Gretchen C. Forward-Rossi v. Jaguar Land Rover North America, Inc et al
Filing
22
MINUTES OF Motion Hearing held before Judge Christina A. Snyder: The Court GRANTS plaintiff's motion for leave to file an amended complaint 15 and GRANTS plaintiff's motion to remand this action to state court 14 ; remanding case to Los Angeles Superior Court, Case No. BC606266. ( MD JS-6. Case Terminated. ) Court Reporter: Laura Elias. (gk)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
‘O’
Case No.
2:16-cv-00949-CAS(KSx)
Title
GRETCHEN C. FORWARD-ROSSI v. JAGUAR LAND ROVER
NORTH AMERICA, LLC
Present: The Honorable
Date
JS-6
June 13, 2016
CHRISTINA A. SNYDER
Catherine Jeang
Deputy Clerk
Laura Elias
Court Reporter / Recorder
N/A
Tape No.
Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs:
Attorneys Present for Defendants:
David Barry
Autumn Lewis
Proceedings:
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FIRST
AMENDED COMPLAINT (Dkt. 15, filed May 13, 2016)
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND (Dkt. 14, filed May 13,
2016)
I.
INTRODUCTION
On January 8, 2016, plaintiff Gretchen C. Forward-Rossi commenced this action in
Los Angeles County Superior Court against defendant Jaguar Land Rover North America
(“JLRNA”). Dkt. 1. “Notice of Removal.” Plaintiff asserted claims against JLRNA for:
(1) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability under the Song-Beverly Consumer
Warranty Act (“Song-Beverly Act”); and (2) breach of an express warranty under the
Song-Beverly Act. Id., Ex. A (“Compl.”). In brief, plaintiff alleges that she purchased a
2012 Land Rover Range Rover from an authorized JLRNA dealership in Los Angeles
and that, after plaintiff began experiencing issues with her vehicle, JLRNA failed to
repair the vehicle pursuant to applicable warranties and attempted to charge plaintiff for a
repair despite the fact that her warranty should have covered the costs of any necessary
repairs. See generally Compl.
On February 10, 2016, JLRNA removed this action to this Court on the basis of
diversity jurisdiction. Notice of Removal. Plaintiff is a citizen of California, Compl. ¶ 1,
and JLRNA is a Delaware Corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey,
Notice of Removal ¶ 8. On May 13, 2016, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a first
amended complaint. Dkt. 15. (“Mot. To Amend”). This motion seeks to add Penegon
West, Inc. d/b/a/ Jaguar Land Rover Newport Beach (“Penegon West”), a California
corporation, as a defendant. Id. In addition, on May 13, 2016, plaintiff filed a motion to
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date
‘O’
Case No.
2:16-cv-00949-CAS(KSx)
Title
JS-6
June 13, 2016
GRETCHEN C. FORWARD-ROSSI v. JAGUAR LAND ROVER
NORTH AMERICA, LLC
remand this action to state court on the grounds that, in light of her proposed amended
complaint, diversity jurisdiction no longer exists in this case. Dkt. 14 (“Mot. To
Remand”). On May 23, 2016, JLRNA filed oppositions to plaintiff’s motions, Dkt. 17,
18, and on May 27, 2016, plaintiff filed replies in support of her motions, Dkt. 19, 20.
Having carefully considered the parties’ arguments, the Court finds and concludes as
follows.
II.
BACKGROUND
On or about December 4, 2012, plaintiff purchased a 2012 Land Rover Range
Rover (“the Vehicle”) from Hornburg Jaguar Land Rover, a JLRNA dealership in Los
Angeles, California. Compl. ¶ 7. When plaintiff purchased the Vehicle, she received
written warranties and other express and implied warrants including, inter alia, that the
Vehicle and its components would be free from all defects in material and workmanship,
that the Vehicle would be fit for the ordinary purpose for which it was intended, that
JLRNA would perform any repairs alignments, adjustments, and/or replacements of any
parts necessary to ensure that the Vehicle was free from any defects in material and
workmanship, that JLRNA would maintain the utility of the Vehicle for four years or
50,000 miles, and that JLRNA would fix any emissions related defects for a period of 7
years or 70,000 miles. Id. ¶ 8.
