Juane L. Elenes et al v. FCA US LLC et al

Filing 21

MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS)- PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO REMAND 7 by Judge Christina A. Snyder. Plaintiffs' motion to remand this action to the Los Angeles Superior Court is DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED. (lom)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

2:16-cv-05415-CAS (ASx)

Title

JUANE L. ELENES ET AL V. FCA US LLC ET AL

Present: The Honorable

Date

‘O’

November 14, 2016

CHRISTINA A. SNYDER

Catherine Jeang
Deputy Clerk

Not Present
Court Reporter / Recorder

N/A
Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs:

Attorneys Present for Defendants:

Not Present

Not Present

Proceedings:

I.

(IN CHAMBERS) - PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO REMAND
(Filed August 19, 2016, Dkt. 7)

INTRODUCTION

On July 17, 2016, Juan L. Elenes and Daisy Elenes filed a complaint in the Los
Angeles County Superior Court against FCA US LLC (“FCA”) and Does one through
ten. The complaint alleges (1) breach of express warranty in violation of the SongBeverly Consumer Warranty Act (“the Act”), California Civil Code §§ 1790 et seq., (2)
breach of implied warranty in violation of the Act, Id., and (3) fraudulent inducement.
On July 20, 2016, FCA removed the action to this Court on the basis of diversity of
citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Dkt. 1. On August 19,
2016, plaintiffs filed the instant motion to remand the action to the Los Angeles County
Superior Court. Dkt. 7. On September 26, 2016, FCA filed an opposition. Dkt. 8. On
October 3, 2016, plaintiffs filed a reply in support of their motion. Dkt. 9.
On October 17, 2016, the Court held oral argument on the present motion and took
the matter under submission. Dkt. 12. Having carefully considered the parties’
arguments, the Court finds and concludes as follows.
II.

BACKGROUND

On August 12, 2012, plaintiffs purchased a 2012 Dodge Durango (“the Vehicle”)
from FCA. Compl ¶ 7. Plaintiffs attached the sales contract for the Vehicle to their
complaint. See Compl. Ex. 1. The sales contract provides that the “Cash Price of Motor
Vehicle and Accessories” was $39,745. Plaintiffs agreed to pay $3,946.04 in taxes and
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

2:16-cv-05415-CAS (ASx)

Date

Title

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November 14, 2016

JUANE L. ELENES ET AL V. FCA US LLC ET AL

fees. Plaintiffs traded in their former vehicle for a value of $15,000, but after the
application of a rebate, still owed $1357.71 on their prior lease. As part of the purchase
of the Vehicle, the seller agreed to pay off the remaining $1357.71 owed on plaintiffs’
former vehicle and to add that $1357.71 to the loan for the Vehicle purchase. Plaintiffs
did not make any down-payment. Including the cash price, taxes, fees, and amount
repaid on plaintiffs’ former vehicle, the total financed amount for the Vehicle was
$45,048.75. Based on plaintiffs’ payment schedule, plaintiffs agreed to pay $703.77 per
month for 72 months for a total payment amount of $50,671.441. From the face of the
sales contract, it does not appear that plaintiffs opted for optional additional expenses
such as a “theft deterrent device,” “service contract,” or “surface protection product.” Ex.
1 at 1.
The Vehicle came factory-equipped with a Totally Integrated Power Module
(“TIPM”), Compl. ¶ 9, which plaintiffs allege was defective, id. ¶ 12. Plaintiffs allege
that the defective TIPM causes a number of problems with the Vehicle and that FCA
failed to disclose TIPM defects to plaintiffs prior to their purchase of the Vehicle. Id. ¶
88.
On or around September 23, 2014, plaintiffs took the Vehicle to FCA’s repair
facility and raised a number of issues purportedly related to the TIPM defect. Id. ¶ 93.
The service manager represented to plaintiffs that the Vehicle had been repaired and was
safe to drive. Id. Plaintiffs allegedly took the vehicle to a repair facility again on October
2, 2015, at which time they raised issues with the transmission and the check engine light.
Id. ¶ 95. The service manager allegedly returned the vehicle to plaintiffs on October 7,
2015, and represented that it had been repaired and was safe to drive. Id.
Plaintiffs claim the Vehicle sale was accompanied by express warranty by which
FCA “undertook to preserve or maintain the utility or performance” of the Vehicle. Id. ¶
128. Plaintiffs allege that the Vehicle was delivered to plaintiffs with serious defects in
violation of the aforementioned express warranty, including but not limited to the

1

Plaintiffs’ loan carried an annual interest rate of 3.95%, which would add
$5,622.69 to the total cost paid for the vehicle if repaid over 72 months according to the
$703.77 per month payment schedule.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

