Jeffrey Fox v. Carolyn W. Colvin

Filing 25

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER AFFIRMING COMMISSIONER by Magistrate Judge Jean P. Rosenbluth. IT IS ORDERED that judgment be entered AFFIRMING the Commissioner's decision, DENYING Plaintiff's request for remand, and DISMISSING this action with prejudice. (See Order for details) (bem)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JEFFREY FOX, Plaintiff, 12 13 v. 14 15 NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 16 Defendant. ) Case No. CV 16-4738-JPR ) ) ) MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ) AFFIRMING COMMISSIONER ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 17 18 I. PROCEEDINGS 19 Plaintiff seeks review of the Commissioner’s final decision 20 denying his application for Social Security disability insurance 21 benefits (“DIB”). 22 the undersigned U.S. Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 23 The matter is before the Court on the parties’ Joint Stipulation, 24 filed May 2, 2017, which the Court has taken under submission 25 without oral argument. 26 Commissioner’s decision is affirmed. The parties consented to the jurisdiction of For the reasons stated below, the 27 28 1 1 II. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff was born in 1951. 3 122.) 4 (Administrative Record (“AR”) agent (AR 33). 5 He obtained a GED (AR 141) and worked as a real estate On March 6, 2013, Plaintiff filed an application for DIB, 6 alleging that he had been unable to work since March 1, 2007, 7 because of post-traumatic-stress disorder, bipolar disorder, 8 depression, hearing loss, arthritis, sleep apnea, hypothyroid, 9 and degenerative disc disease. (AR 60, 122-29.) After his 10 application was denied (AR 60-69), he requested a hearing before 11 an Administrative Law Judge (AR 75-76). 12 December 3, 2015, at which Plaintiff, who was represented by 13 counsel, testified, as did a vocational expert. 14 a written decision issued March 9, 2016, the ALJ found that 15 Plaintiff was not disabled at any time between October 1, 2007, 16 his date first insured, and December 31, 2008, his date last 17 insured. 18 Appeals Council, and on April 29, 2016, it denied review. 19 4.) 20 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 21 (AR 11-28.) A hearing was held on (AR 29-59.) In Plaintiff requested review from the (AR 1- This action followed. Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the 22 Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits. 23 decision should be upheld if they are free of legal error and 24 supported by substantial evidence based on the record as a whole. 25 See id.; Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Parra 26 v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). 27 evidence means such evidence as a reasonable person might accept 28 as adequate to support a conclusion. 2 The ALJ’s findings and Substantial Richardson, 402 U.S. at 1 401; Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007). 2 It is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. 3 Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1035 (citing Robbins v. Soc. Sec. 4 Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006)). 5 substantial evidence supports a finding, the reviewing court 6 “must review the administrative record as a whole, weighing both 7 the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from 8 the Commissioner’s conclusion.” 9 720 (9th Cir. 1996). To determine whether Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, “If the evidence can reasonably support 10 either affirming or reversing,” the reviewing court “may not 11 substitute its judgment” for the Commissioner’s. 12 IV. Id. at 720-21. THE EVALUATION OF DISABILITY 13 People are “disabled” for purposes of receiving Social 14 Security benefits if they are unable to engage in any substantial 15 gainful activity owing to a physical or mental impairment that is 16 expected to result in death or has lasted, or is expected to 17 last, for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 18 § 423(d)(1)(A); Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 19 1992). 42 U.S.C. 20 A. 21 The ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation process to The Five-Step Evaluation Process 22 assess whether a claimant is disabled. 23 § 404.1520(a)(4); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th 24 Cir. 1996) (as amended). 