Debra Gale v. Carolyn W Colvin

Filing 27

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF REMAND by Magistrate Judge Charles F. Eick. Plaintiff's and Defendant's motions for summary judgment are denied and this matter is remanded for further administrative action consistent with this opinion. (sp)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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DEBRA GALE,

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Plaintiff,
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v.
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CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING
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COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
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Defendant.
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___________________________________)

NO. CV 15-8960-E

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER OF REMAND

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Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), IT IS

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HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s motions for summary

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judgment are denied and this matter is remanded for further

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administrative action consistent with this Opinion.

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PROCEEDINGS

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Plaintiff filed a complaint on November 17, 2015, seeking review

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of the Commissioner’s denial of disability benefits.

The parties

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filed a consent to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge on

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December 30, 2015.

Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on

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October 19, 2016.

Defendant filed a “Memorandum in Support of

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Defendant’s Answer,” which the Court construes as Defendant’s cross-

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motion for summary judgment, on November 14, 2016.

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taken both motions under submission without oral argument.

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7-15; “Order,” filed November 23, 2015.

The Court has
See L.R.

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BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION

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Plaintiff asserts disability since October 10, 2010, based in

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part on an alleged “severe psychotic disorder with documented auditory

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hallucinations, paranoia, and other indicia of psychosis” (including

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visual hallucinations) and “chronic major depression” (Administrative

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Record (“A.R.”) 39, 48-50, 52, 161-69, 190).

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abused cocaine until December 24, 2011, and also admits to a history

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of alcohol abuse (A.R. 39, 47).

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November 21, 2013, Plaintiff’s counsel said Plaintiff “still drinks

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alcohol” but “doesn’t abuse it” (A.R. 39).

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alcohol “abuse” approximately one month before the hearing (A.R. 47;

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but see A.R. 61-62 (Plaintiff testified that she drinks “once in a

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blue moon” and last drank a 40-ounce beer two weeks before the

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hearing, and later testified that her last drink was a couple of days

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or one week before the hearing)).

Plaintiff admits she

At an administrative hearing on

Plaintiff said she stopped

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An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that Plaintiff has

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severe mental depression, alcoholism and drug dependence (A.R. 23).

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The ALJ also determined, however, that Plaintiff retains the residual

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functional capacity to perform work at all exertional levels, limited

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only by a preclusion from work requiring understanding, remembering
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and carrying out detailed or complex tasks (A.R. 26-29 (relying on

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non-examining state agency physician’s opinion at A.R. 85-86, and non-

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examining state agency psychologist’s opinion at A.R. 93-97 for mental

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limitations)).

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opinions of Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Thomas Hoffman –

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the only treating or examining medical source to opine on Plaintiff’s

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mental limitations.

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Dr. Hoffman opined, inter alia, that Plaintiff would miss four or more

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days of work per month due to her impairments, and that her “low

This residual functional capacity contradicts the

See A.R. 288-93, 360-64 (Dr. Hoffman’s opinions).

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intellectual capacity” likely would impair Plaintiff’s ability to work

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regardless of substance abuse (A.R. 293, 364).

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A vocational expert testified that a person having the residual

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functional capacity the ALJ found to exist could perform work as an

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industrial cleaner, hand packager, and assembler (A.R. 68).1

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relied on the vocational expert’s testimony to find Plaintiff not

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disabled (A.R. 30-31).

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looking at additional evidence (reportedly a March 2015 document from

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Dr. Hoffman which is not part of the record) (A.R. 1-6).

The ALJ

The Appeals Council denied review after

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

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Under 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), this Court reviews the

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Administration’s decision to determine if: (1) the Administration’s

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findings are supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the

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The vocational expert also testified that the maximum
monthly rate of absenteeism for the jobs identified would be no
more than two days per month (A.R. 71).
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Administration used correct legal standards.

See Carmickle v.

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Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Hoopai v. Astrue,

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499 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Brewes v. Commissioner,

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682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012).

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relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

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support a conclusion.”

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(1971) (citation and quotations omitted); see Widmark v. Barnhart, 454

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F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006).

Substantial evidence is “such

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401

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If the evidence can support either outcome, the court may

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not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.

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Commissioner’s decision cannot be affirmed simply by

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isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.