2:16-cv-05415-CAS (ASx)

Date

Title

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November 14, 2016

JUANE L. ELENES ET AL V. FCA US LLC ET AL

defective TIPM. Id. ¶ 129. Plaintiffs also allege that FCA’s sale of the Vehicle violated
an implied warranty of merchantability. Id. ¶ 144-47.
III.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion for remand is the proper procedure for challenging removal. Remand
may be ordered either for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or for any defect in removal
procedure. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). In general, a federal district court has subject
matter jurisdiction where a case presents a claim arising under federal law (“federal
question jurisdiction”), or where the plaintiffs and defendants are residents of different
states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 (“diversity jurisdiction”). See,
e.g., Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Galindo, 2011 WL 662324, *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 11,
2011) (explaining the two types of jurisdiction). The party seeking removal bears the
burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. See Prize Frize, Inc. v. Matrix, Inc., 167 F.3d
1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 1999).
In determining the amount in controversy, courts first look to the complaint.
“Generally, the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in
good faith.” Ibarra v. Manheim Investments, Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015)
(quotation marks omitted); see also Coleman v. Estes Express Lines, Inc., 730 F. Supp.
2d 1141, 1148 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (Collins, J.)(“In deciding the amount in controversy, the
Court looks to what the plaintiff has alleged, not what the defendants will owe.”), aff'd
631 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2011). “[I]n assessing the amount in controversy, a court must
‘assume that the allegations of the complaint are true and assume that a jury will return a
verdict for the plaintiff on all claims made in the complaint.’ ” Campbell v. Vitran
Express, Inc., 471 Fed.Appx. 646, 648 (9th Cir.2012) (quoting Kenneth Rothschild Trust
v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 199 F.Supp.2d 993, 1001 (C.D.Cal.2002)).
Where, as here, the amount in controversy is contested, and the plaintiff does not
plead a specific amount in controversy, the proponent of federal jurisdiction must
establish it by a preponderance of the evidence. Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co.,
LLC v. Owens, 135 S.Ct. 547, 550 (2014); Rodriguez v. AT&T Mobility Servs. LLC,
728 F.3d 975, 981 (9th Cir. 2013). In determining whether the removing party has
satisfied this burden, the district court may consider facts in the removal petition and
“‘summary-judgment-type evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of
removal.’” Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

2:16-cv-05415-CAS (ASx)

Date

Title

‘O’

November 14, 2016

JUANE L. ELENES ET AL V. FCA US LLC ET AL

(quoting Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1335–36 (5th Cir. 1995)). A
defendant need not “research, state, and prove the plaintiff's claim for damages,”
Coleman, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 1148, particularly because the question asks only the
amount that plaintiff has put at issue, not how much the defendant actually owes, Lewis
v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 627 F.3d 395, 400 (9th Cir. 2010).
IV.

DISCUSSION

In FCA’s notice of removal, FCA argues that the Court has diversity jurisdiction
over the action because the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, plaintiffs are citizens
of the State of California, and FCA is not a citizen of the State of California. FCA
contends that a “conservative” estimate of the amount in controversy is $105,879.21 plus
attorneys’ fees. Not. Removal ¶ 10. Plaintiffs challenge FCA’s calculation of the amount
in controversy and contend that it does not exceed $75,000 and that this action must be
remanded to the Los Angeles County Superior Court.
The Act pursuant to which plaintiffs’ first and second claims arise permits
plaintiffs to seek “recovery of damages and other legal and equitable relief.” Cal. Civ.
Code § 1794(a). The measure of damages includes the sum of [1] restitution, [2] “a civil
penalty which shall not exceed two times the amount of actual damages,” and [3] “the
aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time
expended.”2 Cal. Civ. Code § 1794. Plaintiffs argue that FCA has improperly calculated
restitution [1], that FCA has failed to adequately prove availability of the maximum civil
penalty [2], and that FCA cannot include attorneys’ fees [3] in the calculation of the
amount in controversy. The Court addresses the proof of each component in turn as well
as their inclusion in the amount in controversy below.
A.

Compensatory Damages Pursuant to Song-Beverly Act

The parties agree that if plaintiffs are successful in their claims, they may be
entitled to restitution, but the parties disagree about the calculation of restitution.

