Moises Ayunan v. Tony Tan Caktiong et al

Filing 25

ORDER re: Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Insufficient Service of Process 6 by Judge Ronald S.W. Lew. Because Plaintiff failed to properly serve Defendants and failed to meet his burden to show that this Court has general or specific personal jurisdiction over either of the individual Caktiong Defendants or JFC USA, the Court GRANTS Defendants Motion to Dismiss. The Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's claims. The clerk shall close this case.(MD JS-6. Case Terminated) (jre)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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12 MOISES AYUNAN,
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)
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Plaintiff,
)
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v.
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TONY TAN CAKTIONG; GRACE A. )
TAN CAKTIONG; JOLLIBEE
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FOODS CORPORATION (USA);
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and DOES 1 through 50,
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Defendants.
)
)

CV 15-9355-RSWL-PLAx
ORDER re: Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss for
Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction and
Insufficient Service of
Process [6]

Currently before the Court is Defendants Tony Tan

20 Caktiong (“Mr. Caktiong”), Grace A. Tan Caktiong (“Mrs.
21 Caktiong”) (collectively, the “Caktiong’s”), and
22 Jollibee Foods Corporation (USA)’s (“JFC USA”)
23 (collectively “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss for Lack
24 of Personal Jurisdiction and Insufficient Service of
25 Process [6] (“Motion”).

Having reviewed all papers

26 submitted pertaining to this Motion, the Court NOW
27 FINDS AND RULES AS FOLLOWS: the Court GRANTS
28
1

1 Defendants’ Motion and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claims.1
2

I. BACKGROUND

3 A.

Factual Background

4

Plaintiff is an individual residing in Los Angeles,

5 California.
6

Compl. ¶ 2.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Mr. and Mrs.

7 Caktiong are also individuals residing in Los Angeles,
8 California.2

Id. at ¶ 3.

Plaintiff alleges that

9 Defendant JFC USA is a corporation doing business in
10 Los Angeles, California.3
11

Id. at ¶ 4.

Plaintiff alleges that in October 1975, Mr. and

12 Mrs. Caktiong sought Plaintiff’s advice “on how to
13 establish a better and more profitable eatery business,
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1

The Court also finds that Plaintiff did not properly serve
the individual Caktiong Defendants or JFC USA pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e). Plaintiff argues that he served
all three Defendants by serving Gilbert E. Paderogo (“Paderogo”),
the Human Resources Manager at JFC USA. Plaintiff asserts that
Paderogo accepted service on behalf of Maria Theresa Chua
(“Chua”), the “‘Agent for Service of Process’ for JFC USA and its
Officers.” See Decl. Of Nathan V. Hoffman ¶ 2, ECF No. 9-1.
However, Defendant provides the Declaration of Gilbert E.
Paderogo (“Paderogo Declaration”), in which Paderogo declares
“[a]t no time have I been authorized to accept service of process
on behalf of Mr. and Mrs. Caktiong.” Paderogo Decl. ¶ 3, ECF No.
18-1. Paderogo also states in his Declaration that he is “not
the authorized agent for service of process for defendant JFC
USA.” Id. Plaintiff’s service was not proper because Paderogo
is not an agent authorized by appointment or law to receive
service of process on behalf of Defendants. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
4(e); 4(h)(1).
2

Defendants argue that Mr. and Mrs. Caktiong “are residents
of and citizens of the Philippines.” Decl. of Valerie Feria
Amante (“Amante Decl.”) ¶ 4, ECF No. 6-1.

27

3

Defendants argue that JFC USA is a Nevada corporation with
Amante Decl. ¶

28 its principal place of business in Reno, Nevada.
3.
2

1 having heard of [Plaintiff’s] long experience as a
2 manager of a local hamburger chain.”

Id. at ¶ 7.

3 Plaintiff alleges that he was promised an ownership
4 interest and dividends in the new venture in return for
5 providing to Defendants “the fast food concept he was
6 envisioning as a future for himself.”

Id. at ¶ 8.

7 Plaintiff alleges that part of this concept was “a
8 specialized juicy hamburger with ‘distinct Filipino
9 taste,’” which Plaintiff developed.
10

Id. at ¶¶ 8-9.

