United States America v. County of Los Angeles et al

Filing 103

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 84 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson. (SEE DOCUMENT FOR FURTHER DETAILS) (vv)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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UNITED STATES AMERICA,

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Plaintiff,
v.
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et
al.,

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Defendants.
___________________________

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Case No. CV 15-05903 DDP (JEMx)
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
[Dkt. 84]

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Presently before the court is Defendants’ Motion for Judgment
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on the Pleadings of Intervenors’ First Amended Complaint in
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Intervention (“FACI”).

The FACI alleges that a portion of an

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executed settlement agreement between Plaintiff (“the government”)
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and Defendant (“the County”) violates the Americans with
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Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,
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and Intervenors’ Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Having

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considered the submissions of the parties and heard oral argument,
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the court denies the motion and adopts the following Order.
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I.

Background

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On August 5, 2015, the government filed a Complaint against
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the County under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act

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(“CRIPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997-1997j, and the Violent Crime Control

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and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141.1

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alleged repeated and systemic violations of prisoners’ constitional

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rights in the Los Angeles County jail system.

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violations included constitutionally deficient mental health care

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and related services, such as suicide prevention, psychological and

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pyschiatric services, and discharge planning, as well as inadequate

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housing and sanitation practices and a pattern of excessive force

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against prisoners.

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The Complaint

The alleged

(Complaint ¶¶ 22-26.)

The same day the Complaint was filed, the government and the

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County filed a stipulated settlement of this matter.

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stipulated Settlement Agreement (“Agreement”), which spans 125

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paragraphs and nearly sixty pages, provides for a series of new or

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enhanced policies and practices across nineteen subject areas

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intended to ensure that the County will provide “prisoners at the

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Jails with safe and secure conditions and ensure their reasonable

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safety from harm, including serious risk from self-harm and

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excessive force, and ensure adequate treatment for their serious

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mental health needs.”

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terms is a provision regarding inmate discharge planning

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(“Paragraph 34”).

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34.

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(Agreement ¶ 16.)

The

Among the stipulated

That provision states:

The County and the Sheriff will conduct discharge
planning and linkage to community mental health
providers and aftercare services for all prisoners
with serious mental illness as follows:

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(a)
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For prisoners who are in Jail seven days or
less, a preliminary treatment plan, including
discharge information, will be developed.

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The Complaint also named Los Angeles County Sheriff Jim
McDonnell as a Defendant, in his official capacity.
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(b)

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For prisoners who are in Jail more than seven
days, a [Qualified Mental Health Professional]
will also make available:

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(i)

for prisoners who are receiving
psychotropic medications, a 30-day
prescription for those medications
will be offered either through the
release planning process, through
referral to a re-entry resource
center, or through referral to an
appropriate community provider,
unless clinically contraindicated;

(ii)

in-person consultation to address
housing, mental
health/medical/substance abuse
treatment, income/benefits
establishment, and
family/community/social supports.
This consultation will also identify
specific action to be taken and
identify individuals responsible for
each action;

(iii)

if the prisoner has an intense need
for assistance, as described in
[County Mental Health] policies, the
prisoner will further be provided
direct linkage to an Institution for
Mental Disease (“IMD”), IMD-Step-down
facility, or appropriately licensed
hospital;

(iv)

if the prisoner has a moderate need
for assistance, as described in
[County Mental Health] policies, and
as clinically appropriate to the
needs of the prisoner, the prisoner
will be offered enrollment in Full
Service Partnership or similar
program, placement in an Adult
Residential Facility (“Board and
Care”) or other residential treatment
facility, and direct assistance
accessing community resources;

(v)

if the prisoner has minimal needs for
assistance, as described in [County
Mental Health] policies, the prisoner
will be offered referrals to routine
services as appropriate, such as
General Relief, Social Security,
community mental health clinics,

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substance abuse programs, and/or
outpatient care/support groups.

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(c)
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The County will provide a re-entry resource
center with QMHPs available to all prisoners
where they may obtain information about
available mental health services and other
community resources.

