Camfield et al v. Board of Trustees of Redondo Beach Unified School District et al

Filing 69

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 55 , 56 by Judge Otis D. Wright, II (lc)

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United States District Court
Central District of California

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Plaintiffs,

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Case № 2:16-cv-02367-ODW-FFM

COREY CAMFIELD and MISTY
CAMFIELD,

ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT [55, 56]

v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF REDONDO
BEACH UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT;
STEVEN E. KELLER; ERIK ELWARD;
ORYLA WIEDOEFT; ANNETTE
ALPERN; REDONDO BEACH UNIFIED
SCHOOL DISTRICT; and DOES 1
through 10, inclusive,
Defendants.

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I.

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INTRODUCTION

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This case is about competing rights: the right of elementary school children’s

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parents to access their children’s school campus, and the right of the school to restrict

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that access in certain circumstances.

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incidents between Plaintiffs Corey and Misty Camfield 1 and administrators, teachers,

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and other parents at Jefferson Elementary School, the school restricted Corey and

Following a few disagreements and other

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Because the two Plaintiffs are spouses and share a last name, the Court refers to them by their first
names to avoid confusion.

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Misty’s access by requiring them to obtain advance permission to visit the school’s

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campus. (Statement of Uncontroverted Facts (“SUF”) ¶¶ 65, 84, ECF No. 55-2.) In

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response, Corey and Misty sued the school district and several individuals in their

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official and individual capacities for retaliation and violation of the Camfields’

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constitutional rights. (See Compl., ECF No. 1.) 2 In December 2016, this Court

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granted in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and dismissed several of Corey and

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Misty’s claims without leave to amend.

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summary judgment (or, in the alternative, partial summary judgment) on the

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remaining claims. (ECF Nos. 55, 56.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court

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GRANTS Defendants’ Motion and enters judgment against Corey and Misty

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Camfield.
II.

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(ECF No. 42.)

Now, Defendants seek

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

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Defendant Redondo Beach Unified School District (“RBUSD”) is a public

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school district in California. (SUF ¶ 1.) Jefferson Elementary, the school at issue in

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this case, is within RBUSD. (Id. ¶ 6.) Defendant Dr. Steven Keller is the RBUSD

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Superintendent of Schools, Defendant Dr. Erik Elward is RBUSD’s Director of

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Educational Services, Defendant Dr. Annette Alpern is RBUSD’s Deputy

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Superintendent for Educational Services, and Defendant Dr. Oryla Wiedoeft was the

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principal of Jefferson Elementary during the 2014-15 school year. (Id. ¶¶ 2–5.)

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Plaintiffs Corey and Misty Camfield are the parents of three children, all of

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whom were enrolled at Jefferson Elementary during the 2014-15 school year. (Id.

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¶ 7.) During that school year, two of Corey and Misty’s children—“Minor 1” and

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“Minor 2”—were enrolled in the Fifth Grade, and their other child—“Minor 3”—was

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enrolled in the Third Grade. (Id. ¶ 8.) During this time, Minor 1 received special

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education services at Jefferson Elementary. (Id. ¶ 9.) At all relevant times, Minors 2

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In July of 2016, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint, and in August of 2016, they filed a
Second Amended Complaint. (ECF Nos. 20, 26.)

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and 3 were not diagnosed with any disability nor had they ever been deemed eligible

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for special education services. (Id. ¶ 10.)

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During spring 2014 through spring 2015 (encompassing part of the 2013-14

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school year and the entire 2014-15 school year), Corey and Misty were involved in

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incidents with a few different individuals at Jefferson Elementary. (See id. ¶¶ 11–85.)

