Rodney Dale Rafols v. Carolyn W. Colvin

Filing 25

MEMORANDUM OPINION by Magistrate Judge Charles F. Eick. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied and Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted. (sp)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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RODNEY DALE RAFOLS,

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Plaintiff,
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v.
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NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
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Commissioner of Social Security,
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Defendant.
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___________________________________)

NO. CV 16-5827-E

MEMORANDUM OPINION

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PROCEEDINGS

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Plaintiff filed a complaint on August 4, 2016, seeking review of

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the Commissioner’s denial of benefits.

The parties consented to

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proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge on September 21, 2016.

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Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on April 25, 2017.

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Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on May 25, 2017.

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Court has taken the motions under submission without oral argument.

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See L.R. 7-15; “Order,” filed August 5, 2016.

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The

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BACKGROUND

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Plaintiff asserted disability based on several alleged

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impairments (Administrative Record (“A.R.”) 40-51, 54-62, 71-75, 78-

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81, 214-17, 225).

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functional restrictions (A.R. 49-51, 61-62, 72-81).

Plaintiff testified to allegedly disabling

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Following a previous administrative remand, the Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”) examined the medical record and heard testimony from

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Plaintiff and a vocational expert (A.R. 17-310, 314-618).

The ALJ

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found Plaintiff’s testimony “not entirely credible” (A.R. 26).

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According to the ALJ, “[e]xaggeration of symptoms is repeatedly

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suggested throughout the medical record. . . .” (A.R. 27).

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also observed that Dr. Alexander White, a non-treating, non-examining

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physician, had believed that all of Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms were

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“significantly out of proportion to identifiable physical processes”

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(A.R. 27, 443).

The ALJ

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The ALJ determined that Plaintiff retains the residual functional

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capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work with certain restrictions (A.R.

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23).1

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the physicians of record (A.R. 327-30, 333-50, 362-66, 378-79, 403,

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441-53, 486, 539, 545-50).

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opinions in considerable detail, including the report and opinion of

This RFC is largely consistent with the reports and opinions of

The ALJ discussed these reports and

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The ALJ found a capacity for light work not requiring
more than “occasional bending/stooping . . . or simple route
[sic] repetitive tasks with occasional public and coworker
contact” (A.R. 23).
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Dr. White (A.R. 24-27).

The ALJ declined to incorporate into the RFC

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every aspect of Dr. White’s opinion, omitting the aspect that would

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have restricted Plaintiff to work not requiring more than occasional

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reaching, handling, fingering, and feeling with the left hand (A.R.

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23, 448).

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or clinical findings” supporting an alleged restriction to occasional

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use of the left hand, Dr. White wrote only “giving Pt. the benefit of

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doubt of injury to the L. hand” (A.R. 448).

When asked to identify in writing “the particular medical

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The vocational expert testified that a person having the RFC

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assessed by the ALJ could perform certain jobs existing in significant

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numbers in the national economy (A.R. 83-84).

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testimony, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled (A.R. 28-29).

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Appeals Council considered additional evidence but denied review (A.R.

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1-5, 311-13, 619-907).

In reliance on this
The

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Plaintiff now argues a single alleged administrative error.

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According to Plaintiff, the ALJ erred by assertedly failing to state

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“specific and legitimate reasons” for not incorporating into the RFC

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Dr. White’s opinion restricting Plaintiff to occasional use of the

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left hand.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

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Under 42 U.S.C. section 405(g), this Court reviews the

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Administration’s decision to determine if: (1) the Administration’s

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findings are supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the

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Administration used correct legal standards.
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See Carmickle v.

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Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008); Hoopai v. Astrue,

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499 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Brewes v. Commissioner,

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682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012).

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relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

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support a conclusion.”

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(1971) (citation and quotations omitted); see also Widmark v.

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Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006).

Substantial evidence is “such

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401

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If the evidence can support either outcome, the court may

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not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.

But the

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Commissioner’s decision cannot be affirmed simply by

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isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.

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Rather, a court must consider the record as a whole,

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weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that

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detracts from the [administrative] conclusion.

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Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations and

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quotations omitted).

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Where, as here, the Appeals Council considered additional

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evidence but denied review, the additional evidence becomes part of

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the record for purposes of the Court's analysis.

