Devin Stearns v. Davis Wire Corporation

Filing 18

MINUTES OF Motion Hearing held before Judge Christina A. Snyder RE: Plaintiff's Motion to Remand 12 . Having determined that plaintiff's claims in this action are not, as currently pled, preempted by Section 301and because there is no alt ernative basis for this court to exercise jurisdictionthe Court concludes that this matter is appropriately remanded to state court for further proceedings. The Court REMANDS this action to the Los Angeles County Superior Court, Case No. BC609718. MD JS-6. Case Terminated. ) Court Reporter: Laura Elias. (gk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

2:16-cv-02401-CAS(MRWx)

Title

DEVIN STEARNS v. DAVIS WIRE CORPORATION

Present: The Honorable

Date

‘O’ JS-6

May 23, 2016

CHRISTINA A. SNYDER

Catherine Jeang
Deputy Clerk

Laura Elias
Court Reporter / Recorder

N/A
Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs:

Attorneys Present for Defendants:

Lawrence Freiman

Jonesh Daryanani
Javier Garcia

Proceedings:

I.

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO REMAND (Dkt. 12, filed April 25,
2016)

INTRODUCTION

On February 9, 2016, plaintiff Devin Stearns (“plaintiff”) filed the instant action in
the Los Angeles County Superior Court against defendant Davis Wire Corporation
(“defendant” or “Davis Wire”). Dkt. 1, Ex. A (Complaint). Plaintiff’s complaint asserts
claims for discrimination in violation of the California Family Rights Act (“CFRA”),
California Government Code §§ 12900, et seq. (claim 1); “failure to engage in the
interactive process and provide reasonable accommodation” in violation of the California
Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) (claim 2); discrimination and failure to
prevent discrimination, in violation of FEHA (claims 3 and 4); harassment and failure to
prevent harassment, in violation of FEHA (claims 5 and 6); retaliation in violation of
FEHA (claim 7); “wrongful termination in violation of public policy” (claim 8); failure to
pay meal and rest period compensation, in violation of California Labor Code §§ 226.7,
512, 1194, 1197-1197.2, and 1198 (claim 9); failure timely to pay earned wages, in
violation of California Labor Code § 204 (claim 10); failure to provide accurate wage
statements, in violation of California Labor Code § 226 (claim 11); failure timely to pay
wages earned upon separation of employment, in violation of California Labor Code §§
201, 202, and 203 (claim 12); and violation of California Business and Professions Code
§§ 17200, et seq. (claim 13). See id.
On April 8, 2016, defendant removed this action to federal court on the grounds
that plaintiff’s state law claims arise from and require interpretation of a collective
bargaining agreement (“CBA”), such that they are preempted by section 301(a) of the
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May 23, 2016