25 must determine whether the claimant is currently engaged in 26 substantial gainful activity; if so, the claimant is not disabled 27 and the claim must be denied. 28 20 C.F.R. In the first step, the Commissioner § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful 3 1 activity, the second step requires the Commissioner to determine 2 whether the claimant has a “severe” impairment or combination of 3 impairments significantly limiting his ability to do basic work 4 activities; if not, the claimant is not disabled and his claim 5 must be denied. 6 § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant has a “severe” impairment or combination of 7 impairments, the third step requires the Commissioner to 8 determine whether the impairment or combination of impairments 9 meets or equals an impairment in the Listing of Impairments set 10 forth at 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 1; if so, 11 disability is conclusively presumed. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). 12 If the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments 13 does not meet or equal an impairment in the Listing, the fourth 14 step requires the Commissioner to determine whether the claimant 15 has sufficient residual functional capacity (“RFC”)1 to perform 16 his past work; if so, he is not disabled and the claim must be 17 denied. 18 proving he is unable to perform past relevant work. 19 F.2d at 1257. 20 case of disability is established. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). The claimant has the burden of Drouin, 966 If the claimant meets that burden, a prima facie Id. 21 If that happens or if the claimant has no past relevant 22 work, the Commissioner then bears the burden of establishing that 23 the claimant is not disabled because he can perform other 24 substantial gainful work available in the national economy. 25 § 404.1520(a)(4)(v); Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. That 26 27 28 1 RFC is what a claimant can do despite existing exertional and nonexertional limitations. § 404.1545; see Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989). 4 1 determination comprises the fifth and final step in the 2 sequential analysis. 3 n.5; Drouin, 966 F.2d at 1257. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v); Lester, 81 F.3d at 828 4 B. 5 At step one, the ALJ cited “conflicting evidence” and made The ALJ’s Application of the Five-Step Process 6 no finding about whether Plaintiff had engaged in substantial 7 gainful activity from October 1, 2007, his date first insured, 8 through December 31, 2008, his date last insured, proceeding 9 instead to the next step of the sequential analysis.2 (AR 16.) 10 At step two, she concluded that during the relevant time period 11 Plaintiff had the severe impairments of bipolar disorder, 12 depression, PTSD, “degenerative disc disease of the cervical 13 spine,” and rheumatoid arthritis.3 14 determined that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or equal a 15 listing. 16 (AR 17.) At step three, she (Id.) At step four, the ALJ found that through his date last 17 insured, Plaintiff had the RFC to perform modified medium work: 18 he could “sit[], stand[] and/or walk[] up to 6 hours in an 8-hour 19 workday,” with “no climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds[,] no 20 work around hazards[,] [and] occasional stooping, crouching, 21 crawling and climbing ramps and stairs”; he was “limited to 22 simple, routine work and occasional public contact.” 23 Based on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ concluded that during the 24 relevant period Plaintiff could not have performed his past work (AR 18.) 25 2 26 27 28 The ALJ noted that some Veterans Administration records indicate Plaintiff was employed full time during the relevant period. (AR 16.) 3 Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s finding that his other alleged impairments were not severe. 5 1 as a real estate broker. (AR 22.) At step five, she relied on 2 the VE’s testimony to find that given Plaintiff’s age, education, 3 work experience, and RFC for medium work “impeded by additional 4 limitations,” he could have performed three medium, unskilled 5 “representative occupations” in the national economy: “dietary 6 aide,” DOT 319.677-014, 1991 WL 672771,4 (2) “laundry worker I,” 7 DOT 361.684-014, 1991 WL 672983, and (3) “hand packager,” DOT 8 920.587-018, 1991 WL 687916. 