Anthony Edwards v. A. Arutyunyan et al
Filing
63
MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) by Judge S. James Otero: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT ELVIN VALENZUELA'S MOTION TO DISMISS 50 . The Court GRANTS Defendant Valenzuela's Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint and DISMISSES Plaintiff's Secon d Amended Complaint with leave to amend. Plaintiff may file a Third Amended Complaint to correct the deficiencies within 14 days of the issuance of this Order. Should Plaintiff file a Third Amended Complaint, Defendant shall file an answer or otherwise respond within 14 days thereafter. Strict compliance with this Court's Order is required. (lc)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
DATE: November 10, 2016
CASE NO.: CV 15-05564 SJO (FFMx)
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Anthony Edwards v. A. Arutyunyan et al.
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PRESENT: THE HONORABLE S. JAMES OTERO, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Victor Paul Cruz
Courtroom Clerk
Not Present
Court Reporter
COUNSEL PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFS:
COUNSEL PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTS:
Not Present
Not Present
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PROCEEDINGS (in chambers): ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT ELVIN VALENZUELA'S
MOTION TO DISMISS [Docket No. 50]
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Elvin Valenzuela's ("Valenzuela" or "Defendant")
Motion to Dismiss, filed August 26, 2016 ("Motion"). Defendant filed a Reply in Support of his
Motion to Dismiss notifying the Court of Plaintiff's failure to timely file an Opposition on October
10, 2016. Plaintiff Anthony Edwards ("Edwards" or "Plaintiff") subsequently filed an Opposition
on October 10, 2016, to which Defendant filed a Surreply on October 13, 2016.1 The Court found
this matter suitable for disposition without oral argument and vacated the hearing set for October
24, 2016. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In this Section 1983 action, Plaintiff, a prisoner at the California Men's Colony prison in San Luis
Obispo ("CMC"), alleges that on July 23, 2013, Correctional Officer A. Artyunyan ordered Plaintiff
to pass out mail to other prisoners. (Second Am. Compl. ("SAC") ¶¶ 3, 17-18, ECF No. 49.)2
Plaintiff alleges this was against prison policy (SAC ¶ 18), and that as a result of Plaintiff passing
out mail, Plaintiff was assaulted by other inmates, causing him physical injuries. (SAC ¶¶ 20-21.)
After the assault, and allegedly based on the "wrongful assumption" that Plaintiff had committed
an assault on other inmates, Plaintiff was placed in Administrative Segregation. (SAC ¶¶ 22-23.)
Plaintiff remained in Administrative Segregation for three months. (SAC ¶ 23.)
1
Defendant contends that Plaintiff's failure to timely oppose the instant motion should be
deemed consent to granting the motion. In the interest of rendering a decision on the
merits, the Court elects to consider Plaintiff's untimely Opposition.
2
Plaintiff's action against Defendant A. Arutyunyan was dismissed on June 27, 2016. (See
Order Granting Def. A Arutyunyan's Mot. for Summary J., ECF No. 39.)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
DATE: November 10, 2016
CASE NO.: CV 15-05564 SJO (FFMx)
Plaintiff was returned to General Population on September 22, 2013. (SAC ¶ 24.) On that day,
as a result of passing out inmate mail on July 23, 2013, Plaintiff was again assaulted by other
inmates, causing him physical injury. (FAC ¶ 26.) After this assault, Plaintiff was re-housed in
Administrative Segregation, for a period of five months. (SAC ¶ 25.)
Plaintiff is seeking general, special, exemplary and punitive damages and attorney's fees. (SAC
¶ 9-10.)
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Legal Standard
In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court may only
consider the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, and matters of
judicial notice. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). In evaluating a motion
to dismiss, a court accepts the plaintiff's factual allegations in the complaint as true and construes
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th
Cir. 2000).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12, which provides for dismissal of a plaintiff's cause of action for
"failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted," see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), must be read
in conjunction with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) ("Rule 8"). See Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349
F.3d 1191, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2003). Rule 8 requires that "[a] pleading that states a claim for
relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the pleader is not required to plead "detailed factual
allegations" under Rule 8, this standard demands "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). Pleadings
that contain nothing more than legal conclusions or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action" are insufficient. Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). "To survive a motion
to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). Where a complaint pleads sufficient facts "to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level," a court may not dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545.
