L. D. v. Los Angeles Unified School District

Filing 18

MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER Re Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction #12 by Judge Michael W. Fitzgerald: The Court concludes that Plaintiffs claims must be exhausted administratively before they may be brought in federal court. In addition, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not exhausted those claims. The action is DISMISSED without prejudice to Plaintiff refiling his claims once exhaustion has occurred. (Made JS-6. Case Terminated.) (jp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JS-6

CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
Case No. CV 16-8588-MWF (MRWx)
Date: April 26, 2017
Title:
L.D. v. Los Angeles Unified School District
PRESENT: HONORABLE MICHAEL W. FITZGERALD, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
Rita Sanchez
Courtroom Deputy
ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFS:
None Present

None Present
Court Reporter
ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTS:
None Present

PROCEEDINGS (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER RE DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION [12]
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction,
filed on March 24, 2017. (“the Motion,” Docket No. 12). Plaintiff filed an Opposition
and Defendant filed a Reply. (Docket Nos. 13–14). The Court held a hearing on April
24, 2017.
Having read and considered the briefs, the Court GRANTS the Motion and the
action is DISMISSED without prejudice to Plaintiff refiling the case once all claims
have been properly exhausted.
I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a sixth-grade student at Shirley Avenue Elementary School.
(Complaint, Docket No. 1, ¶ 1). Plaintiff has Down syndrome and is considered a
disabled student pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”). (Id. ¶ 2). Defendant held an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”)
meeting for Plaintiff on May 5, 2014, to address certain behavioral issues. (Id. ¶ 8).
Plaintiff’s parents felt that Defendant was not providing appropriate support for
Plaintiff, so they filed for due process against Defendant, an administrative proceeding
in the Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”). (Id. ¶ 12). The parties reached a
settlement agreement that requires Defendant to provide certain services to Plaintiff to
assist with his behavioral issues at school. (Id.).
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CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
Case No. CV 16-8588-MWF (MRWx)
Date: April 26, 2017
Title:
L.D. v. Los Angeles Unified School District
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges Defendant has failed to comply with that settlement
agreement, and raises a claim for discrimination under the ADA and a claim for a
violation of the Rehabilitation Act. The Complaint cites an incident in which Plaintiff
broke his leg in a fall at school as evidence of discrimination. (Id. ¶ 19).
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Defendant’s Motion is nominally brought under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state
a claim. The Motion is directed, however, at the lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
which would indicate a Rule 12(b)(1) action. If a defendant seeks to challenge not the
plaintiff’s substantive allegations but the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the motion
to dismiss must be brought under Rule 12(b)(1). A jurisdictional attack under Rule
12(b)(1) may be “facial or factual.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035,
1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In a facial attack, the complaint’s allegations must be accepted
as true. Id. But “in a factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations
that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Id. In that case,
facts tending to prove or disprove jurisdiction “are not afforded presumptive
truthfulness.” Young v. United States, 769 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2014).
When jurisdictional facts are “‘so intertwined’ with the substantive dispute that
resolution of the former depends, at least in part, on resolution of the latter,” it may be
inappropriate to resolve factual issues at the motion to dismiss stage. Id. (quoting
Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983)). In that case, “a court
should employ the standard applicable to a motion for summary judgment because
resolution of those jurisdictional facts is akin to a decision on the merits.” Id. The
moving party should prevail only if those facts relevant to jurisdiction are not in
dispute. Id.
III.