Plaintiff alleges that “with the advice and

11 industry of Plaintiff,” the Caktiong’s have “seen the
12 rise of their business empire to become the No. 1 fast
13 food chain in Asia . . . that eventually evolved [into]
14 . . . what is now known as Jollibee Foods Corporation.”
15 Id. at ¶ 16.

Plaintiff alleges that “without the fast

16 food concept provided by [Plaintiff], [the Caktiong’s]
17 would not be dollar multi-billionaires.”
18

Id. at ¶ 16.

Plaintiff alleges that he and Mr. and Mrs. Caktiong

19 “commenced their joint venture and partnership with
20 each having a one-third ownership interest,” and
21 Plaintiff agreed to accept 2.5% of the gross sales of
22 hamburgers for all outlets, whether company-owned or
23 franchised, against his share of partnership profits.
24 Id. at ¶ 10.
25

Plaintiff alleges that the Caktiong’s subsequently

26 formed the corporation Jollibee Foods Corporation in
27 their role as partners and on behalf of the
28 Partnership.

Id. at ¶ 20.

Plaintiff alleges that JFC
3

1 USA assumed the operation and control of the
2 Partnership business and assets.

Id. at ¶ 20.

3 Plaintiff alleges that JFC USA continues to use his
4 hamburger recipe and concept, and that JFC USA
5 operations and assets are derived from and remain
6 Partnership business and assets.

Id. at ¶ 20.

7 Plaintiff also alleges that the Partnership received
8 stock in JFC USA, which was taken on behalf of the
9 Partnership by Mr. and Mrs. Caktiong.
10

Id.

Plaintiff alleges that his “role in the

11 establishment and growth of Jollibee Foods Corporation
12 constitutes a contribution to the partnership,” but “it
13 never became clear to Plaintiff that the money,
14 received by him on a non-regular basis, actually
15 represented 2.5% of the monthly hamburger sales”
16 “because there was never an accounting.”

Id. at ¶ 17.

17 B.

Procedural Background

18

On November 3, 2015, Plaintiff filed his Complaint

19 [1] against Defendants in California Superior Court,
20 alleging claims for (1) dissolution of partnership, (2)
21 accounting, (3) imposition of constructive trust, and
22 (4) declaratory relief.

On December 30, 2015,

23 Defendants removed the Action to the Central District
24 of California [1].
25
26 [6].

The instant Motion was filed on December 10, 2015
Finding the Motion to be suitable for decision

27 without oral argument, the Court took the motion under
28 submission on January 11, 2016 [24].
4

1

II. DISCUSSION

2 A.

Legal Standard

3

When a defendant moves pursuant to Federal Rule of

4 Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) to dismiss for lack of
5 personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden
6 of demonstrating that the court may properly exercise
7 jurisdiction over the defendant.

Pebble Beach Co. v.

8 Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006);
9 Barantsevich v. VTB Bank, 954 F. Supp. 2d 972, 981
10 (C.D. Cal. 2013).

Absent formal discovery or an

11 evidentiary hearing, a plaintiff need only make a prima
12 facie showing that jurisdiction is proper to survive
13 dismissal.
14

Pebble Beach, 453 F.3d at 1154.

To satisfy this burden, a plaintiff can rely on the

15 allegations in his complaint to the extent they are not
16 controverted by the moving party.

Barantsevich, 954 F.

17 Supp. 2d at 982; Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 922
18 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Where not directly controverted,
19 plaintiff’s version of the facts is taken as true for
20 purposes of a 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss.”).

If

21 defendants adduce evidence controverting the
22 allegations, however, the plaintiff must “come forward
23 with facts, by affidavit or otherwise, supporting
24 personal jurisdiction.”

Barantsevich, 954 F. Supp. 2d

25 at 982 (quoting Scott v. Breeland, 792 F.2d 925, 927
26 (9th Cir. 1986)).
27

“The general rule is that personal jurisdiction

28 over a defendant is proper if it is permitted by a
5

1 long-arm statute and if the exercise of that
2 jurisdiction does not violate federal due process.”
3 Pebble Beach, 453 F.3d at 1154-55.

California

4 authorizes jurisdiction in the full extent permitted by
5 the Constitution.

See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 410.

6 Therefore, the only question the Court must ask is
7 whether the exercise of jurisdiction over defendants
8 would be consistent with due process.

