Jamil Rashidi v. Veritiss, LLC et al

Filing 24

MINUTES OF Motion Hearing held before Judge Christina A. Snyder RE: Defendant Mission Essential Personnel, LLC's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction or in the Alternative to Transfer Venue 13 . The Court GRANTS Mission Essential 's motion to dismiss Rashidi's complaint as to Mission Essential. Because the Court concludes that it lacks personal jurisdiction over Mission Essential, Mission Essential's motion to transfer is moot. (MD JS-6. Case Terminated) Court Reporter: Laura Elias. (gk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

JS-6

Case No.

2:16-cv-04761-CAS(JPRx)

Title

JAMIL RASHIDI v. VERITISS, LLC; MISSION ESSENTIAL
PERSONNEL, LLC

Present: The Honorable

Date

‘O’

September 19, 2016

CHRISTINA A. SNYDER

Catherine Jeang
Deputy Clerk

Laura Elias
Court Reporter / Recorder

N/A
Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs:

Attorneys Present for Defendants:

Navid Yadegar

Keith Rasher
George Benjamin
Alecia Winfield

Proceedings:

DEFENDANT MISSION ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL, LLC’S
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL
JURISDICTION (Dkt 13, filed July 6, 2016)
DEFENDANT MISSION ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL, LLC’S
MOTION TO TRANSFER (Dkt 13, filed July 6, 2016)

I.

INTRODUCTION

On May 24, 2016, plaintiff Jamil Rashidi filed this action in the Los Angeles
County Superior Court against defendants Veritiss, LLC, a Virginia corporation and
Mission Essential Personnel, LLC, an Ohio limited liability company, and Does 1–25,
inclusive. Dkt 1-4 (“Compl.”).
On June 29, 2016, the matter was removed to federal court. Dkt. 1. On July 6,
2016, Mission Essential filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or, in
the alternative, a motion to transfer the case to the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio. Dkt. 13 (“Mot.). On July 18, 2016, Rashidi filed his
opposition to Mission Essential’s motion, dkt. 16 (“Opp’n”), and on July 25, 2016,
Mission Essential filed its reply, dkt. 17 (“Reply”).
Having carefully considered the parties’ arguments, the Court finds and concludes
as follows.

CV-4761 (09/16)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Page 1 of 10

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

2:16-cv-04761-CAS(JPRx)

Title

JS-6

JAMIL RASHIDI v. VERITISS, LLC; MISSION ESSENTIAL
PERSONNEL, LLC

II.

Date

‘O’

September 19, 2016

BACKGROUND

Rashidi is a citizen of California and a resident of Los Angeles County. Compl. ¶
4. Mission Essential is an Ohio limited liability company, with offices in Ohio and
Virginia. Id. 5; Mot. at 3. Mission Essential is a government contractor serving
intelligence and military clients. Compl. ¶ 5. Veritiss is a Virginia corporation with its
principal place of business in Virginia. Id. ¶ 6. Veritiss is also a government contractor
and acted as a subcontractor to Mission Essential to provide services to the United States
government in Afghanistan. Id. ¶¶ 6–7.
In or about 2011, while watching television in California, Rashidi saw an
advertisement for a job with defendant Veritiss that required knowledge of English,
Farsi, and Pashtu. Dkt. 16-1 (“Rashidi Decl.”) ¶ 4. Rashidi contacted Veritiss using the
number provided in the advertisement and subsequently received a job application from
Veritiss, delivered by mail to his home. Id. ¶ 5. Rashidi then sent his application by mail
back to Veritiss and later was interviewed by Veritiss over the phone while Rashidi was
at home. Id. ¶ 6–7. After his interview, Rashidi received by mail from Veritiss an offer
letter and an employment contract with Veritiss. Id. ¶ 8. Rashidi executed the contract
while in Los Angeles County, California. Id. Veritiss paid for and arranged Rashidi’s
travel to Afghanistan where he served as a translator and interpreter from approximately
April 2, 2011 to August 31, 2015. Id. ¶¶ 9, 13. Rashidi received his compensation from
Veritiss but Mission Essential exercised controlled over Rashidi’s hours of work, wages,
assignments, and working conditions in Afghanistan. Id. ¶ 15. For example, a Mission
Essential employee was Rashidi’s direct supervisor, Rashidi was required to comply with
all of Mission Essential’s policies and procedures, and Mission Essential had authority to
discipline Rashidi. Id. ¶¶ 16–18, 20. During the course of his employment, Rashidi
received three letters from Veritiss offering to renew his employment contract. Id. ¶¶
10–12.
Rashidi requested medical leave from approximately July 16, 2015 to October 15,
2015 to return to California to receive treatment for medical injuries. Id. ¶ 23. Mission
Essential prepared Rashidi’s “out-processing checklist” and leave of absence Id. ¶ 24 &
Exs. 3, 4. On July 24, 2015, while Rashidi was on leave in California, Mission Essential
contacted him by email and noted that it had attempted to contact him by phone. Rashidi
Decl. ¶ 28. On August 25, 2015 Veritiss also emailed Rashidi and noted that Mission
Essential had been trying to contact him and that Veritiss had been trying to reach
CV-4761 (09/16)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Page 2 of 10

