Leonela Aracely Valdez Herrera v. First National Bank of Omaha, N.A.

Filing 34

ORDER re: Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 23 by Judge Ronald S.W. Lew: denying MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment. SEE ORDER FOR FURTHER AND COMPLETE DETAILS. (jre)

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1 O 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 LEONELA ARACELY VALDEZ HERRERA, 13 Plaintiff, 14 20 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 21 Currently before the Court is Plaintiff Leonela 15 v. 16 FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF 17 OMAHA, N.A., 18 Defendant. 19 2:17-cv-01136-RSWL-SKA ORDER re: Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [23] 22 Aracely Valdez Herrera’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for 23 Partial Summary Judgment (“Motion”) [23]. Having 24 reviewed all papers submitted pertaining to this 25 Motion, the Court NOW FINDS AND RULES AS FOLLOWS: the 26 Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion. 27 /// 28 /// 1 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 A. Factual Background 3 On March 6, 2015, Plaintiff opened a credit card 4 account with Defendant. 5 ¶ 2, ECF No. 23-3. Decl. of Pl. (“Pl. Decl.”) As part of her application for the 6 credit card account, Plaintiff provided her cellphone 7 number as a primary contact number. 8 Id. ¶ 3. In 2016, Plaintiff became unable to make scheduled 9 payments on her credit card account. Id. ¶ 5. 10 Defendant, therefore, began placing collection calls to 11 Plaintiff’s cellphone to collect past-due payments. 12 Id. ¶ 6. In addition to manually placing calls, 13 Defendant utilizes the Avaya Proactive Contact 5.1 14 computer dialing system (“Avaya system”) to place 15 collection calls. Mot. for Summ. J. (“Mot.”), Ex. F 16 (“Mayo Dep.”) 8:16-24, ECF No. 23. Each day, Defendant 17 runs a sweep of its accounts to identify delinquent 18 accounts. Id. at 10:6-10. Defendant then loads the 19 numbers associated with these accounts into the Avaya 20 system, which places calls to the delinquent account 21 holders. Id. at 11:17-21. After the Avaya system 22 dials the number, the call is transferred to an agent. 23 Id. at 22:21-24. 24 On January 4, 2017, Defendant placed a collection 25 call to Plaintiff’s cellphone. Id., Ex. E at 4. The 26 full transcript of the call is as follows: 27 28 Agent: Plaintiff: Agent: “Hello?” “Hello?” “Hi, this is Jodi with First National 2 1 2 Plaintiff: 3 Id., Ex. G. Bank of Omaha on a recorded line. I’d like to speak with Leonela Valdez?” “Stop calling me.” Following the termination of the call, 4 Defendant’s collection agent typed a note into 5 Defendant’s collection system, which stated, “Gal 6 answered and s[ai]d stop calling me then she 7 h[ung]/u[p].” Id., Ex. E at 4. Defendant continued to 8 place a total of forty-two calls to Plaintiff’s 9 cellphone between January 5, 2017 and February 3, 2017. 10 See id. at 4-5; Compl. ¶ 19, ECF No. 1. 11 B. Procedural Background 12 Plaintiff filed her Complaint against Defendant on 13 February 13, 2017 alleging violations of the Telephone 14 Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227, and 15 the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 16 (“RFDCPA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 1788. 17 See Compl. Plaintiff filed the instant Motion [23] on October 18 31, 2017. On November 13, 2017, Defendant filed its 19 Opposition [29] to Plaintiff’s Motion. In its 20 Opposition, Defendant also sought summary judgment on 21 both of Plaintiff’s claims. See Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s 22 Mot. for Summ. J. (“Opp’n”) 11:3-7, 11:18-19, ECF No. 23 29. Plaintiff filed her Reply [32] on November 20, 24 2017. 25 II. DISCUSSION 26 A. Legal Standard 27 1. 28 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 states that a Summary Judgment 3 1 “court shall grant summary judgment” when the movant 2 “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 3 material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as 4 a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is 5 “material” for purposes of summary judgment if it might 6 affect the outcome of the suit, and a “genuine issue” 7 exists if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact8 finder could return a verdict for the non-moving party. 9 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 10 (1986). The evidence, and any inferences based on 11 underlying facts, must be viewed in the light most 12 favorable to the opposing party. Twentieth Century-Fox 13 Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 715 F.2d 1327, 1329 (9th Cir. 14 1983). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the 15 court’s function is not to weigh the evidence, but only 16 to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 17 exists. 