Harris Rutsky &

9 Co. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328 F.3d
10 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2003).
11

Due process requires that a defendant must have

12 such “minimum contacts” with the forum state that
13 “maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional
14 notions of fair play and substantial justice.”

Int’l

15 Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).

The

16 minimum contacts required mean that the defendant must
17 have purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
18 conducting activities within the foreign jurisdiction,
19 thereby invoking the benefits and protections of the
20 foreign jurisdiction’s laws.

See Asahi Metal Indus.

21 Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987).
22

There are two recognized bases for exercising

23 jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant: (1) “general
24 jurisdiction,” which arises where defendant’s
25 activities in the forum are sufficiently “substantial”
26 or “continuous and systematic” to justify the exercise
27 of jurisdiction over him in all matters; and (2)
28 “specific jurisdiction,” which arises when a
6

1 defendant’s specific contacts with the forum give rise
2 to the claim in question.

Helicopteros Nacionales de

3 Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-16 (1984);
4 Doe v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 112 F.3d 1048, 1050-51 (9th
5 Cir. 1997).
6 B.

Discussion

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1.

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Personal Jurisdiction Over the Caktiong’s
a.

General Personal Jurisdiction

“General jurisdiction” arises where the defendant’s

10 activities in the forum are sufficiently “substantial”
11 or “continuous and systematic” to justify the exercise
12 of jurisdiction over him in all matters.

Helicopteros,

13 466 U.S. at 414-16; Red Cross, 112 F.3d at 1050-51.
14 “For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise
15 of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile.”
16 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 (2014).
17

To satisfy his burden, Plaintiff can rely on

18 uncontroverted allegations in the Complaint.
19 Barantsevich, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 982.

However, if

20 Defendants adduce evidence controverting the
21 allegations, Plaintiff must “come forward with facts,
22 by affidavit or otherwise, supporting personal
23 jurisdiction.”

Id.

The Ninth Circuit has noted, “mere

24 allegations of the complaint, when contradicted by
25 affidavits, are [not] enough to confer personal
26 jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant,” and in such
27 a case, “facts, not mere allegations, must be the
28 touchstone.”

Taylor v. Portland Paramount Corp., 383
7

1 F.2d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 1967).

Conflicts between the

2 parties over statements contained in affidavits or
3 declarations must be resolved in plaintiff’s favor.
4 Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 800; Love v. Associated
5 Newpapers, Ltd., 611 F.3d 601, 608 (9th Cir. 2010).
6 “At the same time, however, the plaintiff must submit
7 admissible4 evidence in support of its prima facie
8 case.”

Am. Inst. of Intradermal Cosmetics, Inc. v.

9 Soc’y of Permanent Cosmetic Prof’ls, No. CV 12-06887
10 GAF (JCGx), 2013 WL 1685558, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 16,
11 2013).
12

Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Mr. and

13 Mrs. Caktiong are individuals “residing in the County
14 of Los Angeles, State of California.”
15

Compl. ¶ 3.

Defendants controvert this allegation with the

16 Amante Declaration, in which Amante avers that, based
17 on her personal knowledge as Vice President and Head of
18 Corporate Legal at JFC Philippines, “Mr. Caktiong and
19 his wife Grace A. Tan Caktiong are residents of and
20 citizens of the Philippines.”5

Amante Decl. ¶ 4.

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4

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 602, a witness may testify
to a matter only if evidence is introduced that is sufficient to
support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the
matter. Fed. R. Evid. 602. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 802,
hearsay is inadmissible absent an exception. Fed. R. Evid. 802.
Hearsay is defined as statement that the declarant does not make
while testifying at the current trial or hearing, which is
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the
statement. Fed. R. Evid. 801.
5

The Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s evidentiary objection to

28 this statement in the Amante Declaration as lacking foundation.
See Fed. R. Evid. 602.

Amante’s testimony that she has personal
8

1

In response, Plaintiff argues that Mr. and Mrs.