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The first incident was in spring 2014 when a “Spring Party” was held in Mrs. Storer’s

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classroom, in which Minor 3 was then a student. (Id. ¶ 11.) The “class parent” for

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Mrs. Storer’s class was a mother named Mrs. Boitano. (Id. ¶ 12.) In preparation for

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the Spring Party, Mrs. Boitano had invited a few adults to help out in the classroom

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who did not have children in Mrs. Storer’s class. (Id.) Mrs. Boitano did not invite any

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parents of children in Mrs. Storer’s class to help out. (Id. ¶ 13.) Once Misty became

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aware of this, she sent out an email to all parents in the class regarding Mrs. Boitano’s

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behavior.

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Elementary tried to mediate the conflict between the two parents.

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However, a couple of weeks later, Mrs. Boitano’s husband Robert had an altercation

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with Corey at the Jefferson Elementary school campus. (Id. ¶ 18.) The crux of the

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incident is that Robert demanded that Corey make Misty apologize to Mrs. Boitano.

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(Id.) The incident became heated enough that Corey and Misty later filed a police

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report. (See id. ¶ 20–22.) School classes and activities then took a break for the

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summer.

(Id. ¶¶ 14–16.)

Following the email, the then-principal of Jefferson
(Id. ¶ 17.)

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In August 2014, when Jefferson Elementary posted classroom assignments for

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the 2014-15 school year, Misty became upset when she found out that Minor 3 had

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been assigned to Mrs. Picazo’s class. (Id. ¶¶ 24–28.) Misty believed that Mrs. Picazo

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was in recovery for alcohol addiction and that she was not a suitable teacher. (Id. ¶

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29.) Misty made an appointment with school principal Dr. Oryla Wiedoeft to discuss

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the placement. (Id. ¶¶ 31–33.) Dr. Elward also attended that meeting. (Id. ¶ 35.) In

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the meeting, Misty raised her voice and used profane language. (Id. ¶ 36.) Dr. Elward

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warned Misty that this behavior and language was inappropriate for an elementary

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school camps. (See id. ¶ 37.)

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On the first day of school, Misty and Corey did not allow Minor 3 to attend

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school, because they were displeased with her placement in Mrs. Picazo’s class. (Id.

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¶ 38.) As a result, Dr. Elward explained the school attendance policy to the Camfields

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and warned them that after three unexcused absences, RBUSD would issue a truancy

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letter. (Id. ¶¶ 39, 40.)

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Later that day, Misty showed up to pick up Minors 1 and 2 from school, with

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Minor 3 in tow (who had not attended school that day). (See id. ¶¶ 43, 44.) While on

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campus, she went to Mrs. Picazo’s classroom to discuss the classroom assignment.

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(Id. ¶¶ 44, 45.) Mrs. Picazo and Dr. Wiedoeft were the only people in the classroom

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when Misty arrived. (Id. ¶ 45.) Because Misty had not made an appointment to see

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Mrs. Picazo, Dr. Wiedoeft asked Misty to leave and to set up an appointment at

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another time. (Id. ¶¶ 46, 47.) Misty then got upset and used profane language, calling

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Dr. Wiedoeft a “fucking bitch” before leaving the room. (Id. ¶ 48.) Later in August,

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Misty and Corey did allow Minor 3 to attend school in Mrs. Picazo’s classroom. (Id. ¶

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55.)

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In October 2014, Corey Camfield and Robert Boitano had another altercation.

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(Id. ¶¶ 57–62.) Corey believed that Robert was following him around campus, and in

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response, he confronted Robert and both men raised their voices and used profane

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language. (Id.) Several students and one teacher witnessed the incident. (Id.) The

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teacher reported the incident to Dr. Wiedoeft. (Id. ¶ 62.) Dr. Wiedoeft met with both

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Corey and Robert, and after the meeting, she issued “disruptive parent letters” to both

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of them. (Id. ¶¶ 63–66.) A disruptive parent letter is a letter informing parents that

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their access to campus has been restricted (but not banned) due to disruptive behavior.

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Corey’s letter read in pertinent part:3

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Robert Boitano’s letter was nearly identical to Corey’s. (SUF ¶ 71.)