9 that the VE’s testimony was consistent with the DOT. (AR 22-23.) The ALJ determined (AR 23.) 10 Accordingly, she found that Plaintiff was not disabled during the 11 relevant time period. 12 V. 13 (Id.) DISCUSSION Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in considering the 14 medical evidence and determining his RFC. 15 11-12.) 16 into his RFC portions of the opinion of state-agency psychologist 17 Eric Oritt even though she gave his opinion “significant 18 weight.”5 19 below, remand is not warranted. (See J. Stip. at 4-7, Specifically, he contends that she failed to incorporate (Id. at 4-6; see AR 21.) For the reasons discussed 20 A. 21 A claimant’s RFC is “the most [he] can still do” despite his 22 Applicable Law impairments and related symptoms, which “may cause physical and 23 4 24 25 26 27 28 The occupation as listed in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles is “food-service worker, hospital”; “dietary aide” is an alternative title. See DOT 319.677-014, 1991 WL 672771. 5 Dr. Oritt’s signature line includes a medical-consultant code of “38,” indicating “[p]sychology” (AR 67); see Program Operations Manual System (POMS) DI 24501.004, U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin. (May 5, 2015), 0424501004. 6 1 mental limitations that affect what [he] can do in a work 2 setting.” 3 ALJ’s RFC assessment when the ALJ has applied the proper legal 4 standard and substantial evidence in the record as a whole 5 supports the decision. 6 (9th Cir. 2005). 7 “together with the rest of the relevant evidence [on record].” 8 § 404.1527(b);6 see also § 404.1545(a)(1) (“We will assess your 9 residual functional capacity based on all the relevant evidence 10 11 § 404.1545(a)(1). A district court must uphold an Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 The ALJ must consider all the medical opinions in your case record.”). The ALJ considers findings by state-agency medical 12 consultants and experts as opinion evidence. 13 “[T]he findings of a nontreating, nonexamining physician can 14 amount to substantial evidence, so long as other evidence in the 15 record supports those findings.” 16 522 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). 17 words” to reject a physician’s opinion or a portion of it; the 18 court may draw “specific and legitimate inferences” from the § 404.1527(e). Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, An ALJ need not recite “magic 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6 Social Security regulations regarding the evaluation of opinion evidence were amended effective March 27, 2017. When, as here, the ALJ’s decision is the final decision of the Commissioner, the reviewing court generally applies the law in effect at the time of the ALJ’s decision. See Lowry v. Astrue, 474 F. App’x 801, 805 n.2 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying version of regulation in effect at time of ALJ’s decision despite subsequent amendment); Garrett ex rel. Moore v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d 643, 647 (8th Cir. 2004) (“We apply the rules that were in effect at the time the Commissioner’s decision became final.”); Spencer v. Colvin, No. 3:15-CV-05925-DWC, 2016 WL 7046848, at *9 n.4 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2016) (“42 U.S.C. § 405 does not contain any express authorization from Congress allowing the Commissioner to engage in retroactive rulemaking”). Accordingly, citations to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 are to the version in effect from August 24, 2012, to March 26, 2017. 7 1 ALJ’s opinion. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 755 (9th Cir. 2 1989). 3 record, the ALJ does not need to ‘discuss every piece of 4 evidence.’” 5 1012 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Black v. Apfel, 143 F.3d 383, 386 6 (8th Cir. 1998)). 7 the context of “the entire record as a whole,” and if the 8 “‘evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 9 interpretation,’ the ALJ’s decision should be upheld.” “[I]n interpreting the evidence and developing the Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, The Court must consider the ALJ’s decision in Ryan v. 10 Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008) 11 (citation omitted). 12 B. 13 On March 13, 2014, Dr. Oritt completed the mental portion of Relevant Background 14 the disability determination for Plaintiff’s DIB claim. 15 67.) 