Title

DEVIN STEARNS v. DAVIS WIRE CORPORATION

Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185, et seq. Dkt. 1 (Notice of
Removal).
On April 25, 2016, plaintiff filed a motion to remand this action to state court.
Dkt. 12 (“Motion”). On May 2, 2016, defendant filed an opposition to the motion to
remand. Dkt. 14 (“Opp’n”). On May 9, 2016, plaintiff filed a reply. Dkt. 17 (“Reply”).
On May 23, 2016, the Court distributed a tentative order to the parties and held oral
argument. Having carefully considered the parties’ arguments, the Court finds and
concludes as follows.
II.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Devin Stearns, who is an African-American male, was an employee of
defendant Davis Wire Corporation before he was terminated on an unspecified date.
Complaint at ¶ 7. In the instant action, plaintiff alleges that while he was employed by
defendant, he was subjected to “a hostile work environment on the basis of [his]
race/color through verbal harassment denigrating African American/Black individuals,
slurs about race/color, assault, physical altercation, and visual harassment through written
slurs about race/color in visible locations at the worksite.” Id. at 13. Plaintiff avers that
he lodged various complaints with defendant regarding the workplace environment,
including complaints regarding (1) an incident in which plaintiff was assaulted by another
Davis Wire employee, (2) workplace safety concerns regarding “a generally unsafe work
environment” and “machines being a danger to employees,” and (3) “discrimination and
harassment on the basis of his race/color/ancestry/national origin . . . .” Id. at ¶¶ 10-11,
15.
According to the complaint, defendant terminated plaintiff’s employment “in
retaliation for his workplace safety and assault complaints,” his “legally protected
complaints about harassment and discrimination in violation of FEHA,” as well as his
“medical condition and disability and his exercise of his right to take medical leave.” Id.
at ¶¶ 9, 12, 16. Plaintiff further alleges that defendant violated various provisions of the
California Labor Code by, inter alia, (1) failing to provide ten-minute rest breaks for each
eight hours worked and thirty-minute meal periods for each five hours worked; (2) failing
to pay labor code premiums for the required rest and meal periods that defendant did not
provide; (3) failing to provide accurate wage statements; (4) failing to pay all of
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plaintiff’s wages due twice each calendar month; and (5) failure to pay wages earned at
the time of termination. Id. at ¶¶ 17-21.
Defendant avers that plaintiff was represented as an employee by the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters Union, Local 986 (“Union”), and that as a Union member, the
terms and conditions of plaintiff’s employment were governed by a comprehensive
collective bargaining agreement between Davis Wire and the Union. Washington Decl.,
at ¶ 2, Exh. A (CBA). Defendant further states that in June 2014, plaintiff engaged with
another employee in a physical altercation in the workplace. Id. at ¶ 3. Pursuant to the
CBA, plaintiff submitted to a drug test after the altercation, which came back positive for
marijuana. Id. at Exh. B. Defendant avers that it conducted an investigation into the
matter and terminated plaintiff’s employment for violating the company’s workplace
violence policy. Id. The Union and plaintiff then filed a grievance under the CBA
contesting plaintiff’s discharge. Oravec Decl., at ¶ 3. In plaintiff’s grievance to the
Union, he stated that the “drug screen was positive which I feel was false. Wrongful
termination.” Id. at Exh. C (Grievance).
According to defendant, the Union and plaintiff settled the grievance and the
Union accepted defendant’s decision to discharge plaintiff. In defendant’s view, because
plaintiff “clearly invoked the grievance procedures of the CBA and chose to settle his
grievance under CBA’s grievance procedures of the CBA,” plaintiff has effectively
incorporated the CBA into the settlement agreement. Id. And because plaintiff and the
Union purportedly “grieved [the] termination under the CBA,” plaintiff “cannot now
claim that the CBA is inapplicable.” Opp’n at 3.
III.

LEGAL STANDARD
A.

Removal based upon LMRA Section 301 Preemption

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) provides that a defendant may remove from state to
federal court any civil action over which the district court would have had original
jurisdiction. Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over “all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
“Federal jurisdiction exists only if the federal question appears on the face of the

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plaintiff's ‘well-pleaded complaint.’ ” Milne Employees Ass’n v. Sun Carriers, 960 F.2d
1401, 1406 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987)).
But “there is a corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule under the ‘complete
preemption’ doctrine, ‘applied primarily under § 301 of the LMRA.’ ” Lopez v. Fox
Television Animation, Inc., 76 Fed. App’x 769, 771 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Balcorta v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000)). Under this
exception, “[o]nce an area of state law has been completely pre-empted, any claim
purportedly based on that pre-empted state law is considered, from its inception, a federal
claim, and therefore arises under federal law.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393. With respect
to the propriety of removal based upon Section 301 preemption, the Ninth Circuit has
explained that
Plaintiffs cannot avoid removal by “artfully pleading” only
state law claims that are actually preempted by federal statutes
such as section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.
[Citation.] Thus, if a state law claim is completely preempted
by a federal statute such as section 301, the state law cause of
action necessarily becomes a federal one and can be removed.
Milne, 960 F.2d at 1406 (emphasis added).
B.

