Barry Rosen v. Michael Medlin et al
Filing
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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT 66 by Judge Otis D. Wright, II: The Court awards a permanent injunction, $15,000.00 in statutory damages, $13,130.00 in attorneys fees and $485.00 in costs. (Made JS-6. Case Terminated.). (lc) Modified on 4/28/2016 (lc).
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United States District Court
Central District of California
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Plaintiff,
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Case No. 2:15-CV-05789-ODW-JC
BARRY ROSEN,
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
v.
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MICHAEL “MIKE” MEDLIN DBA
MOTION FOR DEFAULT
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AFFORDABLE AUTOGRAPHS,
JUDGMENT [66]
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AFFORDABLEAUTOGRAPHSHOLLY
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WOOD; HOLLYWOOD SHOW, LLC, A
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CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY
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COMPANY; AND DOES 1-10,
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Defendants.
I.
INTRODUCTION
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This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Barry Rosen’s Motion for
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Default Judgment against Defendant Michael Medlin. (ECF No. 66.) After carefully
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considering Rosen’s moving papers, in addition to the Court’s own familiarity with
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the allegations in this action, the Motion is GRANTED.
II.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
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Barry Rosen is a professional photographer and the copyright holder of the
work at issue —two photographs of model Ali Landry. (Rosen Decl. ¶¶ 2– 3, ECF
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No. 66-1.) On July 18, 2015, Rosen discovered one of the copyrighted photographs
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for sale on eBay by the user “affordableautographshollywood.” (Rosen Decl. ¶ 12.)
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Rosen sent eBay a Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) notice to remove the
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listing; eBay complied with the demand and informed the seller, Medlin, of the
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takedown notice. (Rosen Decl. ¶ 8.) On July 20, 2015 Rosen filed his original
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Complaint against Medlin for copyright infringement. (ECF No. 1.) Medlin was
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properly served and answered on September 2, 2015. (ECF Nos. 13, 23.)
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On September 10, 2015, Rosen filed a First Amended Complaint, alleging that
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Medlin printed the images of Landry off the Internet, obtained the celebrity’s
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signature, and sold the photographs both on eBay and in person. (First Am. Comp.
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(“FAC”) ¶¶ 2–5, ECF No. 25.) After filing the FAC, Rosen claims he attended a
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celebrity memorabilia event at the Hollywood Show, where he found and purchased
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two prints of his Landry photos from Medlin. (Rosen Decl. ¶ 12.) Though served
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with the FAC, Medlin failed to answer the allegations, and on October 8, 2015, the
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Clerk entered default against him. (See ECF Nos. 31, 33.) However, on October, 14,
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2015, Medlin moved to set aside the default, claiming he did not receive the FAC.
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(ECF No. 36.) In support of his motion, Medlin claimed that he found and printed the
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Landry photos from Google and that this formed a basis for a meritorious defense.
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(Id. at 6:6–10, 9:20–21.) The Court granted Medlin’s motion, giving him 14 days to
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respond to the FAC. (ECF No. 54.)
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Medlin once again failed to file a responsive pleading, and on January 8, 2016,
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the Clerk again entered his default. (ECF No. 56.) On January 25, 2016, Medlin
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again moved to set aside the default, claiming that he misunderstood the Court’s
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order. (ECF No. 61.) The Court denied Medlin’s motion. (ECF No. 69.) Rosen
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moved for Default Judgment and this Motion is now before the Court. (ECF No. 66.)
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III.
LEGAL STANDARD
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Default judgment is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 and allows
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the court to enter default judgment “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for
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affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
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55(a). It is within the Court’s discretion to enter default judgment following entry of
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default by the clerk. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986); see Fed.
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R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).
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Amended Complaint, all of the allegations therein, aside from the amount of damages,
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are deemed admitted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6); Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d
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557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977).
Moreover, in light of Medlin’s failure to answer the First
IV.
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DISCUSSION
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In determining whether an entry of default judgment is appropriate, the Ninth
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Circuit has identified seven factors for district courts to consider: (1) the possibility of
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prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the
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sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the
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possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to
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excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil
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Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471–72. All of the
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Eitel factors weigh in favor of granting default judgment on Rosen’s copyright
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infringement claim. The Court addresses each factor in turn.
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A.
Eitel Factors
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The first Eitel factor considers whether a plaintiff would suffer prejudice if
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default judgment were not entered. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Security Cans, 238 F. Supp.
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2d 1172, 1177. Here, Rosen would suffer prejudice because he would be left without
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a remedy given Medlin’s refusal to actively participate in this litigation or in
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settlement discussions. See id.
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The second and third Eitel factors—the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim
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and the sufficiency of the complaint—are often discussed in tandem. See id. at 1175.