A court may deny leave to amend where amendment would be futile or if the claim is legally
insufficient. Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988).
B.
Analysis
1.
Administrative Exhaustion
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), a prisoner challenging prison conditions under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 is required to exhaust all available administrative remedies before filing suit. 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002); see also Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
DATE: November 10, 2016
CASE NO.: CV 15-05564 SJO (FFMx)
1214, 1219 (9th Cir. 2014) ("The Ninth Circuit has explained that Congress purposefully made
exhaustion a precondition to suit, rather than to judgment.") This exhaustion requirement is
mandatory–not discretionary. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81,85 (2006). Although an inmate's
failure to exhaust administrative remedies should be addressed through a summary judgment
motion, "in those rare cases where a failure to exhaust is clear from the face of the complaint, a
defendant may successfully move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1169 (th Cir. 2014) (cert. denied sub nom. Scott v. Albino, 135 S.
Ct. 403).
Despite his contention to the contrary, Plaintiff's claims are subject to the PLRA.3 California's
administrative grievance procedures are codified in Title 15 §§ 3084-3084.7 of the California Code
of Regulations. Pursuant to those regulations, California prisoners are required to proceed
through three separate levels of appeal to exhaust the administrative appeal process. (Mot. 4, see
also Cal. Code. Regs., 15 §§ 3084.1(a), 3084.7.) Accordingly, Plaintiff was required to comply
with the three-step administrative grievance before initiating this action. See McKinney v. Carney,
311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). The undisputed evidence demonstrates that
Plaintiff only completed two of three steps of the administrative appeal process. (Mot. 4, Complete
Appeals History ("Appeals History"), ECF No. 49-2.) Furthermore, the appeal that Plaintiff initiated
was solely in regard to former Defendant Arutyunyan's conduct on July 23, 2013, which allegedly
caused him to be assaulted on two separate occasions. (Appeals History 3-6.) Significantly,
Plaintiff never complains of denial of process regarding his placement in Administrative
Segregation in his appeal. As such, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies against Defendant Valenzuela prior to initiating the instant action.
2.
Failure to State a Claim
The Court next turns to Defendant's argument that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against
Defendant Valenzuela. To state a claim against a particular individual defendant for violations of
his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant, acting under color
of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed under the Constitution or a federal statute.
Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1988). Here, Plaintiff
attempts to bring a claim against Defendant Valenzuela in his individual capacity "for decisions
and orders he made with regard to Plaintiff in deliberate indifference of Plaintiff's civil rights." (SAC
¶ 14.) Defendant argues that the SAC does not make any specific factual allegations that
Defendant Valenzuela engaged in any affirmative act, participated in another's affirmative act, or
failed to perform an act that he was legally required to do, which caused a deprivation to Plaintiff.
3
The Court notes Plaintiff's reliance on Rumbles v. Hill, 182 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir.
1999) for the proposition that "[e]xhaustion of administrative remedies under section
1997e(a) is not required if a prisoner's section 1983 claim seeks only money damages and
if the correctional facility's administrative grievance process does not allow for such an
award." See Opp'n 1-3. Rumbles, as Defendant correctly points out, is no longer good law
for such a proposition.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
DATE: November 10, 2016
CASE NO.: CV 15-05564 SJO (FFMx)
(Mot. 7.) Plaintiff contends that the requisite causal connection can be established by "knowingly
refus[ing] to terminate a series of acts by others, which [the supervisor] knew or reasonably should
have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury." (See Opp'n 4, citing Dubner v.
City &Cnty. of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 968 (9th Cir. 2001).) While Plaintiff articulates the
correct standard, he has not pled any facts supporting his claim against Defendant Valenzuela.
Rule 8(a) demands "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully," and
pleadings, such as Plaintiff's SAC, that contains nothing more than legal conclusions or "a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" are insufficient. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts "to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545.
3.
Qualified Immunity
Finally, the Court addresses Defendant's argument that qualified immunity protects him from
personal liability in this case. (Mot 8-10.) Qualified immunity shields government officials "from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982). At the pleading stage, a dismissal based on qualified immunity is
appropriate, if it can be shown that based on the complaint itself, qualified immunity applies.