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date

‘O’

Case No.

2:16-cv-04761-CAS(JPRx)

Title

JS-6

September 19, 2016

JAMIL RASHIDI v. VERITISS, LLC; MISSION ESSENTIAL
PERSONNEL, LLC

Rashidi on behalf of Mission Essential. Id. ¶ 29. At some point before September 13,
2015, Rashidi learned (though he does not specify when or by what means) that he had
been terminated for failing to respond to requests regarding time card discrepancies.
Compl. ¶ 28. On or about September 13, 2015, Rashidi received a letter from counsel for
Veritiss that acknowledged that Rashidi was no longer employed at Veritiss and
alleged––on the basis of an investigation conducted my Mission Essential––that Rashidi
had not properly recorded his time worked. Rashidi Decl. ¶ 30.
Alleging these facts, Rashidi filed this action, alleging thirteen claims: (1)
disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disability Act (“ADA”), 42
U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et. seq.; (2) disability
discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal.
Gov’t Code § 12940 et seq.; (3) wrongful discharge in violation of public policy; (4)
discrimination, retaliation, interference, and failure to reinstate in violation of the Family
and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.; (5) wrongful termination in
violation of public policy based on the FMLA; (6) failure to accommodate disability in
violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act; (7) failure to accommodate disability in
violation of FEHA; (8) failure to prevent discrimination and harassment in violation of
FEHA; (9) failure to allow inspection of personnel file in violation of California Labor
Code § 226; (10) declaratory relief; (11) injunctive relief; (12) failure to pay wages due in
violation of California Labor Codes §§ 201 and 202; and (13) failure to pay wages upon
separation in violation of California Labor Codes §§ 201 and 202. Compl.
Mission Essential removed this case to federal court on June 29, 2016, Dkt. 1, and
Veritiss consented to removal on July 1, 2016, dkt. 10. On July 6, 2016, Mission
Essential moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, or,
alternatively, to transfer venue to the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio. Mot. at 1.
III.

LEGAL STANDARDS

When a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the
court may properly exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Pebble Beach Co.
v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). Where, as here, a court decides such a
motion without an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie
CV-4761 (09/16)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Page 3 of 10

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date

‘O’

Case No.

