Chris Masillionis v. Silver Wheaton Corp. et al
Filing
248
MINUTES RE [REDACTED] PLAINTIFFS MOTIONS TO (A) MODIFY THE SCHEDULING ORDER AND (B) FOR LEAVE TO FILE A SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT Hearing Held before Judge Christina A. Snyder: Plaintiffs motion to modify the Scheduling Order and for leave to file the proposed SAC is hereby GRANTED 191 . The parties and Deloitte are directed to meet and confer regarding any further extension of the case schedule necessitated by the filing of the proposed SAC. (lc). Modified on 3/27/2018 .(lc). Modified on 3/27/2018 (lc).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
[REDACTED] CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No.
2:15-cv-5146-CAS (JEMx)
2:15-cv-5173-CAS (JEMx)
Title
IN RE SILVER WHEATON CORP. SECURITIES LITIGATION
Present: The Honorable
Date
‘O’
March 26, 2018
CHRISTINA A. SNYDER
Catherine Jeang
Laura Elias
N/A
Deputy Clerk
Court Reporter / Recorder
Tape No.
Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs:
Attorneys Present for Defendants:
Laurence Rosen
Jerome Birn, Jr.
Barry Kaplan
Attorneys Present for Intervenors
Alexander Mircheff
Lee Dunst
Proceedings:
I.
[REDACTED] PLAINTIFFS’ MOTIONS TO (A) MODIFY THE
SCHEDULING ORDER AND (B) FOR LEAVE TO FILE A
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT (Dkt. 191, filed February 5,
2018)
INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND
On July 8, 2015, plaintiff Chris Masilionis filed this securities class action against
defendants Silver Wheaton Corp. (“Silver Wheaton”), Randy V. J. Smallwood
(“Smallwood”), Peter Barnes (“Barnes”), and Gary Brown (“Brown”) (collectively,
“defendants”). Dkt. 1. On October 19, 2015, the Court consolidated the action with
Steve Klein, et al. v. Silver Wheaton Corp., et al., Case No: 2:15-cv-5173-CAS-JEM, and
appointed Joe Elek as lead plaintiff. Dkt. 55. Plaintiffs’ consolidated amended
complaint, filed on December 18, 2016, asserts two claims for relief: (1) violation of
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) et seq. (“the
Exchange Act”), and Rule 10b–5 promulgated thereunder (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5)
against all defendants, and (2) violation of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act against all
individual defendants. Dkt. 60 (“CAC”). Plaintiffs allege that the class period runs from
March 30, 2011 to July 6, 2015, inclusive (“the Class Period”). Id. ¶ 1.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
[REDACTED] CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Date
‘O’
Case No.
2:15-cv-5146-CAS (JEMx)
2:15-cv-5173-CAS (JEMx)
March 26, 2018
Title
IN RE SILVER WHEATON CORP. SECURITIES LITIGATION
In brief, plaintiffs allege that Silver Wheaton, a Canadian precious metals
streaming company traded on the New York Stock Exchange, set up a Cayman Islands
subsidiary, Silver Wheaton Cayman (“SW Cayman”), as a mere “conduit” for its business
operations. CAC ¶¶ 18, 72. Silver Wheaton allegedly did not pay tax on the income it
routed through SW Cayman in violation of the transfer pricing provisions of Canada’s
Income Tax Act. Id. ¶¶ 4–5. Plaintiffs allege that Silver Wheaton knew its tax position
was tenuous, in part because of an ongoing Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”) audit, but
failed to record a $207 million tax liability or disclose an equivalent contingent tax
liability in its annual and quarterly reports filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commissions (“SEC”) during the Class Period. Id. ¶¶ 7, 144. On July 6, 2015, Silver
Wheaton issued a press release announcing that the CRA was proposing to reassess the
company’s tax liability; and the following day Silver Wheaton’s share price fell $2.08 or
approximately 12 percent to close at $15.46 per share. Id. ¶¶ 175–76.
