Mejia v. Colvin

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER by Magistrate Judge Suzanne H. Segal. IT IS ORDERED that Judgment be entered REVERSING the decision of the Commissioner and REMANDING this case for the award of benefits. (See document for further details). (mr)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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EDITHA MEJIA,

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Case No. CV 16-6596 SS
Plaintiff,

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v.

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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

NANCY A. BERRYHILL,1
Acting Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration,

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Defendant.

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I.

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INTRODUCTION

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Editha Mejia (“Plaintiff”) seeks review of the final decision

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of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the

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“Commissioner” or the “Agency”) denying her application for social

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security benefits.

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The parties consented, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

Nancy A. Berryhill is now the Acting Commissioner of Social
Security and is substituted for former Acting Commissioner Carolyn
W. Colvin in this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
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§ 636(c), to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States

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Magistrate Judge.

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the Commissioner is REVERSED and this case is REMANDED for an award

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of benefits consistent with this decision.

For the reasons stated below, the decision of

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II.

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THE FIVE-STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS

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To

qualify

for

disability

benefits,

a

claimant

must

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demonstrate a medically determinable physical or mental impairment

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that prevents her from engaging in substantial gainful activity

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and that is expected to result in death or to last for a continuous

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period of at least twelve months.

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721

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impairment must render the claimant incapable of performing the

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work she previously performed and incapable of performing any other

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substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy.

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Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing

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42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)).

(9th

Cir.

1998)

(citing

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Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715,
U.S.C.

§ 423(d)(1)(A)).

The

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To decide if a claimant is entitled to benefits, an ALJ

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conducts a five-step inquiry.

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steps are:

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

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(1)

Is the claimant presently engaged in substantial

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gainful activity?

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disabled.

If so, the claimant is found not

If not, proceed to step two.

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2

The

1

(2)

Is the claimant’s impairment severe?

2

claimant is found not disabled.

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If not, the

step three.

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(3)

If so, proceed to

Does the claimant’s impairment meet or equal one of

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the specific impairments described in 20 C.F.R.

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Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1?

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claimant is found disabled.

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step four.

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(4)

If so, the

If not, proceed to

Is the claimant capable of performing her past

10

work?

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If not, proceed to step five.

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(5)

If so, the claimant is found not disabled.

Is the claimant able to do any other work?

If not,

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the claimant is found disabled. If so, the claimant

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is found not disabled.

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Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-99; see also Bustamante v. Massanari,

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262 F.3d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted); 20 C.F.R.

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§§ 404.1520(b)-(g)(1) & 416.920(b)-(g)(1).

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The claimant has the burden of proof at steps one through

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four, and the Commissioner has the burden of proof at step five.

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Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 953-54.

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affirmative duty to assist the claimant in developing the record

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at every step of the inquiry.

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claimant meets her burden of establishing an inability to perform

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past work, the Commissioner must show that the claimant can perform

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some

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national economy, taking into account the claimant’s residual

other

work

that

exists

Additionally, the ALJ has an

Id. at 954.

in

3

If, at step four, the

“significant

numbers”

in

the

1

functional capacity (“RFC”), age, education, and work experience.

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Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098, 1100; Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721; 20

3

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g)(1), 416.920(g)(1).

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so by the testimony of a vocational expert or by reference to the

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Medical-Vocational Guidelines appearing in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,

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Subpart P, Appendix 2 (commonly known as “the Grids”).

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v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001).

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has

9

limitations, the Grids are inapplicable and the ALJ must take the

both

exertional

The Commissioner may do

(strength-related)

and

Osenbrock

When a claimant
non-exertional

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testimony of a vocational expert.

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869 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1340

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(9th Cir. 1988)).

Moore v. Apfel, 216 F.3d 864,

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III.

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THE ALJ’S DECISION

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The ALJ employed the five-step sequential evaluation process

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in evaluating Plaintiff’s case.

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Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Act through

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December 31, 2018, and had not engaged in substantial gainful

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activity since July 27, 2013, her alleged onset date.

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Administrative Record (“AR”) 17).

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Plaintiff

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schizoaffective disorder, conversion disorder, and depression. (AR

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17).

had

the

following

At step one, the ALJ found that

(Certified

At step two, the ALJ found that

severe

impairments:

psychosis,

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At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an

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impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically
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equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart

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P, Appendix 1. (AR 18).