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Effective as of today, October 14, 2014, you are not permitted to come
onto the Jefferson Elementary School campus without Dr. Wiedoeft’s
written authorization, and this will require you to give Dr. Wiedoeft a
24 hour notice as to what your purpose is for coming onto the
campus. 4

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(Id. ¶¶ 66–68.)
Following mediation and discussion with school officials, Corey’s restrictions

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on campus access were lifted on or shortly after January 6, 2015. (See id. ¶¶ 73–77.)
Later in January 2015, Misty was involved in a few incidents at the school. (Id.

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¶¶ 78–84.)

She repeatedly went into the school’s Learning Center without an

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appointment, which is a violation of school rules. (Id. ¶¶ 78, 79.) She also twice used

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profanity in addressing Minor 1’s instructional assistants. (Id. ¶¶ 80, 81.) According

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to one of the assistants, Ms. Comeaux, Misty’s behavior made her so uncomfortable

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that she would hide inside a locked classroom until Misty left the campus. (Id. ¶ 82.)

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After learning about this behavior, Dr. Elward issued Misty a disruptive parent

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letter. The letter was substantially similar to the letter previously sent to Corey. (Id.

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¶¶ 83, 84.) During the period in which Misty’s access to campus was restricted, she

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requested access several times. (Id. ¶ 88.) Dr. Wiedoeft granted some but not all of

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the requests. (Id. ¶ 89.) For example, Misty was allowed to attend an open house, a

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hands-on art activity, the Fifth Grade graduation, and a grade party. (Id. ¶ 90.)

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However, she was not allowed to attend some hands-on activities in Ms. Picazo’s

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classroom. (Id. ¶ 91.)

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The 2014-15 school year was the Camfield family’s last year at Jefferson

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Elementary. (See id. ¶ 92.) Minors 1 and 2 matriculated to Adams Middle School,

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and Minor 3 transferred to Washington Elementary School. (Id.)

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After their children left Jefferson Elementary, the Camfields filed this suit based

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on the injustice they believe they experienced in having their access to the school

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Of note, the disruptive parent letter did not prohibit activities such as picking up and dropping off
children at school or bringing notes to the school office for excused absences. (See id. ¶ 87.)

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restricted. (See ECF No. 1.) Defendants’ position throughout this litigation has been

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that they were justified in restricting the Camfields’ access to Jefferson Elementary.

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The Camfields’ Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) listed six causes of

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action. However, on December 2, 2016, this Court dismissed half of them. (ECF No.

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42.) The remaining causes of action are:

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(1)

RBUSD and the individual defendants in their individual capacities;

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(2)

capacities; and

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Retaliation in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”) against RBUSD and the individual defendants in their official

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Retaliation in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act against

(3)

Deprivation of civil rights, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the individual
defendants in their individual capacities.

(See SAC, ECF No. 26.)
III.

LEGAL STANDARD

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“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

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genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

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matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(a). A party seeking summary judgment bears

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the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying

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those portions of the pleadings and discovery responses that demonstrate the absence

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of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323

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(1986). Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, the

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movant must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other

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than for the moving party. See id. On an issue as to which the nonmoving party will

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have the burden of proof, however, the movant can prevail merely by pointing out that

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there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. See id.

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If the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must set forth,

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by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, “specific facts showing that there is a

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genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).

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In evaluating the evidence presented in support of or in opposition to summary

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judgment, the court does not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting

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evidence. Rather, it draws all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

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party. See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630–

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31 (9th Cir. 1987). However, conclusory or speculative testimony is insufficient to

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meet this burden or to raise genuine issues of fact defeating summary judgment. See

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Nelson v. Pima Cmty. Coll., 83 F.3d 1075, 1081–82 (9th Cir. 1996).

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IV.