2:16-cv-04761-CAS(JPRx)

Title

JS-6

September 19, 2016

JAMIL RASHIDI v. VERITISS, LLC; MISSION ESSENTIAL
PERSONNEL, LLC

showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand the motion to dismiss. Ballard v. Savage, 65
F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1181 (C.D.
Cal. 1998), aff’d, 248 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001). The plaintiff’s alleged version of the
facts is taken as true for purposes of the motion if not directly controverted. AT & T v.
Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1996); Unocal, 27 F. Supp. 2d
at 1181. If the defendant adduces evidence controverting the allegations, however, the
plaintiff may not rely on his pleadings, but must “come forward with facts, by affidavit or
otherwise, supporting personal jurisdiction.” Scott v. Breeland, 792 F.2d 925, 927 (9th
Cir. 1986) (quoting Amba Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. Jobar Int’l, Inc., 551 F.2d 784, 787 (9th
Cir. 1977)). Any “‘conflicts between the facts contained in the parties’ affidavits must be
resolved in [plaintiff’s] favor for purposes of deciding whether a prima facie case for
personal jurisdiction exists.’” AT & T, 94 F.3d at 588–89 (quoting WNS, Inc. v. Farrow,
884 F.2d 200, 203 (5th Cir. 1989)).
Generally, personal jurisdiction exists if (1) it is permitted by the forum state’s
long-arm statute and (2) the “exercise of that jurisdiction does not violate federal due
process.” Pebble Beach, 453 F.3d at 1154–55 (citing Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Nat’l
Bank of Coops., 103 F.3d 888, 893 (9th Cir. 1996)).
California’s long-arm jurisdictional statute is coextensive with federal due process
requirements, so that the jurisdictional analysis under state law and federal due process
are the same. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10; Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 620
(9th Cir. 1991). In order for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant, that defendant must have “minimum contacts” with the forum state so that the
exercise of jurisdiction “does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Depending on the
nature of the contacts between the defendant and the forum state, personal jurisdiction is
characterized as either general or specific.
A.

General Jurisdiction

“A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or
foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all claims against them when their
affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially
at home in the forum State.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564
U.S. 915, 919 (2011). Whether a defendant’s contacts are sufficiently substantial,
CV-4761 (09/16)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Page 4 of 10

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date

‘O’

Case No.

2:16-cv-04761-CAS(JPRx)

Title

JS-6

September 19, 2016

JAMIL RASHIDI v. VERITISS, LLC; MISSION ESSENTIAL
PERSONNEL, LLC

continuous, and systematic for an exercise of general jurisdiction depends upon a
defendant’s “[l]ongevity, continuity, volume, economic impact, physical presence, and
integration into the state’s regulatory or economic markets.” Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand
technologies, Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1224 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2006)); see also Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v.
Augusta Nat. Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Factors to be taken into
consideration are whether the defendant makes sales, solicits or engages in business in
the state, serves the state’s markets, designates an agent for service of process, holds a
license, or is incorporated there.”). Occasional sales to residents of the forum state are
insufficient to create general jurisdiction. See Brand v. Menlove Dodge, 796 F.2d 1070,
1073 (9th Cir. 1986). This standard is exacting, “because a finding of general jurisdiction
permits a defendant to be haled into court in the forum state to answer for any of its
activities anywhere in the world.” Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d
797, 801 (9th Cir. 2004).
B.

Specific Jurisdiction

A court may assert specific jurisdiction over a claim for relief that arises out of a
defendant’s forum-related activities. Rano v. Sipa Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 580, 588 (9th Cir.
1993). The test for specific personal jurisdiction has three parts:
(1) The defendant must perform an act or consummate a transaction within the
forum, purposefully availing himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the
forum and invoking the benefits and protections of its laws;
(2) The claim must arise out of or result from the defendant’s forum-related
activities; and
(3) Exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.
Id.; see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475–76,(1985). The
plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first two prongs, and if either is not satisfied,
personal jurisdiction is not established. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802.
In contracts cases, courts conduct a “purposeful availment” analysis to determine
the first prong of the specific jurisdiction test. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802.
Because a contract is “ordinarily but an intermediate step serving to tie up prior business
negotiations with future consequences which themselves are the real object of the
CV-4761 (09/16)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Page 5 of 10

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date

‘O’

Case No.