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At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the RFC

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to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with

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the following nonexertional limitations: she can have “occasional”

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interaction with the public; work should not require more than

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occasional

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critical checking of work; work should be limited to simple,

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routine, repetitive tasks in a work environment not requiring more

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than occasional production or pace work; and work should involve

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only simple work-related decisions, with few if any changes in the

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work place.

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Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and

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limiting effects of her symptoms were not entirely credible.

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20).

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status examination performed by Dr. David Starr, Ph.D.; assigned

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“little weight” to a global assessment of functioning (“GAF”) score2

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assessed by treating physician Dr. David Kent; and assigned “some

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weight”

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Disability Determination Services physicians.

supervision,

(AR 19).

defined

as

requiring

a

supervisor’s

In making this finding, the ALJ ruled that

(AR

The ALJ also discussed the results of a consultative mental

to

the

opinions

of

non-treating

non-examining

State

(AR 21-22).

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Clinicians use a GAF score to rate the psychological, social, and
occupational functioning of a patient. A GAF score between 41 and
50 indicates serious symptoms (e.g. suicidal ideation, severe
obsessional rituals, frequent shoplifting) or any serious
impairment in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g.,
no friends, unable to keep a job). Morgan v. Comm’r, 169 F.3d 595,
598 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999).
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At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could not

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perform her past relevant work.

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considered Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC

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and

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significant numbers in the national economy, including dishwasher,

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potato

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Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled

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under the Agency’s rules.

concluded

peeler

that

Plaintiff

machine

(AR 23).

could

operator,

At step five, the ALJ

perform

and

jobs

janitor.

available

(AR

in

23-24).

(AR 24).

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IV.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

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Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the

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Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits.

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the Commissioner’s decision when the ALJ’s findings are based on

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legal error or are not supported by “substantial evidence” in the

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record as a whole.

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(9th Cir. 2001) (citing Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097); Smolen v.

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Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Fair v. Bowen,

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885 F.2d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1989)).

The court may set aside

Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035

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“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than

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a preponderance.”

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Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1997)).

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evidence which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to

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support a conclusion.” Id. (citing Jamerson, 112 F.3d at 1066;

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Smolen,

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evidence supports a finding, the court must “‘consider the record

80

F.3d

Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720 (citing Jamerson v.

at

1279).

To

6

determine

It is “relevant

whether

substantial

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as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that

2

detracts from the [Commissioner’s] conclusion.’” Aukland, 257 F.3d

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at 1035 (quoting Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir.

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1993)).

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or reversing that conclusion, the court may not substitute its

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judgment for that of the Commissioner.

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21 (citing Flaten v. Sec’y, 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995)).

If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming

Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720-

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V.

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DISCUSSION

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Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred in four ways.

First,

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Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly found that Plaintiff

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did not meet a listing at step three.

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Points and Authorities (“P. Mem.”) at 1, 4-7).

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contends that the ALJ erred in failing to “evaluate and weigh” the

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opinion of Dr. Starr.

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that the ALJ improperly assigned “little weight” to the GAF score

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assessed by Dr. Kent and “some weight” to the opinions of the State

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agency physicians.

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that the ALJ erred in discrediting her testimony regarding the

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intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her symptoms.

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at 1, 9-11).

(Plaintiff’s Memorandum of

(Id. at 1, 7-8).

(Id. at 1, 8-9).

Second, Plaintiff

Third, Plaintiff contends

Fourth, Plaintiff contends

(Id.

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For

the

reasons

discussed

below,

the

Court

agrees

with

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Plaintiff that this case should be remanded because the ALJ failed

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to properly evaluate the medical evidence in formulating an RFC

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and improperly discredited Plaintiff’s testimony.3

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record as a whole, including the improperly discredited testimony

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and medical evidence, establishes that Plaintiff is entitled to

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benefits, the Court remands this case for an award of benefits.

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See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 2014).

Because the

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1.

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The ALJ Did Not Properly Evaluate The Medical Evidence In
Formulating an RFC

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Social Security regulations require the Agency to “evaluate

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every medical opinion [it] receive[s],” generally giving more

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weight to evidence from a claimant’s treating physician.

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§ 404.1527(c).

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opinion of the nature and severity of the claimant’s impairments

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is well-supported by accepted medical techniques, and consistent

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with the other substantive evidence in the record, that opinion is

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ordinarily controlling.