Motion for Remand

A motion for remand is the proper procedure for challenging removal. Remand
may be ordered either for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or for any defect in removal
procedure. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). In general, a federal district court has subject matter
jurisdiction where a case presents a claim arising under federal law (“federal question
jurisdiction”), or where the plaintiffs and defendants are residents of different states and
the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 (“diversity jurisdiction”). See, e.g., Deutsche
Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Galindo, 2011 WL 662324, *1 (C.D.Cal. Feb. 11, 2011)
(explaining the two types of jurisdiction). The Court strictly construes the removal
statutes against removal jurisdiction, and jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any
doubt as to the right of removal. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th

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Cir.1992). The party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing federal
jurisdiction. See Prize Frize, Inc. v. Matrix, Inc., 167 F.3d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir.1999).
III.

DISCUSSION
A.

The Scope of LMRA Section 301 Preemption

Under Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, district courts have
jurisdiction over claims arising from “violations of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization representing employees in an industry.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Federal
substantive law preempts state law in an action arising under Section 301 in order to
further the interest in uniform federal interpretation of collective bargaining agreements.
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 209 (1985) (“[D]imensions of § 301
require the conclusion that substantive principles of federal labor law must be paramount
in the area covered by the statute [so that] issues raised in suits of a kind covered by §
301 [are] to be decided according to the precepts of federal labor policy.”) (citing
Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962)). Accordingly, Section 301’s
preemptive force has been construed to cover most “state law actions that require
interpretation of labor agreements.” Aguilera v. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp., 223 F.3d
1010, 1016 (9th Cir. 2000).
Where a right “exists solely as a result of the [collective bargaining agreement],
then the claim is preempted,” and the court’s analysis ends there. Burnside v. Kiewit
Pacific Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at
212). However, if the right exists independently of the collective bargaining agreement,
it may still be preempted if “it is nevertheless ‘substantially dependent on analysis of a
collective-bargaining agreement.’ ” Id. (citing Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 394). In general,
if resolution of a state law claim requires an interpretation of the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement, then the claim is substantially dependent upon the collective
bargaining agreement and is therefore preempted under section 301. Burnside, 491 F.3d
at 1060; Cramer v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683, 693 (9th Cir. 2001) (en
banc), cert. denied 534 U.S. 1078 (2002). On the other hand, if the “meaning of contract
terms is not the subject of dispute, the bare fact that a collective bargaining agreement
will be consulted in the course of the state-law litigation” does not result in preemption.
Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 124 (1994).
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Indeed, despite the broad preemptive effect of Section 301, claims that seek to
vindicate “nonnegotiable state-law rights . . . independent of any right established by
contract” are not within the scope of Section 301 preemption. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S.
at 213; see also Livadas, 512 U.S. at 123-24 (“[Section] 301 cannot be read broadly to
pre-empt nonnegotiable rights conferred on individual employees as a matter of state law.
. . . [I]t is the legal character of a claim, as ‘independent’ of rights under the
collective-bargaining agreement . . . that decides whether a state cause of action may go
forward” (citations omitted)). “As a result, if a state law cannot be waived or modified
by private contract, and if the rights it creates can be enforced without resort to the
particular terms, express or implied, of a labor contract, § 301 does not preempt the claim
for violation of the law.” Vasserman v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem’l Hosp., 65 F. Supp.
3d 932, 951-52 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (Morrow, J.) (citing Miller v. AT&T Network Systems,
850 F.2d 543, 546 (9th Cir. 1988)).
Ultimately, therefore, “[t]he plaintiff's claim is the touchstone for [Section 301
preemption] analysis; the need to interpret the CBA must inhere in the nature of the
plaintiff's claim.” Cramer, 255 F.3d at 691. Specifically, the court must consider
“whether the claim can be resolved by ‘look[ing] to’ versus interpreting the CBA. If the
latter, the claim is preempted; if the former, it is not.” Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1060
(internal citations omitted) (alteration in original); see also Cramer, 255 F.3d at 691-92
(“[A]lleging a hypothetical connection between the claim and the terms of the CBA is not
enough to preempt the claim: adjudication of the claim must require interpretation of a
provision of the CBA.”).
B.