2:16-cv-04761-CAS(JPRx)

Title

JS-6

September 19, 2016

JAMIL RASHIDI v. VERITISS, LLC; MISSION ESSENTIAL
PERSONNEL, LLC

business transaction,” a court must evaluate four factors to determine whether purposeful
availment has occurred: (1) prior negotiations, (2) contemplated future consequences, (3)
the terms of the contract, (4) the parties’ actual course of dealing. Burger King, 471 U.S.
at 478–79. A single contract for the sale of goods to a plaintiff in the forum state may be
sufficient for specific jurisdiction over a defendant, but only where the contract creates a
“substantial connection” with the forum state. Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011,
1017 (9th Cir. 2008). “The foreseeability of causing injury in another state is not a
sufficient basis on which to exercise jurisdiction,” without more. Gray & Co. v.
Firstenberg Mach. Co., Inc., 913 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1990).
In tort cases, by contrast, courts conduct a “purposeful direction” analysis.
Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. Purposeful direction is analyzed under the “effects
test.” Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 787–89, (1984); Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d
1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002). Under the “effects” test, “the defendant must have allegedly:
(1) committed an intentional act; (2) expressly aimed at the forum state; (3) causing harm
that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state.” Yahoo! Inc. v. La
Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 803).
If the plaintiff establishes the first two prongs regarding purposeful availment and
the defendant’s forum-related activities, then it is the defendant’s burden to “present a
compelling case” that the third prong, reasonableness, has not been satisfied. Id. at 802
(quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477). The third prong requires the Court to balance
seven factors: (1) the extent of the defendant’s purposeful availment, (2) the burden on
the defendant, (3) conflicts of law between the forum state and the defendant's state, (4)
the forum's interest in adjudicating the dispute, (5) judicial efficiency, (6) the plaintiff’s
interest in convenient and effective relief, and (7) the existence of an alternative forum.
Roth, 942 F.2d at 623.
IV.

DISCUSSION
A.

General Jurisdiction

Mission Essential argues that this Court lacks general personal jurisdiction because
Mission Essential does not have substantial, continuous, or systematic contacts with
California. Mot. at 6. The Court agrees. Mission Essential offers uncontroverted
CV-4761 (09/16)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Page 6 of 10

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date

‘O’

Case No.

2:16-cv-04761-CAS(JPRx)

Title

JS-6

September 19, 2016

JAMIL RASHIDI v. VERITISS, LLC; MISSION ESSENTIAL
PERSONNEL, LLC

evidence that it has offices only in Ohio and Virginia, and that all of its executive and
administrative functions are conducted from those offices; that Mission Essential has
never owned property, held bank accounts, or owned any other significant assets in
California; that Mission Essential does not maintain a telephone listing or address in
California; and that Mission Essential’s agent for service of process is located in Ohio.
Id. at 7.
Nonetheless, Rashidi argues that the conduct of Veritiss should be imputed to
Mission Essential for the purposes of the Court’s personal jurisdiction analysis because
the two defendants were joint-employers and served as each another’s agents and
representatives. Opp’n at 6–10. The Court disagrees. The conduct of Veritiss may not
be imputed to Mission Essential for three reasons. First, Rashidi’s agency theory relies
on a now-repudiated test articulated in Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909
(9th Cir. 2011). See Opp’n 6–7. In Bauman, the Ninth Circuit held:
“The agency test is satisfied by a showing that the subsidiary functions as the
parent corporation’s representative in that it performs services that are sufficiently
important to the foreign corporation that if it did not have a representative to
perform them, the corporation’s own officials would undertake to perform
substantially similar services.
Id. at 920 (quoting Unocal, 248 F.3d at 928). However, the Supreme Court “invalidated”
that agency test because it “sweeps too broadly to comport with the requirements of due
process.” Ranza v. Nike, Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1071 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Daimler AG v.
Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 759 (2014)). The Ninth Circuit has since held that “[t]he agency
test is therefore no longer available to [a plaintiff] to establish jurisdiction over [a
defendant].” Id. Second, even if the agency test did apply, Rashidi does not provide any
evidence to demonstrate that Mission Essential exercised control over Veritiss or vice
versa. See Bauman, 644 F.3d at 920 (the agency test “requires the plaintiffs to show an
element of control”); id. at 923 (“[T]o form an agency relationship, both the principal and
the agent must manifest assent to the principal’s right to control the agent.”) (quoting
United States v. Bonds, 608 F.3d 495, 506 (9th Cir. 2010)). Third, a joint-employer
relationship may establish liability, see, e.g., Moreau v. Air France, 356 F.3d 942, 944
(9th Cir. 2004), but joint employment does not determine personal jurisdiction. See
Campanelli v. Image First Unif. Rental Serv., Inc., No. 15-CV-04456-PJH, 2016 WL
4729173, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2016) (“[B]asing personal jurisdiction on joint
CV-4761 (09/16)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Page 7 of 10