On January 29, 2016, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the CAC, arguing that
plaintiffs failed to state a Rule 10b–5 claim under the heightened pleading requirements
of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4.
Dkt. 61. On June 6, 2016, the Court denied the motion––finding that plaintiffs (1)
adequately alleged defendants made false or misleading statements in its SEC filings; and
(2) alleged facts raising a strong inference of scienter notwithstanding defendants’
asserted reliance on their auditors and accountants, Deloitte and Pricewaterhouse
Coopers. Dkt. 79. Discovery, which had been stayed pursuant to the PSLRA,
commenced and the parties filed a Joint Rule 26(f) Report on July 13, 2016. Dkt. 84.
The parties proposed a November 1, 2016 deadline for motions to amend the pleadings or
add parties. Id. On November 7, 2016, the Court held a Scheduling Conference and
adopted the proposed deadline. Dkt. 96. After moving for class certification on
November 1, 2016, plaintiffs initiated the letters rogatory process to seek third-party
discovery from Deloitte’s Canadian affiliate, Deloitte LLP (“Deloitte”). Dkt. 91. On
May 8, 2017, the Court granted plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. Dkt. 148.
On February 5, 2018, plaintiffs filed the instant motion to modify the scheduling
order and for leave to file a proposed Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) adding
Deloitte as a defendant. Dkt. 191 (“Mot.”). On February 26, 2018, Deloitte filed an
unopposed motion to intervene for the limited purpose of opposing plaintiffs’ motion.
Dkt. 211. Defendants and Deloitte filed their respective oppositions on March 1 and
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
[REDACTED] CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Date
‘O’
Case No.
2:15-cv-5146-CAS (JEMx)
2:15-cv-5173-CAS (JEMx)
March 26, 2018
Title
IN RE SILVER WHEATON CORP. SECURITIES LITIGATION
March 5, 2018. Dkt. 221 (“SW Opp’n”); dkt. 223-1 (“Dlt. Opp’n”). On March 14, 2018,
plaintiffs filed a reply. Dkt. 238 (“Reply”). The Court held a hearing on March 26, 2018.
Having carefully considered the parties arguments, the Court finds and concludes as
follows.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Once the deadline to file amended pleadings has passed, a party seeking leave to
amend must satisfy the requirements of both Rule 16(b) and Rule 15(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609
(9th Cir. 1992). Rule 16(b)(4) provides that a scheduling order may be modified “only
for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). This requirement
“primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” Johnson, 975
F.2d at 609. The scheduling order may be modified only “if it cannot reasonably be met
despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.” Id. “Although the existence or
degree of prejudice to the party opposing the modification might supply additional
reasons to deny a motion, the focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for
seeking modification. If that party was not diligent, the inquiry should end.” Id.
If the moving party shows good cause under Rule 16(b), the court applies Rule
15(a)’s liberal standards in determining whether to grant leave to amend. Id. at 608.
Rule 15(a) provides that “leave [to amend] shall be freely given when justice so
requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Generally, leave to amend is “denied only upon
showing of bad faith, undue delay, futility, or undue prejudice to the opposing party.”
Chudacoff v. Univ. Med. Ctr. of S. Nevada, 649 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). Rule 15(a) “is to be applied with extreme
liberality,” Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir.
1990), and whether to permit amendment is a decision “entrusted to the sound discretion
of the trial court.” Jordan v. County of Los Angeles, 669 F.2d 1311, 1324 (9th Cir.
1982).
III.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs contend there is “good cause” to modify the Scheduling Order and seek
leave to assert a claim against Deloitte for violation of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act.
Mot. at 1. Plaintiffs maintain they have pursued discovery diligently and did not seek to
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
[REDACTED] CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Date
‘O’
Case No.
2:15-cv-5146-CAS (JEMx)
2:15-cv-5173-CAS (JEMx)
March 26, 2018
Title
IN RE SILVER WHEATON CORP. SECURITIES LITIGATION
add Deloitte earlier because they had no reason to suspect wrongdoing and only obtained
the documents necessary to state a claim against the auditor in January 2018. Id. at 1–2.