The Claims in the Instant Action

In the instant action, plaintiff asserts thirteen individual claims that arise under
California law. Specifically, plaintiff asserts a claim for “wrongful termination in
violation of public policy” (claim 8), as well as claims for alleged violations of the
California Family Rights Act (claim 1), the California Fair Employment and Housing Act
(claims 2 through 7), the California Labor Code (claims 9 through 12), and California’s
unfair competition law (claim 13). Defendant removed plaintiff’s action to federal court
on the grounds that plaintiff’s state law claims “exclusively arise from and require
interpretation of a CBA” and are accordingly preempted by Section 301. Notice of
Removal, at 4.
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However, neither defendant’s Notice of Removal nor its opposition to the instant
motion makes clear which of plaintiff’s thirteen claims are purportedly preempted by
Section 301. Rather, defendant’s Notice of Removal states more generally that plaintiff’s
“discharge claims” and “workplace safety claims” are governed by and require
interpretation of a CBA, such that they are preempted by Section 301. Id. at 5.1 In
opposition to the instant motion, defendant similarly argues that “plaintiff’s claims and
allegations that he was subjected to inferior terms and conditions of employment and
discharged for allegedly making safety complaints arise from and require interpretation of
the CBA.” Opp’n at 5.
For reasons explained below, the Court finds that plaintiff’s claims are not
preempted by Section 301, such that this matter may appropriately be remanded to state
court.
1.

Plaintiff’s Claims Do Not Arise from the CBA

In opposition to the instant motion, defendant first argues in general terms that
plaintiff “has put the entire CBA [between defendant and the Union] at the front and
center of this lawsuit by claiming that he was not granted the terms and conditions of
employment promised under the CBA.” Opp’n at 5. Defendant further argues that “all of
the terms and conditions of [p]laintiff’s employment arise exclusively from a CBA that
was negotiated between the [defendant] and the Union,” such that plaintiff’s “right to
those terms and conditions of employment arise entirely from the CBA.” Id. In
defendant’s view, “[t]his alone requires a finding of preemption.” Id.
Defendant’s argument fundamentally misses the mark, as it misconstrues the nature
of plaintiff’s complaint and the claims asserted therein. In the operative complaint,
plaintiff does not “claim[] that he was not granted the terms and conditions of
employment promised under the CBA” (Opp’n at 5); rather, plaintiff asserts a series of
claims that arise under California law and that exist independent of the particular terms of

1

Defendant further argues in its Notice of Removal that the Court should exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the “remaining claims” in this action, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. sections 1367 and 1441(c). Notice of Removal, at 5.
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the CBA.2 Of course, “[Section] 301 cannot be read broadly to pre-empt nonnegotiable
rights conferred on individual employees as a matter of state law . . . [and] ‘independent’
of rights under the collective-bargaining agreement.” Livadas, 512 U.S. at 123-24.
Despite defendant’s contention to the contrary, plaintiff’s complaint makes no
reference to the CBA whatsoever, nor does it otherwise implicate rights that “exist[]
solely as a result of the CBA.” Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1059; see also Meyer v. Irwin
Indus., Inc., 723 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1243 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“Plaintiff's claims arise wholly
under state law. Indeed, plaintiff alleges only state law claims and expressly indicates
that the CBA need not be referenced . . . Thus, § 301 preemption is clearly not
implicated.”); Davies v. Premier Chemicals, Inc., 50 Fed. App’x 811, 812 (9th Cir. 2002)
(“Davies’ state-law complaint does not refer to the CBA or allege a breach of contract.
Rather, Davies alleges that Premier committed tortious discharge in violation of Nevada’s
public policy by firing him for refusing to work on a machine after safety locks had been
removed and for refusing to operate a machine for which he had no training . . . Section
301 does not preempt claims to vindicate such nonnegotiable state law rights.)
2.