DISCUSSION

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Corey and Misty’s causes of action for retaliation, under both Section 504 of the

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Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA, can be analyzed together because they are

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based on the same standard. Douglas v. Cal. Dep’t of Youth Auth., 285 F.3d 1226 n.3

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(9th Cir. 2002) (“cases interpreting either [Section 504 or the ADA] are applicable and

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interchangeable” (quoting Allison v. Dep’t of Corr., 94 F.3d 949, 497 (9th Cir. 1996))).

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The Court will first analyze the retaliation claims before turning to the § 1983 claim.

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A.

Claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA

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Corey and Misty’s retaliation claims are rooted in the fact that their child,

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Minor 1, has a disability and received special education services at Jefferson

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Elementary. (See SUF ¶ 9.) According to Corey and Misty’s operative complaint,

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their behavior leading up to the issuance of their respective disruptive parent letters

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was in connection with advocating for their disabled child, and the letters represent the

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school’s retaliation for the parents’ advocacy. (SAC ¶ 33.)

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1.

Legal Standard

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Both Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA contain anti-

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retaliation provisions, which are designed to give non-disabled persons standing to

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bring claims for retaliation they experience in advocating for the rights of disabled

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persons. See Barker v. Riverside Cnty. Office of Educ., 584 F.3d 821, 824–28 (9th Cir.

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2009). In order to prove a retaliation claim under either statute, a plaintiff must first

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make a prima facie case. A prima facie case for retaliation requires a plaintiff to show

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that (1) they engaged in a protected activity; (2) the defendant knew that the plaintiff

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was engaging in a protected activity; (3) the plaintiff experienced an adverse action on

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the part of defendant; and (4) a causal connection exists between the protected activity

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and the adverse action. Pardi v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 389 F.3d 840, 849 (9th Cir.

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2004). If a plaintiff can make the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant

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to show a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for taking the adverse action. Id. And if

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the defendant can make that showing, the burden once again shifts to the plaintiff to

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demonstrate that the defendant’s “legitimate” reason is pretexual. Brooks v. City of

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San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir. 2000).
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Analysis

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First, Corey and Misty admit in their Reply that Corey has no valid claim for

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retaliation. (Reply 2, ECF No. 62 (“Therefore, summary judgment must be granted in

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support of defendants as to Corey Camfield’s first and second causes of action.”).)

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Thus, analysis is only necessary as to Misty’s retaliation claims. Further, only Misty’s

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conduct in relation to Minor 1 is relevant to the retaliation claims, as the conduct must

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involve advocacy for a disabled person, and Minor 1 is the only Camfield child with a

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disability.

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A reasonable jury could conclude that Misty has established a prima facie case

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here because she can show that she (1) was engaged in a protected activity in

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advocating for Minor 1’s education; (2) Defendants knew that Minor 1 was receiving

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special education services and that Misty was advocating for the child’s educational

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situation; (3) the disruptive parent letter constitutes “adverse action”; and (4) the

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reason for the issuance of the disruptive parent letter was Misty’s behavior in

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connection with promoting Minor 1’s education. Indeed, Defendants concede in their

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Motion that “Misty Camfield can demonstrate prima facie causation based on

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temporal proximity.” (Mot. 19.)

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However, there is no genuine dispute that Defendants had a legitimate, non-

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retaliatory or pretextual basis for restricting Misty’s access to campus. It is undisputed

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that school administrators found Misty’s behavior on campus unacceptable on

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repeated occasions throughout 2014 and 2015. (SUF ¶¶ 66, 84.)

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In their Opposition, Misty and Corey primarily argue that Misty’s behavior was

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not sufficiently “disruptive” to restrict her access to campus—and thus that

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Defendants’ restrictions on her access to campus were retaliatory and non-legitimate.

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Corey and Misty cite Lee v. Natomas Unified School District, 93 F. Supp. 3d 1160,

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1169 (E.D. Cal. 2015), which found that “disruptive behavior” that has risen only to

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the level of causing school district staff to feel annoyed and harassed is not a proper

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basis for excluding a parent from a school campus. Corey and Misty argue that here,

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too, the “disruptive” behavior was merely an annoyance to school district staff and

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thus did not warrant the disruptive parent letter restricting Misty’s access to campus.