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Here, the FAC alleges willful copyright infringement. Specifically, Rosen contends
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that he is the copyright holder of the Landry photographs and that Medlin willfully
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violated Rosen’s exclusive rights under the Copyright Act by (1) reproducing the
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copyrighted work and (2) distributing copies of the copyrighted work to the public by
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offering them for sale. (FAC ¶¶ 2–5.) To succeed on a copyright infringement claim,
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a plaintiff must establish (1) ownership of a valid copyright and (2) that the defendant
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violated at least one of the exclusive rights of the copyright holder. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
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Moreover, a plaintiff sustains his burden of proving willfulness “by showing [the]
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defendant knew or should have known it infringed [the plaintiff’s] copyright.” UMG
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Recordings, Inc. v. Disco Azteca Distrib., Inc., 446 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1173 (E.D. Cal.
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2006) (quoting Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1543
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(S.D.N.Y. 1991)).
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Rosen sufficiently pleads factual allegations to sufficiently state the elements of
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his claim. As alleged in the FAC, and evidenced by Certificates of Registration from
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the U.S. Copyright office, Rosen owns the copyright to the Ali Landry photographs at
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issue. (FAC ¶ 15; Rosen Decl., Ex. 1.) Rosen alleges that he did not grant Medlin
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permission to copy or distribute the photographs and that Medlin went on to sell prints
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of the copyrighted work on eBay (under the moniker “affordableautographs
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hollywood”) and at trade shows such as Comic-Con and the Hollywood Show. (FAC
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¶¶ 16, 26.) Rosen notes that Medlin continued to sell the copyrighted photos even
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after he received a DMCA notice from eBay and months after he was served with the
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original complaint. (Rosen Dec. ¶ 12.) And as previously determined by the Court,
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Medlin failed to put forward a meritorious defense based on fair use. (See Order
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Denying Mot. to Set Aside Entry of Default 5:19–20, ECF No. 69.) Accordingly, the
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Court finds that the second and third Eitel factors favor granting default judgment.
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Next, the Court must consider the amount of money at stake in relation to the
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seriousness of Medlin’s conduct. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471–72. Here, Rosen seeks an
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amount that consists of discretionary awards and statutory damages provided under
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the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 504, 505; Elekta Ent. Group, Inc. v. Crawford,
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226 F.D.R. 388, 393 (C.D. Cal. 2005). Hisorically, courts have awarded significant
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damages against a defendant accused of engaging in willful infringement and who
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failes or refuses to respond to the compalint against him. See Phillip Morris U.S.A.
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Inc. v. Castworld Prods., 219 F.R.D. 494, 500 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (awarding damages in
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the amount of $2,000,000 for willful trademark infringement when defendant failed to
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participate in the judicial process); see also Craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., 694
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F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1060 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (granting large damages and entry of default
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when defendant engaged in willful copyright infringement and failed to participate in
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litigation). Given Medlin’s willful infringement, combined with his failure to actively
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participate in this litigation, this factor favors entry of default judgement.
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The Court also concludes that the next factor, the possibility of a dispute
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concerning material facts, favors entry of default judgment. Because Medlin failed to
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answer the FAC, the facts therein are taken as true. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6); Geddes v.
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United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977). Thus, no issues of material fact
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will preclude entry of default judgment.
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The sixth Eitel factor considers whether the default was due to excusable
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neglect. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. Medlin was properly served twice in this case, and
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his two Motions to Set Aside Default indicate that he is clearly aware of the pending
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litigation. (See ECF Nos. 35, 61.) His repeated failure to timely respond coupled with
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his inadequate justifications makes excusable neglect unlikely. (See Order Denying
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Mot. to Set Aside Entry of Default 3:15–16.) Accordingly, this factor favors entry of
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default judgment.
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The final Eitel factor examines whether the strong preference that cases be
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decided on the merits weighs against the entry of default judgment. Eitel, 782 F.2d at
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1472. However, when a defendant’s failure to appear “makes a decision on the merits
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impractical,” entry of default is warranted. Pepisco, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Here,
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the Court offered Medlin an additional opportunity to defend this suit on the merits by
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setting aside the original entry of default. (See ECF No. 54.) Medlin chose to
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squander his second chance. Medlin’s consistent inability to follow court rules has
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not only caused significant delay, but has also prohibited Rosen from efficiently
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litigating his claim. As a decision on the merits has become increasingly impractical
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due to Medlin’s conduct, the final factor favors an entry of default judgment.
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In sum, after reviewing Rosen’s Motion in light of the factors articulated in
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Eitel, the Court deems entry of default judgment appropriate. The Court now turns to
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Rosen’s requested relief.
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B.
Remedies
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Rosen requests a permanent injunction, statutory damages in the amount of
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$100,000 for willful copyright infringement, and attorney’s fees. (Mot. 15–19.) The
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Court addresses each in turn.
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1.
Permanent Injunction
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The Copyright Act authorizes a court to grant temporary or final injunctions to
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“prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 502(a). Generally, a
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permanent injunction will be granted when liability has been established and a threat
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of continuing violations exists. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, 991 F.2d 511, 520
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(9th Cir. 1993).
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Here, liability has been established with the entry of default. Medlin’s conduct
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since litigation commenced, specifically his continued sale of Rosen’s copyrighted
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photos, signals a threat of future violations. Thus, an injunction here is appropriate.
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2.