Defendants and Deloitte contend that plaintiffs have been on notice that Deloitte was a
potential defendant but failed to investigate their claim prior to the November 1, 2016
deadline, and have not been diligent in pursuing discovery or seeking leave to amend.
SW Opp’n at 1–2; Dlt. Opp’n at 1–2. Defendants and Deloitte argue that they face
significant prejudice and assert that plaintiffs are engaging in improper gamesmanship.
SW Opp’n at 3; Dlt. Opp’n at 2–3. Defendants further argue the motion should be denied
pursuant to Rule 15(a) because amendment would be futile. SW Opp’n at 3. The Court
address these arguments below.
A.
Rule 16(b) Good Cause Requirement
A moving party may establish “good cause” under Rule 16(b)(4) by showing that
(1) she was diligent in assisting the court in crafting a workable scheduling order; (2) her
noncompliance with a deadline occurred notwithstanding diligent efforts to comply
because of matters that were not reasonably foreseeable or anticipated at the time of the
scheduling conference; and (3) she was diligent in seeking amendment once it became
apparent that she could not comply with the order. Jackson v. Laureate, Inc., 186 F.R.D.
605, 608 (E.D. Cal. 1999). The Court also considers the existence and degree of
prejudice to the non-moving parties in determining whether there is good cause to permit
modification. See Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609.
1.
Plaintiffs’ Diligence Prior to the Scheduling Conference
Because plaintiffs did not seek third-party discovery from Deloitte until after the
November 1, 2016 deadline to amend the pleadings or add parties had expired,
defendants and Deloitte argue that plaintiffs cannot show good cause. SW Opp’n at 7–9;
Dlt. Opp’n at 9–11. Deloitte argues that plaintiffs were not diligent in creating a
workable scheduling order because it was plainly foreseeable that their potential claims
against the auditor needed to be investigated well in advance of the November 1, 2016
deadline. Id. at 10–11 (citing Jackson, 186 F.R.D. at 608). Whether plaintiffs’ failure to
seek discovery from Deloitte prior to the deadline precludes a finding of good cause
depends, in large part, on when plaintiffs were put on notice that they had a potential
claim against the auditor. The parties dispute this issue sharply.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
[REDACTED] CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Date
‘O’
Case No.
2:15-cv-5146-CAS (JEMx)
2:15-cv-5173-CAS (JEMx)
March 26, 2018
Title
IN RE SILVER WHEATON CORP. SECURITIES LITIGATION
Defendants note that plaintiffs have known about Deloitte’s identity and
involvement since the beginning of the case. SW Opp’n at 6. For example, defendants’
motion to dismiss filed on January 29, 2016 indicated that Silver Wheaton was relying on
Deloitte’s clean audit opinions to negate scienter. Id. The Court briefly discussed this
asserted defense in its order denying the motion. See Dkt. 79 at 21–22. In addition,
defendants asserted an affirmative defense of good faith reliance on the advice of
“experts and professional advisors” in their Answer, filed July 20, 2016. SW Opp’n at 7.
[REDACTED] Because plaintiffs did not contact Deloitte until November 15, 2016 and
made no effort to extend the November 1, 2016 deadline for amending pleadings or
adding parties, defendants argue that plaintiffs lacked diligence. Id. at 8; Dlt. Opp’n at 9–
11.
Plaintiffs maintain that after surviving a motion to dismiss, they “had no reason to
suspect, and did not suspect, that discovery might reveal facts allowing them to state a
claim against Deloitte.” Reply at 4. Plaintiffs note that the PSLRA’s pleading
requirements are stringent. Id. Where the defendant is an auditor, a plaintiff must allege
facts showing “the accounting practices were so deficient that the audit amounted to no
audit at all, or an egregious refusal to see the obvious, or to investigate the doubtful, or
that the accounting judgments which were made were such that no reasonable accountant
would have made the same decisions if confronted with the same fact.” New Mexico
State Inv. Council v. Ernst & Young LLP, 641 F.3d 1089, 1098 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation
omitted). Plaintiffs’ CAC relied on allegations by a former employee of SW Cayman
(“FE1”), who stated that Silver Wheaton withheld information from the company’s
auditors, including Deloitte. See CAC ¶¶ 181–85. Based on these allegations, plaintiffs
concluded that they did not likely have claims against Deloitte. Reply at 4.