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However, Lee is distinguishable in that the school district’s action involved seeking a

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restraining order, whereas in this case Defendants temporarily restricted Misty’s

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access but did not ban it altogether.

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Misty and Corey cite another case, Braxton v. Municipal Court, 10 Cal. 3d 138,

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150 (1973), to argue that Misty’s behavior was not sufficiently disruptive to warrant

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Defendants’ adverse action. Braxton stands for the rule that a person’s conduct must

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constitute a “substantial and material threat” to the orderly operation of campus in

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order for a school to be justified in restricting that person’s access to campus. Id. at

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145. This argument fails because Braxton dealt with an incident on a college campus,

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and the California Court of Appeal has subsequently determined that the holding in

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Braxton does not apply to the conduct of non-students or to primary or secondary

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schools. See O’Toole v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. App. 4th 488, 512–13 (2006);

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Reeves v. Rocklin Unified Sch. Dist., 109 Cal. App. 4th 652, 660 (2003).

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Without any meaningful citations to case law supporting parents’ unfettered

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right to access an elementary school campus, Corey and Misty’s argument that

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Defendants’ actions were not warranted fails. As such, the Camfields cannot meet

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their burden of proving that Defendants’ proffered reason for the restrictions on access

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was pretextual. The Court therefore GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary

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judgment as to the Camfields’ Section 504 and ADA retaliation claims.

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B.

Section 1983 Claim

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Corey and Misty allege violations of both the federal and California state

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constitutions under this cause of action. The alleged violations are of Corey and

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Misty’s rights to free speech, equal protection, and procedural due process of law.

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However, the California Supreme Court has held that there is no private right of action

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for damages for alleged violations of the free speech, due process, or equal protection

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rights enumerated in the California Constitution. See, e.g., Degrassi v. Cook, 29 Cal.

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4th 333, 338 (2002); Katzberg v. Univ. of Cal., 29 Cal. 4th 300, 314 n.15 (2002).

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Thus, the Camfields’ § 1983 cause of action need only be analyzed as to their

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allegations of federal constitutional violations.

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Corey and Misty assert this cause of action against only the individual

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defendants (Dr. Steven Keller, Dr. Erik Elward, Dr. Oryla Wiedoeft, and Dr. Annette

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Alpern) in their individual capacities.

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1.

Legal Standard

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In order to successfully make a claim for constitutional violations under § 1983,

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Corey and Misty must prove: (1) the individual defendants subjected Corey/Misty to

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conduct that occurred under color of state law; and (2) this conduct deprived

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Corey/Misty of rights, privileges, or immunities guaranteed under federal law or the

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U.S. Constitution. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

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2.

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The Court will analyze the Camfields’ case as to each asserted violation.

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Analysis
i.

Free Speech Violation

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Corey and Misty claim that because their speech—specifically, arguments with

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other parents and teachers on campus, as well as profanity used during school

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meetings—was the basis for the school’s restrictions on their access to campus, their

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freedom of speech has been impermissibly curtailed. However, the biggest legal

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barrier to this argument is that public schools are not public forums for purposes of

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free speech.

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Traditional public forums are places like public parks or sidewalks. In those

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spaces, regulation of speech is permissible only where it is “narrowly drawn to

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achieve a compelling state interest.” Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.

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Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992). The Ninth Circuit has held that public schools are not

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public forums for purposes of free speech. See DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist.

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Bd. of Educ., 196 F.3d 958, 965 (9th Cir. 1999). As a result of that status, government

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actors are permitted to “make distinctions in access on the basis of subject matter and

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speaker identity . . . . The touchstone for evaluating these distinctions is whether they

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are reasonable in light of the purpose which the forum at issue serves.” Perry Educ.