Plaintiff’s Claims are not Substantially Dependent upon Analysis
of the CBA

Even if the rights upon which plaintiff’s claims rest are nonnegotiable and exist
independently of the CBA, these claims may still be preempted if their resolution is
“nevertheless ‘substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining
agreement.’ ” Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1059 (citing Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 212). In
opposition to the instant motion to remand, defendant appears to argue that plaintiff’s
eighth claim for “wrongful termination in violation of public policy” requires

2

Specifically, plaintiff asserts thirteen individual claims under California
law––i.e., a claim for “wrongful termination in violation of public policy (and not in
violation of the terms of the CBA) (claim 8), as well as claims for alleged violations of
the California Family Rights Act (claim 1), the California Fair Employment and Housing
Act (claims 2 through 7), the California Labor Code (claims 9 through 12), and
California’s unfair competition law (claim 13).
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interpretation of the CBA and is therefore preempted by Section 301.3 For reasons

3

The Court notes that defendant’s arguments in support of removal do not appear
to be premised upon plaintiff’s twelve other claims asserted in this action (i.e., claims for
violations of CFRA (claim 1), FEHA (claims 2 through 7), the California Labor Code
(claims 9 through 12), and California’s unfair competition law (claim 13)). However, to
the extent defendant contends that these claims are preempted by Section 301, the Court
notes that courts generally find such claims not to be preempted. For example, with
respect to plaintiff’s FEHA claims (i.e., claims 2 through 7), the Ninth Circuit has
“consistently held that state law discrimination claims under the FEHA do not require
courts to interpret the terms of a CBA and are therefore not preempted by § 301.”
Schrader v. Noll Mfg. Co., 91 Fed. App’x. 553, 555 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Ackerman v.
W. Elec. Co., 860 F.2d 1514, 1517 (9th Cir.1988) (finding no Section 301 preemption of
FEHA disability discrimination claim because the right not to be discriminated against on
account of one’s physical handicap is “defined and enforced under state law without
reference to the terms of any collective bargaining agreement”); see Chmiel v. Beverly
Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1286–87 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding no Section 301
preemption of FEHA age discrimination claim because the statute creates a “mandatory
and independent state right”); Cook v. Lindsay Olive Growers, 911 F.2d 233, 240 (9th
Cir. 1990) (finding no Section 301 preemption of FEHA religious discrimination claim
because “the right not to be discriminated against on the basis of religion cannot be
removed by private contract”); see also Ramirez v. Fox Television Station, Inc., 998 F.2d
743, 748-49 (9th Cir. 1993) (“In every case in which we have considered an action
brought under the California Employment Act, we have held that it is not preempted by
section 301.”).
Similarly, plaintiff’s claims for violations of the California Labor Code (claims 9
through 12) exist independent of the CBA, arise wholly from California state law, and are
not preempted by Section 301. See Vasserman, 65 F. Supp. 3d at 960 (C.D. Cal. 2014)
(claim for failure to pay meal and rest period compensation in violation of California
Labor Code §§ 226.7 is not preempted by Section 301 because “[m]eal periods are a
non-negotiable right under state law”); id. at 953 (claim for failure to provide overtime
compensation in violation of California Labor Code § 204 is not preempted by Section
301); Avalos v. Foster Poultry Farms, 798 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1162 (E.D. Cal. 2011)
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explained below, the Court disagrees and accordingly concludes that this matter is
appropriately remanded to state court.
a.

Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy (claim
8)

The Ninth Circuit has explained that “[a] claim that a discharge violates public
policy ‘is preempted [by Section 301] . . . if it is not based on any genuine state public
policy, or if it is bound up with interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement and
furthers no state policy independent of the employment relationship.’ ” Jackson v. S.
California Gas Co., 881 F.2d 638, 643-44 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Young v. Anthony’s
Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d 993, 1002 (9th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). On the other
hand, “a claim is not preempted if it poses no significant threat to the collective
bargaining process and furthers a state interest in protecting the public transcending the
employment relationship.” Young, 830 F.2d at 1001.
Thus, for example, the Ninth Circuit in Paige v. Henry J. Kaiser Company found
plaintiff’s claim for wrongful discharge not to be preempted where it was premised upon
violations of California state statutes and public policy:
A private right of action for wrongful discharge due to safety
complaints co-exists with the Cal/OSHA remedial scheme.
[Citation.] California’s OSHA regulations protect all workers,
irrespective of any labor agreement. State health and safety
standards benefit all employees as individual workers, not
because they are or are not members of a collective bargaining
association. And California’s interest in providing this private
cause of action is the enforcement of the underlying statute or

(claim for failure to provide accurate wage statements in violation of California Labor
Code § 226 is not preempted by Section 301); id. (claim for failure timely to pay wages
earned upon separation of employment in violation of California Labor Code §§ 201,
202, and 203 is not preempted by Section 301).

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policy, not to regulate the employment relationship. [Citation.] .
. . Thus the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy exists independent of any contractual right . . . The
resolution of [plaintiff’s] wrongful discharge claim therefore
depends upon an analysis of Cal/OSHA and California tort law.
Since it is not intertwined or substantially dependent upon
consideration of the terms of the labor contract, it is not
preempted by section 301.

826 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1987); c.f. Romero v. San Pedro Forklift, Inc., 266 F. App’x
552, 555 (9th Cir. 2008) (“This Court long ago recognized that Section 301 does not
preempt the California tort of wrongful discharge.”) (citing Paige, 826 F.2d at 863).
Similarly, in Jackson v. Southern California Gas Company, the Ninth Circuit held
that a district court erred in finding plaintiff’s claim for wrongful discharge in violation
of public policy to be preempted where plaintiff alleged that the “wrongful termination
violate[d] [California’s] public policy against racial discrimination.” 881 F.2d at 643-44.
As the Court explained, “[t]here is little doubt that California has adopted a public policy
against discrimination in the work place,” and “enforcement of the state discrimination
statutes would not require interpretation of any of the provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement.” Id. at 644. Accordingly, plaintiff’s claim for wrongful discharge
in violation of California’s public policy against racial discrimination was not preempted.
Id.
In the instant action, plaintiff alleges that defendant terminated his employment (1)
“on the basis of his race,” and (2) in retaliation for “his workplace safety and assault
complaints” and “his legally protected complaints about harassment and discrimination in
violation of FEHA.”4 Complaint at ¶¶ 70, 74-75. Plaintiff avers that termination under