16 Plaintiff had a “mild” restriction in activities of daily living 17 and “moderate” difficulties in maintaining social functioning and 18 concentration, persistence, or pace. 19 or [t]wo” episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration. 20 (Id.) 21 (AR 64- After reviewing the medical evidence, Dr. Oritt found that (AR 65.) Dr. Oritt assessed Plaintiff’s mental RFC. He had had “[o]ne (AR 65-67.) He 22 opined that Plaintiff had no limitations in the area of 23 understanding and memory. 24 limitations in maintaining attention and concentration for 25 extended periods; performing activities within a schedule, 26 maintaining regular attendance, and being punctual within 27 customary tolerances; working in coordination with or in 28 proximity to others without being distracted by them; completing (AR 66.) 8 He had “moderate” 1 a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from 2 psychologically based symptoms; and performing at a consistent 3 pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods. 4 (Id.) 5 limitations in carrying out short and simple, or detailed, 6 instructions; sustaining an ordinary routine without special 7 supervision; or making simple work-related decisions. 8 When asked to explain Plaintiff’s “sustained concentration and 9 persistence capacities and/or limitations,” Dr. Oritt opined that Dr. Oritt found that Plaintiff had no significant (Id.) 10 “[a] more flexible and low demand work environment would be 11 preferable but not required.” 12 would require only “[o]rdinary supervision.” 13 (Id.) He noted that Plaintiff (Id.) In the area of social interaction, Dr. Oritt opined that 14 Plaintiff had “moderate” limitations in interacting appropriately 15 with the general public, accepting instructions and responding 16 appropriately to criticism from supervisors, maintaining socially 17 appropriate behavior, and adhering to basic standards of neatness 18 and cleanliness; he had no significant limitations in his ability 19 to ask simple questions, request assistance, or get along with 20 coworkers or peers without distracting them or exhibiting 21 behavioral extremes. 22 Plaintiff’s “social interaction capacities and/or limitations,” 23 Dr. Oritt opined that he “would do best in a job not requiring 24 customer service, contact with [the] public, [or] demanding 25 social interaction.” 26 cooperate with co-workers.” 27 28 (AR 66-67.) (AR 67.) When asked to explain He would, however, “be able to (Id.) In the area of adaptation, Dr. Oritt opined that Plaintiff had “moderate” limitations in responding appropriately to changes 9 1 in the work setting, setting realistic goals, and making plans 2 independently of others; he had no significant limitations in his 3 ability to be aware of normal hazards and take appropriate 4 precautions, travel in unfamiliar places, or use public 5 transportation. 6 “adaptation capacities and/or limitations,” Dr. Oritt opined that 7 he “would function best in a workplace setting with defined 8 workplace tasks,” where he would “not be required to develop 9 independent workplace goals.” (Id.) When asked to explain Plaintiff’s (Id.)7 10 C. 11 The ALJ limited Plaintiff to “simple, routine work and Analysis 12 occasional public contact.” 13 RFC, she gave “significant weight” to Dr. Oritt’s opinion, 14 finding that it was “both consistent with and supported by the 15 substantial medical evidence of record and [Plaintiff]’s 16 allegations and presentation at the hearing.” 17 1A).) 18 “significant weight” to the opinion; instead, he argues that the 19 ALJ erred because portions of his RFC “differ[] from Dr. Oritt’s 20 opinion and there is no explanation for the deviation.”8 21 Stip. at 6.) (AR 18.) In assessing Plaintiff’s (AR 21 (citing Ex. Plaintiff does not contend that the ALJ erred in giving (See J. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ 22 7 23 24 25 26 27 28 It is not entirely clear that Dr. Oritt’s 2014 findings related to the relevant period. Although he indicated that his mental-RFC evaluation was for “Date Last Insured: 12/31/2008” (AR 65), the medical records he reviewed were recent and his findings were all made in the present tense (see AR 66-67). Because neither party contends otherwise, the Court assumes that Dr. Oritt’s evaluation was for the relevant period. 8 Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s physical-RFC assessment, credibility findings, or indeed any other portion of her decision. 