[REDACTED]
The Court finds no reason to fault plaintiffs for relying FE1’s allegations that
Silver Wheaton withheld information from its auditors. In light of these allegations,
defendants’ asserted defense that it was relying on clean audit opinions does not
necessarily implicate Deloitte in the alleged securities fraud. It is therefore unsurprising
that plaintiffs did not anticipate needing to seek leave to amend or modify the scheduling
order until defendants produced allegedly inculpatory documents in discovery. Plaintiffs
have otherwise shown that they diligently pursued discovery starting in July 2016 while
preparing to move for class certification. Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiffs
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
[REDACTED] CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Date
‘O’
Case No.
2:15-cv-5146-CAS (JEMx)
2:15-cv-5173-CAS (JEMx)
March 26, 2018
Title
IN RE SILVER WHEATON CORP. SECURITIES LITIGATION
were diligent in the period leading up to the Scheduling Conference and that their
noncompliance was the result of events that were not reasonably foreseeable or
anticipated at that time. See Jackson, 186 F.R.D. at 608.
2.
Plaintiffs’ Diligence in Seeking Discovery and Amendment
Defendants and Deloitte also contend that plaintiffs were dilatory during discovery
and did not diligently seek leave to amend their complaint as documents were being
produced. SW Opp’n at 8–9; Dlt. Opp’n at 12–15. Having reviewed the timeline set
forth in the briefs and the record, the Court finds no indication that plaintiffs were
behaving in a dilatory fashion. [REDACTED] Plaintiff have filed or served three
motions to compel, one of which has been resolved in their favor. See dkt. 127.
Plaintiffs have also conducted extensive foreign and third party discovery—requiring
plaintiffs to obtain letters rogatory from this Court, retain counsel and an accounting
expert in Canada, and file proceedings in a Canadian provincial court to enforce the
letters rogatory over Deloitte’s objections. See Mot. at 2–10; Dlt. Opp’n at 4–8; Reply at
6–11. The Court accordingly finds that plaintiffs have diligently pursued discovery
against both defendants and Deloitte.
Plaintiffs acknowledge that based on documents produced in October 2017
pursuant to letters rogatory, they learned that Deloitte both identified and had been made
aware of serious deficiencies in Silver Wheaton’s tax position. Mot. at 13.
[REDACTED] Defendants and Deloitte argue these productions show a lack of diligence
because plaintiffs did not move to modify the scheduling order and seek leave to amend
when this information was first produced. Id. at 12; Dlt. Opp’n at 13–15. Deloitte notes
“[c]ourts have held that waiting two months after discovering new facts to bring a motion
to amend does not constitute diligence under Rule 16.” Id. at 14–15 (quoting Sako v.
Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n, No. 14CV1034-GPC JMA, 2015 WL 5022326, at *2
(S.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2015)).
However, unlike Sako and other cases relied upon by Deloitte where the claims
were subject to notice pleading, here, plaintiffs must meet Rule 9(b)’s heightened
standard and the “more exacting pleading requirements” of the PSLRA. Zucco Partners,
LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009). Plaintiffs must also satisfy
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
[REDACTED] CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Date
‘O’
Case No.
2:15-cv-5146-CAS (JEMx)
2:15-cv-5173-CAS (JEMx)
March 26, 2018
Title
IN RE SILVER WHEATON CORP. SECURITIES LITIGATION
the particularly difficult standard for pleading a Rule 10b–5 claim against an auditor. See
New Mexico State Inv. Council, 641 F.3d at 1097–98; see also DSAM Glob. Value Fund
v. Altris Software, Inc., 288 F.3d 385, 390 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that an complaint
against an auditor will dismissed unless based on “specific facts that shed light on the
mental state” of the defendant). Accordingly, the Court finds it reasonable under the
circumstances for plaintiffs to have waited to amend their complaint until after Deloitte
produced additional documents and their audit work papers on January 5, 2018. An
earlier attempt at amendment could very well have resulted in dismissal under the
PSLRA’s stringent pleading standards.
