Daisley v. Blizzard Music Limited (US) et al
Filing
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ORDER - Defendants' motion to transfer is GRANTED. This action is hereby transferred to the District Court for the Central District of California. The remaining motions raised in the defendants' omnibus motion are denied without prejudice to renew. Signed by Judge Howard D. McKibben on 2/22/2017. (Copies have been distributed pursuant to the NEF - DRM) [Transferred from Nevada on 2/23/2017.]
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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DISTRICT OF NEVADA
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ROBERT DAISLEY,
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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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BLIZZARD MUSIC LIMITED (US) and )
JOHN MICHAEL OSBOURNE,
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Defendant.
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_________________________________ )
3:16-cv-00519-HDM-WGC
ORDER
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Before the court is defendant John Michael Osbourne’s
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(“Osbourne”) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction
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pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), Osbourne and
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co-defendant Blizzard Music Limited (US)’s (“Blizzard US”) motion
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to transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), defendants’ motion to
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dismiss or stay the action due to binding arbitration agreement,
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and defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
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pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and Rule 9(b)
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(ECF No. 8).
Plaintiff Robert Daisley (“Daisley”) has opposed (ECF
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No. 14), and defendants have replied (ECF No. 16).
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In his complaint, filed in state court on August 8, 2016 and
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removed to this court on August 31, 2016, Daisley asserts that he
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co-authored a number of songs with defendant Osbourne and others in
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late 1979, 1980, and 1981.
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songwriter agreements that assigned his copyright interest in the
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songs to Blizzard UK.
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UK and owned primarily by Osbourne.
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agreements, Blizzard UK acted as the publisher and administrator
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for Daisley’s share of the songs and was responsible for collecting
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and distributing royalties to Daisley.
In 1980 and 1981, Daisley entered into
Blizzard UK is an entity incorporated in the
Under the terms of the
Blizzard UK was to pay 90
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percent of all royalties received on Daisley’s behalf to Daisley,
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retaining a ten percent fee for itself.
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Daisley understood that administration of the copyrights
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within the United States was done by Blizzard US, an entity created
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and controlled by Osbourne.
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not learn until 2014 that Blizzard US was retaining fifteen percent
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of the royalties it received before remitting the royalties to
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Blizzard UK for distribution to Daisley.
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Osbourne, Blizzard US, and Blizzard UK concealed this fact so that
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Daisley would not know of the additional deductions.
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asserts that the songwriting agreements do not allow Blizzard US or
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Blizzard UK to take an additional fifteen percent deduction.
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Daisley accordingly commenced this action against Osbourne and
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Blizzard US for fraud and an accounting.
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Daisley resides in Australia.
However, Daisley asserts that he did
Daisley asserts that
Daisley
Osbourne resides in Los
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Angeles, California, and England.
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Nevada and has a post office box and bank account in Nevada, but
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its books and records are physically located in California and its
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administration of licenses is conducted primarily in California.
Blizzard US is incorporated in
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The court first addresses the defendants’ motion to transfer
venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
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The court may transfer venue to any district “where it might
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have been brought” for “the convenience of parties and witnesses,
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in the interest of justice.”
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party bears the burden of showing that an adequate alternative
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forum exists.
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n.22 (9th Cir. 2000).
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party shows: (1) venue is proper in the transferor district court;
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
The moving
Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 499
“Transfer is appropriate when the moving
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(2) the transferee district court has personal jurisdiction over
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the defendants and subject matter jurisdiction over the claims; and
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(3) transfer will serve the convenience of the parties and
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witnesses, and will promote the interests of justice.”
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Himax Techs., Inc., 530 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
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A.
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Pfeiffer v.
Proper Venue
While Blizzard US is incorporated in Nevada, the record
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reflects that its business is conducted almost exclusively in
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California.
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District of California is a district where both defendants reside
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and is therefore a proper venue for this action.
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1391(b)(1).
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B.
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Osbourne also resides in California.
The Central
See 28 U.S.C. §
Personal and Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Defendant Osbourne resides in California.
The federal
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district court in California therefore has personal jurisdiction
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over Osbourne.
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Blizzard US is incorporated in Nevada, has a bank account in
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Nevada, and has a P.O. Box in Nevada.
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offices in Nevada, all of its books and records are located in
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However, Blizzard US has no
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California, and the business of Blizzard US is conducted primarily
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out of California.
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any substantial business in Nevada.
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music publisher, and the review, negotiation, and granting of
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license requests are done by Sharon Osbourne, on defendant
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Osbourne’s behalf, principally from her office in Los Angeles,
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California.
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Blizzard US’s business is conducted primarily from Los Angeles,
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California, which is also the location of its books and records,
There is no evidence that Blizzard US conducts
Specifically, Blizzard US is a
(ECF No. 22 (Sharon Osbourne Decl. ¶¶4-5)).