2 Caktiong have substantial and continuous contacts to
3 establish general personal jurisdiction in California,
4 as evidenced by the fact that they (1) maintain a
5 residence in La Puente, California;6 (2) have a daughter
6 domiciled in California; (3) have a sister that
7 purchases property in California in her name, but on
8 their behalf;7 and (4) is “regularly seen in California
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10 knowledge as Vice President and Head of Corporate Legal at JFC in
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the Philippines is sufficient to establish her personal
knowledge. See id.
6

Plaintiff does not provide admissible evidence in support
of this allegation. Plaintiff produces two declarations of
Nathan V. Hoffman (“Hoffman Declaration” and “Supplemental
Hoffman Declaration”), to which Hoffman attaches a link to two
webpages to support the alleged “substantial contacts” of Mr. and
Mrs. Caktiong. See Hoffman Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 9-1. The first
webpage states that Tony Tan Caktiong “has lived” at a California
address in La Puente, California. See id., Ex. 1. The second
webpage provides an additional address in Los Angeles, California
in the “Address & Phone History” section of the page. Suppl.
Hoffman Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. 3, ECF No. 10. Hoffman’s Declarations
concerning the California address history of “Tony Tan Caktiong”
do not concern Mrs. Caktiong, and cannot be used to support
personal jurisdiction over her. Additionally, the statements in
the Hoffman Declarations are inadmissible under Federal Rule of
Evidence 602 for lack of foundation. Hoffman does not develop
how he has personal knowledge that Mr. Caktiong “maintains a
residence” in Los Angeles and La Puente, California. Hoffman’s
only bases for his assertions are the webpages, which are
inadmissible hearsay bearing no circumstantial indicia of
reliability. See Akro Corp. v. Luker, 45 F.3d 1541, 1546-47
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Beverly Hills Fan v. Royal Sovereign
Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1994)) (hearsay may be
considered for purposes of determining personal jurisdiction,
provided it bears circumstantial indicia of reliability).
7

Plaintiff provides the Declaration of Moises Ayunan
(“Ayunan Declaration”), in which Ayunan declares that Mr. and
Mrs. Caktiong “maintain a home in La Puente,” “have a daughter
who resides in the Pasadena area,” have “a sister who is also
local to Southern California,” and “[i]t is common knowledge in
9

1 at business openings and checking on the status of
2 businesses.”

Pl.’s Opp’n 6:14-25.

None of these

3 allegations are supported by admissible evidence, and
4 therefore, cannot be used to establish general
5 jurisdiction over the Caktiong’s.8

See Intradermal

6 Cosmetics, 2013 WL 1685558, at *4.
7

The only piece of admissible evidence Plaintiff

8 provides is that the Caktiong’s stayed at Ayunan’s home
9 for over a month in 1977, while Ayunan allegedly
10 “instructed” them in the fast food business in Los
11 Angeles.

Ayunan Decl. ¶ 3.

This evidence is

12 insufficient to establish the requisite “minimum
13 contacts” necessary for a prima facie showing of
14 general jurisdiction over the Caktiong’s.
15
16

b.

Specific Personal Jurisdiction

Although this forum cannot assert general

17 jurisdiction over Mr. and Mrs. Caktiong, it may still
18 assert specific jurisdiction depending on the quality
19 and nature of their contacts with the forum state in
20 relation to the cause of action.

Lake v. Lake, 817

21
22 the Filipino community that Tony’s sister bought property in her
name for” the Caktiong’s.

Ayunan Decl. ¶¶ 5-7, ECF No. 9-2.

23 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 602, Ayunan does not establish the
basis of his personal knowledge for these assertions.

Moreover,

24 the contacts of the Caktiong’s family members do not demonstrate
that the Caktiong’s contacts with California justify personal

25 jurisdiction.
26
8
In any case, these facts are insufficient to show that Mr.
and Mrs. Caktiong’s activities in California are substantial, or
27
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continuous and systematic, to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction over them in all matters. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at
414-416.
10

1 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).
2

“Specific jurisdiction” arises when a defendant’s

3 specific contacts with the forum give rise to the claim
4 in question.

Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414-16; Red

5 Cross, 112 F.3d at 1050-51.

To ensure that the

6 exercise of specific jurisdiction is consistent with
7 due process, the Court must be satisfied that the
8 following have been shown: (1) the nonresident
9 defendant purposefully availed himself of the privilege
10 of conducting activities in the forum by some
11 affirmative act or conduct; (2) plaintiff’s claim must
12 arise out of or result from the defendant’s forum13 related activities; and (3) exercise of jurisdiction
14 must be reasonable.