Plaintiff contends that, notwithstanding these warranties, shortly after purchasing
the Vehicle, it began to manifest a number of defects. Compl. ¶ 11. For example,
plaintiff states that, when the Vehicle had only 179 miles, the battery would not start and
needed to be replaced. Id. ¶ 13. Accordingly, on at least eight separate occasions
plaintiff delivered the Vehicle to one of JLRNA’s authorized service and repair facilities,
agents, and/or dealers to request repairs. Id. ¶ 11. On each such occasion, the Vehicle
was out of service for thirty or more days. Id.
On November 2, 2015, plaintiff again delivered her vehicle to one of JLRNA’s
authorized service and repair facilities. Id. ¶ 16. However, on this occasion she was
informed that the Vehicle was now considered “out of warranty” and that she would be
required to pay $2,605.59 to have her vehicle repaired. Id. Thereafter, plaintiff contacted
JLRNA to request that the Vehicle be repurchased. Id. ¶ 17. According to plaintiff,
JLRNA refused to repurchase her vehicle and instead offered merely to pay for the cost
of repairing the Vehicle (a cost plaintiff contends should have been covered under her
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date
‘O’
Case No.
2:16-cv-00949-CAS(KSx)
Title
JS-6
June 13, 2016
GRETCHEN C. FORWARD-ROSSI v. JAGUAR LAND ROVER
NORTH AMERICA, LLC
warranties). Id. Further, plaintiff alleges that JLRNA only offered to pay for the cost of
repairing the Vehicle if she would agree to waive her rights under the Song-Beverly Act.
Id. Shortly after this exchange, plaintiff filed the instant action against JLRNA asserting
claims for violations of the Song-Beverly Act. Compl.
Plaintiff now seeks to amend her complaint to add an additional defendant:
Penegon West. Dkt. 15. According to plaintiff, Penegon West is a California
Corporation that owns and operates a JLRNA dealership in Newport Beach, California.
Dkt. 15, Ex. 1 (“Proposed FAC”) ¶ 3. Plaintiff contends, that she delivered the Vehicle
to Penegon West’s dealership for repairs on several occasions, but that Penegon West
was negligent in making these repairs. Id. ¶ 42.1 In addition, plaintiff alleges that, on at
least one occasion, Penegon West attempted to charge plaintiff for repairs to the Vehicle
despite the fact that such repairs should have been covered by the Vehicle’s warranty. Id.
¶ 50. Plaintiff seeks to add Penegon West to her two existing claims under the SongBeverly Act and to assert two addition claims, solely against Penegon West, for negligent
repair and for violation of California Business & Professions Code § 17200 (“the UCL”).
See generally id.
III.
LEGAL STANDARD
Generally, motions to amend a complaint to add new parties are governed by Rule
15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 15 mandates that leave to amend be
freely granted whenever justice requires. This policy is applied with “extraordinary
liberality.” Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir.
1990); see also AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist West, Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 951 (9th
Cir. 2006) (“Rule 15(a) is very liberal and leave to amend ‘shall be freely given when
justice so requires’”). Courts may deny leave to amend where the proposed amendment
would be futile, where it is sought in bad faith, or where it will create undue delay.
Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Saul
v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 843 (9th Cir. 1991).
1
Plaintiff does not specify in her papers or in her proposed amended complaint
why she sought repairs from Penegon West’s Newport Beach dealership as opposed to
Hornburg Jaguar Land Rover, where she purchased the Vehicle.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date
‘O’
Case No.
2:16-cv-00949-CAS(KSx)
Title
JS-6
June 13, 2016
GRETCHEN C. FORWARD-ROSSI v. JAGUAR LAND ROVER
NORTH AMERICA, LLC
Rule 15, however, “does not apply when a plaintiff amends her complaint after
removal to add a diversity destroying defendant.” Greer v. Lockheed Martin, No. CV 101704 JF (HRL), 2010 WL 3168408, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2010) (quoting Chan v.