10 1 failed to incorporate Dr. Oritt’s alleged findings that he “could 2 not work with the public” or in a “service occupation” and “would 3 need defined tasks” and “preferable [sic] low stress.” 4 7.) 5 Plaintiff misstates Dr. Oritt’s opinion. (Id. at Dr. Oritt did not 6 opine that Plaintiff “could not work with the public”; he stated 7 that he was “[m]oderately limited” in his ability to “interact 8 appropriately” in that area (AR 66) and “would do best” in a job 9 “not requiring . . . contact with the public” (AR 67). Dr. Oritt 10 did not opine that Plaintiff could not work in a “service 11 occupation”; rather, he found that he “would do best” in a 12 position “not requiring customer service.” 13 limit Plaintiff to only “defined tasks”; he noted that he “would 14 function best” in a setting with “defined workplace tasks.” 15 (Id.) 16 rather, he noted that “[a] more flexible and low demand work 17 environment would be preferable but not required.” 18 Oritt stated preferences, not requirements, for work that would 19 accommodate Plaintiff’s limitations. 20 those recommendations was reasonable; she was not required to 21 address every word of Dr. Oritt’s opinion, as Plaintiff 22 suggests.9 (Id.) He did not And he did not limit Plaintiff to “low stress” work; (AR 66.) Dr. The ALJ’s interpretation of See Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1198; Howard, 341 F.3d at 1012. 23 24 25 26 27 28 9 Notably, the ALJ specifically rejected those portions of the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating doctor, Dr. Douglas Sears, that assessed greater limitations than those found by Dr. Oritt (see AR 21-22), including his opinion that Plaintiff could not work with the public or in situations of high stress (AR 266-78). Plaintiff does not challenge the weight the ALJ gave to Dr. Sears’s opinions nor point to any other medical-opinion evidence that contradicts his RFC. 11 1 Further, as Defendant points out, Plaintiff’s RFC is “fully 2 consistent” with the actual limitations Dr. Oritt imposed. (J. 3 Stip. at 8.) 4 and occasional public contact.” 5 Plaintiff had moderate limitations in his ability to “perform at 6 a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of 7 rest periods” and in concentration and persistence, but he found 8 no limitations in his ability to carry out short and simple, or 9 detailed, instructions, make simple work-related decisions, or The ALJ limited Plaintiff to “simple, routine work (AR 18.) Dr. Oritt opined that 10 sustain an ordinary routine without special supervision. (AR 11 66.) 12 ordinary supervision and cooperate with coworkers, but that he 13 “would function best” with “defined workplace tasks” and no 14 requirement that he “develop independent workplace goals.” 15 66-67.) 16 work environment” was preferable but not required (AR 66), and 17 that Plaintiff “would do best” without public contact or 18 “demanding social interaction” (AR 67). 19 properly translated by the ALJ into a restriction to “simple, 20 routine work” with only “occasional public contact.” 21 Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 2008) 22 (finding that ALJ’s limitation to “simple, routine, repetitive” 23 work sufficiently accommodated medical-opinion evidence that 24 claimant had “moderate” limitation in pace and “other mental 25 limitations regarding attention, concentration, and adaption”); 26 Hughes v. Colvin, 599 F. App’x 765, 766 (9th Cir. 2015) (ALJ’s 27 RFC assessment accounted for moderate difficulties in social 28 functioning, concentration, and persistence by restricting He found that Plaintiff had the capacity to work under (AR Dr. Oritt opined that “[a] more flexible and low demand 12 Those limitations were See Stubbs- 1 claimant to simple, routine, repetitive tasks in job where she 2 could work independently, with no more than occasional public 3 interaction); Rodriquez v. Colvin, No. 1:13-CV-01716-SKO, 2015 WL 4 1237302, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2015) (“a moderate limitation 5 in the ability to complete a workday or workweek without 6 interruption is consistent with and properly captured by a 7 limitation to simple repetitive tasks”); McLain v. Astrue, No. 8 SACV 10-1108 JC, 2011 WL 2174895, at *6 (C.D. Cal. June 3, 2011) 9 (“[m]oderate mental functional limitations . . . are not per se 10 disabling, nor do they preclude the performance of jobs that 11 involve simple, repetitive tasks” (citations omitted)). 