Statutory Damages
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Rosen requests $100,000 in statutory damages for willful copyright
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infringement, noting that in willful infringement cases, courts often award multipliers
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of three (or more) times the unpaid licensing fees as statutory damages. (Mot. 16:20–
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22) (citing Odnil Music, Ltd. v. Katharsis LLC, S-05-0545 WBS JFM, 2006 WL
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2545869, *8 (E.D. Cal. July 21, 2006); Fermanta Int’l Melodies, Inc. v. Champions
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Golf Club, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1257, 1264 (S.D. Tex. 1989). Rosen argues that he
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routinely receives between $5,000 and $10,000 for a single use, editorial license for
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his photographs and adds that Medlin would have paid $20,000 for proper licenses to
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use both Landry photographs. (Mot. 17:9–11; Rosen Decl. ¶ 21.) He asks the Court
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to apply a multiplier of five for willful misconduct (5 x $20,000) damages. (Mot.
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17:13.)
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infringement and should deter future misconduct by Medlin. (Mot. 17:13–16.)
Rosen argues that this amount falls within the applicable range for willful
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The Copyright Act allows a copyright owner to elect to recover an award of
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statutory damages in lieu of actual damages any time before final judgment is
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rendered. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). The Act allows for statutory damages in a sum not
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less than $750 or more than $30,000 for all infringements with respect to any one
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work. Id. Furthermore, “[i]n a case where the copyright owner sustains the burden of
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proving, and the court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court in
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its discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than
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$150,000.” Id. § 504(c)(2).
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Although Rosen suggests a multiple of five would be appropriate, the Court is
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guided by “what is just in the particular case, considering the nature of the copyright,
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the circumstances of the infringement and the like.”
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Records, Inc., 909 F.2d 1332, 1336 (9th Cir. 1990). The circumstances of this case
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simply do not warrant an award of $100,000. Medlin found the two Landry images on
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Google, obtained the celebrity’s signature, and sold the prints for roughly $30 dollars.
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(Mot. to Set Aside Entry of Default 6:6–10, ECF No. 36; Rosen Decl., Ex. 2.) Medlin
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was put on notice of his infringing conduct through the DMCA takedown notice,
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however he subsequently sold two of the copyrighted images at trade shows. While
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not taking lightly the seriousness of Medlin’s conduct, the circumstances of this case
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mimic similar copyright lawsuits brought by Rosen in this District. See, e.g., Rosen v.
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Global Net Access, No. CV 10–2721–DMG (E), 2014 WL 2803752 (C.D. Cal. Jan.
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16, 2015) (awarding $45,000 for nine photographs); Rosen v. Netfronts, Inc., No. CV
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12–658 CAS (FFMx), 2013 WL 3467205 (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2013) (awarding $800 for
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four photographs).
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concludes that an award of $7,500 per photograph sufficiently compensates Rosen,
Peer Int’l Corp. v. Pausa
Factoring in the willfulness of Medlin’s conduct, the Court
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while also demonstrating to Medlin that it “costs less to obey” the Copyright Act than
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to violate it. Odnil Music Ltd., 2006 WL 2545869, at *7.
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3.
Attorney’s Fees
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Rosen also requests an award of attorney’s fees. Under the Copyright Act, a
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court may award costs and a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party. 17
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U.S.C. § 505. The Ninth Circuit has identified five non-exclusive factors that a court
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may consider in deciding whether to award attorney’s fees under section 505: (1) the
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degree of success obtained; (2) frivolousness; (3) motivation; (4) objective
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unreasonableness; and (5) the need to advance considerations of compensation and
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deterrence. Magnuson v. Video Yesteryear, 85 F.3d 1424, 1432 (9th Cir. 1996); Smith
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v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1221 (9th Cir. 1996).
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The factors favor awarding attorney’s fees in this case. The foregoing analysis
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indicates that Rosen was successful on the merits and that his claim was not frivolous.
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Rosen adds that attorney’s fees would be appropriate not only because of Medlin’s
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willful conduct, but also because many of the motions filed in this lawsuit could have
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been avoided if Medlin actively participated in this litigation or engaged in settlement
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discussions. (Mot. 18:19–21.) Indeed, Medlin’s consistent inability to follow court
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rules, with no credible explanation for his conduct, resulted in a waste of judicial
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resources. See Sun World, Inc. v. Lizarazu Olivarria, 144 F.R.D. 384, 390 (E.D. Cal.
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1992). The Court also agrees that an award of attorney’s fees against Medlin serves as
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a further reminder against engaging in willful misconduct. See Magnuson, 85 F.3d at
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1432 (noting that in considering attorney’s fees under section 505, a district court
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should “seek to promote the Copyright Act’s objectives”) (quoting Historical
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Research v. Cabral, 80 F.3d 377, 378–79 (9th Cir. 1996)). Accordingly, the Court
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awards Rosen $13,130.00 in attorney’s fees and $485.00 in costs.
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V.
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CONCLUSION
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For the reasons discussed above, the Court hereby GRANTS Rosen’s Motion
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for Default Judgment (ECF No. 66). The Court awards a permanent injunction,
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$15,000 in statutory damages, $13,130.00 in attorney’s fees and $485.00 in costs.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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April 27, 2016
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____________________________________
OTIS D. WRIGHT, II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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