Bucephalus Alternative Energy Group, LLC, No. C 08-04537, 2009 WL 1108744, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2009) (internal quotation marks ommitted)). This type of amendment
is instead analyzed under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e), which states that, “if after removal the
plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would destroy subject matter
jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit joinder and remand the action to the
State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e). “The language of § 1447(e) is couched in permissive
terms and it clearly gives the district court the discretion to deny joinder.” Newcombe v.
Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 691 (9th Cir. 1998).
When deciding whether to permit joinder under § 1447(e), “ a court should
consider: (1) whether the party sought to be joined is needed for adjudication and would
be joined under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a); (2) whether the statute of
limitations would prevent the filing of a new action against the new defendant should the
court deny joinder; (3) whether there has been unexplained delay in seeking the joinder;
(4) whether the joinder is solely for the purpose of defeating federal jurisdiction; and (5)
whether the claim against the new party seems valid.” Clinco v. Roberts, 41 F. Supp. 2d
1080, 1081-82 (C.D. Cal. 1999). A court’s decision under § 1447(e) is reviewed for
abuse of discretion. See Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 691.
IV.
ANALYSIS
A.
Motion for Leave to File a First Amended Complaint
In her motion for leave to file a first amended complaint, plaintiff seeks to add
Penegon West as a defendant. Penegon West, like plaintiff, is a California citizen. As
such, if the Court permits plaintiff to join Penegon West in this action, diversity
jurisdiction will no longer exist. Accordingly, the Court evaluates plaintiff’s motion
under section 1447(e). As stated above, courts consider five factors in determining
whether to permit joinder under section 1447(e). See Clinco, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1081-82.
Here, the Court finds that four of these factors support allowing plaintiff to add Penegon
West to this action.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.
2:16-cv-00949-CAS(KSx)
Title
JS-6
GRETCHEN C. FORWARD-ROSSI v. JAGUAR LAND ROVER
NORTH AMERICA, LLC
1.
Date
‘O’
June 13, 2016
Extent that Defendant is Needed for Just Adjudication of the
Matter
“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 requires joinder of persons whose absence
would preclude the grant of complete relief, or whose absence would impede their ability
to protect their interests or would subject any of the parties to the danger of inconsistent
obligations.” Clinco, 41 F.Supp.2d at 1082; Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a). However, while courts
consider the standard set forth under Rule 19 in determining whether to permit joinder
under section 1447(e), “amendment under § 1447(e) is a less restrictive standard than for
joinder under [Rule 19].” IBC Aviation Services, Inc. v. Compania mexicana de
Aviacion, S.A. de C.V., 125 F.Supp.2d 1008, 1011–12 (N.D. Cal. 2000). “The standard is
met when failure to join will lead to separate and redundant actions,” but it is not met
when “defendants are only tangentially related to the cause of action or would not prevent
complete relief.” Id. at 1012.
Plaintiff argues that her proposed claims for relief against Penegon West “arise[]
from the same transactions as the claims already alleged against Defendant JLRNA.”
Mot. To Amend, at 5. The Court agrees. All of the claims asserted against JLRNA and
Penegon West involve the same vehicle, the same alleged defects in that vehicle, and the
same lengthy and, ultimately, unsuccessful attempt to repair that vehicle. Resolution of
these claims will likely require many of the same documents and witnesses and turn on
many of the same legal and factual questions. Moreover, Penegon West owns and
operates the dealership that was responsible for making many of the repairs to plaintiff’s
vehicle. Accordingly, it cannot be said that Penegon West is only “tangentially related”
to the existing claims against JLRNA; rather, Penegon West is directly related to these
causes of action and, in fact, was a direct participant, in the conduct which gives rise to
plaintiff’s existing claims against JLRNA. This factor, therefore, weighs in favor of
granting plaintiff leave to amend the complaint.
2.
Timeliness
“When determining whether to allow amendment to add a nondiverse party, courts
consider whether the amendment was attempted in a timely fashion.” Clinco, 41 F. Supp.
2d at 1083.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date
‘O’
Case No.