For these reasons, the Court finds that plaintiffs have demonstrated diligence in
pursuing this litigation.
3.
Prejudice to Defendants and Deloitte
Defendants and Deloitte contend they will face significant prejudice if plaintiffs
are granted leave to amend. First, defendants argue that plaintiffs are improperly
attempting to change their theory of liability just as fact discovery is scheduled to close.
SW Opp’n at 17–18. [REDACTED] Although prejudice may arise where new claims
require defendants to undertake an entirely new course of defense late in the litigation,
see Morongo Band of Mission Indians, 893 F.2d at 1079, there is no indication here that
defendants will have to abandon their current defense strategy. The addition of Deloitte
will not prevent defendants from asserting their affirmative defense.
Defendants further argue they will be prejudiced by delays and increased litigation
costs if Deloitte is joined at this late stage. SW Opp’n at 20. Deloitte would likely move
to dismiss, which would require several months to resolve during which discovery would
be stayed pursuant to the PSLRA.1 Id. If the motion to dismiss is denied, defendants
argue that Deloitte would need time to [REDACTED]. Defendants argue that the
1
The PSLRA “provides that, upon the filing of a motion to dismiss by the
defendants in a private securities fraud action, ‘all discovery and other proceedings shall
be stayed during the pendency’ of such motion.” Medhekar v. U.S. Dist. Court for the N.
Dist. of California, 99 F.3d 325, 327 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u–
4(b)(3)(B)).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
[REDACTED] CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Date
‘O’
Case No.
2:15-cv-5146-CAS (JEMx)
2:15-cv-5173-CAS (JEMx)
March 26, 2018
Title
IN RE SILVER WHEATON CORP. SECURITIES LITIGATION
depositions of six witnesses would effectively need to be retaken. Id. Similarly, Deloitte
argues that granting leave to amend would result in “tremendous disruption” because,
according to basic principles of due process, it must be allowed the opportunity to
relitigate all legal and factual issues already decided in this case, including class
certification. Dlt. Opp’n at 18–20.
If joined as a defendant, Deloitte will have the opportunity to seek dismissal of
plaintiffs’ claims. Deloitte will also have the opportunity to challenge the propriety of
class certification—plaintiffs will likely move to certify the class against Deloitte; and
Deloitte may also seek decertification. The current case schedule will likely require
modification. Nevertheless, the Court anticipates that neither defendants nor Deloitte
will be required to engage in substantial additional document discovery. The Court also
considers decertification unlikely given the nature of this securities class action. To the
extent that limited discovery may be required, however, “the need for additional
discovery is insufficient by itself to deny a proposed amended pleading based on
prejudice.” Greenfield v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., No. C03-05183 MHP, 2004 WL
2600135, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2004); see also Newton v. Am. Debt Servs., Inc., No.
C-11-3228 EMC, 2013 WL 5592620, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2013) (additional
discovery alone is not sufficient prejudice).
Deloitte argues that plaintiffs are attempting an “end-run” around the PSLRA’s
discovery stay through third-party discovery. Dlt. Opp’n at 15–20. Deloitte notes the
Ninth Circuit in Medhekar stated that by enacting that discovery stay, “Congress clearly
intended that complaints in these securities actions should stand or fall based on the
actual knowledge of the plaintiffs rather than information produced by the defendants
after the action has been filed.” 99 F.3d 325, 328 (9th Cir. 1996). However, Medhekar
did not involve third-party discovery, and the Ninth Circuit has since held that “a party
does not violate a PSLRA discovery stay by relying on materials provided by a thirdparty pursuant to a valid subpoena issued when no PSLRA discovery stay was in effect.”
