to remove a vehicle that is left upon a freeway

Collin, 21 Cal. App. 4th at 805.

Nor is there any

Plaintiff’s argument that the impound of the trailer was

(Opp. at 7.)

The California Vehicle Code allows a

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right-of-way for more than four hours or displays a license plate

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that was not issued to that vehicle, or where an officer has

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probable cause to believe the vehicle is or contains evidence of a

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crime or reasonably believes the vehicle has been abandoned.

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Vehicle Code §§ 22651(f),(o)(1)(b), 22655.5(b), 22699(a).

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evidence is undisputed that the tractor-trailer was subject to

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impoundment under any and all of these provisions.6

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Cal.

The

Plaintiff also argues, briefly, that “[t]he evidence is

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disputed as to whether defendants intended to and exercised ‘a

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reasonable opportunity to inquire’ into Plaintiff’s claim of

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ownership.”

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Plaintiff’s argument appears to be that Relles converted the

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tractor-trailer by not immediately releasing it to Topolewski until

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the evening, as opposed to the morning, of April 15.

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Giacomelos v. Bank of Am. Nat. Trust & Sav. Assoc., 237 Cal. App.

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2d 99, 100 (1965) (“The law does recognize the dilemma of one in

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possession as a bailee or similar holder upon demand by a third

(Opp. at 9:12-14.)

Although not stated as such,

See

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For these same reasons, HST did not act wrongfully in
carrying out Barrett’s request to impound the tractor-trailer.
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party for the goods.

Such holder does not become a converter by

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making a qualified refusal to surrender if his real and stated

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purpose is to secure a reasonable opportunity to inquire into the

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claimant’s right.”)

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Although Plaintiff contends that there is a dispute as to

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whether Relles’ efforts were reasonable, it is undisputed that

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Relles spent the day inquiring with Canadian authorities as to the

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status of the trailer as well as investigating the trailer itself.

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As discussed above, regardless of the outcome of the Canadian

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inquiry, Relles had probable cause to suspect that the trailer was

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stolen, or possibly the subject of an insurance fraud scheme.7

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Further, because the trailer had an altered VIN, Relles had wide

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discretion to dispose of or release it.

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Accordingly, Relles’ decision to continue investigating the tractor

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trailer for, at most, one business day was not unreasonable or

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wrongful.

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Cal. Vehicle Code § 10751.

For these reasons, the court grants summary judgment to
Defendants on Plaintiff’s conversion claim.

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C.

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The elements of a negligence claim are: (1) the existence of a

Negligence

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duty to exercise due care, (2) breach of that duty, (3) causation,

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and (4) damages.

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(2001).

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Defendant breached a duty to Plaintiff or caused any damages.

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Plaintiff’s responses are not well developed.

Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 26 Cal.4th 465, 500

Defendants argue that there is no evidence that any

Plaintiff contends

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Even if there were evidence of conversion, Defendants argue
that Barrett and Relles would be immune from Plaintiff’s tort claim
under California Government Code §§ 821.6 and 820.2. Plaintiff
does not address this argument.
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that “the crux of Plaintiff’s negligence claim is the failure to

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use ordinary care in safeguarding Plaintiff’s property rights in

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the Truck and resulting damage.”

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evidentiary support for Plaintiff’s argument, such as it is.

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the five disputed facts Plaintiff cites, three pertain to the

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television and refrigerator, discussed above in the context of

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Plaintiff’s conversion claim.

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to whether the truck’s bumper was already damaged when the HST tow

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truck arrived.

(Opp. at 9:21-22.)

(PDIF 33-35.)

There is no
Of

The other two pertain

HST’s driver took pictures of the bumper prior to

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the tow.

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photographs was already there when he arrived, and that he did not

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see any further damage being caused during the tow.

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¶¶ 10, 12.)

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Barrett stated that damage to the bumper depicted in the

(Barrett Decl.

Plaintiff disputes this evidence with reference to counsel

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Mark Overland’s Declaration and exhibits 4, 5, and 6 thereto.

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Overland Declaration, however, simply misstates the evidence.

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Overland states that Barrett’s police report indicates no damage to

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the tractor’s bumper prior to the tow.

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However, exhibit 4, to which Overland cites, is not the report

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pertaining to the tractor, but rather the report pertaining to the

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trailer.

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Overland, is Barrett’s report on the tractor.

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describes damage to the right bumper, left rear wheel area, the

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right window (which Barrett admittedly broke to gain entry to the

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cab), and elsewhere.

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of excerpts from Topolewski’s deposition, wherein Topolewski

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recounts visiting the HST yard and observing damage to the tractor

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consistent with Barrett’s report.

(Overland Decl., Ex. 4.)

(Overland Decl. ¶ 5.)

Exhibit 5, also cited by

(Overland Decl., Ex. 5.)

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The

That report clearly

Exhibit 6 consists

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On this record, no reasonable trier of fact could conclude

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that the damage to the truck, other than the broken window, was

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caused by any Defendant.

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Plaintiff argue, that Barrett’s decision to break the window in the

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course of entering the tractor’s cab to make sure nobody was hiding

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or incapacitated within was a breach of any duty Barrett owed to

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Plaintiff.

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Plaintiff’s negligence claim.

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IV.

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No trier of fact could find, nor does

Accordingly, summary judgment is granted on

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motions for Summary

Judgment are GRANTED with respect to all claims.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Dated: October 17, 2016
DEAN D. PREGERSON
United States District Judge

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