Danie Crane v. Zip 2 Zip Transfer and Storage Inc et al
Filing
10
MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) - DEFENDANT ZIP 2 ZIP TRANSFER AND STORAGE INC.'S MOTION TO DISMISS by Judge Christina A. Snyder: The Court GRANTS defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's state law claims 7 and DISMISSES those claims without prejudice. Court Reporter: Not Present. (gk)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Case No.
Title
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
‘O’
2:16-cv-07649-CAS(SSx)
Date November 21, 2016
DANIE CRANE v. ZIP 2 ZIP TRANSFER AND STORAGE INC. ET AL.
Present: The Honorable
Catherine Jeang
Deputy Clerk
CHRISTINA A. SNYDER
N/A
Tape No.
Attorneys Present for Defendants:
Not Present
Court Reporter / Recorder
Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs:
Not Present
Not Present
(IN CHAMBERS) - DEFENDANT ZIP 2 ZIP TRANSFER AND
Proceedings:
STORAGE INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS (Dkt. 7, filed October
21, 2016)
The Court finds this motion appropriate for decision without oral argument. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. Local Rule 7-15. Accordingly, the hearing date of
November 28, 2016 is vacated, and the matter is hereby taken under submission.
I.
INTRODUCTION
On August 29, 2016, plaintiff Danie Crane filed this action in California Superior
Court against defendant Zip 2 Zip Transfer and Storage Inc. Dkt. 1-2 (“Compl”).
Plaintiff asserted six claims against defendant: (1) trespass to personal property;
(2) conversion; (3) negligence; (4) breach of contract; (5) liability pursuant to 49 U.S.C.
§ 14706 et seq.; and (6) unfair business practices under the California Business and
Professions Code § 17000 et seq. Id. The gravamen of plaintiff’s complaint is his
allegation that defendant lost and damaged plaintiff’s household goods when defendant
transported plaintiff’s goods from California to his new home in New Mexico. Id. ¶ 6.
Plaintiff alleges that the value of the lost and damages goods amounts to $18,200. Id.
On October 14, 2016, defendant removed this action to this Court on the basis of
federal question jurisdiction. Dkt. 1.
On October 21, 2016, defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss, requesting that
the Court dismiss plaintiff’s state law claims as preempted by the Carmack Amendment
to the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 11706, 14706. Dkt. 7. On November 7,
2016, defendant filed a notice of non-opposition to its motion. Dkt. 8. To date, plaintiff
has not opposed defendant’s motion to dismiss.
CV-7469 (11/16)
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Case No.
Title
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
‘O’
2:16-cv-07649-CAS(SSx)
Date November 21, 2016
DANIE CRANE v. ZIP 2 ZIP TRANSFER AND STORAGE INC. ET AL.
II.
LEGAL STANDARDS
A motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal
sufficiency of the claims asserted in a complaint. Under this Rule, a district court
properly dismisses a claim if “there is a ‘lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence
of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.’” Conservation Force v.
Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t,
901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to
provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[F]actual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.
In considering a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept as true all
material allegations in the complaint, as well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn
from them. Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). The complaint must be
read in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Sprewell v. Golden State
Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). However, “a court considering a motion to
dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can
provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); see Moss v. United States Secret Service,
572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[F]or a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the
non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must be
plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.”). Ultimately,
“[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
As a general rule, leave to amend a complaint which has been dismissed should be
freely granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). However, leave to amend may be denied when “the
court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading
could not possibly cure the deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture
Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th
Cir. 2000).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Case No.
Title
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
‘O’
2:16-cv-07649-CAS(SSx)
Date November 21, 2016
DANIE CRANE v. ZIP 2 ZIP TRANSFER AND STORAGE INC. ET AL.
III.
DISCUSSION
Congress enacted the Carmack Amendment in 1906 as a response to the diverse
state laws addressing liability to shippers for carriers who transported goods across state
lines. See Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 505 (1913). A plaintiff may
bring a Carmack Amendment claim in federal court “only if the amount in controversy
exceeds $10,000, exclusive of interests and costs.” Hall v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc., 476
F.3d 683, 686 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007); see 28 U.S.C. § 1337(a).1 The scheme of the
Amendment is “comprehensive enough to embrace responsibility for all losses resulting
from any failure to discharge a carrier’s duty as to any part of the agreed transportation.”
Georgia, Florida, & Alabama Ry. Co. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U.S. 190, 196 (1916); see
also See New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co. v. Nothnagle, 346 U.S. 128, 131
(1953) (“With the enactment in 1906 of the Carmack Amendment, Congress superseded
diverse state laws with a nationally uniform policy governing interstate carriers’ liability
for property loss.”).
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has held that “[t]he Carmack Amendment is a
federal statute that provides the exclusive cause of action for interstate shipping contract
claims, and it completely preempts state law claims alleging delay, loss, failure to deliver
and damage to property.” White v. Mayflower Transit, LLC, 543 F.3d 581, 584 (9th Cir.
2008). In addition, “the Carmack Amendment may constitute an affirmative defense
even to state law claims that are not completely pre-empted.” Hall, 476 F.3d at 689.
As a result, in cases in which the plaintiffs alleged shippers lost or damaged
plaintiffs’ items during interstate moves, the Ninth Circuit has concluded that “[t]he
Carmack Amendment bars [a plaintiff’s] claims for ‘general negligence[,]’” White, 543
F.3d at 584–85, and “constitutes a complete defense to . . . to fraud and conversion claims
arising from a carrier’s misrepresentations as to the conditions of delivery or failure to
carry out delivery,” Hall, 476 F.3d at 689. In addition, a breach of contract claim is
“completely preempted by the Carmack Amendment.” Id. at 688. “Trespass to property
is the unlawful interference with its possession.” Elton v. Anheuser-Busch Beverage
Grp., Inc., 50 Cal. App. 4th 1301, 1306 (1996) (quotation marks omitted). Trespass to
property is a species of conversion. 5 Witkin, Summary 10th Torts § 720 (2005) (“The
tort of trespass to chattels, dubbed by Prosser the ‘little brother of conversion,’ allows
1
Plaintiff satisfies this jurisdictional amount because he alleges that the value of
his lost and damaged goods amounts to $18,200.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Case No.
Title
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
‘O’
2:16-cv-07649-CAS(SSx)
Date November 21, 2016
DANIE CRANE v. ZIP 2 ZIP TRANSFER AND STORAGE INC. ET AL.
recovery for interferences with possession of personal property not sufficiently important
to be classified as conversion.). Therefore, the Court finds that the Carmack Amendment
constitutes a complete defense to plaintiff’s trespass to property claim as it does his
conversion claim. Finally, the Court concludes that plaintiff’s claim of unfair business
practices is also preempted because it arises from same underlying allegations of the loss
and damage to goods shipped in interstate commerce. See Rini v. United Van Lines, Inc.,
104 F.3d 502, 506 (1st Cir. 1997) (“[A]ll state laws that impose liability on carriers based
on the loss or damage of shipped goods are preempted.”); Roberts v. N. Am. Van Lines,
Inc., 394 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1182 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (dismissing plaintiff’s claim of unfair
business practices because Congress has manifested an intent to occupy the entire field of
interstate transportation of household goods).
Accordingly, each of plaintiff’s state law claims—negligence, conversion, breach of
contract, trespass to property, and unfair business practices—falls within the preemptive
scope of the Carmack Amendment.
IV.
CONCLUSION
In accordance with the foregoing, the Court GRANTS defendant’s motion to
dismiss plaintiff’s state law claims and DISMISSES those claims without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Initials of Preparer
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:
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CMJ
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