Carmelo Raul Haynes v. G. Biaggini et al

Filing 41

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS REQUEST FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 39 by Judge Otis D. Wright, II . (lc). Modified on 10/16/2019 (lc).

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United States District Court
Central District of California

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Case No: 2:16-cv-01949-ODW (JEMx)

CARMELO RAUL HAYNES,
Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
REQUEST FOR A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER [39]

v.
G BIAGGINI et al.,
Defendants.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s Request for a Temporary Restraining

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Order to prevent Plaintiff from facing retaliation by Defendants.

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ECF No. 39.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES the TRO.

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II.

(TRO 1,

BACKGROUND

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Carmelo Haynes, Plaintiff in pro se, filed suit against Chief Deputy Warden G.

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Biaggini and other correctional counselors and custody officers on March 3, 2016.

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(Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges he was wrongfully transferred to CCI and

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placed in the SHU based on his allegations that he was improperly found guilty of

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committing battery. (R. & R. 5, ECF No. 35.) On October 30, 2017, the Court

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entered judgement against Plaintiff for failing to exhaust his administrative remedies

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before filing the suit. (J., ECF No. 28.)

On October 8, 2019, nearly two years later, Plaintiff files this motion for a

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temporary restraining order (“TRO”).

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somewhat unclear, Plaintiff fears that he or his personal belongings will be harmed in

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retaliation for agreeing to testify against Officer Moisa.1 (TRO 2.) Plaintiff alleges

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that on February 18, 2018 Officer Moisa confiscated his television without his

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permission and has similarly taken possessions of other inmates. (TRO 2.) Plaintiff

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also alleges that correctional officers often assault inmates and that Officer Moisa has

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previously assaulted inmate, Demetrius Brashear. (TRO 2.) Plaintiff states he is in

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“fear of retaliation due to staff misconduct that is ongoing with no penological

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purpose.” (TRO 2.) He seeks a TRO ordering that, Defendants should be prevented

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from harming him or his personal belongings. (TRO 2.) He also requests that he be

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sent to a different institution other than the Lancaster State Prison.2 (TRO 4.)
III.

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(TRO.)

Although his TRO request is

LEGAL STANDARD

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“An application for a temporary restraining order involves the invocation of a

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drastic remedy which a court of equity ordinarily does not grant, unless a very strong

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showing is made of a necessity and desirability of such action.” Youngstown Sheet &

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Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 978, 980 (D.D.C. 1952). The standard for issuing a

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temporary restraining order is “substantially identical” to that for issuing a preliminary

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injunction. Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7

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(9th Cir. 2001). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, a court may grant

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preliminary injunctive relief to prevent “immediate and irreparable injury.” Fed. R.

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Civ. P. 65(b). To obtain this relief, a plaintiff must make a clear showing that (1) “he

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is likely to succeed on the merits”; (2) “he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the

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absence of preliminary relief”; (3) “the balance of equities tips in his favor”; and

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(4) “an injunction is in the public interest.” Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los

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Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Def.

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Officer Moisa was not named in the prior complaint and thus, Defendant must file a separate
complaint along with this TRO instead of filing a TRO in the already closed matter.
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Plaintiff is currently placed in the Psychiatric Inpatient Program at the Salinas Valley State prison.

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Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). The “clear showing” requirement is particularly

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strong when a party seeks a TRO. See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972

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(1997).
IV.

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A.

DISCUSSION

Procedural Requirements

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Local Rule 65-1 sets out the procedure required in the Central District of

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California for a party seeking a TRO. See C.D. Cal. L.R. 65-1. “A party seeking a

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[TRO] must submit an application, a proposed TRO, and a proposed order to show

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cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue.”

Id.

Here, Plaintiff has

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submitted a motion for a TRO without a proposed order. (ECF No. 39.) Accordingly,

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Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Local Rules governing injunctive relief. Thus,

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the Court denies the TRO.

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B.

Standing

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Furthermore, Plaintiff must have Article III constitutional standing to obtain

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injunctive relief. “To seek injunctive relief, a plaintiff must show that he is under

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threat of suffering ‘injury in fact’ that is concrete and particularized; the threat must be

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actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; it must be fairly traceable to the

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challenged action of the defendant; and it must be likely that a favorable judicial

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decision will prevent or redress the injury.” Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S.

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488, 493 (2009); Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc. 709 F.3d 1281, 1286–87 (9th

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Cir. 2013).

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Plaintiff submits no evidence other than unsworn pleading allegations to

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support the notion that he will be injured by the conduct he seeks to enjoin. (See

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Compl.) He asserts that he fears Officer Moisa will injure him for testifying against

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Officer Moisa in Brasher’s law suit or alternatively, for filing a claim against Officer

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Moisa. (TRO 4.) However, he neither alleges that he has already testified nor that

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Officer Moisa has threatened violence after he decided to testify, or otherwise support

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the notion that such violence is actual and imminent.

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(See TRO.)

Moreover,

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Plaintiff’s allegations that Officer Moisa confiscated his property without proper

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documentation in the past do not sufficiently link hypothetical future testimony to the

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hypothetical future harm. (TRO 2.) Such speculative harm is not actual or imminent

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and does not convey standing for injunctive relief. See Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382,

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1389 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing that courts in the Ninth Circuit “have repeatedly

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found a lack of standing where the litigant’s claim relies upon a chain of speculative

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contingencies”). Consequently, Plaintiff lacks standing to seek the TRO.3
V.

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Request for a

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CONCLUSION

Temporary Restraining Order. (ECF No. 39.)

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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October 16, 2019

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____________________________________
OTIS D. WRIGHT, II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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As Plaintiff’s Request fails for the above reasons, the Court does not reach the Winter factors. See
Winter, 555 U.S. at 20 (2008).

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