Jillella v. Int’l Solutions Grp.,

15 Inc., 507 F. App’x 706, 708 (9th Cir. 2013); Roth v.
16 Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 620 (9th Cir. 1991).
17

The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the

18 first two prongs of the test.

Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d

19 at 802 (citing Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1347, 1361
20 (9th Cir. 1990)).

If the plaintiff fails to satisfy

21 either of these prongs, personal jurisdiction is not
22 established in the forum state.
23

Id.

Under the second prong, the Ninth Circuit employs a

24 “but for” test to determine whether a claim arises from
25 forum-related activities.

Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d

26 1495, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995).

Here, the question is

27 whether, but for Mr. and Mrs. Caktiong’s contacts with
28 California, Plaintiff’s claims would have arisen.
11

1 Plaintiff does not demonstrate the nexus between his
2 claims and Defendants’ activities in the forum, as
3 Plaintiff makes no arguments to carry his burden on
4 this issue.

Plaintiff does not show that if Defendants

5 had not conducted the aforementioned activities in
6 California, Plaintiff would have no claim against them.
7 See id.

Accordingly, the “but for” test is not

8 satisfied with respect to Plaintiff’s claims.
9

Because Plaintiff does not support that his claims

10 arise from Mr. and Mrs. Caktiong’s forum-related
11 activities, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to
12 Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction over the
13 Caktiong’s.
14
15
16

2.

Personal Jurisdiction Over JFC USA
a.

General Personal Jurisdiction

“A court may assert general jurisdiction over

17 foreign (sister-state or foreign country) corporations
18 to hear any and all claims against them when their
19 affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and
20 systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in
21 the forum state.”

Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 754.

“The

22 standard is met only by ‘continuous corporate
23 operations within a state [that are] thought so
24 substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit
25 against [the defendant] on causes of action arising
26 from dealings entirely distinct from those
27 activities.’”

Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand

28 Technologies, Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1224 (9th Cir. 2011)
12

1 (quoting King v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 632 F.3d
2 570, 579 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted)).

“Factors

3 to be taken into consideration are whether the
4 defendant makes sales, solicits or engages in business
5 in the state, serves the state’s markets, designates an
6 agent for service of process, holds a license, or is
7 incorporated there.”

Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v.

8 Augusta Nat. Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000).
9

In Daimler, the Supreme Court held that, in order

10 to subject a foreign corporation to general
11 jurisdiction, that corporation’s affiliations with the
12 forum must be “so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to
13 render it essentially at home in the forum State.”
14 S. Ct. at 761.

134

The Court noted that the paradigm bases

15 for general jurisdiction are a corporation’s place of
16 incorporation and principal place of business, however,
17 “in an exceptional case, . . . a corporation’s
18 operations in a forum other than its place of
19 incorporation or principal place of business may be so
20 substantial and of such a nature as to render the
21 corporation at home in that State.”

Id. at 761 n. 19.

22 The Court found that Daimler was not such an
23 “exceptional case,” even though the subsidiary had
24 multiple forum-based facilities, was the largest
25 supplier of luxury vehicles to the forum, and the
26 subsidiary’s sales in the forum accounted for 2.4% of
27 the parent corporation’s worldwide sales.
28 752, 761 n. 19.
13

See id. at

1

Here, Plaintiff argues that Defendant JFC USA has

2 substantial, continuous, and systematic contacts with
3 California based on JFC USA’s (1) maintenance of
4 offices in California; (2) registration with the
5 California Secretary of State to do business in
6 California; (3) employment of a Human Resources Manager
7 at its California offices; and (4) appointment of an
8 agent for service of process who is registered with the
9 California Secretary of State.

Pl.’s Opp’n 5:10-25.

10 Plaintiff argues that it does not rely on the minimum
11 contacts of a subsidiary of JFC USA, but rather JFC USA
12 itself.

Id. at 6:2-4.

Plaintiff’s evidence consists

13 of the California Secretary of State’s webpage stating
14 that “Jollibee Foods Corporation (USA)” has its
15 “Jurisdiction” in Nevada, but has an address and an
16 agent for service of process in City of Industry,
17 California.
18

Hoffman Decl., Ex. 1.

