Ivan Rene Moore v. Michelle Rosenblatt et al
Filing
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ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAININGORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 17 . This order is without prejudice to Moore filing a properly noticed and supported motion for a preliminary injunction that complies with this Courts standing orders, his duties under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, and the Local Civil Rules by Judge Otis D. Wright, II (lc)
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United States District Court
Central District of California
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IVAN RENE MOORE,
Plaintiff,
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Case № 2:15-cv-08021-ODW (GJS)
v.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MICHELLE ROSENBLATT, et al.,
Defendants.
EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR A
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
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ORDER AND PRELIMINARY
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INJUNCTION [17]
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I.
INTRODUCTION
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On December 15, 2015, Plaintiff Ivan Rene Moore (“Moore”) filed an ex parte
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application seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against
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“Defendants Kimberly Martin Bragg, and remaining Defendants, their agents and
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attorneys from selling, transferring, destroying, [and] hypothecating Ivan Rene
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Moore’s property, during the pendency of this action, specifically identified as
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follows: Clothing, shoes, kitchen equipment, personal property, piano, SSLK console,
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music/sound/recording equipment, musical instruments, master recordings, ’71
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Camaro, personal legal documents, Motorcycle; auto parts, tools, paintings, jewelry,
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certificates of deposits, deeds to real property, Barer [sic] Bonds, Coin Collections,
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corporate notes and records. Legal exhibits work product for all cases.” [Dkt. 17 at
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3.]
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For the following reasons, the Court DENIES the request for a temporary
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restraining order and DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the request for a
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preliminary injunction.
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II.
LEGAL STANDARD
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“The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is identical to the
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standard for issuing a preliminary injunction.” Lockheed Missile & Space Co. v.
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Hughes Aircraft Co., 887 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (N.D. Cal. 1995). A court may only
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grant such relief “upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.”
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Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). To prevail, the moving
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party must show: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood that the
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moving party will suffer irreparable harm absent preliminary injunctive relief; (3) that
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the balance of equities tips in the moving party’s favor; and (4) that preliminary
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injunctive relief is in the public interest (the “Winter factors”). Id. at 20. “Under
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Winter, plaintiffs must establish that irreparable harm is likely, not just possible, in
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order to obtain a preliminary injunction.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell,
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632 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2011) (original emphasis).
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“‘serious questions going to the merits’ and a hardship balance that tips sharply
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toward the plaintiff can [also] support issuance of an injunction, assuming the other
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two elements of the Winter test are also met.” Id. at 1132, 1135 (holding that the
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“sliding scale” test remains viable “so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a
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likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest”).
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III.
In the Ninth Circuit,
DISCUSSION
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Applying the above standard, the Court finds that Moore’s papers do not come
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even close to establishing the necessary likelihood for success on the merits, or even
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serious questions going to the merits. Accordingly, the Court does not address the
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other prongs of the Winter test.
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Moore relies solely on the fact that he “has been awarded this property
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specifically” in a Los Angeles Superior Court action as proof that he is likely to
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succeed on the merits in this civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [See Dkt. 17 at 5.]
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Moore’s reliance is misplaced because Moore must overcome significant procedural
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hurdles to continue to prosecute his case.
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First, absolute immunity likely bars Moore’s claims against state judges
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predicated on their exercise of judicial authority by issuing orders and judgments.
