Rene Guzman Ramirez v. David Long

Filing 21

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE by Magistrate Judge Frederick F. Mumm: (see attached) (jm)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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RENE GUZMAN RAMIREZ,

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Petitioner,
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v.
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DAVID LONG, Warden, C.C.C.F., )
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Respondent.
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No. CV 16-3615-FFM
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR
FAILURE TO PROSECUTE

PROCEEDINGS

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On or about May 24, 2016, petitioner Rene Guzman Ramirez (“petitioner”),

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a California inmate proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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by a Person in State Custody (the “petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Dkt.

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1.)

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After initially reviewing the petition, on May 27, 2016, the Court issued its

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standard Order Requiring Return to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “case

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management order”). (Dkt. 4.) Therein, the Court ordered that, if respondent

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elected to file a return to the petition, petitioner was to file a reply to the return

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within thirty days after service thereof. (Id. at 3.) Additionally, the Order

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expressly required petitioner to apprise the Court of any address changes and

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warned that a failure to do so would result in a dismissal of the petition for failure

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to prosecute. (Id. at 4.)

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On July 5, 2016, petitioner informed the Court that he had been granted

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early parole under California Assembly Bill 109, Cal. Stats. 2011, ch. 15. (Dkt.

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8.) Petitioner advised the Court that, as a result, he would be released from prison

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and into the custody of Los Angeles County Probation Department on July 6,

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2016. Furthermore, petitioner stated that his new address would be 334 1/4 W.

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87th St., Los Angeles, CA 90003.

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After several extensions of time, respondent filed a return to the petition on

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September 2, 2016. (Dkt. 13.) Accordingly, petitioner’s reply was due on or

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before October 3, 2016. To date, petitioner has not filed a reply, sought an

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extension of time in which to do so, or otherwise communicated with the Court.

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Finally, the Court notes that each piece of mail it has attempted to deliver

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to plaintiff since July 22, 2016, has been returned as undeliverable. (See Dkts.

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11, 18-20.) Thus, it appears that petitioner has failed to keep the Court apprised

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of his correct address.

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DISCUSSION

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The Court has inherent power to achieve the orderly and expeditious

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disposition of cases by dismissing actions for failure to prosecute and failure to

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comply with Court orders. See Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30 (1962)

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(finding that “[t]he power to [dismiss for failure to prosecute] is necessary in

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order to prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases and to avoid

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congestion in the calendars of District Courts”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). In Carey

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v. King, 856 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1988), the Ninth Circuit cited the following

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factors as relevant to the Court’s determination whether to dismiss an action for

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failure to prosecute: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of

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litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to

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the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits,
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and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.” See Carey, 856 F.2d at 1440.

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The same factors are evaluated when determining whether to dismiss an action

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based on a party’s failure to comply with a Court order. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963

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F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992).

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The Five Carey Factors Warrant Dismissal

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1.

Public’s Interest in the Expeditious Resolution of Litigation

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“The public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation always favors

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dismissal.” Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999).

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Furthermore, in addition to the public’s inherent interest in the expeditious

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resolution of litigation, plaintiff’s inactivity and failure to comply with the

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Court’s case management order further warrant dismissal. Indeed, during the

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approximately ten months since petitioner was released from prison, he has failed

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to provide the Court with his current address. Without petitioner’s address, the

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Court cannot effectively grant petitioner any relief, even if justified, because the

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Court cannot locate petitioner.

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2.

The Court’s Need to Manage Its Docket

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District courts are permitted to control their dockets “without being subject

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to endless non-compliance with case management orders.” In re

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Phenylpropanolamine Products Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 1227 (9th

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Cir. 2006). “The trial judge is in the best position to determine whether the delay

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in a particular case interferes with docket management and the public interest.”

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Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002).

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As noted above, petitioner’s inaction has caused this case to remain

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inactive on the Court’s docket for approximately eight months. This case cannot

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continue languishing on the Court’s docket because of petitioner’s ongoing

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failure to advance his own cause. Accordingly, the Court’s need to control its

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docket strongly supports dismissal.

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3.

Risk of Prejudice to Respondent

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“[T]he failure to prosecute diligently is sufficient by itself to justify

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dismissal . . . [t]he law presumes injury from unreasonable delay.” In re Eisen, 31

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F.3d 1447, 1452 (9th Cir. 1994) (ellipses in original) (quoting Anderson v. Air

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West, Inc., 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976)). Here, petitioner has not only

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delayed this case’s advance, but he has also declined to communicate with the

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Court in any way. Accordingly, he has not provided any excuse for the delay, let

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alone a reasonable excuse. Because petitioner has not demonstrated any reason

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for his continued failure to notify the Court of his new address, prejudice to

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respondent is presumed. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of dismissal.

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4.

Public Policy Favoring Disposition on the Merits

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Ordinarily, the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits

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militates against dismissal. See, e.g., In re Phenylpropanolamine Products

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Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d at 1228. However, “this factor ‘lends little support’

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to a party whose responsibility it is to move a case toward disposition on the

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merits but whose conduct impedes progress in that direction.” See id. (citations

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omitted). It is a habeas petitioner’s responsibility to move a case toward a

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disposition on the merits. See Morris v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 942 F.2d 648,

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652 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that it is the “responsibility of the moving party” to

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advance a matter toward a disposition on the merits).

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As discussed above, petitioner’s failure to provide the Court with his

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address prevents the Court from moving this case towards a disposition on the

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merits. Accordingly, petitioner has caused this case to remain stalled for eight

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months with no indication that it will ever be disposed of on the merits.

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Therefore, the fourth factor weighs against dismissal only minimally, if at all.

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5.

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Finally, the fifth Carey factor weighs in favor of dismissal. Petitioner has

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Availability of Less Drastic Alternatives

not kept the Court up to date regarding his address and has altogether ceased
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participating in his own case. Thus, the Court is left with only two options: allow

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this matter to remain open and on the Court’s docket until some unknown time

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when petitioner regains an interest in this litigation; or dismiss this case. For the

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litany of reasons discussed herein, the only reasonable option is to dismiss the

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matter. Petitioner was adequately warned that the failure to follow Court orders

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or notify the Court of any address changes would result in the dismissal of this

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case for failure to prosecute. Accordingly, the fifth factor further encourages

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dismissal.

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ORDER
It is therefore ordered that the petition be DISMISSED without
prejudice.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
DATED: April 19, 2017

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/S/ FREDERICK F. MUMM
FREDERICK F. MUMM
United States Magistrate Judge

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