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(Agreement ¶ 34.)
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Intervenors intervened and later filed the FACI, which alleges
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that Paragraph 34 violates the ADA, Section 504 of the
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Rehabilitation Act, and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
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Intervenors allege, for example, that Paragraph 34 facially
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discriminates against disabled prisoners whose disability stems
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from personality disorders, substance abuse and dependence
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disorders, dementia, or developmental disabilities, as well as all
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disabled prisoners who spend seven days or fewer in jail.2
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(Agreement ¶ 34, 34(a); FACI ¶ 101.)

The FACI also alleges that

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Paragraph 34 discriminates against disabled inmates, fails to
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reasonably accommodate Intervenors’ disabilities, and places
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certain inmates in non-integrated environments in violation of the
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ADA’s integration mandate.

(FACI ¶¶ 101, 112.)

Intervenors

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further allege, in essence, that Paragraph 34's discharge
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procedures do not allow Intervenors to access medical and
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psychiatric services, and that Paragraph 34's failings constitute
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deliberate indifference to Intervenors’ serious medical needs.
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Defendants now move for judgment on the pleadings.
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II.

Legal Standard

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The Agreement’s definition of “serious mental illness”
expressly excludes these substantive categories, with the exception
of personality disorders that are “associated with serious or
recurrent significant self-harm.” (Agreement ¶ 15(aa).)
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A party may move for judgment on the pleadings “[a]fter the

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pleadings are closed [] but early enough as not to delay the

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trial.”

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proper when the moving party clearly establishes that no material

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issue of fact remains to be resolved and that it is entitled to

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judgment as a matter of law.

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Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1990); Doleman v. Meiji

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Mut. Life Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 1480, 1482 (9th Cir. 1984).

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standard applied on a Rule 12(c) motion is essentially the same as

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).

Judgment on the pleadings is

Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard

The

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that applied on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to

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state a claim, with the court accepting all of the non-moving

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party’s allegations as true.

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F.3d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 2011).

Lyon v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 656

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III. Discussion

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A.

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Defendants contend first that Intervenors lack standing to

Standing

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bring their claims.

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invasion of a concrete, legally protectable interest is sufficient

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to constitute an injury for purposes of standing.

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Defenders of Wildlife, 540 U.S. 555, 560, 564 n.2 (1992).

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Defendants argue that it is uncertain whether Intervenors will be

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incarcerated again, and that even if they are incarcerated, it is

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unclear whether they will be adversely affected by the policies set

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forth in Paragraph 34.

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credible threat of future injury.

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Security, 669 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 2012).

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It is well established that the “imminent”

See Lujan v.

Intervenors need only show, however, a
Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland

As this court noted in allowing intervention in this case,
“Intervenors have presented evidence that they are caught up in a
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tragic cycle of homelessness and incarceration perpetuated and

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punctuated by manifestations of mental illness and unbroken by any

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adequate treatment.”

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some Intervenors have been detained in Los Angeles County jail

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facilities dozens of times, while others have been arrested

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hundreds of times.

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and most have histories of substance abuse.

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appears that Intervenors have entered the jail system largely as a

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result of their mental health conditions, and that those conditions

(Dkt. 75 at 8 n.4).

The FACI alleges that

All suffer from at least one mental illness,
In some cases, it

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have then been aggravated by incarceration and, in some cases, the

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denial of medication.

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streets, often in a more vulnerable, less stable state than when

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they entered the jail system.

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appears to be little doubt that there is a credible threat that

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Intervenors will again find themselves incarcerated and subject to

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the policies set forth in Paragraph 34.

Intervenors have then been released onto the

Under these circumstances, there

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Defendants also argue that Intervenors lack standing as a

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matter of law because the threat of future injury to Intervenors is

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entirely dependent on their engaging in illegal conduct in the

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future.

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where the future injury could be inflicted only in the event of

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future illegal conduct by the plaintiff.”

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F.3d 849, 865 (9th Cir. 2001).

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denied where it is “contingent upon [plaintiffs’] violating the

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law, getting caught, and being convicted.”

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Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (quoting

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Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 15 (1983).

The Ninth Circuit has held that “standing is inappropriate

Armstrong v. Davis, 275

In other words, standing should be

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Hodgers-Durgin v. de la

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Defendants appear to assume that Intervenors are only caught

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up in the jail system when they violate the law and are convicted

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of a crime.