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Rather, a court must consider the record as a whole,

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weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that

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detracts from the [administrative] conclusion.

But the

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Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations and

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quotations omitted).

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DISCUSSION

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On the present record, the Court is unable to conclude that the

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Administrations’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.

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Remand is appropriate.

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I.

Summary of the Records Regarding Plaintiff’s Mental Health
Treatment

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Plaintiff’s mental health treatment records are lengthy and

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somewhat repetitious.

Treating psychiatrist Dr. Thomas Hoffman

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provided a “Mental Impairment Questionnaire” dated August 3, 2012

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(A.R. 288-93).2

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three months beginning July 2011 (A.R. 288; see also A.R. 320-32, 396-

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97 (Dr. Hoffman’s treatment notes)).

Dr. Hoffman had been treating Plaintiff every one to

He diagnosed: (1) psychotic

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disorder, not otherwise specified; (2) depressive disorder, not

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otherwise specified; (3) cocaine dependence; (4) alcohol dependence;

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and (5) borderline intellectual functioning (A.R. 288).

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assigned Plaintiff a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score of

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43, indicating “[s]erious symptoms (e.g., suicidal ideation, severe

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obsessional rituals, frequent shoplifting) OR any serious impairment

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in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., no friends,

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unable to keep a job)” (A.R. 288).3

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Plaintiff uses drugs (cocaine and alcohol) “at times” (A.R. 288).

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Hoffman noted that Plaintiff’s medications (Sertraline (Zoloft) and

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Quietapine (Seroquel)) could cause drowsiness, but Plaintiff reported

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none and often complained she cannot sleep (A.R. 288).

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prognosis was “poor” (A.R. 288).

Dr. Hoffman

Dr. Hoffman reported that

Plaintiff’s

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The copy of the questionnaire provided to the Court is
of poor quality and is very difficult to read. See A.R. 288-93.
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Clinicians use the GAF scale to rate “psychological,
social, and occupational functioning on a hypothetical continuum
of mental health-illness.” See American Psychiatric Association,
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM-IVTR”) 34 (4th Ed. 2000 (Text Revision)).
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Dr.

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In the questionnaire, Dr. Hoffman made check marks denoting,

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inter alia, substance dependence, difficulty thinking or

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concentrating, and memory impairment, and elsewhere noted that

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Plaintiff’s substance abuse contributes to her limitations (A.R. 289,

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293).

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which had not been formally tested and was “estimated” (A.R. 288,

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291), is “chronic” and likely would impair Plaintiff’s ability to work

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“irregardless” of substance abuse (A.R. 293; see also A.R. 288

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(Plaintiff’s intellectual capacity reportedly contributes to

Dr. Hoffman opined that Plaintiff’s low intellectual capacity,

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“disability/poor adaptive functioning”)).

Dr. Hoffman indicated that

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Plaintiff would be “unable to meet competitive standards” for

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remembering work-like procedures, and for understanding, remembering,

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and carrying out detailed instructions or the stress of semiskilled or

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skilled work (A.R. 290-91).

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would have “serious limitations” (but not preclusion) in her ability

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to understand, remember, and carry out short and simple instructions,

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maintain attention, maintain regular attendance, work with others

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without being unduly distracted, make simple work-related decisions,

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complete a normal work day or work week without interruptions, perform

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at a consistent pace, get along with coworkers, respond appropriately

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to changes in a routine work setting, deal with normal work stress,

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and set realistic goals or make plans independently of others (A.R.

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290-91).

Dr. Hoffman indicated that Plaintiff

Dr. Hoffman explained:

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Based on several meetings, [Plaintiff’s] intellectual

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capacity seems fairly low; it seems unlikely that

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[Plaintiff] would be able to follow detailed (and sometimes

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even relatively simple) commands/instructions/procedures;
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her IQ has not been formally tested and observations are

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only gross estimations. . . .

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Low intellectual capacity (possibly from birth; possibly due

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to stroke/brain damage) affect her ability to concentrate

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and make and follow through with plans, her thought is

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observed to be concrete and simple; it seems unlikely that

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she would be able to problem solve or follow through with

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work related instructions at the level required to function

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in the work place; symptoms/poor adaptive functioning are

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likely impaired from exacerbation of mood episodes.

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(A.R. 291).