2

Because jurisdiction over this action ultimately turns on the proper addition and
subtraction of several different amounts, the Court assigns them separate alpha-numeric
labels for simplicity.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

2:16-cv-05415-CAS (ASx)

Date

Title

‘O’

November 14, 2016

JUANE L. ELENES ET AL V. FCA US LLC ET AL

The Act defines restitution as “the actual price paid or payable by the buyer,
including [1a] any charges for transportation and manufacturer-installed options . . . and
including [1b] any collateral charges such as sales or use tax, license fees, registration
fees, and other official fees.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(B). However, the
calculation of restitution excludes, [1x] “nonmanufacturer items installed by a dealer or
the buyer,” id., and is reduced by [1y] an amount attributable to the consumer’s use, Cal.
Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(C).
It appears that plaintiffs agreed to pay a total of $45,048.75 on August 12, 2012,
which plaintiffs paid by accepting a loan. Part of that total was for the “Cash Price of
Motor Vehicle and Accessories,” Compl. Ex. 1, which appears to have included “[1a] any
charges for transportation and manufacturer-installed options,” Cal. Civ. Code §
1793.2(d)(2)(B). By the terms of the loan, plaintiffs would pay a total of $50,671.44,
including finance charges. Finance charges are correctly included in the calculation of
the amount in controversy because they are recoverable pursuant to the Act. Mitchell v.
Blue Bird Body Co., 80 Cal. App. 4th 32, 34 (2000). Accordingly, the total amount
financed also appears to have included all taxes and fees [1b].
As noted supra, $1,357.71 of the financed amount was attributed to plaintiff’s
remaining debt on their prior vehicle. Accordingly, that sum must be excluded from the
purchase price, including the appropriate portion of finance charges attributable to that
sum. Accordingly, $49,144.27, or $50,671.44 minus $1527.17, is the relevant amount
paid by plaintiff.
The Court must next determine the appropriate reduction of that amount based on
the exclusion of “[1x] nonmanufacturer items installed by a dealer or the buyer,” Cal.
Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(B), and [1y] the reduction attributable to the plaintiffs’ use of
the Vehicle, Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(C). The purchase agreement does not appear
to list any nonmanufacturer items installed by the dealer or buyer. Instead it lists “N/A”
adjacent to a number of “Optional” features, including several “theft deterrent device[s]”
and “surface protection product.” Compl. Ex. 1. Accordingly, for purposes of this order,
there do not appear to have been any costs attributable to nonmanufacturer items installed
in the Vehicle.
Regarding the reduction of restitution based on plaintiffs’ use of the Vehicle [1y],
the Act provides:
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

2:16-cv-05415-CAS (ASx)

Date

Title

‘O’

November 14, 2016

JUANE L. ELENES ET AL V. FCA US LLC ET AL

The amount directly attributable to use by the buyer shall be determined by
multiplying the actual price of the new motor vehicle paid or payable by the
buyer, including any charges for transportation and manufacturer-installed
options, by a fraction having as its denominator 120,000 and having as its
numerator the number of miles traveled by the new motor vehicle prior to
the time the buyer first delivered the vehicle . . . for correction of the
problem that gave rise to the nonconformity.
Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(C).
In this case, the “actual price” pursuant to subsection (C) is the cash price of
$39,745.00. To determine the reduction for plaintiffs’ use [1y], the Court multiplies
$39,745 by a fraction equal to the number of miles driven by plaintiffs’ in the Vehicle
prior to first delivering the vehicle to FCA for correction divided by 120,000. FCA has
submitted evidence that between August 12, 2012, when plaintiffs purchased the Vehicle,
and September 23, 2014, when plaintiffs brought the vehicle to be repaired, the Vehicle’s

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

2:16-cv-05415-CAS (ASx)

Date

Title

‘O’