Defendants argue that JFC USA is a Nevada

19 corporation which “has not conducted any business in
20 California whatsoever and has not done anything else to
21 purposefully avail itself of the benefits and
22 protections of California.”

Defs.’ Mot. 4:20-22.

23 Defendants provide the Amante Declaration, which states
24 that JFC USA “is a subsidiary of [Philippines-based]
25 JFC, and is an active Nevada corporation with its
26 principal place of business located . . . [in] Reno,
27 Nevada.”
28

Amante Decl. ¶ 3.

As an initial matter, the Court rejects Defendants’
14

1 assertion that Plaintiff relies on an affiliate of JFC
2 USA’s contacts with California to establish general
3 jurisdiction over JFC USA.

The business entity

4 information provided by Plaintiff through the
5 California Secretary of State website sufficiently
6 shows that Plaintiff relies on JFC USA’s contacts with
7 California, not the contacts of an “affiliate.”
8

Although JFC USA is not incorporated in California

9 and does not have its principal place of business in
10 California, Daimler does not foreclose the possibility
11 that, under some circumstances, a forum may be “home”
12 if it does not fall into one of the paradigmatic
13 categories.

Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760-61.

However,

14 the Supreme Court emphasized that merely engaging in a
15 “substantial, continuous and systematic course of
16 business” is not sufficient to establish general
17 jurisdiction, and described as “exceptional” the case
18 in which a defendant would be “at home” in a forum
19 other than its place of incorporation or principal
20 place of business.

Id. at 761 n. 19.

The Supreme

21 Court also explained that in determining whether a
22 defendant is at home, the court must consider the
23 defendant’s “activities in their entirety, nationwide
24 and worldwide.”
25

Id. at 762 n. 20.

On balance, Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden

26 of establishing a prima facie showing for general
27 jurisdiction.

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that

28 Defendant has engaged in “continuous and systematic
15

1 general business contacts,” that “approximate physical
2 presence” in the forum state.
3 1224.

See Mavrix, 647 F.3d at

Plaintiff shows that JFC USA is registered to do

4 business in California, designated an agent for service
5 of process in California, and maintains an address in
6 City of Industry, California; however, Plaintiff does
7 not demonstrate any facts showing whether, or to what
8 extent, JFC USA actually does business in California.
9 Plaintiff provides no facts to support the extent of
10 JFC USA’s sales or operations in California.
11

In this case, JFC USA’s contacts with California do

12 not warrant a determination that, based on those ties,
13 JFC USA can be haled to Court in California, even if
14 the cause of action is unrelated to those contacts.
15 Accordingly, this case is not an “exceptional” one in
16 which JFC is “at home” in a forum other than its place
17 of incorporation or principal place of business.
18 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 n. 19.
19
20

b.

Specific Personal Jurisdiction

In determining whether this Court has specific

21 jurisdiction over JFC USA, the Court considers the
22 following contacts: (1) JFC USA’s maintenance of
23 offices in California; (2) JFC USA’s registration with
24 the California Secretary of State to do business in
25 California; (3) JFC USA’s employment of a Human
26 Resources Manager at its California offices; and (4)
27 JFC USA’s appointment of an agent for service of
28 process who is registered with the California Secretary
16

1 of State.

As explained above, Plaintiff fails to show

2 that his claims arise from any of Defendants’ forum3 related activities.

See Ballard, 65 F.3d at 1500

4 (explaining the “but for” test for determining whether
5 the plaintiff’s claim “arises out of” the defendant’s
6 forum-related activities).

Accordingly, the Court

7 finds that Plaintiff has not established a prima facie
8 showing of specific jurisdiction over JFC USA, and
9 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
10
11

III. CONCLUSION
Because Plaintiff failed to properly serve

12 Defendants and failed to meet his burden to show that
13 this Court has general or specific personal
14 jurisdiction over either of the individual Caktiong
15 Defendants or JFC USA, the Court GRANTS Defendants
16 Motion to Dismiss.
17 claims.

The Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s

The clerk shall close this case.

18 IT IS SO ORDERED.
19
20 DATED: February 23, 2016

/s/ RONALD S.W.LEW

21

HONORABLE RONALD S.W. LEW
Senior U.S. District Judge

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