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Dr. Hoffman circled “marked” functional limitation in Plaintiff’s

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ability to maintain concentration, persistence, or pace, and circled

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that Plaintiff would have one to two episodes of decompensation of at

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least a two week duration per year (A.R. 292).

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that Plaintiff would miss four or more days of work per month (A.R.

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293).

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Hoffman checked “no,” but added, “cannot say for sure” (A.R. 293).4

Dr. Hoffman opined

Where the questionnaire asked if Plaintiff is a malingerer, Dr.

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Dr. Hoffman provided a “Mental Residual Functional
Capacity Questionnaire” dated September 3, 2013, which contains
findings similar to those contained in the earlier questionnaire
(A.R. 360-64). Dr. Hoffman again estimated borderline
intellectual functioning with no formal testing, and assigned a
GAF of 43 (A.R. 360 (noting that Plaintiff “demonstrates a below
average to low intellectual capacity”)). He reported “marginal”
response to treatment (A.R. 360).

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(continued...)
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Dr. Hoffman’s treatment notes suggest that Plaintiff’s condition

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may have been improving somewhat with treatment and medication.

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Plaintiff first saw Dr. Hoffman in July 2011 – during a time when she

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admittedly was using cocaine and alcohol – Dr. Hoffman stated, inter

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alia, that: (1) Plaintiff felt her medications stabilize her mood,

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keep her calm, and help her sleep, but she had “poor adherence” to

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treatment (i.e., she missed appointments and had not taken her

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medications for the past month); (2) Plaintiff was “vague/

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contradictory” concerning her alcohol and cocaine use, stating that

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she does not drink when she takes her medication but has difficulty

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recalling periods of sobriety; (3) Plaintiff planned to “obtain

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sobriety” “on [her] own”; and (4) Plaintiff nonetheless reported

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“doing real good” with no recent depressive symptoms, and a “generally

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When

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(...continued)
Dr. Hoffman checked the same boxes as he did in the earlier
questionnaire. Compare A.R. 289-91 with A.R. 361-63. Where
asked to explain Plaintiff’s limitations relating to unskilled
work and to include medical/clinical findings to support the
assessment, Dr. Hoffman answered, “Patient reports problems
controlling her mood/irritability. She has difficulty dealing
with people; she has cognitive deficits and problems with memory
and concentration” (A.R. 362). Dr. Hoffman cited no tests to
support the alleged cognitive deficits and problems with memory
and concentration (A.R. 362). Where asked the same questions for
semiskilled and skilled work, Dr. Hoffman answered similarly to
what he wrote in the earlier questionnaire, referring to
Plaintiff’s allegedly low intellectual capacity and memory,
concentration and executive functioning problems. See A.R. 363;
compare A.R. 291 (answer quoted above).
Dr. Hoffman again opined that Plaintiff would miss more than
four days of work per month (A.R. 364). Dr. Hoffman indicated
without qualification that Plaintiff was not a malingerer (A.R.
364; compare A.R. 293 (qualifying answer)). Dr. Hoffman opined
that Plaintiff would “remain low functioning even with sobriety”
and explained that Plaintiff reported over one year of sobriety
yet her deficits and poor functioning persist (A.R. 364).
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stable” mood (A.R. 331).

Reportedly, Plaintiff’s speech was at a

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normal rate and volume, her mood was “good,” her affect full/

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euthymic/stable/well-related, her thought processes were linear/

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logical/concrete, and her insight and judgment were “fair” (A.R. 331).

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Dr. Hoffman did note to “r/o” (rule out) borderline intellectual

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functioning; Plaintiff reported attending special education (A.R.

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331).5

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331).

Dr. Hoffman continued Plaintiff’s Seroquel and Zoloft (A.R.

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In September 2011, Plaintiff reported no recent mood problems and

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said her medications were helping her (A.R. 330).

Her mood apparently

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was unchanged from July (A.R. 330).

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record, Plaintiff was calm, interactive, euthymic, mostly logical but

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fairly concrete, and had a “fair” level of insight (A.R. 330).

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Plaintiff reportedly had not used cocaine in “months” and drank every

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two months (A.R. 330; but see A.R. 328 (Plaintiff admitting that she

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used cocaine until December 24, 2011)).

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interested in drug or alcohol treatment, saying that she was “cutting

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it out and can do this on [her] own” (A.R. 330).

