Gilbert Guzman v Space Exploration Technologies Corp. et al

Filing 25

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND by Judge Manuel L. Real: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Remand 18 is GRANTED. Case Remanded to Los Angeles Superior Court, Case No. BC574495. ( MD JS-6. Case Terminated. ) (gk)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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GILBERT GUZMAN, an individual,

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Plaintiff,
vs.
SPACE EXPLORATION TECHNOLOGIES
CORP., a Delaware Corporation; and DOES 1
through 60, inclusive;
Defendants.

) CASE NO. CV 15-6000-R
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) ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
) MOTION TO REMAND
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Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, which was filed on November 18, 2015.
(Dkt. No. 18). This Court took the matter under submission on December 15, 2015.

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A defendant may remove a civil action from state court to federal court if original

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jurisdiction would have existed in the federal court at the time the complaint was filed. 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1441(a). The Ninth Circuit “strictly construe[s] the removal statute against removal jurisdiction.

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Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). The strong presumption against removal

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jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.

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Id. Accordingly, federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of

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removal in the first instance. Id.

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Federal question jurisdiction is governed by the “well-pleaded complaint rule.” Under that

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principle, subject matter jurisdiction is proper only when a federal question appears on the face of

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a complaint. See, e.g., Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). As a result, a

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defendant cannot remove solely “on the basis of a federal defense, including the defense of pre-

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emption, even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint, and even if both parties

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concede that the federal defense is the only question truly at issue” in the case. Id. at 393.

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Even when properly removed in the first instance, “a district court has discretion to remand

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a properly removed case to state court when none of the federal claims are remaining, upon a

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proper determination that retaining jurisdiction over the case would be inappropriate.” Harrell v.

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20th Century Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 203, 205 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v.

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Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted). This discretionary power

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allows “district courts to deal with cases involving pendent claims in the manner that best serves

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the principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity which underlie the pendent

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jurisdiction doctrine.” Cohill, 484 U.S. at 357. Attempts by the Plaintiff to manipulate the

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appropriateness of the forum can be taken into account by the trial court when determining

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whether remand would be proper. Id.

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Even assuming, arguendo, that removal of this case was proper under this Court’s federal

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question and supplemental jurisdiction, both parties agree that any potential basis for removal

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jurisdiction is no longer in the Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. As a result, both parties

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agree that this Court has the discretion to remand this case if in the interest of judicial economy,

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convenience, fairness, and comity. Discovery has begun in this case, but it has all occurred in the

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state court proceeding. While the Defendant suggests that remand might delay its day in court for

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a year or more, it provides absolutely no basis for this assertion. Considering that this case was

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removed to this Court only in August, very little federal motion practice has occurred, and

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significant discovery has already commenced at the state court; the interests of judicial economy,
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convenience, fairness, and comity all weigh in favor of remand here. When also factoring in the

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ambiguous nature of the merits for removal in the first instance and the strong presumption against

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removal jurisdiction generally, this Court may and does, fairly and justifiably, REMAND this case

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to the Superior Court of the State of California. See generally Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is GRANTED. (Dkt. No.

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18).

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Dated: December 18, 2015.

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___________________________________
MANUEL L. REAL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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