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Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983).

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Given this broad discretion of school administrators to restrict speech on

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campus, no reasonable jury could find that the temporary limitations (and not total

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ban) of Corey and Misty’s participation on Jefferson Elementary’s campus were not

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reasonable in light of their disruptions to the normal activities of campus.

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Notably, Corey and Misty cite only one federal case in their Opposition to

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support their argument that they were subjected to a violation of their free speech

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rights. The case is Jeglin v. San Jacinto Unified School District, 827 F. Supp. 1459

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(C.D. Cal. 1993), and it holds that prohibiting elementary school and middle school

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students from wearing clothing “bearing insignias, writings or pictures which identify

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any college or professional sports team” is a violation of the students’ free speech. Id.

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at 1464. While the case does stand loosely for the proposition that free speech rights

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weigh more heavily in some instances than a school’s interest in protecting its

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educational process, Jeglin is easily distinguishable from the instant matter because

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the level of disturbance—children wearing sports teams’ t-shirts—is far below the

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disturbance in this case: parents getting into fights and using abusive and

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inappropriate language on an elementary school campus.

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Camfields’ First Amendment claim fails.

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ii.

See id.

Thus, the

Equal Protection Violation

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Next, Corey and Misty allege that the individual defendants violated their right

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to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. There are two ways in which a

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person can allege a violation of their right to equal protection. First, a person can

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claim to be a member of a protected class. See City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne

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Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). Corey and Misty have not done so here. Thus,

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they must make their case using the second method: showing that they have “been

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intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no

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rational basis for the difference in treatment.” See Village of Wilowbrook v. Olech,

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528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).

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Here, it is plain that Corey and Misty cannot show that they were intentionally

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treated differently from others in a similar situation. In fact, they received exactly the

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same treatment as others who behaved similarly, like Robert Boitano. (See SUF ¶ 71.)

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In their Opposition, Corey and Misty make the vague claim that they “have been

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subjected to restrictions and sanctions to which other similarly situated parents, whose

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students attend school in school districts that actually comply with the law, are not

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subjected.” (Opp’n 18, ECF No. 61.) However, Corey and Misty reference no facts

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whatsoever to support this argument. Thus, their Equal Protection claim must fail.

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iii.

Procedural Due Process Violation

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Finally, Corey and Misty allege that Defendants violated their right to

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protection under the Due Process Clause, which prohibits the government from

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depriving individuals of their “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”

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U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

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The problem for Corey and Misty is that they do not have a constitutionally

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protected right to access the Jefferson Elementary campus. The Supreme Court has

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held that school administrators have the right to immediately remove from school

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property individuals who pose a threat of an ongoing disruption to the academic

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process. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 582–83 (1975). Reading the Constitution

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to grant individuals an unfettered liberty interest in access to sensitive places like an

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elementary school campus would leave school administrators powerless to protect the

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students therein. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 470–71 (1980).

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Further, Corey and Misty complain that the school did not follow due process

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standards in imposing limitations on their ability to access campus, but they fail to

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explain what such due process mechanisms might look like. And, in fact, Corey and

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Misty were given warnings before the school issued the disruptive parent letters, and

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both parents’ restrictions on accessing campus were ultimately lifted after further

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meetings with school administrators. Thus, it is unclear what additional procedural

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protections Corey and Misty would have liked to have been afforded but were denied.

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Overall, Corey and Misty focus on the school’s lack of authority for restricting

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their access to campus, but the real issue is Corey and Misty’s lack of a

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constitutionally-protected right to such access to begin with. Therefore, the Court

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GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the Camfields’ § 1983

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claim, as they cannot show that they were deprived of any constitutional right.

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V.

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CONCLUSION

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For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for

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summary judgment in its entirety. (ECF Nos. 55, 56.) The clerk of court shall close

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the case, and a Judgment will issue.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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July 17, 2017

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____________________________________
OTIS D. WRIGHT, II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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