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continued Plaintiff’s medications (A.R. 330).

According to this treatment

Plaintiff evidently was not

Dr. Hoffman

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In December 2011, Plaintiff admitted that she was still using

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cocaine, which Dr. Hoffman stated “may be [the] cause of mood problems

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or [at] least contribute,” but Plaintiff’s mood and behavior appeared

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stable (A.R. 329).

Again, she reportedly was calm, interactive,

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In every available treatment note except the last one,
Dr. Hoffman indicated a need to rule out borderline intellectual
functioning. See A.R. 321-31, 396-97.
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pleasant, with good eye contact, normal rate and volume of speech,

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“alright” mood, full/euthymic affect, and linear thought processes

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(A.R. 329). Dr. Hoffman continued Plaintiff’s medications (A.R. 329).

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In early March 2012, Plaintiff reportedly had been sober for the

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past three months (since December 24, 2011) –

her longest period of

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sobriety since her teens (A.R. 328).

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Anonymous occasionally (A.R. 328).

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Plaintiff’s mood and behavior appeared stable (A.R. 328).

She was attending Alcoholics
Dr. Hoffman stated that
She

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reportedly was calm, pleasant, interactive and euthymic, with stable

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affect and linear thought processes (A.R. 328).

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Trazodone to Plaintiff’s medications (A.R. 328).

Dr. Hoffman added

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Plaintiff returned later in March 2012, complaining that her

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medications were not working and that she was depressed (A.R. 327).

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She was “most bothered” by poor sleep (A.R. 327).

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calm and interactive, “depressed,” with a calm and stable affect and

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with linear thought processes (A.R. 327).

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logical/reasonable and she supposedly was committed to maintaining her

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sobriety (A.R. 327).

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Zoloft, discontinued Trazodone, and added Benadryl (A.R. 327).

She apparently was

Her plans appeared

Dr. Hoffman increased Plaintiff’s Seroquel and

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In April 2012, Plaintiff reported that she felt less depressed

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with the medication adjustments, but was still sleeping poorly and was

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hearing voices (“random comments/commands”) weekly (A.R. 326).

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Plaintiff apparently was calm and interactive, with “fair” mood,

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stable and euthymic affect, and linear thought processes (A.R. 326).

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Reportedly, her plans were logical/reasonable, and she was committed
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to her sobriety (A.R. 326).

Dr. Hoffman assessed Plaintiff’s mood as

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stable and improving, but her poor sleep was only partially helped by

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medications (A.R. 326).

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“likely [secondary to] past prolonged/heavy substance abuse” (A.R.

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326).

Plaintiff’s auditory hallucinations were

Dr. Hoffman increased Plaintiff’s Seroquel (A.R. 326).

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In July 2012, Plaintiff reported that she had felt more depressed

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lately with sad mood and poor concentration, and had occasional

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suicidal ideation and auditory hallucinations (A.R. 326).

Plaintiff

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admitted that she was taking her medication only sporadically (A.R.

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325).

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calm, interactive, “depressed,” with stable/euthymic affect, and had

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linear but concrete thought processes (A.R. 325).

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observable psychosis (A.R. 325).

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logical/reasonable and she remained committed to sobriety (A.R. 325).

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Dr. Hoffman continued Plaintiff’s medications (A.R. 325).

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annotated the treatment note, stating that on August 3, 2012, he

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completed and forwarded the “Mental Impairment Questionnaire” to

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Plaintiff’s case manager per Plaintiff’s request (A.R. 325).

She also “claim[ed] sobriety” (A.R. 325).

Reportedly, she was

There was no

Plaintiff’s plans appeared

Dr. Hoffman

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In August 2012, Plaintiff reported occasional transient low moods

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and anxiety, but her medications apparently were improving her

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symptoms and leaving her “calmer” (A.R. 324).

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calm, interactive and euthymic, with stable affect and linear thought

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processes (A.R. 324).

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alcohol (A.R. 324).

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(A.R. 324).

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Plaintiff evidently was

She claimed that she was using no drugs or
Dr. Hoffman continued Plaintiff’s medications

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In October 2012, Plaintiff reported some attenuated auditory

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hallucinations, which Dr. Hoffman again noted were a “likely

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persisting effect from years of drug abuse,” but also reported

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improvement with treatment (A.R. 323).