Groten v. California, 251 F.3d 844, 851 (9th Cir. 2001). Qualified immunity "balances two
important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power
irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they
perform their duties reasonably." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). A court must
consider two factors when running a qualified immunity analysis: first, whether the defendant's
actions in fact amounted to a constitutional violation; and second, whether, in spite of such
violation, a reasonable official would not understand that his conduct violated that right.4 Tamas
v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 630 F.3d 833, 842 (9th Cir. 2010). In other words, to satisfy the
requirements for qualified immunity, government officials must demonstrate that they "reasonably
but mistakenly believed that [their] conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional
right." Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 2001).
Here, Plaintiff's SAC contains no specific factual allegations about Defendant Valenzuela. (See
generally SAC.) Plaintiff, without specifically naming Defendant Valenzuela, claims that
"[Defendants] made decisions and implemented and executed on those decisions regarding
Plainitff's status and housing that they knew would place Plaintiff in danger" and "made such
classifications and decisions with a deliberate indifference to the rights and safety of Plaintiff."
4
The Supreme Court at one point required courts to focus first on whether a constitutional
violation took place before determining whether such violation may have been the result
of a reasonable but mistaken belief that there was no violation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
194 (2001). The Supreme Court has since abandoned this requirement, however, and now
allows courts to consider these factors in either order as appropriate. Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223 (2009).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
DATE: November 10, 2016
CASE NO.: CV 15-05564 SJO (FFMx)
(SAC ¶¶ 27, 40.) However, Plaintiff has made no factual allegations linking Defendant to specific
acts in his SAC. In its Opposition, Plaintiff only states that "[s]ince the warden has overall
responsibility for the operation of procedure of determining whether to release inmates from
administrative segregation and to which population they should be placed in, [Plaintiff's] allegations
are clearly plausible. (Opp'n 6.) However, to plead sufficiently, Plaintiffs must proffer "enough
facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). Without adequate factual allegations, the Court is unwilling to assume that Defendant
Valenzuela knew of the alleged wrongdoing, and thus would have realized its alleged commission
violated Plaintiff's rights. Plaintiff's allegations are thus insufficient to state a claim against
Defendant Valenzuela in his individual capacity.
4.
Leave to Amend
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), a district court should grant leave to amend
when justice so requires, "even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it
determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Lopez
v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citation omitted). Futility alone can justify
the denial of leave to amend. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995); see Miller v.
Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted) ("[A] proposed
amendment is futile only if no set of facts can be proved under the amendment . . . that would
constitute a valid and sufficient claim or defense."). However, the Court may properly deny leave
to amend where the plaintiff has already amended the complaint more than once and failed to
correct deficiencies that cause the complaint to fail to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
The Ninth Circuit has held that "a district court's discretion over amendments is especially broad
where the court has already given a plaintiff one or more opportunities to amend his complaint."
DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 n. 3 (9th Cir.1987) (citations omitted); see also
Simon v. Value Behavioral Health, Inc., 208 F.3d 1073, 1084 (9th Cir.) (same), amended on other
grounds, 234 F.3d 428 (9th Cir.2000); see, e.g., McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 809
(9th Cir.1988) (district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow a second amended
complaint where the first amendment had failed to cure deficiencies). Here, the Court has
previously allowed Plaintiff to amend his complaint on two separate occasions. (See Amended
Compl. "FAC"), ECF No. 26; Second Amended Compl. ("SAC"), ECF No. 49.) The Court shall
allow Plaintiff one final opportunity to amend his complaint.
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III.
CONCLUSION
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
DATE: November 10, 2016
CASE NO.: CV 15-05564 SJO (FFMx)
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant Valenzuela's Motion to Dismiss the
Second Amended Complaint and DISMISSES Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint with leave
to amend. Plaintiff may file a Third Amended Complaint to correct the deficiencies within
fourteen (14) days of the issuance of this Order. Should Plaintiff file a Third Amended Complaint,
Defendant shall file an answer or otherwise respond within fourteen (14) days thereafter. Strict
compliance with this Court's Order is required.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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