Tito A. Thomas v. California Victim Compensation Program et al

Filing 31

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS [Docket No. 21 ] by Judge S. James Otero. The Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion. Although the Court liberallyconstrues the pro se Plaintiff's Complaint and holds it to less stringent standar ds than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), the Court also finds no basis to grant Plaintiff leave to amend because it is absolutely clear that the Complaint's deficiencies cannot be cured by amen dment. See Hicks, 2011 WL 1648604, at *4. Plaintiff's claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine and the applicable statute of limitations. Accordingly, the Court dismisses the instant action without leave to amend. IT IS SO ORDERED. Case Terminated. Made JS-6. See minute order for details. (jy)

JS-6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

DATE: September 13, 2016

CASE NO.: CV 16-04734-SJO (PJWx)
TITLE:

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Tito A. Thomas v. California Victim Compensation Program, et al.

========================================================================
PRESENT: THE HONORABLE S. JAMES OTERO, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Victor Paul Cruz
Courtroom Clerk

Not Present
Court Reporter

COUNSEL PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFF:

COUNSEL PRESENT FOR DEFENDANT(S):

Not Present

Not Present

========================================================================
PROCEEDINGS (in chambers): ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
[Docket No. 21]
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Michael Heffner's ("Heffner" or "Defendant")
Motion to Dismiss ("Motion"), filed as a joined motion on August 18, 2016.1 Plaintiff has not filed
an Opposition. The Court found this matter suitable for disposition without oral argument and
vacated the hearing set for September 26, 2016. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). For the reasons
stated below, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion.
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Proceeding pro se, Plaintiff filed the operative Complaint in the Eastern District of California on
June 6, 2016. On June 28, 2016, the court in the Eastern District of California transferred the
action to this Court. (ECF No. 6.)
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Heffner–the former Police Chief of the City of Hawthorne–
falsified police reports which caused him to become homeless. (Compl. 5, ECF No. 1.) Although
Plaintiff does not provide any facts as to the underlying state criminal proceedings, Plaintiff also
alleges that the California Supreme Court discriminated against him by denying his appeal.
(Compl. 6.) Accordingly, Plaintiff filed his Complaint asserting a violation of his Due Process and
Speedy Trial rights under the California Constitution. (Compl. 4.)
In the instant motion, Heffner seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint, arguing: (1) Plaintiff fails to
invoke federal question jurisdiction; (2) Plaintiff's suit is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine;

1

Heffner originally filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ("Rule 12(b)(6)") on August 17, 2016. (ECF No. 17.) On August
25, 2016, Heffner filed another motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and additional
bases. (ECF No. 27.) For purposes of ruling on Heffner's Motion to Dismiss, the Court
disregards Heffner's remaining motions to dismiss (ECF No. 17 and ECF. No. 27) as moot.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

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DATE: September 13, 2016

CASE NO.: CV 16-04734-SJO (PJWx)

and (3) Plaintiff's suit is barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff did not oppose Heffner's
Motion.
II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Legal Standard for Motion to Dismiss

Federal courts have original jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In general, a case arises under federal law
when "federal law creates a cause of action." Wander v. Kaus, 304 F.3d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 2002).
Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, "federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is
presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams,
482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (citation omitted). "[D]eterminations about federal jurisdiction require
sensitive judgments about congressional intent, judicial power, and the federal system." Merrell
Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 810 (1986).
As a court of limited jurisdiction, a district court must determine the issue of subject-matter
jurisdiction before reaching the merits of a case. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't., 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998). "When
a requirement goes to subject-matter jurisdiction, courts are obligated to consider sua sponte
issues that the parties have disclaimed or have not presented. Subject-matter jurisdiction can
never be waived or forfeited." Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648 (2012) (internal quotations
omitted).
When subject-matter jurisdiction is challenged under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
("Rule(12)(b)(1)"), the plaintiff "must show in his pleading, affirmatively and distinctly, the existence
of whatever is essential to federal jurisdiction, and, if he does not do so, the court, on having the
defect called to its attention or on discovering the same, must dismiss the case, unless the defect
be corrected by amendment." Tosco Corp. v. Comtys. For a Better Env't., 236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th
Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010) (citation
omitted).
B.

Plaintiff Fails to Invoke Federal Question Jurisdiction

The Court first addresses Defendant's claim that Plaintiff's Complaint may be dismissed pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of federal question jurisdiction. In his form Complaint, Plaintiff attempts
to invoke federal question jurisdiction by checking the box indicating that a federal question is at
issue. (Compl. 3.) But, Plaintiff's only cognizable claim raises a provision from the California State
Constitution as opposed to the United States Constitution. Plaintiff invokes the California
Constitution by stating:

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DATE: September 13, 2016

CASE NO.: CV 16-04734-SJO (PJWx)

California Constition [sic] Article 1 Declaration of Rights Sec. 29. In
a criminal case, the people of the State of California have the right to
due process of law and to a speedy and public trial.
(Compl. 4.) Since Plaintiff brings no other cognizable claim, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has
failed to invoke federal question jurisdiction. Plaintiff also lacks diversity jurisdiction since all
parties appear to be domiciled in the State of California. (Compl. 2-3.)
C.