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ignore the voices and said the voices were infrequent with medication

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(A.R. 323).

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and had no persisting depression (A.R. 323).

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calm, pleasant, interactive and euthymic, with stable affect and

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linear thought processes (A.R. 323).

Plaintiff said she could

Plaintiff was doing “fair,” was unhappy with her housing,
Plaintiff evidently was

Plaintiff reported that she had

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not used drugs or alcohol since December (A.R. 323).

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Dr. Hoffman

continued Plaintiff’s medications (A.R. 323).

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In December 2012, Plaintiff reported she was “doing alright,” and

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felt that her medications were improving her symptoms (A.R. 321).

She

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apparently had not had any recent auditory hallucinations (A.R. 321).

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Plaintiff evidently was calm, interactive and euthymic, with stable

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affect and linear thought processes (A.R. 321).

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that she was sober (A.R. 321).

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medications (A.R. 321).

Plaintiff claimed

Dr. Hoffman continued Plaintiff’s

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In March 2013, Plaintiff reported that she had been sober for

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over a year (A.R. 320).

She supposedly was doing well with no recent

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auditory hallucinations, but she said she still had worries about her

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finances and housing (A.R. 320).

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medications improved her mood, irritability, auditory hallucinations,

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and sleep with no reported side effects (A.R. 320 (noting “marked

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improvement” with treatment)).

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interactive and euthymic, with stable affect and linear thought

She apparently felt that her

Reportedly, Plaintiff was calm,

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processes (A.R. 320).

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Dr. Hoffman continued Plaintiff’s medications

(A.R. 320).

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In May 2013, Plaintiff reported her medications had been stolen

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and she had been without them for a month (A.R. 397).

She said she

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was sleeping poorly and experiencing occasional auditory

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hallucinations, which she thought “were pretty much gone before when

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taking meds” (A.R. 397).

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(A.R. 397).

She claimed to be maintaining her sobriety

Plaintiff evidently was calm, interactive and euthymic,

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with full/stable affect and linear thought processes (A.R. 397).

Dr.

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Hoffman said Plaintiff’s mood and behavior appeared stable with no

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complaints, even though Plaintiff had not taken her medication, and

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Dr. Hoffman also said that Plaintiff’s auditory hallucinations were

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under “good control” with medications (A.R. 397).

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continued Plaintiff’s medications (A.R. 397).

Dr. Hoffman

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In August 2013, Plaintiff reported being more anxious/irritable

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the past week because she went to Fresno to visit family and ran out

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of medications (A.R. 396).

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her medications and still hears occasional comments/commands even with

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medications, but she feels she can ignore them (A.R. 396).

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claimed to be maintaining her sobriety (A.R. 396).

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Plaintiff was calm, interactive and euthymic, with constricted/stable

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affect, normal speech, and linear thought processes (A.R. 396).

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mood and behavior appeared stable, she had “significant improvement”

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in her auditory hallucinations with medications, and her reality

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testing was intact (A.R. 396).

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borderline intellectual functioning” (A.R. 396).

She said she feels “good” when she takes

She

Reportedly,

Dr. Hoffman indicated “likely

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Dr. Hoffman

Her

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continued Plaintiff’s medications (A.R. 396).

Dr. Hoffman annotated

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the note, stating that on September 3, 2013, he reviewed, completed

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and forwarded a mental health questionnaire to Plaintiff’s case

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manager per Plaintiff’s request (A.R. 396).

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II.

The ALJ Materially Erred in the ALJ’s Evaluation of the Medical
Evidence.

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The ALJ relied on the opinions of the non-examining state agency

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physician and non-examining state agency psychologist in determining

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Plaintiff’s mental residual functional capacity (A.R. 29 (citing A.R.

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80-86 (initial disability determination) and A.R. 87-99

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(reconsideration disability determination)).

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state agency physician had no medical records to consider and

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therefore found no disability as of December 21, 2012 (A.R. 86).6

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reconsideration, a state agency psychologist reviewed Dr. Hoffman’s

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records including the Mental Impairment Questionnaire dated August 3,

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2012, which the psychologist stated was “difficult to read” (A.R. 93

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(citing, inter alia, A.R. 288-93)).

