James William Myers v. Carolyn W. Colvin

Filing 28

ORDER RE: "COUNSEL'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. 406(b)" by Magistrate Judge Charles F. Eick. Section 406(b) fees are allowed in the gross amount of $13,187.00 to be paid out of the sums withheld by the Commissioner from Plaintiff's benefits. Counsel shall reimburse Plaintiff in the amount of $3,000.00, previously paid by the Government under the Equal Access to Justice Act. (sp)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JAMES WILLIAM MYERS,

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Plaintiff,
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v.
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CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
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Commissioner of Social Security,
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Defendant.
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NO. CV 15-2534-E

ORDER RE: “COUNSEL’S MOTION
FOR ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO
42 U.S.C. § 406(b)”

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On September 12, 2016, counsel for Plaintiff filed “Counsel’s

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Motion for Attorney Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b).”

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October 7, 2016, Defendant filed a response.

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On

seeks attorneys fees in the amount of $13,187.00.

Counsel for Plaintiff

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BACKGROUND

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The Court previously remanded this matter to the Commissioner for

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further administrative action.

The Commissioner subsequently awarded

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benefits to Plaintiff totaling $52,748.80.

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represented Plaintiff under a contingent fee agreement providing for

Plaintiff’s counsel

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fees in the amount of 25 percent of past-due benefits.

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APPLICABLE LAW

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Section 406(b)(1) of Title 42 provides:

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Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant

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. . . who was represented before the court by an attorney,

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the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a

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reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of

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25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which

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the claimant is entitled . . . In case of any such judgment,

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no other fee may be payable . . . for such representation

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except as provided in this paragraph.

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406(b)(1)(A).

42 U.S.C. §

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According to the United States Supreme Court, section 406(b)

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does not displace contingent-fee agreements as the primary

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means by which fees are set for successfully representing

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Social Security benefits claimants in court.

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§ 406(b) calls for court review of such arrangements as an

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independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable

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results in particular cases.

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boundary line:

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that they provide for fees exceeding 25 percent of the past-

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due benefits.

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attorney for the successful claimant must show that the fee

Rather,

Congress has provided one

Agreements are unenforceable to the extent

Within this 25 percent boundary . . . the

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sought is reasonable for the services rendered.

Gisbrecht

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v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002) (citations omitted)

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(“Gisbrecht”).

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The hours spent by counsel representing the claimant and

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counsel’s “normal hourly billing charge for noncontingent-fee cases”

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may aid “the court’s assessment of the reasonableness of the fee

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yielded by the fee agreement.”

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may reduce counsel’s recovery

Id. at 808.

The Court appropriately

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based on the character of the representation and the results

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the representative achieved.

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for delay, for example, a reduction is in order so that the

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attorney will not profit from the accumulation of benefits

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during the pendency of the case in court.

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are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent

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on the case, a downward adjustment is similarly in order.

If the attorney is responsible

If the benefits

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Id. (citations omitted).

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DISCUSSION

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The fee sought does not exceed the agreed-upon 25 percent of

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past-due benefits.

Neither “the character of the representation” nor

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“the results the representative achieved” suggest the unreasonableness

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of the fee sought.

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significant delay in securing Plaintiff’s benefits.

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present case is legally indistinguishable from Crawford v. Astrue,

Plaintiff’s counsel was not responsible for any

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Because the

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586 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2009), this Court is unable to find that a

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comparison of the benefits secured and the time Plaintiff’s counsel

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spent on the matter suggest the unreasonableness of the fee sought.

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Therefore, the Court concludes that “the fee sought is reasonable for

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the services rendered,” within the meaning of Gisbrecht.

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ORDER

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Section 406(b) fees are allowed in the gross amount of

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$13,187.00, to be paid out of the sums withheld by the Commissioner

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from Plaintiff’s benefits.

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amount of $3,000.00, previously paid by the Government under the Equal

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Access to Justice Act.

Counsel shall reimburse Plaintiff in the

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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DATED: October 18, 2016.

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/S/
CHARLES F. EICK
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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