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date

‘O’

Case No.

2:16-cv-04761-CAS(JPRx)

Title

JS-6

September 19, 2016

JAMIL RASHIDI v. VERITISS, LLC; MISSION ESSENTIAL
PERSONNEL, LLC

employer status . . . appears to be the minority view. . . . Even if [defendant] were liable
under a ‘joint employer’ theory, this does not establish that a separate, non-resident
corporate entity without minimum contacts can be hailed into a California court.”); In re
Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Employment Practices Litig., 735 F. Supp. 2d 277, 328
(W.D. Pa. 2010), aff’d, 683 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2012) (“The court is persuaded by the latter
group of decisions in which the courts recognized that the joint employer theory and
similar concepts are relevant for determining liability, but are not for determining
whether a court may exercise personal jurisdictional over a party.”); id. 326–28
(collecting cases); Vogt v. Greenmarine Holding, LLC, No. CIV.A.1:01-CV-0311-JOF,
2002 WL 534542, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 20, 2002) (“Plaintiffs argue that the proper test
for personal jurisdiction is whether OMC and Defendants constitute a ‘single employer’
so as to be liable under [a statute]. The court finds, however, that it is improper to
conflate an issue of subject matter jurisdiction with personal jurisdiction. Liability and
jurisdiction are two separate inquiries.”); cf. A. T. & T., 94 F.3d at 591 (“Even if the
requirement of personal jurisdiction allows a parent corporation to avoid liability, and
thus undercuts [a statute’s] purpose . . . , liability is not to be conflated with amenability
to suit in a particular forum.”). “The existence of a relationship between [Veritiss] and
[Mission Essential] is not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over [Mission
Essential] on the basis of [Veritiss’s] minimum contacts with the forum.” Unocal Corp.,
248 F.3d at 925. “Each defendant’s contacts with the forum State must be assessed
individually.” Calder, 465 U.S. at 790.
B.

Specific Jurisdiction

When assessing whether it may exercise specific jurisdiction, the Court looks first
to whether Mission Essential has purposely availed itself of the privilege of conducting
activities in this district or purposefully directed its activities into this district.1 “The

1

At oral argument, counsel for Rashidi noted that even if an agency relationship is
insufficient to establish general personal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has stated that
“[a]gency relationships . . . may be relevant to the existence of specific jurisdiction.”
Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 759 n.13 (first emphasis added). However, as described above,
control by the principal over the agent is an essential element of the agency relationship
and plaintiff has failed to provide evidence showing that Mission Essential exercised
control over Veritiss. Therefore, the Court considers only the conduct of Mission
CV-4761 (09/16)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Page 8 of 10

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date

‘O’

Case No.