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opined that Plaintiff would have sustained concentration and

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persistence limitations in that she assertedly would have moderate

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limitations in her abilities to: (1) maintain attention and

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concentration for extended periods; and (2) complete a normal work day

On initial review, the

The state agency psychologist

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It appears that the Administration had requested
Plaintiff’s medical records from an attorney who was not then
representing Plaintiff. See A.R. 83-85 (detailing attempts to
obtain Plaintiff’s medical records from attorney Norman J.
Homen); see also A.R. 101 (Appointment of Representative form for
Homen dated April 17, 2012); A.R. 115 (Appointment of
Representative form for George Aaron dated June 30, 2012).
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On

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or work week without interruption from psychologically based symptoms,

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and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number of

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rest periods (A.R. 97).

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these limitations “do not preclude [Plaintiff] from performing the

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basic mental demands of competitive work on a [regular] basis” (A.R.

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97).

Nevertheless, the psychologist concluded that

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The ALJ erred by relying on the non-examining state agency
psychologist to determine Plaintiff’s mental residual functional

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capacity.

The law generally requires that the opinion of a treating

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or examining physician receive more weight than the opinion of a non-

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examining physician.

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(9th Cir. 1995).

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itself constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of

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the opinion of either an examining physician or a treating physician.”

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Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 831 (9th Cir. 1995) (emphasis in

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original); see also Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2007)

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(“When [a nontreating] physician relies on the same clinical findings

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as a treating physician, but differs only in his or her conclusions,

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the conclusions of the [nontreating] physician are not ‘substantial

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evidence.’”); Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 n.4 (9th Cir.

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1990) (“The nonexamining physicians’ conclusion, with nothing more,

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does not constitute substantial evidence, particularly in view of the

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conflicting observations, opinions, and conclusions of an examining

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physician”).

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on Dr. Hoffman’s treatment notes (on which Dr. Hoffman based his

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opinions) (A.R. 93-94).

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psychologist relied on the same evidence to reach different opinions

See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1040-41

“The opinion of a nonexamining physician cannot by

Here, the non-examining state agency psychologist relied

Because the non-examining state agency

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than the opinions reached by Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist, the

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non-examining psychologist’s opinions could not furnish substantial

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evidence to support the ALJ’s decision.

See id.

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III. Remand is Appropriate.

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Remand is appropriate because the circumstances of this case

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suggest that further administrative review could remedy the ALJ’s

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errors.

McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 888 (9th Cir. 2011); see also

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INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (upon reversal of an

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administrative determination, the proper course is remand for

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additional agency investigation or explanation, except in rare

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circumstances); Treichler v. Commissioner, 775 F.3d 1090, 1101 (9th

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Cir. 2014) (remand for further administrative proceedings is the

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proper remedy “in all but the rarest cases”); Garrison v. Colvin, 759

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F.3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014) (court will credit-as-true medical

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opinion evidence only where, inter alia, “the record has been fully

18

developed and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful

19

purpose”); Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1180-81 (9th Cir.), cert.

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denied, 531 U.S. 1038 (2000) (remand for further proceedings rather

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than for the immediate payment of benefits is appropriate where there

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are “sufficient unanswered questions in the record”).

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significant unanswered questions in the present record.

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it is not clear whether Dr. Hoffman would find the same functional

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limitations absent drug or alcohol use.

There remain
For instance,

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On remand the ALJ may want to reconsider whether to order an

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examination and evaluation of Plaintiff by a consultative psychiatrist
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1

or psychologist.

See Reed v. Massanari, 270 F.3d 838, 843 (9th Cir.

2

2001) (where available medical evidence is insufficient to determine

3

the severity of the claimant’s impairment, the ALJ should order a

4

consultative examination by a specialist).7

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6

CONCLUSION

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For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s
motions for summary judgment are denied and this matter is remanded
for further administrative action consistent with this Opinion.

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LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

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DATED: January 6, 2017.

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/s/
CHARLES F. EICK
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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27
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7

The Court has not reached any issue regarding the ALJ’s
rejection of Dr. Hoffman’s opinions, except insofar as to
determine that reversal with a directive for the immediate
payment of benefits would not be appropriate at this time.
“[E]valuation of the record as a whole creates serious doubt that
[Plaintiff] is in fact disabled.” See Garrison v. Colvin, 759
F.3d at 1021.
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