Curtis Watson v. SEIU UHW et al

Filing 8

MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS - COURT ORDER by Judge Percy Anderson remanding case to Los Angeles County Superior Court, Case number BC 631517. Case Terminated. Made JS-6. (See document for specifics) (mrgo)

JS-6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 16-7119 PA (PLAx)

Title

Curtis Watson v. SEIU-UHW, et al.

Present: The Honorable

Date

September 26, 2016

PERCY ANDERSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Kamilla Sali-Suleyman

Not Reported

N/A

Deputy Clerk

Court Reporter

Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs:

Attorneys Present for Defendants:

None

None

Proceedings:

IN CHAMBERS - COURT ORDER

Before the Court is a Notice of Removal filed by defendants SEIU-UHW, Marcus Hatcher, and
Veronica Chavez (collectively “Defendants”) on September 22, 2016. Defendants contend that the
Court possesses federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over the Complaint filed by
plaintiff Curtis Watson (“Plaintiff”). Specifically, Defendants’ Notice of Removal asserts that this
Court’s jurisdiction is based on § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (the “LMRA”), 29 U.S.C.
§ 185.
I.

Background

Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, filed his Complaint in Los Angeles Superior Court on August
23, 2016. Plaintiff’s Complaint appears to allege a claim for breach of contract. However, the
Complaint was prepared using a form complaint created by the Judicial Council of California and does
not allege any facts. Defendants’ Notice of Removal acknowledges that Plaintiff’s Complain lacks “any
factual allegations” but nevertheless contends that “it is clear . . . that Plaintiff is attempting to complain
about a “‘breach of contract’” and that the “only ‘contract’ that Plaintiff could be referring to is either the
Collective Bargaining Agreement between his employer and SEIU-UHW or the SEIU-UHW
Constitution.” (Notice of Removal ¶ 10.) According to Defendants, “resolution of the Plaintiff’s claim
will require a determination of the Union’s and employer’s obligations to the Plaintiff under the terms of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement” and is therefore preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185. (Id.) Defendants similarly assert that if Plaintiff is suing
under the SEIU-UHW Constitution, “then resolution of Plaintiff’s claims will also require the analysis,
application, and interpretation of the Union’s Constitution and By-Laws.” (Id.) Finally, while admitting
that Plaintiff “does not directly allege” a claim that the SEIU-UHW breached its duty of fair
representation, Defendants contend that such a claim, were it to exist, would be subject to the same
LMRA preemption analysis. (Id.)
II.

Legal Standard

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, having subject matter jurisdiction only over
matters authorized by the Constitution and Congress. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511
U.S. 375, 377, 114 S. Ct. 1673, 1675, 128 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1994). A suit filed in state court may be
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JS-6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 16-7119 PA (PLAx)

Date

Title

September 26, 2016

Curtis Watson v. SEIU-UHW, et al.

removed to federal court if the federal court would have had original jurisdiction over the suit. 28
U.S.C. § 1441(a). A removed action must be remanded to state court if the federal court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is on the party
seeking removal, and the removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction.” Prize Frize,
Inc. v. Matrix (U.S.) Inc., 167 F.3d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 1999). “Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if
there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566
(9th Cir. 1992).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, this Court has original jurisdiction over civil actions “arising under”
federal law. Removal based on § 1331 is governed by the “well-pleaded complaint” rule. Caterpillar,
Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S. Ct. 2425, 2429, 96 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1987). Under this rule,
“federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of plaintiff’s properly
pleaded complaint.” Id. If the complaint does not specify whether a claim is based on federal or state
law, it is a claim “arising under” federal law only if it is “clear” that it raises a federal question. Duncan
v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996). The only exception to this rule is where plaintiff’s
federal claim has been disguised by “artful pleading,” such as where the only claim is a federal one or is
a state claim preempted by federal law. Sullivan v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 813 F. 2d 1368, 1372 (9th
Cir. 1987).
III.