2:16-cv-00949-CAS(KSx)
Title
JS-6
June 13, 2016
GRETCHEN C. FORWARD-ROSSI v. JAGUAR LAND ROVER
NORTH AMERICA, LLC
Here, plaintiff filed the instant motion five months after filing the initial complaint
and four months after this action was removed. This delay is “not unreasonable under
this circuit’s precedents,” as the parties have yet to file dispositive motions. Compare
Lara v. Bandit Industries, Inc., 2013 WL 1155523, at *3 (E.D. Cal. March 19, 2013)
(holding that filing five months after the initial complaint and three months after removal
was not untimely when the parties had not filed dispositive motions), with Lopez v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 697 F.2d 1328, 1332 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding that it “was too late” to add a
diversity-destroying defendant over six months after removal and just four days before a
hearing was set on the motion for summary judgment); see also Yang v. Swissport USA,
Inc., 2010 WL 2680800, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (granting plaintiffs’ motion to amend
filed nine months after removal where “no dispositive motions have been filed, and the
discovery completed thus far [would] be relevant whether the case is litigated in [federal]
court or state court”). Thus, this factor also supports allowing the amendment.
3.
Motive Behind Joinder
JLRNA argues that the Court should deny plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend
because plaintiff’s motive in adding Penegon West as a defendant is “to destroy
diversity.” “[T]he motive of a plaintiff in seeking the joinder of an additional defendant
is relevant to a trial court’s decision to grant the plaintiff leave to amend his original
complaint.” Clinco, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1083 (quoting Desert Empire Bank v. Insurance
Company of North America, 623 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th Cir. 1980)). However,
“[s]uspicion of diversity destroying amendments is not as important now that § 1447(e)
gives courts more flexibility in dealing with the addition of such defendants.” IBC
Aviation, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 1012 (citing Trotman v. United Parcel Service, No. C-961168-VRW, 1996 WL 428333, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 16, 1996)).
Here, JLRNA contends that plaintiff’s proposed first amended complaint is a
“sloppy cut and paste attempt” to add Penegon West to this case and, therefore, it can be
inferred that plaintiff’s true motive is to eliminate diversity jurisdiction. In some cases,
courts have inferred an improper motive where the plaintiff’s proposed amended
complaint contains only minor or insignificant changes to the original complaint. For
example, in Clinco, the court “suspect[ed]” that plaintiff had joined the new defendants in
an effort to defeat federal jurisdiction because plaintiff was aware of the removal and
filed an amended complaint that was substantially similar to the original complaint. See
Clinco, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1083 n.2. However, in Clinco, “[a]part from various editorial
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date
‘O’
Case No.
2:16-cv-00949-CAS(KSx)
Title
JS-6
June 13, 2016
GRETCHEN C. FORWARD-ROSSI v. JAGUAR LAND ROVER
NORTH AMERICA, LLC
differences, the first amended complaint add[ed] a one-sentence allegation to the first
cause of action and slightly alter[ed] the sixth cause of action.” Id. Here, by contrast,
plaintiff seeks to add much more than a single sentence and a few minor alterations to her
complaint; rather, plaintiff seeks to add two additional claims that, while relying on many
of the same facts, are conceptually distinct from her two existing claims under the SongBeverly Act. Accordingly, unlike Clinco, plaintiff’s proposed amendment appears to be
substantive and the Court declines to impute an improper motive to plaintiff simply
because she seeks to add a non-diverse defendant. This factor is, therefore, either neutral
or weighs in favor of granting plaintiff’s motion.
4.
Apparent Validity of Plaintiff’s Claims
“The existence of a facially legitimate claim against the putative defendant weighs
in favor of permitting joinder under § 1447(e).” Taylor v. Honeywell Corp., 2010 WL
1881459, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2010). As stated above, plaintiff seeks to add claims
against Penegon West for violations of the Song-Beverlyt Act, negligent repair, and
violation of the UCL.
In its opposition, JLRNA does not directly address the validity of plaintiff’s
proposed claims against Penegon West. Instead, in addressing plaintiff’s “motive” for
amendment, JLRNA briefly states that plaintiff’s causes of action against Penegon West
are “frivolous” because Penegon West’s Newport Beach dealership “did not sell the
[V]ehicle to plaintiff.” Opp’n to Mot. To Amend, at 5. However, regardless of whether
Penegon West sold the Vehicle to plaintiff, plaintiff has alleged that she delivered the
Vehicle to Penegon West’s Newport Beach dealership for repairs and that, in the course
of conducting these repairs, Penegon West has failed to exercise reasonable care and
wrongfully attempted to charge plaintiff for repairs that were covered by her warranty.