4

Plaintiff alleges that prior to his termination, he “made safety complaints
concerning [d]efendant’s machines being a danger to employees and a generally unsafe
work environment,” and further that he “complained to [d]efendant about [d]efendant’s
employee assaulting [p]laintiff through a physical altercation.” Complaint at ¶¶ 68-69.
Plaintiff further alleges that “[d]efendant[] subjected [p]laintiff to a hostile work
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such circumstances and on such grounds was “wrongful and in contravention of FEHA,
CFRA, Labor Code [sections] 6310, 1102.5,” as well as the California Court of Appeal’s
ruling in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.3d 167, 178 (1980) (holding that “an
employer may not coerce compliance with . . . unlawful directions by discharging an
employee who refuses to follow such . . . order[s]”).
In opposition to the instant motion, defendant argues that plaintiff’s claim for
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is preempted by Section 301. According
to defendant, plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim is “unquestionably governed by and
require[s] interpretation of the CBA because [p]laintiff and the Union settled [p]laintiff’s
discharge grievance,” such that resolution of plaintiff’s discharge claim is “inextricably
intertwined” with the terms of the CBA. Opp’n at 8. Specifically, defendant argues that
in order to adjudicate the wrongful discharge claim, the Court “will be required” to
interpret various provisions of the CBA, including provisions outlining (1) the definition
of what constitutes “sufficient and proper cause” to discharge plaintiff; (2) defendant’s
“work rules”; (3) the meaning of the word “settled” under the CBA, so as to determine
whether plaintiff may “re-open grievances that have been settled” pursuant to the CBA’s
grievance procedure; and (4) plaintiff’s rights with regard to drug testing, “including the
ability and process for alleging positive drug tests.” Opp’n at 8.
At bottom, defendant’s argument is that the Court may be required to interpret the
CBA and the settlement agreement in assessing the merits of a defense to plaintiff’s claim
for wrongful discharge. However, the Ninth Circuit has routinely held that Section 301
cannot be asserted defensively in order to trigger preemption. Specifically, an en banc
panel of the Ninth Circuit held in Cramer that for a claim to be preempted by section 301,
“the need to interpret the CBA must inhere in the nature of [the] claim” itself. 255 F.3d
at 691. “If the claim is plainly based on state law, § 301 preemption is not mandated
simply because the defendant refers to the CBA in mounting a defense.” Id.; see also
Humble, 305 F.3d at 1008 (“As explained in Cramer, the plaintiff's claim is the

environment on the basis of race/color through verbal harassment denigrating African
American/Black individuals, slurs about race/color, assault, physical altercation, and
visual harassment through written slurs about race/color in visible locations at the
worksite.” Id. at ¶ 71.
CV-90 (06/04)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date

‘O’ JS-6

Case No.

2:16-cv-02401-CAS(MRWx)

May 23, 2016

Title

DEVIN STEARNS v. DAVIS WIRE CORPORATION

touchstone for the preemption analysis, and ‘the need to interpret the CBA must inhere in
the nature of the plaintiff's claim’ to trigger preemption. . . . [D]efensive reliance on the
terms of the CBA, mere consultation of the CBA’s terms, or speculative reliance on the
CBA will not suffice to preempt a state law claim.” (emphasis added)); Sprewell v.
Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 991 (9th Cir. 2001) (defensive reliance on CBA
terms is insufficient to trigger preemption).
Again, plaintiff’s claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy alleges
that defendant terminated his employment “on the basis of his race” and in retaliation for
complaints that he made regarding both “workplace safety and assault,” and “harassment
and discrimination in violation of FEHA.” Complaint at ¶¶ 70, 74-75. Among other
things, plaintiff alleges that defendant’s discharge violated California Labor Code section
6310, which bars discharge of employees based upon the lodging of certain workplace
safety or health complaints. See Cal. Lab. Code § 6310(a)-(d). Accordingly, plaintiff’s
wrongful discharge claim is clearly “based on a[] genuine state public policy,” Jackson,
881 F.2d at 643-44, and its adjudication “poses no significant threat to the collective
bargaining process and furthers a state interest in protecting the public transcending the
employment relationship,” Young, 830 F.2d at 1001.
In other words, plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim is not premised upon rights
exclusively governed by the CBA, but rather upon genuine state public policy. Thus,
even a finding by the Court that defendant had “sufficient and proper cause” under the
CBA to discharge plaintiff would have little bearing on whether any such discharge
nonetheless violated California public policy proscribing termination on certain
prohibited grounds. C.f. Humble, 305 F.3d at 1011 (“[Defendant] argues that when it
offers a non-discriminatory justification for its conduct by relying on authorizing CBA
provisions, that suffices to trigger preemption of [plaintiff’s] reasonable accommodation
claim. This argument is unavailing after Cramer, which held that reliance on CBA
provisions to defend against an independent state law claim does not trigger § 301
preemption.”). The relevant inquiry is whether defendant’s discharge violated a genuine
public policy, regardless of whether it may have complied with the terms of the CBA.5

5

In a footnote, defendant rightfully notes that FEHA claims and claims for
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy may be preempted by Section 301 where
CV-90 (06/04)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Page 13 of 15

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date

‘O’ JS-6

Case No.