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been incarcerated for drug offenses stemming from addiction

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problems, or for shoplifting food, soap, shampoo, toothpaste, and

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deodorant, or for other petty offenses often associated with

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homelessness.

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inability, to pay fines incurred after riding public transportation

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without a valid fare.

Granted, some Intervenors acknowledge that they have

Some have outstanding warrants for failure, or

It is unclear at this stage, however,

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whether or how often Intervenors have been convicted of criminal

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offenses.

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above may be closely entwined with mental health issues and

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potential defenses related thereto.

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subjected to unlawful practices by law enforcement or custodial

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personnel without having ever engaged in illegal conduct.

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e.g. Armstrong, 275 F.3d at 866; Hodgers-Durgin, 199 F.3d at 1041.

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Some Intervenors, including veterans, appear to have been

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incarcerated after exhibiting symptoms of mental illness, including

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schizophrenic episodes, periods of confusion related to post-

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traumatic stress disorder, hearing voices, and talking to trees,

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without any facially apparent tie to any illegal activity.

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27.)

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In addition, criminal activities of the type described

Furthermore, a person may be

See,

(Dkt.

Nor is the court persuaded that the standing principle

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articulated in Armstrong is applicable to the mental health-focused

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circumstances here.

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Supreme Court cases as did the Armstrong court, explained that the

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Supreme Court’s approach to the denial of standing was “based on

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the plaintiff’s ability to avoid engaging in illegal conduct.”

The Hodgers-Durgin court, citing the same

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Hodgers-Durgin, 199 F.3d at 1041 (discussing City of Los Angeles v.

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Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) and Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 15

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(1998)) (emphasis added).

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mentally ill, homeless, and possibly addicted or chemically

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dependent individuals can realistically be said to have the ability

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to avoid engaging in the type of minor infractions that appear to

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result in repeated incarcerations, particularly where the very fact

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of incarceration may disrupt ongoing care, exacerbate the effects

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of disabilities, and impede future treatment.

This court has serious questions whether

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At this stage, it appears to the court that the threat of

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future harm to Intervenors is not dependent on their conscious

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decisions to purposefully engage in unlawful activity in the

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future.

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concomitant symptoms and behaviors, which may be aggravated by the

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types of practices challenged here, are likely to lead to repeated

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incarcerations and exposure to the harms alleged.

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therefore, have standing.

Rather, the very nature of Intervenors’ disabilities and

Intervenors,

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B.

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A plaintiff bringing a discrimination claim under Title II of

ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims

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the ADA or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act must allege “(1)

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the plaintiff is an individual with a disability; (2) the plaintiff

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is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of

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some public entity’s services, programs, or activities; (3) the

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plaintiff was either excluded from participation in or denied the

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benefits of the public entity’s services, programs, or activities,

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or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and

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(4) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by

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reason of the plaintiff’s disability.”
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Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d

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890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002); Melton v. Dallas Area-Rapid Transit, 391

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F.3d 669, 676 (9th Cir. 2004).

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Much of the parties’ argument here is colored by differences

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in the characterization of the FACI’s claims.

Defendants seek to

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cast the claims in terms of discrimination between groups of

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disabled inmates; namely, those who qualify for extra discharge

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planning under Paragraph 34 and those who do not.

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acknowledging that they did take this position earlier, Intervenors

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appear to concede that benefits extended to one group of disabled

Although

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individuals need not necessarily be provided to all disabled

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people.

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. [T]he central purpose of [the Rehabilitation Act] . . . is to

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assure that handicapped individuals receive ‘evenhanded treatment’

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in relation to nonhandicapped individuals. . . .

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in the Rehabilitation Act that requires that any benefit extended

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to one category of handicapped persons also be extended to all

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other categories of handicapped persons.”).

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See Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 548-49 (1988) ( . .

There is nothing

Intervenors’ main contention, however, is different.

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Intervenors argue that Paragraph 34 results in a denial of

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meaningful, state-provided discharge planning services with respect

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to Intervenors.

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[Intervenors] from meaningful access to County and other services

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based on their disability.”

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(Opposition at 16.)

That denial, in turn, “bars

(Opp. at 18:14-15.)