Petrie v. Elec. Game Card, Inc., 761 F.3d 959, 970 (9th Cir. 2014). Courts in this circuit
also freely grant leave to amend in securities cases where plaintiffs learn new information
during discovery. See, e.g., In re Allstate Life Ins. Co. Litig., No. CV-09-8162-PCT-
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
[REDACTED] CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Date
‘O’
Case No.
2:15-cv-5146-CAS (JEMx)
2:15-cv-5173-CAS (JEMx)
March 26, 2018
Title
IN RE SILVER WHEATON CORP. SECURITIES LITIGATION
GMS, 2012 WL 176497, at *6 (D. Ariz. Jan. 23, 2012).2 Because no discovery stay was
in effect when plaintiffs obtained and enforced letters rogatory against Deloitte, there has
been no violation of the PSLRA. Moreover, the purpose of the PSLRA is “to prevent
unnecessary imposition of discovery costs on defendants,” Petrie, 761 F.3d at 969
(citation omitted), not to preclude parties from using legitimately obtained discovery to
refine their case. The Court accordingly finds no prejudicial use of third-party discovery
by plaintiffs. Relatedly, Deloitte argues that plaintiffs are engaging in a “bait-andswitch” and should be judicially estopped from making new allegations that are
inconsistent with their prior exculpatory allegations. Dlt. Opp’n at 16–17. However,
plaintiffs’ allegations are not necessarily inconsistent or contradictory; and the Court has
no reason to believe that plaintiffs are acting in bad faith.
The Court therefore finds that neither defendants nor Deloitte would be
significantly prejudiced if plaintiffs were permitted leave to amend. Accordingly,
plaintiffs have demonstrated “good cause” to modify the scheduling order pursuant to
Rule 16(b)(4).
B.
Leave to Amend Under Rule 15(a)
As previously noted, leave to amend “shall be freely given when justice so
requires,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), and the Ninth Circuit instructs courts to apply this
discretionary standard “with extreme liberality.” Morongo Band of Mission Indians, 893
F.2d at 1079. Accordingly, leave to amend “generally shall be denied only upon showing
of bad faith, undue delay, futility, or undue prejudice to the opposing party.” Chudacoff,
649 F.3d at 1152. Here, the Court has already determined that (1) there is no showing of
bad faith; (2) plaintiffs have been diligently pursuing discovery and thus there is no
undue delay in bring the instant motion; and (3) neither defendants nor Deloitte would be
significantly prejudiced if plaintiffs are permitted leave to amend. Defendants assert that
amendment would be futile because plaintiffs’ Rule 10b–5 claim is time barred. SW
Opp’n at 22–23. However, recognizing this Court’s view that futility arguments “are
more properly addressed on a motion to dismiss,” Rowen v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. CV
2
The cases relied upon by Deloitte, In re Petrobras Sec. Litig., No. 14-CV-9662
(JSR), 2016 WL 3144395 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2016) and In re Bisys Sec. Litig., 496
F.Supp.2d 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), are distinguishable because they involve attempts by
plaintiffs to revive Rule 10b–5 claims that had already been dismissed with prejudice.
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Date
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Case No.
2:15-cv-5146-CAS (JEMx)
2:15-cv-5173-CAS (JEMx)
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Title
IN RE SILVER WHEATON CORP. SECURITIES LITIGATION
12-1762 CAS(MAN)x, 2013 WL 140219, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2013), Deloitte has
reserved its rights to make these arguments should the Court grant plaintiffs’ motion.
Dlt. Opp’n at 22–23.
In light of Rule 15(a)’s liberal standard, the Court will grant plaintiffs leave to file
their proposed SAC.
IV.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, plaintiffs’ motion to modify the Scheduling Order and for
leave to file the proposed SAC is hereby GRANTED. The parties and Deloitte are
directed to meet and confer regarding any further extension of the case schedule
necessitated by the filing of the proposed SAC.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
00
Initials of Preparer
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