2:16-cv-02401-CAS(MRWx)

May 23, 2016

Title

DEVIN STEARNS v. DAVIS WIRE CORPORATION

Similarly, even if the Court were to conclude, as defendant insists, that in bringing the
instant lawsuit plaintiff breached the settlement agreement that purportedly arose from

adjudication of the claim itself requires the Court to interpret the terms of a CBA. Opp’n
at 7 n.2. However, in the cases which defendant cites, plaintiff’s claims were generally
preempted because the claims themselves (and not merely defendant’s defenses)
depended upon establishing a violation of a collective bargaining agreement or settlement
agreement. C.f. Guidry v. Marine Eng’rs. Beneficial Ass’n., 2007 WL 707511, at *4
(N.D.Cal. Mar. 6, 2007) (Breyer, J.) (“[S]tate-law claims are preempted only when the
resolution of an allegation of discrimination itself hinges on the interpretation of a labor
contract.”) (emphasis in original). For example, defendant cites Madison v. Motion
Picture Set Painters and Sign Writers Local 729, 132 F.Supp.2d 1244 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
(Morrow, J.), wherein the plaintiff sued his union claiming that it had discriminated
against him in the manner in which it had handled a grievance procedure set forth under
the terms of a CBA. For the court in Madison to determine whether the plaintiff had been
discriminated against, the Court was therefore required to determine (1) what the CBA’s
grievance procedures were and (2) whether those procedures had been applied to plaintiff
in a manner that differed from any other employees. Similarly, in Audette v.
Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union, 195 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1999), the Ninth
Circuit held that a plaintiff’s state-law discrimination claim was preempted by Section
301. However, unlike the plaintiff in this action, the plaintiff in Audette claimed that the
defendants discriminated against him by failing to comply with a settlement agreement
that had expressly incorporated the terms of an underlying CBA, such that interpretation
of the CBA was necessary to resolution of the claim itself. Id. at 1112; see also Padilla v.
Pac. Bell Tel. Co., 2015 WL 728695, at *3 (C.D.Cal. Feb 19, 2015) (Pregerson, J.)
(distinguishing Audette “both because it applies Washington rather than California law
and because the discrimination alleged in that case was in the context of enforcing a
settlement agreement that relied on an underlying CBA to define its terms and provide for
enforcement”) (citations omitted). Again, plaintiff’s claim here for wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy is unrelated to the particulars of defendant’s handling of the
CBA’s grievance procedure or the settlement agreement that arose therefrom.
CV-90 (06/04)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Page 14 of 15

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date

‘O’ JS-6

Case No.

2:16-cv-02401-CAS(MRWx)

May 23, 2016

Title

DEVIN STEARNS v. DAVIS WIRE CORPORATION

the CBA grievance procedure, any such finding would not provide grounds for
preemption of plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim.6
Having determined that plaintiff’s claims in this action are not, as currently pled,
preempted by Section 301––and because there is no alternative basis for this court to
exercise jurisdiction––the Court concludes that this matter is appropriately remanded to
state court for further proceedings.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, the Court REMANDS this action to the Los
Angeles County Superior Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
00
Initials of Preparer

:

10

CMJ

6

While it is true that resolution of a claim premised upon an alleged violation
of the grievance settlement would likely require interpretation of the CBA, no such claim
is at issue in this action. Again, to the extent defendant seeks to rely upon the settlement
agreement in asserting a defense, any such reliance does not provide grounds for Section
301 preemption and removal of this action to federal court.
CV-90 (06/04)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Page 15 of 15