ANALYSIS

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Complaint actually seeks to litigate the
adequacy of the free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) provided by Defendant to
Plaintiff. If that's the case, then Plaintiff must first exhaust his claims through the
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CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
Case No. CV 16-8588-MWF (MRWx)
Date: April 26, 2017
Title:
L.D. v. Los Angeles Unified School District
administrative procedures established by the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (“IDEA”). See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(l) (“[B]efore the filing of a civil action under
such laws seeking relief that is also available under this subchapter, the procedures
under subsections (f) and (g) shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be
required had the action been brought under this subchapter.”). The IEP is the
“centerpiece of the statute's education delivery system,” and “serves as the ‘vehicle’ or
‘means’ of providing a FAPE.” Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743, 753
(2017) (quoting Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988)). A suit that “seek[s] relief
for the denial of a FAPE” must meet this exhaustion requirement. Id. “[I]n
determining whether a suit indeed ‘seeks’ relief for such a denial, a court should look
to the substance, or gravamen, of the plaintiff's complaint.” Id. Thus, the inquiry does
not hinge on whether a complaint uses the words “FAPE” or “IEP” specifically. Id.
The Supreme Court has recently provided some helpful “clues” as to whether a
complaint concerns denial of a FAPE, or “instead addresses disability-based
discrimination.” Id. at 756. These clues come in the form of two questions a court
should ask when analyzing a child’s complaint: (1) “could the plaintiff have brought
essentially the same claim if the alleged conduct had occurred at a public facility that
was not a school,” and (2) “could an adult at the school—say, an employee or visitor—
have pressed essentially the same grievance?” Id. (emphasis in original). If the claims
could only be brought at a school, and only by a child, then the complaint “probably
does concern a FAPE, even if it does not explicitly say so.” Id.
Addressing those two questions here, the Court concludes Plaintiff really seeks
relief under IDEA, and must first exhaust his claims. First, Plaintiff’s claims center on
his IEP and his behavioral issues at the school, claims which could not be brought
against any other “public facility.” The Complaint alleges the “level of behavior
support” from Defendant has been inadequate, and that Defendant failed to address
Plaintiff’s parents’ concerns regarding Plaintiff’s behavioral issues in his IEP meeting.
(Complaint ¶¶ 7–8). The Complaint also specifically alleges Defendant’s lack of
support did not allow Plaintiff to “access his academic curriculum and make progress.”
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CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
Case No. CV 16-8588-MWF (MRWx)
Date: April 26, 2017
Title:
L.D. v. Los Angeles Unified School District
(Id. ¶ 11). These claims are focused on Plaintiff’s experience at school and would
make no sense outside that context.
Second, an adult could not have brought Plaintiff’s claims. As discussed, the
claims focus solely on Plaintiff’s IEP and the inadequacy of the educational support
provided by Defendant.
The Supreme Court also noted that the “history of the proceedings” might shed
light on whether a plaintiff’s claims concern denial of a FAPE, particularly in cases
where “a plaintiff has previously invoked the IDEA's formal procedures to handle the
dispute.” Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 757. Here that is precisely what occurred when Plaintiff’s
parents initially pursued administrative remedies to handle their dispute with
Defendant.
Plaintiff’s Complaint here makes one claim that is arguably directed at
discrimination: “Plaintiff has been denied and excluded from access to the Defendant’s
Program, which would provide Plaintiff a less confining program that satisfies
Plaintiff’s needs.” (Id. ¶ 18). The Complaint never specifies what “program” Plaintiff
is referring to, nor are there any factual allegations to support the claim.
The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s Complaint actually concerns an alleged
denial of a FAPE as required by the IDEA, and thus that Plaintiff was required to
exhaust his claims administratively prior to bringing them in federal court.
Defendant further argues that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his claims here. In
his short Opposition Plaintiff responds merely that exhaustion is not required in this
case. He does not seem to take issue with Defendant’s assertion that exhaustion has
not, in fact, occurred. Courts addressing similar fact patterns have found a lack of
exhaustion when a student and the school district have previously entered into a
settlement agreement, and the student subsequently alleges a violation of that
agreement. See, e.g., J.P. v. Cherokee Cty. Bd. of Educ., 218 F. App'x 911, 913 (11th
Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal of suit where “[i]t was undisputed that the only request
for a due-process hearing relating to J.P.'s FAPE occurred in proceedings that took
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CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
Case No. CV 16-8588-MWF (MRWx)
Date: April 26, 2017
Title:
L.D. v. Los Angeles Unified School District
place in 2001 and resulted in a settlement agreement as to the claims asserted in the
2001 complaint. The instant claims, by contrast, concern whether Defendants' actions
in November 2003 violated the IDEA and constituted a breach of the provisions of the
settlement agreement”); Pedraza v. Alameda Unified Sch. Dist., 2007 WL 949603, at
*5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2007) (holding IDEA’s exhaustion requirement was not met
when parties entered into a mediated settlement agreement). Here, Plaintiff’s claims
concern an alleged breach of a settlement agreement reached in 2014. He never filed
an administrative complaint with Defendant regarding any breach of the settlement
agreement. Those claims have not been exhausted as required by the IDEA.
At the hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel mentioned a different settlement agreement
signed by the parties in September 2015. This settlement is not discussed in Plaintiff’s
pleadings or his briefing on this Motion. The Court has no way of knowing what the
settlement encompassed. Counsel seemed to assert that the settlement foreclosed suit
under the IDEA, and that this fact should somehow support allowing this lawsuit to go
forward under the current claims for relief. Even considering this settlement, which
was never brought to the Court’s attention prior to the hearing, the fact remains that
Plaintiff’s suit is really one for relief under the IDEA, as discussed above. Dismissal to
allow for exhaustion is the proper course of action.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims must be exhausted
administratively before they may be brought in federal court. In addition, the Court
concludes that Plaintiff has not exhausted those claims. The action is DISMISSED
without prejudice to Plaintiff’s refiling his claims once exhaustion has occurred.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
This Order shall constitute notice of entry of judgment pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 58. Pursuant to Local Rule 58-6, the Court ORDERS the Clerk to
treat this order, and its entry on the docket, as an entry of judgment.
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CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
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