Hewing closely to Traynor, Defendants argue that Intervenors

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cannot possibly be discriminated against because non-disabled

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inmates do not receive any discharge planning services that are not

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available to disabled inmates, including Intervenors.

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(“Although Intervenors argue that non-disabled persons receive
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(Reply at 13

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discharge planning in the form of being ‘processed, released, and

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walked out the door,’ they do not allege that disabled persons are

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not processed and released.”).)

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planning is considered a “service,” all inmates are processed and

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released in the same, evenhanded way.

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fact that Paragraph 34 provides some additional benefits to some,

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but not all, disabled people is immaterial, as the provision of

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those extra benefits to a select disabled few does not deny any

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disabled person a service available to a nondisabled person.

In other words, even if discharge

Thus, the argument goes, the

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(Reply at 13 (“Non-disabled persons do not need or receive any of

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the services set forth in paragraph 34.”).)

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persuasive.

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This argument is not

The ADA and Rehabilitation Act cover both intentional

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discrimination and facially neutral practices that

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disproportionately impact disabled people.

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F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1996).

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that courts should not dwell on distinctions between intentionally

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discriminatory practices and those that are merely “thoughtless,”

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but should instead “assess whether disabled persons were denied

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‘meaningful access’ to state-provided services.”

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Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 302 (1985).)

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denies disabled persons meaningful access to state services by

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reason of their disability discriminates against disabled

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individuals in violation of the ADA.

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Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81

The Ninth Circuit has counseled

Id. (discussing
A policy that

Crowder, 81 F.3d at 1485.

It is somewhat unclear whether the parties consider discharge

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planning itself to be a state-provided service.

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implicitly suggest that it is, albeit a very basic one that is

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provided in the same way to every inmate.
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Defendants

At this stage of the

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proceedings, the nature and scope of Defendants’ “processing and

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release” procedures are not yet factually developed.

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characterization, however, of discharge policy as mere, and

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uniformly-applied, guidance toward the jailhouse door strikes the

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court as an oversimplification.

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designed to achieve certain goals, which may or may not be limited

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to constitutional or other floors.3

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and could not, for example, simply show a severely ill inmate to an

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exit without any concern for what might befall that inmate on the

Any

Defendants’ discharge policies are

Defendants presumably do not,

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other side of the door.

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1160, 1164 (9th Cir. 1999) (“A state’s failure to provide

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medication sufficient to cover [a post-incarceration] transitional

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period amounts to an abdication of its responsibility to provide

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medical care to those, who by reason of incarceration, are unable

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to provide for their own medical needs.”).

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acknowledged at argument that the discharge process does account

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for disabilities to some extent.

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example, that a jail cannot discharge a wheelchair-bound inmate by

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simply wheeling her out the door onto an elevated, ramp-less

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entryway without running afoul of the ADA.

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See, e.g. Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d

Indeed, Defendants

Defendants do not dispute, for

Although factual questions abound, it appears to the court

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that inmates may receive some form of discharge planning services.4

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For a non-disabled person, the procedure necessary to satisfy

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Defendants’ goals may not entail anything more than directing the

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The court recognizes that further factual development may be
required before these goals can be delineated.
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It is unclear, for example, whether Paragraph 34 represents
the entirety of Defendants’ discharge policy even regarding those
disabled persons to whom it applies.
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inmate to the exit stairs.

That does not mean, however, that no

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service is provided, or that the same discharge service would prove

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meaningful to a person in a wheelchair, or to mentally ill persons

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such as Intervenors.

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non-disabled people and, as a result of Paragraph 34, some disabled

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people, in a manner and condition that enables those persons to

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perform life activities such as arranging transportation, obtaining

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medical care, accessing food and shelter, and seeking other public

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services.

Intervenors argue that Defendants discharge

Intervenors, in contrast, are not discharged in that

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same manner or condition.

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adequately alleged that, as a result of their particular

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disabilities, they are denied meaningful access to discharge

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planning services.

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any or all of the modifications to Paragraph 34 Intervenors seek

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are reasonable or necessary to afford them meaningful access to

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such services, are questions for another day.