November 14, 2016

JUANE L. ELENES ET AL V. FCA US LLC ET AL

mileage had increased by 25,987 miles.3 Accordingly, the net mileage offset for

3

In opposition to the instant motion, FCA attached a declaration from Jay Weaver,
Customer Relations and Warranty Operations Manager of FCA’s California Business
Center. Opp’n Ex. 4. FCA offers the Weaver declaration to authenticate purported
warranty claim reports that FCA also attached as Exhibit 4 to its opposition. The
warranty claim reports appear to show the mileage of a vehicle with the same VIN that
plaintiffs allege is assigned to the Vehicle. The warranty claim reports also list the
Vehicle’s mileage on various dates the Vehicle was brought to FCA for repairs.
Specifically, it provides that the mileage was 26,063 miles on September 23, 2014, the
same day plaintiffs allege that they first brought the Vehicle for repairs. FCA argues that
the mileage reduction should be based on 25,987 miles because the sales contract shows
that the Vehicle had 76 miles on the odometer when plaintiffs purchased it.
Plaintiffs object to consideration of the Weaver declaration and the warranty claim
reports pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 402, 802, 901, and the best evidence rule.
Dkt. 10.
However, the Court determines that they are relevant to estimate the use-reduction
of the amount in controversy. Furthermore, Federal Rule of Evidence 902 (“Rule 902")
provides that “[t]he following items of evidence are self-authenticating; they require no
extrinsic evidence of authenticity in order to be admitted.” Accordingly, Rule 902(11)
permits admission of certain business records without further extrinsic evidence. To
satisfy Rule 902(11) the records must be accompanied by a certification from their
custodian or other qualified person showing they satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule
of Evidence 803(6)(A)-(C) (“Rule 803").
The Weaver certification meets the initial requirements of Rule 902(11). Weaver
claims to work with FCA’s warranty repair reports on a daily basis. Weaver’s
certification states that the warranty claim records were made at or near the time of the
events described by someone with knowledge of the matters set forth therein (Rule
803(6)(A)), were kept in the course of FCA’s regularly conducted business activity (Rule
803(6)(B)), and were made by FCA as part of its regular practice (Rule 803(6)(C)).
Rule 902(11) also requires that FCA give plaintiffs adequate notice of its intent to
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

2:16-cv-05415-CAS (ASx)

Date

Title

‘O’

November 14, 2016

JUANE L. ELENES ET AL V. FCA US LLC ET AL

plaintiffs’ use of the vehicle is $8,607.11.
For purposes of this motion, the Court therefore estimates the amount of restitution
[1] available pursuant to the Act to be $49,144.27 in net payment minus the mileage
offset of $8,607.11, or $40,537.16.
B.

Civil Penalty

“It is well established that punitive damages are part of the amount in controversy
in a civil action,” where they are recoverable under one or more of the plaintiff's claims
for relief. Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 945 (9th Cir.2001). Pursuant to the
Act, “[i]f the buyer establishes that the failure to comply was willful, the judgment may
include . . . a civil penalty which shall not exceed two times the amount of actual
damages.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(c). Courts treat the Act’s civil penalties akin to
punitive damages. See e.g. Suman v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. App. 4th 1309, 1317 (1995)
(“These subdivision (c) penalties have been likened, by courts, to punitive damages”).
The Court estimates the amount in controversy by assuming plaintiffs’ allegations are
true. See Campbell, 471 Fed.Appx. at 648. Plaintiffs allege that FCA has “willfully
failed to comply with its responsibilities under the Act.” Compl. ¶ 141. Accordingly, the
amount in controversy estimate may include a civil penalty.

offer the records and an opportunity to inspect the records and certification so that
plaintiffs have a fair opportunity to challenge them. From the parties submissions the
Court cannot discern if FCA gave the appropriate notice or permitted plaintiffs to inspect
the records at issue. Accordingly, the Court invites oral argument regarding whether
plaintiffs require time to inspect the records and whether they intend to challenge the
records’ authenticity.
For purposes of this tentative order, the Court assumes that FCA will make the
records available for inspection or that plaintiffs do not challenge the authenticity of the
warranty records. Accordingly, for purposes of this motion, the records appear to be
admissible and the Court may consider them as “summary-judgment-type evidence.”
Singer, 116 F.3d at 377.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

2:16-cv-05415-CAS (ASx)

Date

Title

‘O’