Plaintiff's Suit is Barred by the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

The Court next addresses Defendant's contention that Plaintiff is barred from suit under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal court cannot assert
jurisdiction to exercise appellate review of state court judgments. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263
U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476
(1983). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents a party losing in state court from seeking what
in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States District Court.
See Johnson v. Degrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies
to "state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state court judgments rendered before the
district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Only the
United States Supreme Court may review decisions of a state court of last resort. See Worldwide
Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted).
The Court finds that Plaintiff's federal action against Heffner fits squarely within the purview of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine as articulated in Exxon Mobil Corp v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. As
against Heffner, Plaintiff's legal theory centers around the fact that Heffner allegedly falsified police
reports which led to some form of criminal sanctions against Plaintiff. As a result of the falsified
police reports, Defendant alleges that he has become homeless. After his appeal was denied in
2013, Plaintiff brought the present suit before this Court. In other words, Plaintiff lost in state
court, complains of the injuries caused by that judgment, and brings the present case before the
Court to review and reject the state judgment against him. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine makes
clear that this Court lacks jurisdiction in reviewing state judgments. Accordingly, Plaintiff is barred
from suit under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
D.

The Statute of Limitations Bars Plaintiff From Bringing a Civil Action for Deprivation
of Rights

Even if this Court were to infer that Plaintiff brought a Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights under
Title 42 United States Code Section 1983 ("Section 1983"), as Heffner suggests, Plaintiff's suit
would be barred by the applicable statute of limitations in addition to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
The statute of limitations period for a Section 1983 claim is governed by the forum state's statute
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

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of limitations for personal injury claims. Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 486 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir.
2007). California imposes a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. See
California Code of Civil Procedure § 335.1. Federal law governs the accrual of the limitations
period of a Section 1983 claim. Lukovsky v. City and Cnty. of S.F., 535 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir.
2008) (citation omitted). Under federal law a claim accrues "when the plaintiff knows or has
reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action." Id. (citation omitted).
As against Heffner, Plaintiff's action is based upon the allegation that Heffner lied on police
reports, which presumably led to some form of criminal punishment. (Compl. 5.) Plaintiff had a
reasonable opportunity to discover his Section 1983 claim against Heffner upon arraignment–or
sometime shortly thereafter–as every criminal defendant is afforded the right to discovery. At that
point, Plaintiff had access to the alleged falsified police reports. Given that Plaintiff's arraignment
was long before his May 2012 appeal–and more than four years before the filing of his
Complaint–the two-year statutory period has expired. Therefore, even if this Court were to
interpret Plaintiff's Complaint as bringing a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff's action would
be barred by the applicable statute of limitations in addition to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
E.

It is Unnecessary for the Court to Address the Sufficiency of Plaintiff's Complaint

The Court finds it unnecessary to delve into the issues of the sufficiency of Plaintiff's pleadings
since Plaintiff is barred from suit for the reasons already discussed above. Such analysis is
unnecessary given the dispositive nature of the Court's findings with respect to lack of jurisdiction,
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the statute of limitations.
F.

Dismissal is Without Leave to Amend

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), a district court should grant leave to amend
when justice so requires, "even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it
determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Lopez
v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citation omitted). Futility alone can justify
the denial of leave to amend. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995); see Miller v.
Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted) ("[A] proposed
amendment is futile only if no set of facts can be proved under the amendment . . . that would
constitute a valid and sufficient claim or defense."). Factors to be considered in determining
whether leave to amend should be given include "bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing
party, futility of the amendment, and whether the party has previously amended his pleadings."
Bonin, 59 F.3d at 845.
The Court dismisses the present case without leave to amend since any amendment would be
futile. Granting Plaintiff leave to amend to establish federal jurisdiction and plead sufficient facts
would remain futile since Plaintiff's claim is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Priority
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DATE: September 13, 2016

CASE NO.: CV 16-04734-SJO (PJWx)

applicable statute of limitations as discussed above. Additionally, Plaintiff has already initiated a
second lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California based on the
same set of facts.2 The Court finds that such gamesmanship results in duplicative litigation. In
sum, Plaintiff will not be granted leave to amend his complaint since (1) Plaintiff is barred from suit
under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; (2) the applicable statute of limitations has expired; and (3)
Plaintiff has brought the same lawsuit in the Central District of California where he has had the
opportunity to amend his complaint.
III.

RULING

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion. Although the Court liberally
construes the pro se Plaintiff's Complaint and holds it to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), the Court also finds
no basis to grant Plaintiff leave to amend because it is absolutely clear that the Complaint's
deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. See Hicks, 2011 WL 1648604, at *4. Plaintiff's
claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine and the applicable statute of limitations.
Accordingly, the Court dismisses the instant action without leave to amend.

IT IS SO ORDERED

2

The Court takes judicial notice of the numerous other lawsuits Plaintiff has filed in state
and federal court. See Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir.1988) ("In
addition to the complaint, it is proper . . . to take judicial notice of matters of public record
outside the pleadings and consider them for purposes of the motion to dismiss.") (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). In the past eighteen months, Plaintiff has initiated
four lawsuits against the City of Hawthorne. After filing the instant Complaint, Plaintiff filed
a second lawsuit against Heffner, also in the Central District of California, on August 9,
2016. (16-CV-05924-JLS-RAO). This second lawsuit is based on similar (and more
detailed) allegations as brought against Heffner here. (ECF No. 1.) On August 15, 2016,
Plaintiff's Complaint was dismissed with leave to amend. (ECF No. 7.) Plaintiff has since
amended his Complaint. (ECF No. 12.)

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