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At this stage, Intervenors have

Whether that is the case, and if so, whether

Even if discharge planning is not itself a service, Defendants

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are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Defendants’

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position is premised upon “the assumption that no violation of the

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ADA occurs unless a service or benefit of the state is provided in

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a manner that discriminates against disabled individuals.”

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Crowder, 81 F.3d at 1483.

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however, “[t]his simply is not so.”

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addition to “outright discrimination” of the type upon which

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Defendants focus, the ADA also prohibits “those forms of

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discrimination which deny disabled persons public services

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disproportionately due to their disability.”

As the Ninth Circuit stated in Crowder,

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Crowder, 81 F.3d at 1483.

Id.

In

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In Crowder, disabled plaintiffs brought an ADA challenge to

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the State of Hawaii’s policy of quarantining all carnivorous

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animals entering the state.

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120-day quarantine procedures were imposed on all dogs, including

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guide dogs for the visually impaired.

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visually-imparied plaintiffs on summary judgment, the district

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court concluded that even though Hawaii’s quarantine policy did not

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allow plaintiffs to make meaningful use of state-provided services,

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plaintiffs could not show an ADA violation because they had not

Crowder, 81 F.3d at 1482-83.

Id.

The same

In finding against the

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been denied any state services on the basis of a disability.

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at 1483-84.

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Id.

The Ninth Circuit, focusing on “meaningful access” to public

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services rather than intentional denial of them, reversed.

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Crowder, 81 F.3d at 1484-85.

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the fact that the state applied the quarantine evenhandedly, the

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policy disproportionately burdened the visually disabled,

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effectively denying them access to public services such as

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transportation, parks, and government facilities.

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denials of meaningful access, the court held, constitute

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discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of the ADA.

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Id. at 1485.

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The court held that, notwithstanding

Id.

Such

Intervenors here allege discrimination similar to that in

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Crowder.

Certain inmates are released, whether under Paragraph 34

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or not, in a manner that allows them to access state services,

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programs, and activities.

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allegedly determined by their particular disabilities, are not

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afforded that same access.

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quarantine effectively denies . . . the plaintiffs in this case[]

Intervenors, whose manner of release is

See Crowder, 81 F.3d at 1484 (“Hawaii’s

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meaningful access to state services . . . while such services . . .

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remain open and easily accessible by others.”).

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Defendants argue in a footnote that Crowder is inapt because

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it involved taking something away from a disabled person.

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at 13 n. 3.)

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court’s reasoning had nothing to do with the state’s active taking

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of disabled individuals’ guide dogs.

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“meaningful access” approach moved away from an emphasis on

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intentional acts in an attempt to better capture instances of

That distinction is not persuasive.

(Reply

The Crowder

To the contrary, the court’s

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discriminatory “benign neglect, apathy, and indifference.”5

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Crowder, 81 F.3d at 1484 (internal quotation marks and citation

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omitted).

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of active deprivation, but to other facially neutral barriers, such

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as stairs or a refusal to communicate by spoken word.

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84.

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cannot, as a matter of law, require Defendants to provide

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Intervenors with “extra” accommodations, that argument is no more

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persuasive than asserting that wheelchair-bound people need not be

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provided “extra” ramps or elevators to access government buildings

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accessible by staircase.

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The court analogized Hawaii’s quarantine not to any form

Id. at 1483-

To the extent Defendants contend that “meaningful access”

See Crowder, 81 F.3d at 1483-84.

Intervenors have adequately alleged that they are denied
meaningful access to public services on the basis of their

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Even if some sort of active intrusion were required,
Defendants provide no explanation why the deprivation of
Intervenors’ liberty, which denies them the ability to seek out or
continue mental health treatment of their choosing, and may
disproportionately exacerbate the deleterious effects of certain
disabilities, in part as a result of the loss of the ability to
access community resources, would not constitute an affirmative
deprivation on par with the quarantining of a guide dog.
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disabilities.

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warranted.

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Accordingly, judgment on the pleadings is not

Integration Mandate

Paragraph 34(b)(iii) provides that certain prisoners with an

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“intense need for assistance” will be provided a “direct linkage to

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an Institution for Mental Disease (“IMD”), IMD-Step-down facility,

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or appropriately licensed hospital.”