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495 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Garrison, 759 F.3d at

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1012 (even when contradicted, treating or examining physician’s

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opinion is owed deference, and often the “greatest” weight).

20 C.F.R.

Where the Agency finds the treating physician’s

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); Orn v. Astrue,

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Where a treating source is not given “controlling weight,”

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the Agency must give “good reasons” for the deviation.

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§ 404.1527(c)(2); Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012 & n.11.

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treating doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor, the

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ALJ must provide “specific and legitimate reasons” for rejecting

20 C.F.R.
If the

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Because the Court remands on these grounds, it is unnecessary to
address Plaintiff’s other arguments.
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the treating physician’s opinion.

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157 F.3d at 725. “Where an ALJ does not explicitly reject a medical

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opinion or set forth specific, legitimate reasons for crediting

4

one medical opinion over another, he errs.

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errs when he rejects a medical opinion or assigns it little weight

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while

7

explanation that another medical opinion is more persuasive, or

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criticizing it with boilerplate language that fails to offer a

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substantive basis for his conclusion.”

doing

nothing

more

than

Orn, 495 F.3d at 632; Reddick,

ignoring

In other words, an ALJ

it,

asserting

without

Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012-

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13 (citing Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1464 (9th Cir. 1996)).

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Here, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the ALJ failed to

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properly evaluate the medical evidence, including the treating

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doctor’s opinions, in formulating an RFC.

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Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly failed to “evaluate

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and weigh” Dr. Starr’s opinion.

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12,

18

examination.

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anxiety and depression,” occasional panic attacks, hearing voices,

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some sleep disturbance and nightmares, and suicidal thoughts.

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431).

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haloperidol,

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Plaintiff’s

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questions testing her mental status.

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diagnosed

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type, first episode, currently in remission.

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reported that Plaintiff had “problems with mood and thinking,”

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“problems with mood and anxiety with occasional panic attacks,”

2013,

Dr.

Starr

(P. Mem. at 1, 7-8).

performed

(AR 430-33).

a

consultative

On November

psychological

Plaintiff reported “problems with

(AR

Plaintiff reported that she had been prescribed Seroquel,
and

Loestrin.

appearance,

Plaintiff

with

(AR

demeanor,

431).

Dr.

and

responses

examined

to

(AR 431-32).

schizoaffective

9

Starr

disorder,
(AR 432).

several

Dr. Starr
depressive
Dr. Starr

1

and hallucinations.

2

“marginally oriented” and had difficulty paying attention and

3

concentrating; her fund of information was “extremely limited”;

4

she did not think abstractly; her judgment was impaired; and she

5

required assistance to manage funds.

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assign Dr. Starr’s opinion any particular weight, but discussed

7

the examination and stated that Dr. Starr “never opined that

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[Plaintiff] was precluded from work activity within the confines

9

of the [RFC].”

(AR 432).

Dr. Starr found that Plaintiff was

(AR 432).

The ALJ did not

(AR 21-22).

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11

Although the RFC assessed by the ALJ limited Plaintiff’s

12

interaction with others and the complexity of Plaintiff’s work,

13

(AR 19), the Court disagrees with the ALJ’s apparent conclusion

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that the RFC fully accounts for the limitations and conditions

15

observed by Dr. Starr.

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explain how the RFC accounts for Plaintiff’s limited fund of

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information, suicidal thoughts, and hallucinations, (AR 432), or

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whether these conditions have any effect on Plaintiff’s ability to

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work.

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discussion of Dr. Starr’s observations was inadequate.

For example, the ALJ does not adequately

The Court therefore agrees with Plaintiff that the ALJ’s

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22

Plaintiff also alleges that the ALJ erred in assigning “little

23

weight” to a GAF score of 45 assessed by treating physician Dr.

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David A. Kent, M.D., when Plaintiff was released from psychiatric

25

hospitalization on September 6, 2013.

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this score “little weight” because it was “merely a snapshot view”

27

of

28

reflective of “the entire period at issue.”

Plaintiff’s

functioning

“at

10

a

(AR 21, 360).

particular

The ALJ gave

time”

(AR 21).

and

not

The Court

1

agrees with Plaintiff that the ALJ’s opinion overlooks without

2

explanation the GAF score of 45 assessed by treating physician Dr.