18 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Under Rule 56, the party moving for summary 19 judgment has the initial burden to show “no genuine 20 dispute as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 56(a); see Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 22 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). The burden 23 then shifts to the non-moving party to produce 24 admissible evidence showing a triable issue of fact. 25 Nissan Fire & Marine Ins., 210 F.3d at 1102-03; see 26 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment “is 27 appropriate when the plaintiff fails to make a showing 28 sufficient to establish the existence of an element 4 1 essential to [her] case, and on which [she] will bear 2 the burden of proof at trial.” Cleveland v. Policy 3 Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 805–06 (1999); see 4 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 5 The standard for a motion for summary judgment 6 “provides that the mere existence of some alleged 7 factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an 8 otherwise properly supported motion for summary 9 judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine 10 issues of material fact.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247- 11 48. 12 2. 13 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(g) authorizes Partial Summary Judgment 14 courts to grant partial summary judgment to limit the 15 issues to be tried in a case. State Farm Fire & Cas. 16 Co. v. Geary, 699 F. Supp. 756, 759 (N.D. Cal. 1987) 17 (citing Lies v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 641 F.2d 765, 769 18 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981)). Absent a specific statute 19 authorizing otherwise, a partial summary judgment under 20 Rule 56(g) is not a final judgment but rather an 21 interlocutory summary adjudication or a pre-trial 22 order, neither of which is appealable prior to the 23 entry of a final judgment in the case. Wynn v. 24 Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 212 F.2d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 25 1954). 26 B. Discussion 27 In its Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion, Defendant 28 also requests the Court grant summary judgment in its 5 1 favor on both of Plaintiff’s causes of action. 2 11:4-7, 11:18-19. Opp’n Defendant at no point requested a 3 hearing date for its “motion.” Defendant filed its 4 Opposition, which includes the request for the Court to 5 enter summary judgment in its favor, on November 13, 6 2017. The Court previously set the motion filing cut- 7 off for October 31, 2017. 8 Continue, ECF No. 22. See Order re Stip. to Therefore, no matter what form 9 Defendant’s request for summary judgment takes, 10 Defendant filed its “motion” fourteen days after the 11 filing deadline. 12 Courts in this circuit have held that “[i]t is not 13 an abuse of discretion for a court to deny or strike a 14 motion on the basis that it is untimely filed according 15 to the timetable set by the scheduling order.” Dayton 16 Valley Inv’rs, Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 664 17 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1178 (D. Nev. 2009)(citing Johnson v. 18 Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 610 (9th Cir. 19 1992)); see C.D. Cal. R. 7-12 (“The Court may decline 20 to consider any memorandum or other document not filed 21 within the deadline set by order or local rule.”). 22 Accordingly, because Defendant’s “motion” was filed two 23 weeks after the motion filing cut-off date, the 24 “motion” is untimely, and the Court will not consider 25 Defendant’s request for the Court to enter summary 26 27 28 6 1 judgment in its favor.1 2 The Court now turns to the merits of Plaintiff’s 3 Motion. Plaintiff seeks partial summary judgment on 4 her TCPA claim. 5 6 7 8 9 The TCPA states, It shall be unlawful for any person within the United States . . . to make any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice . . . to any telephone number assigned to a . . . cellular telephone service . . . . 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). To prove that Defendant 10 violated the TCPA, Plaintiff must establish that 11 (1) Defendant called her cellphone (2) using an ATDS. 12 See Levy v. Receivables Performance Mgmt., LLC, 972 F. 13 Supp. 2d 409, 417 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). The parties do not 14 dispute these two elements are met, and therefore, 15 Plaintiff has proven her prima facie case under the 16 TCPA. 17 The Court need only assess whether Defendant had 18 Plaintiff’s express consent to call Plaintiff. 19 “Express consent is not an element of a plaintiff’s 20 prima facie case but is an affirmative defense for 21 which the defendant bears the burden of proof.” Van 22 Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., Ltd. Liab. Co., 847 23 F.3d 1037, 1044 (9th Cir. 2017). The Federal 24 Communications Commission (“FCC”) has made clear that 25 26 27 28 1 Even assuming the Court considered Defendant’s improper “motion,” there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff clearly and expressly revoked her consent to be called, and therefore, the Court DENIES Defendant’s “motion” on its merits. 