Plaintiff alleges that this conduct was negligent and constituted a breach of her
warranties. Moreover, in light of plaintiff’s allegations that she returned the Vehicle to
Penegon West’s dealership on “numerous occasions” and that Penegon West still failed
to adequately repair the Vehicle, plaintiff appears to have, at a minimum, a facially
legitimate claim for negligent repair. See also Southwest Forest Industries, Inc. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 422 F.2d 1013, 1018 (9th Cir. 1970) (noting that, generally,
“[o]ne who undertakes repairs has a duty arising in tort to do them without negligence.”).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date
‘O’
Case No.
2:16-cv-00949-CAS(KSx)
Title
JS-6
June 13, 2016
GRETCHEN C. FORWARD-ROSSI v. JAGUAR LAND ROVER
NORTH AMERICA, LLC
Accordingly, JLRNA has failed to demonstrate that plaintiff does not have
“facially legitimate” claims against Penegon West. This factor, therefore, weighs in favor
of granting plaintiff’s motion.
5.
Statute of Limitations
Finally, plaintiff does not argue that a new action against Penegon West would be
time-barred. Accordingly, this factor does not support granting plaintiff’s motion. See
Clinco, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1083. However, in light of the other four factors, the Court
finds that, on balance it is appropriate to permit plaintiff to amend her complaint to add
Penegon West as a defendant. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS plaintiff’s motion for
leave to file a first amended complaint.2
B.
Motion to Remand
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1332(a), the federal courts have original jurisdiction
over state law actions where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and the action is
between parties of diverse citizenship. In its notice of removal, JLRNA argued that
diversity jurisdiction existed because the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000 and
the parties were diverse—specifically, plaintiff is a citizen of California where as JLRNA
2
In assessing whether joinder is appropriate pursuant to section 1447(e), some
courts also consider the potential prejudice to either party. See, e.g., IBC Aviation, 125
F. Supp.2d at 1011. Here, JLRNA makes no argument that it will suffer prejudice if
plaintiff is permitted to amend her complaint. On the other hand, as already stated,
plaintiff has facially legitimate claims against Penegon West that arise out of the same
series of transactions and occurrences as her claims against JLRNA. If the Court were to
deny plaintiffs motion for leave to amend, plaintiff would be required to pursue two
substantially similar lawsuits in two different forums—an action against JLRNA before
this Court and an action against Penegon West in California state court. See also Bandit
Industries, Inc., 2013 WL 1155523, at *5 (“This Court . . . finds that precluding Plaintiffs
from joining Cal–Line would prejudice Plaintiffs because they would be required either
to abandon a viable claim against Cal–Line or to initiate a duplicative litigation in state
court.”). Accordingly, to the extent the Court considers this factor, it also weighs in favor
of granting plaintiff’s motion.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date
‘O’
Case No.
2:16-cv-00949-CAS(KSx)
Title
JS-6
June 13, 2016
GRETCHEN C. FORWARD-ROSSI v. JAGUAR LAND ROVER
NORTH AMERICA, LLC
is a citizen of Delaware and New Jersey. However, with the addition of Penegon West as
a defendant, this action is no longer between parties of diverse citizenship: both plaintiff
and Penegon West are citizens of California.
As jurisdiction no longer exists on the basis of diversity, the Court GRANTS
plaintiff’s motion to remand. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at any time before final
judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall
be remanded.”); Id. § 1447(e) (If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional
defendants whose joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny
joinder, or permit joinder and remand the action to the State court.”) (emphasis added).
V.
CONCLUSION
In accordance with the foregoing, the Court GRANTS plaintiff’s motion for leave
to file an amended complaint and GRANTS plaintiff’s motion to remand this action to
state court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
00
Initials of Preparer
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:
05
CMJ
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