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Michael Millward on October 17, 2013, (AR 517-18), and a GAF score

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of 29 assessed by Dr. James Piktel at Intermountain Hospital on

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December 22, 2014. (AR 597).

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Piktel reported that Plaintiff had been involuntarily admitted to

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Intermountain Hospital due to “overwhelming suicidal ideation and

8

auditory hallucinations.”

9

herself with a knife, but allegedly her boyfriend took the knife

10

away.

11

Elsewhere in his evaluation, Dr.

(AR 594).

Plaintiff “had a plan to kill

(AR 594).

In the ER, she was observed hitting herself with a chair.”

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13

Defendant argues that a GAF score is not a “medical opinion,”

14

and that the ALJ need not have discussed Plaintiff’s GAF scores at

15

all.

16

at 6-8).

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measure a claimant’s ability to function in a work environment,

18

the Agency has endorsed the use of GAF scores as one form of

19

evidence reflective of mental functioning.

20

Message 13066 (effective July 22, 2013) (“We consider a GAF rating

21

as opinion evidence.”).

22

the GAF score assessed by Dr. Kent, rejecting it because it was

23

“merely a snapshot view” of Plaintiff’s condition.

24

noted supra, however, other physicians assessed low GAF scores at

25

other

26

contradicting the ALJ’s sole stated reason for not affording more

27

weight to Dr. Kent’s score.

28

indicating serious limitations in functioning, over a considerable

(Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities (“D. Mem.”)
Preliminarily, although a GAF score does not directly

times

during

SSA Administrative

In any event, the ALJ chose to analyze

Plaintiff’s

treatment

(AR 21).

history,

As

directly

Because there were numerous GAF scores

11

1

period of time, the ALJ should have evaluated this evidence.

2

ALJ therefore failed to provide adequate reasons for rejecting the

3

score assessed by Dr. Kent.

The

Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012-13.

4
5

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred in assigning “some

6

weight” to the opinions of non-treating, non-examining State agency

7

physicians.

8

State agency opinions “do not as a general matter deserve as much

9

weight

as

(AR 22).

those

of

The ALJ’s opinion acknowledged that the

examining

or

treating

physicians,”

but

10

nevertheless ruled that “those opinions do deserve some weight,

11

particularly in a case like this in which there exist a number of

12

other reasons to reach similar conclusions (as explained throughout

13

this decision).”

14

“supported a finding of ‘not disabled.’”

(AR 22).

The ALJ noted that the opinions
(AR 22).

15
16

The Court agrees that the ALJ’s reasons for assigning “some

17

weight” to the opinions of the State agency doctors and relying on

18

them in finding Plaintiff “not disabled” are so vague as to preclude

19

review of his decision on this issue.

20

relied on these opinions rather than the opinions of treating or

21

examining physicians, he did not provide sufficient reasons for

22

doing so.

To the extent that the ALJ

Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012-13.

23
24

For the foregoing reasons, the Court agrees with Plaintiff

25

that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the medical evidence in

26

formulating an RFC.

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\\

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\\
12

1

2.

The ALJ Improperly Discredited Plaintiff’s Testimony

2
3

Unless there is affirmative evidence showing that the claimant

4

is

5

testimony regarding the intensity, persistence and limiting effects

6

of her symptoms must be “clear and convincing.”

7

Comm’r, 574 F.3d 685, 693 (9th Cir. 2009).

8

“ordinary

9

inquiry.

malingering,

the

ALJ’s

techniques

of

reasons

for

credibility

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284.

rejecting

a

claimant’s

Valentine v.

The ALJ may use

evaluation”

during

this

The ALJ may consider, among

10

other

11

(2) inconsistencies in her testimony or between testimony and

12

conduct;

13

(5) testimony from physicians and third parties concerning the

14

nature,

15

complains.

16

2002); see also Smolen, 80 F.3d 1273 at 1284.

17

credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in the

18

record, the court may not engage in second-guessing.