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Commissioner, 682 F.3d at 1163 (“[W]hen the Appeals Council considers

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new evidence in deciding whether to review a decision of the ALJ, that

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evidence becomes part of the administrative record, which the district

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court must consider when reviewing the Commissioner's final decision

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for substantial evidence”; expressly adopting Ramirez v. Shalala, 8

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F.3d 1449, 1452 (9th Cir. 1993)); Taylor v. Commissioner, 659 F.3d
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See Brewes v.

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1228, 1231 (2011) (courts may consider evidence presented for the

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first time to the Appeals Council “to determine whether, in light of

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the record as a whole, the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial

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evidence and was free of legal error”); Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953,

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957 n.7 (9th Cir. 1993) (“the Appeals Council considered this

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information and it became part of the record we are required to review

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as a whole”).

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DISCUSSION

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After consideration of the record as a whole, Defendant’s motion

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is granted and Plaintiff’s motion is denied.

The Administration’s

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findings are supported by substantial evidence and are free from

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material2 legal error.

Plaintiff’s arguments are unavailing.

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Contrary to Plaintiff’s arguments, the law did not require that

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the ALJ state “specific and legitimate reasons” for failing to

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incorporate into the RFC every aspect of Dr. White’s opinion.

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Ninth Circuit’s “specific and legitimate reasons” requirement applies

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only to the opinions of treating physicians, and, perhaps, to the

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opinions of other examining physicians.

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821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1995); but see Nyman v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 528,

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531 (9th Cir. 1986) (an ALJ need not explicitly detail the reasons for

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rejecting the contradicted opinion of a non-treating, examining

See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d

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The harmless error rule applies to the review of
administrative decisions regarding disability. See Garcia v.
Commissioner, 768 F.3d 925, 932-33 (9th Cir. 2014); McLeod v.
Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 886-88 (9th Cir. 2011).
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The

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physician).

Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s reference to “a treating

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medical opinion” and Plaintiff’s urging of the “specific and

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legitimate reasons” standard,3 Dr. White was neither a treating

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physician nor an examining physician (A.R. 441).

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An ALJ may reject the opinion of a non-treating, non-examining

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physician merely “by reference to specific evidence in the medical

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record.”

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cf. Social Security Ruling 96-8p (“if the RFC assessment conflicts

Sousa v. Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 1998);

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with an opinion from a medical source, the adjudicator must explain

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why the opinion was not adopted”).

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referenced sufficiently specific evidence and explanation to justify

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the RFC’s failure to incorporate a restriction to occasional use of

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the left hand.

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opinions of the physicians of record, including reports and opinions

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of examining physicians who placed no restriction on Plaintiff’s use

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of his left hand.

In the present case, the ALJ

The ALJ discussed in some detail the reports and

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Additionally, the ALJ’s proper discounting of Plaintiff’s

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credibility amply supports the refusal to incorporate a left hand

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restriction into the RFC under the circumstances of this case.

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admitted absence of any “medical or clinical findings” supporting a

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left hand restriction, Dr. White conceded he was giving Plaintiff “the

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benefit of doubt” by crediting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints

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See Plaintiff’s “Motion for Summary Judgment or
Remand,” filed April 25, 2017, at p. 4.
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In the

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regarding an alleged left hand restriction (A.R. 448).4

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reject the opinion of even a treating physician when the opinion is

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based on the claimant’s properly discounted subjective complaints.

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See Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001); Morgan

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v. Commissioner, 169 F.3d 595, 602 (9th Cir. 1999); accord Fair v.

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Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 605 (9th Cir. 1989).

An ALJ may

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Almost all of the medical evidence of record in the present case
supports the RFC assessed by the ALJ.

To the extent any of the

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medical evidence is in conflict, it was the prerogative of the ALJ to

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resolve such conflicts.

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Cir. 2001).

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interpretation,” the Court must uphold the administrative decision.

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See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 1995); accord

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Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002); Sandgathe v.

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Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997).

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ALJ’s rational interpretation of the evidence in the present case

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notwithstanding any conflicts in the record.

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See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 509 (9th

When evidence “is susceptible to more than one rational

The Court will uphold the

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Curiously, Dr. White accorded Plaintiff this “benefit
of doubt” notwithstanding Dr. White’s belief that all of
Plaintiff’s symptoms were “significantly out of proportion to
identifiable physical process” (A.R. 443).
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CONCLUSION

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For all of the foregoing reasons,5 Plaintiff’s motion for summary

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judgment is denied and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is

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granted.

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LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

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DATED: June 7, 2017.

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/s/
CHARLES F. EICK
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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The Court has considered and rejected each of
Plaintiff’s arguments. The Court has discussed Plaintiff’s
principal arguments herein.
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