7 1 consumers expressly consent to be contacted when they 2 provide their cellphone numbers as part of a credit 3 application. See In re Rules Implementing the Tel. 4 Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 23 FCC Rcd. 559, 564 (Dec. 5 28, 2007)(“We conclude that the provision of a cell 6 phone number to a creditor, e.g., as part of a credit 7 application, reasonably evidences prior express consent 8 by the cell phone subscriber to be contacted at that 9 number regarding the debt.”). 10 Plaintiff does not dispute that she gave her 11 express consent for Defendant to call her when she 12 signed up for the credit card account with Defendant. 13 Mot. 11:22-25. Rather, Plaintiff contends that she 14 expressly revoked her consent in the January 4, 2017 15 call with Defendant’s representative and any calls she 16 received thereafter were in violation of the TCPA. Id. 17 at 12:2-3. 18 “The TCPA does not explicitly grant consumers the 19 right to revoke their prior express consent.” Van 20 Patten, 847 F.3d at 1047 (internal citations omitted). 21 In 2015, however, the FCC clarified that consumers may 22 revoke their “consent in any reasonable manner that 23 clearly expresses [their] desire not to receive further 24 calls.” In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the 25 Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 30 FCC Rcd. 7961, 7999 26 (July 10, 2015); see Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1048. 27 Courts do not consider the called party’s subjective 28 intent, and instead, “consent is terminated when the 8 1 [person who obtained consent] knows or has reason to 2 know that the other is no longer willing for him to 3 continue the particular conduct.” Dixon v. Monterey 4 Fin. Servs., No. 15-cv-03298-MMC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5 82601, at *8 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2016)(quoting Osorio 6 v. State Farm Bank, F.S.B., 746 F.3d 1242, 1253 (11th 7 Cir. 2014)). 8 Here, Plaintiff asserts that she clearly revoked 9 her consent to be called when she stated “stop calling 10 me” in the January 4, 2017 call. Mot. 12:6-8. 11 Defendant’s representative’s notes from immediately 12 after the call reference this statement. 13 4. Id., Ex. E at Defendant contends in the Declaration of Paul 14 Osborne that a minor had previously answered 15 Plaintiff’s phone, and therefore, Defendant was not 16 clear on whether Plaintiff herself had actually 17 requested that Defendant stop calling her. 18 Paul Osborne ¶ 13, ECF No. 29-1. Decl. of While Plaintiff 19 argues that Defendant has not produced any evidence to 20 support its assertion that a minor previously answered 21 Plaintiff’s phone, “the court must examine the evidence 22 in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draw 23 all justifiable inferences in its favor.” Anderson, 24 477 U.S. at 248. 25 Importantly, “a factual dispute regarding alleged 26 revocation of consent cannot be properly resolved on 27 summary judgment.” Walker v. Transworld Sys., No. 28 8:14-cv-588-T-30MAP, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174136, at 9 1 *7 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 17, 2014); see Osorio, 746 F.3d at 2 1256 (finding that whether the plaintiff revoked his 3 consent was “exactly the kind of factual dispute that 4 cannot properly be resolved on summary judgment”). 5 While Plaintiff stated in the January 4, 2017 call, 6 “stop calling me,” these were the only words other than 7 “hello” that Plaintiff stated in the entire call. 8 Mot., Ex. G. See Plaintiff then did not answer another one 9 of Defendant’s calls and never again asserted any 10 desire not to be called regarding her credit card 11 account. Whether Plaintiff’s request to “stop calling” 12 was a clear and express revocation of her consent to be 13 called is a question of fact reserved for the jury. 14 See Bally v. First Nat’l Bank of Omaha, No. 17-10632, 15 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177286, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 16 26, 2017)(denying summary judgment motion because 17 “[r]easonable minds could differ regarding whether [the 18 p]laintiff clearly expressed his desire not to receive 19 further calls from [the d]efendant”); Ruffrano v. HSBC 20 Fin. Corp., No. 15CV958A, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132674, 21 at *49 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2017)(noting that the FCC 22 analyzes revocation as a totality of circumstances, a 23 standard that “calls for fact finding not appropriate 24 in a summary judgment motion”). 25 Because there remains a genuine issue of material 26 fact as to whether Plaintiff clearly and expressly 27 revoked her consent to be called, the Court DENIES 28 Plaintiff’s Motion. 10 1 2 III. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES 3 Plaintiff’s Motion [23]. 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 6 DATED: December 4, 2017 s/ RONALD S.W. LEW 7 HONORABLE RONALD S.W. LEW Senior U.S. District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11

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