19

F.3d at 958-59.

things:

(3)

(1)

her

severity,

a

plaintiff’s

daily

and

reputation

activities;

effect

of

(4)

the

her

for

truthfulness;

work

symptoms

record;

of

which

and

she

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir.
If the ALJ’s

Thomas, 80

20
21
22

As

Plaintiff

observes,

the

ALJ’s

only

clear

statement

regarding Plaintiff’s credibility was:

23
24

[Plaintiff] alleges an inability to perform work activity

25

due to symptoms of her mental impairments such as an

26

inability to concentrate, poor memory, limited focus,

27

forgetfulness, panic attacks, and an inability to work

28

with others due to anxiety and auditory hallucinations.
13

1

Her physical complaints have been discussed above and

2

found non-severe.

3
4

After

5

undersigned

6

determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to

7

cause

8

statements

9

limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely

10

careful

the

consideration
finds

alleged

that

of

the

evidence,

[Plaintiff’s]

symptoms;

concerning

the

however,

intensity,

the

medically

[Plaintiff’s]

persistence

and

credible for the reasons explained in this decision.

11
12

(AR 20).

13

that he found not credible and to link that testimony to specific

14

portions of the record rebutting Plaintiff’s testimony.

15

cannot conclude that the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons

16

for discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony.

17

775 F.3d 1133, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The government argues that

18

[c]laimant’s

19

headaches a week conflicts with the medical record.

20

matter, the ALJ never connected the medical record to [c]laimant’s

21

testimony about her headaches. Although the ALJ made findings . . .

22

concerning [c]laimant’s treatment for headaches, he never stated

23

that he rested his adverse credibility determination on those

24

findings.

25

argument that the history of treatment for headaches is a specific,

26

clear, and convincing reason to support the credibility finding.”);

27

Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 494 (9th Cir. 2015). (“Our

28

review of the ALJ’s written decision reveals that . . . she simply

The ALJ wholly failed to identify the specific testimony

testimony

For

that

that

reason

she

has,

alone,

14

we

The Court

See Burrell v. Colvin,

on

average,

reject

the

one

or

two

As an initial

government’s

1

stated her non-credibility conclusion and then summarized the

2

medical evidence supporting her RFC determination.

3

the sort of explanation or the kind of ‘specific reasons’ we must

4

have in order to review the ALJ’s decision meaningfully, so that

5

we may ensure that the claimant’s testimony was not arbitrarily

6

discredited.

7

district court could be reasonable inferences drawn from the ALJ’s

8

summary

9

exclusively the ALJ’s to make, and ours only to review. . . .

10

Because the ALJ failed to identify the testimony she found not

11

credible, she did not link that testimony to the particular parts

12

of the record supporting her non-credibility determination.

13

was legal error.”).

Although

of

the

the

evidence,

inconsistencies

the

This is not

identified

credibility

by

determination

the

is

This

14
15

Defendant

nevertheless

argues

that

the

ALJ

provided

16

appropriate reasons for discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony.

17

analyzing whether Plaintiff’s impairments were “severe,” the ALJ

18

stated

19

following a car accident in July 2013, treatment notes in November

20

2013 stated that Plaintiff was in no “acute distress” and was not

21

in pain.

22

used a cane at times, there was “never a provider who prescribed a

23

cane as there were no medical findings that she needed assistance

24

with gait.”

25

with pain medications” after the accident, and “was quite active

26

with walking and exercising.

27

severe as alleged.”

28

“noted

that,

although

(AR 18).

a

(AR 18).

treatment

Plaintiff

complained

of

physical

In

pain

The ALJ also found that, although Plaintiff

The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff “did well

(AR 20).
record

Thus, the accident was likely not as
Defendant also argues that the ALJ
showing
15

largely

normal

physical

1

findings.”

2

Plaintiff’s mental impairments, Defendant argues that the ALJ

3

“showed how Plaintiff’s psychological conditions stabilized with

4

medication

5

“treatment gap” between May 2014 and January 2015.

6

10 (citing AR 21-22)).

(D. Mem. at 9 (citing AR 20-21)).

after

treatment

in

September

With respect to

2013”

and

noted

a

(D. Mem. at 9-

7
8
9

A court can only affirm based upon the reasons that the ALJ
actually relied upon in his decision.

Bray v. Comm’r, 554 F.3d

10

1219,

11

administrative law require us to review the ALJ’s decision based

12

on the reasoning and factual findings offered by the ALJ — not post

13

hoc rationalizations that attempt to intuit what the adjudicator

14

may have been thinking.”).

15

no

16

Defendant’s

17

conclusion.