Analysis

Defendants have not asserted a satisfactory basis for this Court’s jurisdiction. Defendants claim
the Court has federal question jurisdiction over this case because the action arises under federal law,
namely § 301 of the LMRA. Section 301 of LMRA states: “Suits for violation of contracts between an
employer and a labor organization representing employees . . . may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). The Supreme Court has
interpreted § 301 to require claims “alleging a violation of a provision of a labor contract [to] be brought
under § 301 and be resolved by reference to federal law.” Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202,
211, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 1911, 85 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1985). This preemption of state claims extends “beyond
suits alleging contract violations” to those requiring interpretation of the provisions of labor agreements:
[Q]uestions relating to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed, and
what legal consequences were intended to flow from breaches of that
agreement, must be resolved by references to uniform federal law, whether
such questions arise in the context of a suit for breach of contract or in a
suit alleging liability in tort. Any other result would elevate form over
substance and allow parties to evade the requirements of § 301 by
relabeling their contract claims as claims for tortious breach of contract.
Id. However, the scope of § 301 preemption is not absolute:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 16-7119 PA (PLAx)

Date

Title

September 26, 2016

Curtis Watson v. SEIU-UHW, et al.
[N]ot every dispute concerning employment, or tangentially involving a
provision of a collective-bargaining agreement, is pre-empted by § 301 or
other provisions of the federal labor law. . . . Clearly, § 301 does not grant
the parties to a collective-bargaining agreement the ability to contract for
what is illegal under state law. In extending the pre-emptive effect of §
301 beyond suits for breach of contract, it would be inconsistent with
congressional intent under that section to preempt state rules that proscribe
conduct, or establish rights and obligations, independent of a labor
contract.

Id. at 211-12, 105 S. Ct. 1911-12, 85 L. Ed. 2d 206. “[T]o help preserve state authority in areas
involving minimum labor standards, the Supreme Court has distinguished between claims that require
interpretation or construction of a labor agreement and those that require a court simply to ‘look at’ the
agreement.” Balcorta v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000). In
particular, “when the meaning of contract terms is not subject to dispute, the bare fact that a collectivebargaining agreement will be consulted in the course of state-law litigation plainly does not require the
claim to be extinguished.” Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 124, 114 S. Ct. 2068, 2078, 129 L. Ed.
2d 93 (1994).
“[E]ven if dispute resolution pursuant to a [collective bargaining agreement], on one hand, and
state law, on the other, would require addressing precisely the same set of facts, as long as the state-law
claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is ‘independent’ of the
agreement for § 301 preemption purposes.” Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399,
409-10, 108 S. Ct. 1877, 100 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1988). Accordingly, preemption under § 301 requires a
two-step analysis. Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007). First, the Court
must determine “whether the asserted cause of action involves a right conferred upon an employee by
virtue of state law, not by a CBA.” Id. If the right is conferred by a collective bargaining agreement,
preemption applies. Id. If the right is conferred by state law, the Court must determine whether the
plaintiff’s claim is nevertheless “substantially dependent on analysis of a collective bargaining
agreement.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If the claim requires the court to “interpret,” rather
than merely “look to,” the collective bargaining agreement, then the claim is substantially dependent
thereon and is preempted by § 301. Id. at 1060; see also Detabali v. St. Luke’s Hospital, 482 F.3d 1199,
1203 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“The plaintiff’s claim is the touchstone for this
analysis; the need to interpret the collective bargaining agreement must inhere in the nature of the
plaintiff’s claim.”).
Here, the Complaint contains no factual allegations. The Court therefore cannot determine if
Plaintiff’s claims are preempted by the LMRA and if the Court therefore possesses subject matter
jurisdiction over this matter. Nor is there any way for the Court to determine if Plaintiff’s claims will
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JS-6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 16-7119 PA (PLAx)

Date

Title

September 26, 2016

Curtis Watson v. SEIU-UHW, et al.

require the Court merely to “look to” the CBA rather than interpret it. Moreover, while Plaintiff may
attempt to assert a claim alleging the SEIU-UHW’s breach of its duty to fair representation, the
Complaint has not done so. As a result, Defendants have failed to satisfy their burden to establish this
Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
Conclusion
The Court therefore concludes that Defendants have failed to satisfy their burden to establish that
§ 301 of the LMRA preempts Plaintiff’s state-law claim or any other basis to confer federal question
jurisdiction. For the foregoing reasons, the Court remands this action to Los Angeles Superior Court,
Case No. BC 631517 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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