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“Absolute judicial immunity ‘insulates judges from charges of erroneous acts or
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irregular action.’” Burton v. Infinity Capital Mgmt., 753 F.3d 954, 959 (9th Cir. 2014)
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(quoting In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2002)); see Mireles v. Waco, 502
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U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991) (per curiam) (“It is well settled that judges are generally immune
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from suit for money damages.”). That protection from suit exists “even when it is
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alleged that [a judge’s] action was driven by malicious or corrupt motives[.]” In re
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Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219,
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225 (1988)). And judicial immunity extends to all “civil suits arising out of their
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judicial functions,” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11, which means it applies not only to suits
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for damages, but also “to actions for declaratory, injunctive and other equitable
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relief.” Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 1996) (superseded by statute
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on other grounds). This includes federal civil rights actions and ADA claims. E.g.,
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Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended on denial
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of reh'g (Oct. 11, 2001); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (en
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banc). To determine what constitutes a “judicial act,” a court considers whether “(1)
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the precise act is a normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred in the judge’s
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chambers; (3) the controversy centered around a case then pending before the judge;
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and (4) the events at issue arose directly and immediately out of a confrontation with
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the judge in his or her official capacity.” New Alaska Dev. Corp. v. Guetschow, 869
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F.2d 1298, 1302 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted) (cited in Salessi v. Commonwealth
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Land Title Ins. Co., No. SA CV 08-01274-DOC, 2013 WL 5676209 at *9 (C.D. Cal.
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Oct. 16, 2013)). Issuing orders and judgments plainly fall within the prototypical
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scope of judicial action.
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Similarly, certain other defendants working for the courts—such as court
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clerks—may also be protected by absolute quasi-judicial immunity. Castillo, 297
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F.3d at 948 (“[I]ndividuals, when performing functions that are judicial in nature, or
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who have a sufficiently close nexus to the adjudicative process, are entitled to a grant
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of absolute quasi-judicial immunity[.]”).
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Second, a substantial portion of this suit, if not the entire suit, may be barred by
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the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.1 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “prevents lower federal
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courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by ‘state-court losers’
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challenging ‘state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
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commenced.’” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 460 (2006) (per curiam) (quoting
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Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Here,
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much of Moore’s suit is predicated on a challenge to the non-enforcement of
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judgments upon jury verdicts and other judicial orders in state court proceedings.
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Accordingly, the Court is unlikely to be able to assert jurisdiction over a substantial
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portion of Moore’s claims.
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Third, regardless of judicial immunity, the Eleventh Amendment likely bars a
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damages award against the judges and other state court employees in their official
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capacities. It is well settled that “a suit against a state official in his official capacity is
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no different from a suit against the State itself.” Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l
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Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police,
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491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Accordingly, the Eleventh Amendment bars section 1983
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actions against state officials, just as it does for suits against states, because neither are
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“persons” covered by section 1983. Id.
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District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust
Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
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The judicial defendants here are judges of the Superior Courts of the State of
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California. Those courts are state courts, and thus the judges and other Superior Court
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employees are state employees. See Saunders v. Law Offices of Elaine Van Beveren,
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520 Fed. App’x 548, 549 (9th Cir. 2013); Greater L.A. Council on Deafness, Inc. v.
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Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir.1987) (“The official name of the court is the
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Superior Court of the State of California; its geographical location within any
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particular county cannot change the fact that the court derives its power from the State
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and is ultimately regulated by the State. Judges are appointed by California’s
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governor, and their salaries are established and paid by the State.”). Therefore, suits
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against the judges and judicial employees are suits against the State, likely barred by
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the Eleventh Amendment.
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These are but a tip of the iceberg. And even putting aside the underlying
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procedural issues, Moore makes no attempt in his moving papers to demonstrate that
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he is likely to prove the elements of Section 1983 against any defendant, namely that
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“(1) the action complained of occurred ‘under color of law,’ and (2) the action
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resulted in a deprivation of a constitutional right or a federal statutory right.”
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Mangum v. Action Collection Serv., Inc., 575 F.3d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting
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Azer v. Connell, 306 F.3d 930, 935 (9th Cir. 2002)). Indeed, for the private defendant
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Kimberly Martin-Bragg, Moore is unlikely to show the requisite state action.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
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For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES Moore’s Ex Parte
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Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. [ECF No.
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17.] This order is without prejudice to Moore filing a properly noticed and supported
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motion for a preliminary injunction that complies with this Court’s standing orders,
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his duties under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, and the Local Civil Rules.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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December 21, 2015
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OTIS D. WRIGHT, II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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