2:16-cv-04761-CAS(JPRx)

Title

JS-6

September 19, 2016

JAMIL RASHIDI v. VERITISS, LLC; MISSION ESSENTIAL
PERSONNEL, LLC

Ninth Circuit has noted that purposeful availment and purposeful direction are two
distinct concepts.” Lang v. Morris, 823 F. Supp. 2d 966, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
Specifically, the “purposeful availment analysis is most often used in suits sounding in
contract,” where as the “purposeful direction analysis . . . is most often used in suits
sounding in tort.” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802.
Rashidi’s claims are neither tort nor contract claims. Cf. Senne v. Kansas City
Royals Baseball Corp., 105 F. Supp. 3d 981, 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2015), (“Wage and hour
claims asserted under the FLSA and state law are neither tort nor contract claims.”).
Mission Essential applies the purposeful availment test, see Mot. at 8, while Rashidi uses
the purposeful direction analysis. The Court therefore addresses the first prong of the
specific jurisdiction test under both the contractual purposeful availment approach and
the purposeful direction approach for suits sounding in tort.
The Court considers four factors under the purposeful availment test: (1) prior
negotiations, (2) contemplated future consequences, (3) the terms of the contract, (4) the
parties’ actual course of dealing. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478–79. Rashidi does not
present evidence that Mission Essential was in any way involved in the negotiations of
his employment contract, that Mission Essential contemplated the consequences of
entering into an employment relationship with Rashidi, that Mission Essential determined
the terms of the employment contract, or that Mission Essential communicated with
Rashidi about the contract. Mission Essential communicated with Rashidi while he was
in California via one email and attempted, but failed, to communicate with him by phone.
See Rashidi Decl. ¶ 28. A single successful communication does not provide a sufficient
basis for jurisdiction. See Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1271
(9th Cir. 1981) (“The smaller the element of purposeful interjection, the less is
jurisdiction to be anticipated and the less reasonable is its exercise.”). Rashidi has not
alleged any other instance in which Mission Essential itself engaged in any conduct
related to California.
To satisfy the purposeful direction “effects” test, “the defendant allegedly [must]
have (1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing
harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state.” Yahoo!, 433
F.3d at 1206 (9th Cir. 2006). While Mission Essential’s email to Rashidi was intentional
Essential for the purposes of its specific jurisdiction analysis.
CV-4761 (09/16)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Page 9 of 10

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Date

‘O’

JS-6

Case No.

2:16-cv-04761-CAS(JPRx)

September 19, 2016

Title

JAMIL RASHIDI v. VERITISS, LLC; MISSION ESSENTIAL
PERSONNEL, LLC

and expressly aimed at Rashidi in California, Rashidi does not allege that the
communication caused him harm. Mission Essential’s email alerted Rashidi, who was on
medical leave, to Mission Essential’s leave administration process. See Rashidi Decl.,
Ex. 8. The email did not effectuate or address the termination of Rashidi’s employment,
which constitutes the basis for each of Rashidi’s claims. Therefore, Mission Essential’s
conduct does not satisfy the “effects” test.
The Court next considers whether Rashidi’s claim arises out of or results from the
Mission Essential’s forum-related activities. “To determine whether a claim arises out of
forum-related activities, courts apply a ‘but for’ test. Unocal, 248 F.3d at 924. As noted
above, Mission Essential’s email to Rashidi in California did not address Rashidi’s
termination, the basis for Rashidi’s claims. Furthermore, Rashidi has not presented any
evidence suggesting that he would not have suffered his alleged injuries “but for”
Mission Essential’s email. As a result, the Court finds that Rashidi has not alleged facts
sufficient to show that his claims arise out of or result from Mission Essential’s
California-related activities.
Where, as here, a plaintiff fails to establish purposeful availment or a but-for
relationship between the defendant’s forum-related activities and the plaintiff’s claims,
“[the] plaintiff[] therefore fail[s] to establish specific jurisdiction, and the Court need not
reach the third prong of the specific jurisdiction test.” Unocal, 248 F.3d at 924.
The Court therefore concludes that it may not exercise specific jurisdiction over
Mission Essential.
V.

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Mission Essential’s motion
to dismiss Rashidi’s complaint as to Mission Essential. Because the Court concludes that
it lacks personal jurisdiction over Mission Essential, Mission Essential’s motion to
transfer is moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
00
Initials of Preparer

CV-4761 (09/16)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

:

04

CMJ

Page 10 of 10