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provision does not adequately define “intense need,” and thus

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violates the ADA’s integration mandate, which requires public

Intervenors allege that this

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entities to “administer services, programs, and activities in the

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most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified

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individuals with disabilities.”6

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28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d).

In Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, the Supreme Court

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concluded that the integration mandate requires community-based, as

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opposed to hospital or institutional, treatment when “[1] the

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State’s treatment professionals determine that such placement is

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appropriate, [2] the affected persons do not oppose such treatment,

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and [3] the placement can be reasonably accommodated, taking into

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account the resources available to the State and the needs of

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others with mental disabilities.”

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Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 607 (1999).

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addressed an integration mandate claim in Townshend v. Quasim, 328

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F.3d 511 (9th Cir. 2003).

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integration mandate regulation and Olmstead, the court nevertheless

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applied the traditional ADA pleading standard.

Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel.
The Ninth Circuit subsequently

There, although citing to both the

Townshend v.

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This mandate is patterned on one set forth in the
Rehabilitation Act’s implementing regulations. See 28 C.F.R. §
41.51(d).
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Quasim, 328 F.3d at 516 (“To prove that a public service or program

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violates Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show (1) he is a

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qualified individual with a disability; (2) he was either excluded

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from participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity’s

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services, programs, or activities or was otherwise discriminated

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against by the public entity; (3) such exclusion, denial of

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benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability.”)

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(internal quotation and citation omitted).

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Here, the arguments regarding the integration mandate claims

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are focused primarily on the parties’ conflicting views of the

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appropriate pleading standard, and are otherwise not fully

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developed.

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claim appears sufficiently pleaded under Townshend.

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motion is therefore denied with respect to the integration mandate

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claim, without prejudice.

At this juncture, Intervenors’ integration mandate
Defendants’

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B.

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The FACI alleges that Intervenors “have a known and obvious

Constitutional Claims

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need for medical care after release from custody,” that inadequate

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discharge planning under Paragraph 34 threatens to deny them that

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medical care as a matter of policy, and that adoption of Paragraph

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34 constitutes deliberate indifference to Intervenors’ medical

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needs in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

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Defendants argue that Intervenors’ constitutional claims fail as a

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matter of law.

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Defendants, citing to the Supreme Court of Massachusetts,

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argue that homeless, mentally ill people have no constitutional

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rights to follow-up medical care after incarceration.

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21, citing Williams v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office of Human Servs.,
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(Motion at

1

414 Mass. 551, 566 (1993).

The court disagrees.

In the Ninth

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Circuit, “the state must provide an outgoing prisoner who is

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receiving and continues to require medication with a supply

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sufficient to ensure that he has that medication available during

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the period of time reasonably necessary to permit him to consult a

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doctor and obtain a new supply.

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this transitional period amounts to an abdication of its

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responsibility to provide medical care to those, who by reason of

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incarceration, are unable to provide for their own medical needs.”

A state’s failure to . . . cover

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Wakefield, 177 F.3d at 1164. The court sees no reason why this

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principle should not apply to mental illness.7

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Next, Defendants contend that Intervenors fail to allege

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deliberate indifference.

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inartfully makes reference to the deliberate indifference standard

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with respect to both the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment claims.

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pre-trial detainee need not show deliberate indifference to prevail

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on a Fourteenth Amendment claim.

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F.3d 918, 934 (9th Cir. 2004).

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does allege deliberate indifference.

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disabilities and serious medical needs are apparent and known to

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Defendants, and that Defendants not only ignore those needs, but do

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so as an explicit matter of policy, i.e. Paragraph 34.

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Defendants are correct that the FACI

See, e.g. Jones v. Blanas, 393

In any event, however, the FACI
Intervenors allege that their

As with the integration mandate claim, the constitutional

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claims are not the focus of either party’s briefing.

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thus far, Intervenors’ constitutional claims are adequately

As presented

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A

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If anything, a public entity may be more responsible for
mental health treatment where the incarceration itself has
aggravated or exacerbated the harmful symptoms of mental illness.
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alleged.

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the constitutional claims, without prejudice.

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IV.

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Defendants’ motion is therefore denied with respect to

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion is DENIED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: May 17, 2016
DEAN D. PREGERSON
United States District Judge

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