November 14, 2016

JUANE L. ELENES ET AL V. FCA US LLC ET AL

Plaintiffs argue that FCA has not satisfied its burden of presenting evidence that
plaintiffs may be entitled to the maximum amount of the civil penalty rather than some
lesser amount in civil penalties. However, plaintiffs specifically seek the maximum
amount permissible in civil penalties. See Compl. Prayer ¶ (e) (plaintiffs seek a “civil
penalty in the amount of two times Plaintiffs’ actual damages”). As noted above,
“[g]enerally, the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in
good faith.” Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1197 (quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs’ prayer for
relief is therefore enough to determine whether the amount in controversy should include
the maximum amount of the civil penalty or some lesser portion. See Saulic v. Symantec
Corp., 2007 WL 5074883, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 26, 2007) (Stotler, J.). “Plaintiff could
have ‘remained silent or ambiguous on one or more of the ingredients needed to calculate
the amount in controversy,’ thereby requiring the removing party to ‘show the stakes of
litigation ... given plaintiff's actual demand.’” Id. (quoting Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat'l
Ass'n, 479 F.3d 994, 999 (9th Cir.2007). By specifically seeking the maximum civil
penalty, plaintiffs placed that amount in controversy. Accordingly, FCA need only
provide evidence of damages from which the amount of civil penalties can be determine.
As discussed supra, FCA’s submissions are sufficient to estimate the amount in
controversy as restitution to be $40,537.16. Pursuant to the Act, that amount may be
doubled to determine the civil penalty sought by plaintiffs.
Furthermore, where the maximum civil penalty is predicated upon and capped by
other damages, courts routinely include the maximum available civil penalty when
estimating the amount in controversy. See e.g. Bruce v. Waggoners Trucking, Inc., 2016
WL 4508232, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2016) (Fitzgerald, J.) (The amount in controversy
includes twice the amount at issue where “Plaintiff could be entitled [to] up to double
compensation for the overtime owed”); Saulic, 2007 WL 5074883, at *7. Where a state
law claim authorizes up to “treble damages,” the Ninth Circuit, in dicta, has indicated
support for inclusion of those damages. See Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co.,
225 F.3d 1042, 1046 fn. 3 (9th Cir. 2000) (although, in Chabner, it was “unclear whether
the jurisdictional minimum would have been met” without allegations regarding the
amount of underlying damages). Accordingly, some courts have opted to include the
maximum civil penalty without relying on the plaintiffs’ specific prayer for relief. Brady
v. Mercedes Benz USA, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1009 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (citing
Chabner, 225 F.3d at1046 fn. 3).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

2:16-cv-05415-CAS (ASx)

Date

Title

‘O’

November 14, 2016

JUANE L. ELENES ET AL V. FCA US LLC ET AL

Here, the Court need not speculate as to the underlying damages for restitution. As
discussed supra, the Court estimates the amount in controversy as restitution [1] to be
$40,537.16. Pursuant to the Act, the civil penalty amount in controversy [2] is double
those potential damages, $81,074.32.
C.

Other Damages Affecting the Amount in Controversy

In addition to [1] restitution and [2] a civil penalty, the Act permits plaintiffs to
seek “[3] the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorneys’ fees based on
actual time expended.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1794. The parties dispute whether and how, at
this stage in the litigation, attorneys’ fees should be estimated for purposes of
determining the amount in controversy. Regarding the amount of attorneys’ fees to
consider for jurisdictional purposes, courts have reached differing conclusions. Compare
e.g. Brady, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 1011 (“a reasonable estimate of fees likely to be incurred
to resolution is part of the benefit permissibly sought by the plaintiff and thus contributes
to the amount in controversy”) with Reames v. AB Car Rental Servs., Inc., 899 F. Supp.
2d 1012, 1019 (D. Or. 2012) (“Although the Ninth Circuit has not yet resolved this issue .
. . attorney fees anticipated but unaccrued at the time of removal are not properly in
controversy for jurisdictional purpose”).
However, the sum of the restitution and civil penalty amounts in controversy
exceed $120,000. Accordingly, the $75,000 jurisdictional amount has been satisfied and
the Court need not resolve what amount of attorneys’ fees may be included. It appears
that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1332. Plaintiffs’ motion to remand this action to the Los Angeles Superior Court should
be denied.
D.

Comity

Plaintiff’s final argument in favor of remand is that the Court should remand this
action so as not to interfere with “California’s authority over its own statutes, regulatory
programs, and public policy.” Mot. at 19. During oral argument on this motion, plaintiff
informed the Court that there are several potentially related cases currently proceeding in
state court and that FCA has filed a petition in state court for coordination of those cases.
The parties noted that a hearing on FCA’s coordination petition was scheduled for
October 21, 2016. Accordingly, the Court took this matter under submission and ordered
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

2:16-cv-05415-CAS (ASx)

Date

Title

‘O’

November 14, 2016

JUANE L. ELENES ET AL V. FCA US LLC ET AL

the parties to file a joint report regarding the coordination petition no later than October
28, 2016. On October 27, 2016, the parties filed a joint report requesting an extension of
time until November 8, 2016, because the coordination petition hearing in state court was
rescheduled to October 31, 2016. Dkt. 13. The Court granted the parties an extension
until November 8, 2016. Dkt. 14. On November 7, 2016, the Court held a scheduling
conference with the parties regarding this action, during which the parties discussed the
coordination petition in state court. At that time the parties did not apprise the Court of
any facts that would cause the Court to reject jurisdiction. Nor have the parties filed any
further update regarding the state court proceedings.
Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion to remand this action is DENIED without
prejudice. Plaintiff will be permitted to renew the present motion or seek a stay of this
action as may be warranted by any substantial change in the potentially related state court
proceedings.
V.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs’ motion to remand this action to the Los Angeles Superior Court is
DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
00
Initials of Preparer

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:

00

CMJ

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