1225

clear

(9th

reasons

Cir.

for

“post

hoc

2009)

(“Long-standing

principles

of

As discussed supra, the ALJ provided

discrediting

Plaintiff’s

rationalizations”

do

testimony,

not

and

disturb

this

18
19

Moreover, several of the justifications asserted by Defendant

20

are overstated or questionable.

21

failure to seek or follow prescribed medical treatment may suggest

22

that the alleged impairment is not severe or disabling, see Fair,

23

885 F.2d at 603, the Ninth Circuit has cautioned against drawing

24

such

25

impairments.

26

(claimant’s failure to seek treatment for depression is an improper

27

basis from which to conclude that the claimant does not suffer from

inferences

when

For example, although a claimant’s

evaluating

a

claimant’s

asserted

mental

Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1996)

28
16

1

it).4

2

can be consistent with a claim of disability. See Lester v. Chater,

3

81 F.3d 821, 833 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Occasional symptom-free periods

4

– and even the sporadic ability to work – are not inconsistent with

5

disability.”).

Additionally, symptom-free periods or temporary improvement

6
7

Defendant’s remaining justifications for the ALJ’s decision

8

appear to be based on alleged inconsistencies between the medical

9

evidence and Plaintiff’s impairments.

However, it is improper to

10

reject subjective testimony based solely on its inconsistencies

11

with the objective medical evidence.

Bray, 554 F.3d at 1227.

12
13

For the foregoing reasons, the Court agrees with Plaintiff

14

that the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for

15

discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her limitations.

16
17

3.

The ALJ’s Errors Warrant Remand For An Award Of Benefits

18
19

The Court remands for an award of benefits where “(1) the

20

record

21

proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed

22

to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence,

23

whether claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the

24

improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ

25

would

has

be

been

required

fully

to

developed

find

the

and

claimant

further

administrative

disabled

on

remand.”

26
27
28

Moreover, the ALJ identified a “treatment gap” between May 2014
and January 2015, (AR 22), but, as noted supra, it appears that
Plaintiff was psychiatrically hospitalized in December 2014 due to
overwhelming suicidal ideation and hallucinations. (AR 594).
4

17

1

Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020 (citations omitted).

2

true” rule allows courts the flexibility to remand for further

3

proceedings only where the record as a whole “creates serious

4

doubt” that a claimant is disabled.

The “credit-as-

Id. at 1021.

5
6

Remand for benefits under Garrison is appropriate.

The Court

7

is satisfied that the record has been fully developed, that further

8

administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose, and that

9

if the discounted testimony and opinions were credited as true,

10

Plaintiff would be entitled to benefits.

11
12

Particularly, the Court observes that the record as a whole

13

leaves no serious doubt that Plaintiff is disabled.

14

F.3d at 1021.

15

2, 2015 hearing before the ALJ.

16

body “hurts a lot,” her right hand “malfunctions,” and she hears

17

voices, which tell her to “run” or “kill [her]self,” “a lot.”

(AR

18

60,

two

19

hospitalizations for psychiatric issues along with medical and

20

physical impairments that, taken together, would be disabling.

64).

Garrison, 759

Plaintiff was 51 years old at the time of the April

Plaintiff’s

(AR 55).

medical

She testified that her

history

documents

21
22

The Court also notes that Plaintiff was granted disability

23

benefits for a subsequent application covering the period after

24

June 16, 2015.

25

the subsequent grant of benefits is not itself determinative of

26

issues in this case, which covers an earlier time period, (D. Mem.

27

at 11-12), it has some impact on the Court’s analysis of whether

28

there would be any value in further administrative proceedings.

(Dkt. No. 19).

Although Defendant is correct that

18

1
2

Accordingly, the Court remands with directions to the Agency
to calculate and award benefits to Plaintiff.

3
4

VI.

5

CONCLUSION

6
7

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that Judgment be

8

entered REVERSING the decision of the Commissioner and REMANDING

9

this

case

for

the

award

of

benefits.

The

Clerk

10

of the Court shall serve copies of this Order and the Judgment on

11

counsel for both parties.

12
13

DATED:

June 22, 2017

14
15
16

/S/
SUZANNE H. SEGAL
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

17
18
19
20

THIS DECISION IS NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION IN LEXIS/NEXIS,
WESTLAW OR ANY OTHER LEGAL DATABASE.

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
19