12 Even assuming the ALJ erred in failing to include in 13 Plaintiff’s RFC a prohibition on public contact or a specific 14 requirement of “low stress” and “defined tasks” (J. Stip. at 7), 15 any error was harmless. 16 Plaintiff’s RFC could perform three representative occupations: 17 dietary aide, DOT 319.677-014, 1991 WL 672771, laundry worker, 18 DOT 361.684-014, 1991 WL 672983, and hand packager, DOT 920.587- 19 018, 1991 WL 687916. 20 13,828 laundry-worker jobs and 43,123 hand-packager jobs were 21 available nationally. 22 are consistent with Plaintiff’s alleged additional limitations.10 23 (J. Stip. at 9.) 24 The VE testified that a person with (AR 54.) (Id.) The VE further testified that As Defendant argues, those two jobs A laundry worker “[w]ashes and irons . . . linens and 25 26 10 27 28 Defendant appears to concede that the dietary-aide job would involve some level of public contact. (See J. Stip. at 9 (arguing harmless error for only laundry-worker and hand-packager jobs)); see also DOT 319.677-014, 1991 WL 672771. 13 1 clothes used by employees . . . or washes uniforms, aprons, and 2 towels in establishments supplying employees with these linens,” 3 “[u]s[ing] equipment usually found in household or in small 4 laundry.” 5 “[p]ackages materials and products manually” and variously 6 “[c]leans packaging containers,” “[l]ines and pads crates and 7 assembles cartons,” “[o]btains and sorts product,” “[w]raps 8 protective material around product,” “[s]tarts, stops, and 9 regulates speed of conveyor,” “[i]nserts or pours product into 10 containers or fills containers from spout or chute,” “[w]eighs 11 containers and adjusts quantity,” “[n]ails, glues, or closes and 12 seals containers,” “[l]abels containers, container tags, or 13 products,” “[s]orts bundles or filled containers,” “[p]acks 14 special arrangements or selections of product,” “[i]nspects 15 materials, products, and containers at each step of packaging 16 process,” and “[r]ecords information, such as weight, time, and 17 date packaged.” 18 DOT 361.684-014, 1991 WL 672983. A hand packager DOT 920.587-018, 1991 WL 687916. Both jobs have a list of defined tasks and do not appear to 19 involve any public contact or obviously stressful work. Indeed, 20 neither could reasonably be described as a “customer service” 21 occupation; both require the lowest level of public interaction 22 and list “talking” as “not present.” 23 WL 672983; DOT 920.587-018, 1991 WL 687916; DOT app. B - 24 Explanation of Data, People, and Things, 1991 WL 688701. 25 error was thus harmless. 26 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006) (nonprejudicial or irrelevant 27 mistakes are harmless); Gallo v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 449 28 F. App’x 648, 650 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Because the ALJ satisfied his See DOT 361.684-014, 1991 Any See Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 14 1 burden at Step 5 by relying on the VE’s testimony about the 2 Addresser job, any error that the ALJ may have committed by 3 relying on the testimony about the ‘credit checker’ job was 4 harmless” (citing Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 5 1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008)); see also Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 6 F.3d 1035, 1043-44 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that VE’s testimony 7 describing single occupation for which significant number of jobs 8 existed sufficed). 9 the hand-packager and laundry-worker jobs is a significant Some 57,000 jobs available nationally between 10 number. 11 29 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that 25,000 nationally available jobs 12 presented “close call” but nonetheless sufficed as “work which 13 exists in significant numbers”). 14 VI. 15 See Gutierrez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 740 F.3d 519, 528- CONCLUSION Consistent with the foregoing and under sentence four of 42 16 U.S.C. § 405(g),11 IT IS ORDERED that judgment be entered 17 AFFIRMING the Commissioner’s decision, DENYING Plaintiff’s 18 request for remand, and DISMISSING this action with prejudice. 19 20 DATED: July 27, 2017 21 ______________________________ JEAN ROSENBLUTH U.S. Magistrate Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11 That sentence provides: “The [district] court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 15

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