Ronald Bratton v. Rick Hill

Filing 4

ORDER DISMISSING HABEAS CORPUS PETITION WITH PREJUDICE AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY by Judge Michael W. Fitzgerald, Because Petitioner has not and cannot state a cognizable claim, the Petition is denied and the case is dismissed with prejudice. Further, because he has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, he is not entitled to a certificate of appealability. (See document for further details.) (sbou)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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RONALD BRATTON,

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Petitioner,

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v.
RICK HILL,

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Respondent.

CASE NO. CV 16-6266-MWF (PJW)
ORDER DISMISSING HABEAS CORPUS
PETITION WITH PREJUDICE AND
DENYING CERTIFICATE OF
APPEALABILITY

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In November 1994, Petitioner was convicted in Los Angeles County

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Superior Court of second degree murder and sentenced to 19 years to

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life in prison.

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counsel attended a parole hearing.

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They were given an opportunity to challenge the documentary evidence

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considered by the Parole Board and to submit additional evidence.

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(Hearing at C5-C7.)

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counsel made a closing argument.

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Parole Board’s oral decision that followed, the Board explained to

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Petitioner why he was being denied parole for a five-year period.

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(Hearing at C102-C118.)

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(Petition at 2.)

On November 4, 2015, he and his
(Petition, Exhibit C (“Hearing”).)

Petitioner made a statement at the hearing and
(Hearing at C96-C101.)

In the

Following the denial, Petitioner unsuccessfully challenged the
Parole Board’s decision in habeas corpus petitions in the Los Angeles

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County Superior Court, the California Court of Appeal, and the

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California Supreme Court.

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On August 22, 2016, he filed a habeas corpus petition in this court,

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claiming that: (1) he was denied due process because the Parole

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Board’s decision was not supported by any evidence; (2) the Board’s

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failure to set a release date has resulted in a cruel and unusual

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sentence of life without the possibility of parole, in violation of

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the Eighth Amendment; (3) the Board’s five-year parole denial pursuant

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to California Proposition 9 was an unlawful ex post facto punishment;

(Petition at 2(b), 2(c), and Exhibit A.)

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and (4) the Board violated his due process rights by preventing him

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from submitting psychiatric evidence or having a psychiatrist present

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at the hearing.

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(Petition at 3(a)-(z), 4(a)-(b).)

The Court has a duty to screen habeas corpus petitions before

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ordering service on a respondent.

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656 (2005).

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petition that a petitioner is not entitled to relief, the Court can

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dismiss the petition at the outset.

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§ 2254 Cases; and Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992).

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the following reasons, the Court concludes that it is clear on the

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face of the petition that Petitioner is not entitled to relief and,

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therefore, the petition is dismissed with prejudice.

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See Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644,

In so doing, if it plainly appears from the face of a

See Rule 4, Rules Governing
For

The Court’s review of parole denials is limited to determining

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whether a petitioner was given an opportunity to be heard and an

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explanation for the reasons denying his parole.

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562 U.S. 216, 220 (2011).

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complaint that the Parole Board’s decision was not based on any

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evidence (or that the evidence was flawed) is not properly before the

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Court.

Swarthout v. Cooke,

Clearly, that happened here.

Petitioner’s

Id. at 221 (“[I]t is no federal concern [] whether
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California’s ‘some evidence’ rule of judicial review (a procedure

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beyond what the Constitution demands) was correctly applied.”).

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Likewise, Petitioner’s argument that his due process rights were

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violated when he was not allowed to present psychiatric evidence is

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misplaced.

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psychiatric testimony at a parole hearing.

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Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 9-11, 16 (1979)

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(holding state procedure “affords an opportunity to be heard, and when

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parole is denied it informs the inmate in what respects he falls short

There is no federal constitutional right to present
See, e.g., Greenholtz v.

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of qualifying for parole; this affords the process that is due under

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the circumstances.

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such, Petitioner’s claims are not cognizable in this action.

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e.g., Thompson v. Soto, 2015 WL 3929651, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 24,

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2015) (rejecting petitioner’s claims that use of immunized testimony

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and inaccurate confidential information in parole decision violated

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due process rights).1

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The Constitution does not require more.”)

As
See,

Petitioner’s claim that the Board’s failure to grant him a parole

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date renders his sentence cruel and unusual is also rejected.

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Petitioner was convicted of murder.

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sentence for murder is not cruel and unusual punishment.

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United States v. LaFleur, 971 F.2d 200, 211 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[I]t is

It is beyond dispute that a life
See, e.g.,

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To the extent that Petitioner contends that his rights under
the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”) were violated by the
Board’s actions, this claim is rejected. Petitioner acknowledged at
the hearing that he was competent to proceed and his counsel agreed
that his ADA rights had been met, without objection from Petitioner.
(Hearing at C6-C7.) No more was required. See Armstrong v. Davis,
275 F.3d 849, 859, 865 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting, in parole hearing
context, ADA requires that the Board make reasonable accommodations to
enable inmates to attend and comprehend parole hearings), abrogated on
other grounds by Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 504-05 (2005).
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clear that a mandatory life sentence for murder does not constitute

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cruel and unusual punishment.”).

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Petitioner’s argument that a five-year denial by the Parole Board

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violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the federal Constitution has been

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considered and rejected by both the Ninth Circuit and the California

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Supreme Court.

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2016) (concluding retroactive application of Proposition 9 does not

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violate the Ex Post Facto Clause); In re Vicks, 56 Cal.4th 274 (2013)

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(same).

Gilman v. Brown, 814 F.3d 1007, 1016-21 (9th Cir.

In light of these decisions, the state courts’ rejection of

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his claim cannot be said to be an unreasonable application of clearly

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established federal law.

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786 (2011) (holding federal habeas relief is precluded “so long as

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‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state

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court’s decision”); Stevenson v. Asuncion, 2016 WL 4154946, at *3

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(C.D. Cal. June 24, 2016) (denying petitioner’s ex post facto claim in

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light of Ninth Circuit’s conclusion in Gilman that retroactive

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application of Proposition 9 did not violate federal law).

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See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770,

Because Petitioner has not and cannot state a cognizable claim,

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the Petition is denied and the case is dismissed with prejudice.

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Further, because he has not made a substantial showing of the denial

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of a constitutional right, he is not entitled to a certificate of

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appealability.

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Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003).

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See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b);

IT IS SO ORDERED

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DATED:

September 20, 2016.

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MICHAEL W. FITZGERALD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Presented by:

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PATRICK J. WALSH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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