As
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the record supports a conclusion that Blizzard US’s principal place
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of business is in California.
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California would have personal jurisdiction over Blizzard US.
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defendants have conceded that California courts have jurisdiction
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over Blizzard US.
Thus, the federal district court in
The
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Finally, the parties do not dispute that the federal district
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court in California would have jurisdiction over Daisley’s claims.
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C.
Convenience of the Parties and Witnesses and Interests of
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Justice
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The court must weigh several factors in determining whether
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transfer is appropriate: (1) the location where the relevant
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agreements were negotiated and executed; (2) the state that is most
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familiar with the governing law; (3) the plaintiff’s choice of
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forum; (4) the respective parties’ contacts with the forum; (5) the
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contacts relating to plaintiff’s cause of action in the chosen
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forum; (6) the differences in the cost of litigation in the two
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forums; (7) the availability of compulsory process to compel
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witnesses; and (8) the ease of access to sources of proof.
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Jones,
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211 F.3d at 498-99.
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1. Where Relevant Agreements were Negotiated and Executed
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It appears that the only agreements at issue in this case are
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the songwriter agreements.
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agreements are not relevant to this case, he does cite them in his
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complaint and defendants rely on them in their motion to dismiss.
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The record reflects that the agreements were executed in England.
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(ECF No. 8-3 (Sharon Osbourne Decl. ¶5)).
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pointing to either California or Nevada as relevant to the
While Daisley argues that these
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agreements’ negotiation and/or execution.
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There is no evidence
neutral.
This factor is therefore
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2. State Most Familiar with Governing Law
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The parties agree that Nevada law applies to Daisley’s claims.
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As this court is more familiar with Nevada law than a court in
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California might be, this factor weighs against transfer.
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3. Plaintiff’s Choice of Forum
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Daisley argues that defendants have failed to overcome the
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strong presumption in favor of a plaintiff’s choice of venue.
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However, while a plaintiff’s selection of a forum is generally due
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heavy deference, deference is reduced for foreign plaintiffs.
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Lueck v. Sundstrand Corp., 236 F.3d 1137, 1145 (9th Cir. 2001);
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Gemini Capital Grp., Inc. v. Yap Fishing Corp., 150 F.3d 1088, 1091
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(9th Cir. 1998); Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp.
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2d 1134, 1141 (C.D. Cal. 2005); see also Boston Telecomms. Grp. v.
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Wood, 588 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2009).
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deference is not the same thing as no deference.”
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at 1143.
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Daisley’s choice of Nevada entitled to deference, it is not
Even so, “less
Daisley is not a resident of Nevada.
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Lueck, 236 F.3d
Accordingly, while
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entitled to great deference.
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transfer, but only slightly.
This factor therefore weighs against
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4. Parties’ Contacts with Nevada
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Daisley does not assert any contacts with Nevada.
Defendant
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Osbourne has had some contacts with Nevada, but they appear to be
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sporadic and infrequent and not particularly relevant to the
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dispute in this case.
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The party with the most Nevada contacts is defendant Blizzard US,
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which is incorporated in Nevada, and has a Nevada bank account and
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P.O. Box.
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(See ECF no. 7-2 (John Osbourne Decl.)).
contacts with Nevada.
However, the record does not reflect any additional
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When compared to the parties’ contacts with California – where
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Osbourne lives and the business of Blizzard US is conducted – it is
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apparent that the parties’ contacts with Nevada are not as
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substantial as those with California.
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connection to Nevada and defendants’ contacts with California,
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including that it is the location of the books and records of the
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business and where the review, negotiation, and granting of
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licenses is undertaken, outweigh their contacts with Nevada, this
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factor favors transfer.
Given that Daisley has no
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5. Parties’ Contacts Relating to Daisley’s Claims
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Insofar as Daisley’s claims are concerned, it is unclear that
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Nevada has any relation to them other than the fact that one of the
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defendants is incorporated in Nevada and maintains a bank account
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and P.O. Box in Nevada.
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that is the basis of the complaint occurred in Nevada other than
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the fact that one of the defendants is incorporated here.
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there any persuasive argument that the effects of the alleged
There is no allegation that the wrongdoing
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Nor is
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wrongdoing were felt in Nevada.
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Nevada relating to Daisley’s claims are not substantial and the
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actions that Daisley complains of did not take place here, this
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factor also favors transfer.
Because the parties’ contacts with
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6. Cost of Litigation
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No individual person involved in this litigation resides in
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Nevada.
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Compared to Reno, Los Angeles is an easier and more direct
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destination for most witnesses coming from abroad.
All individuals reside in either California or abroad.
This means that
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it is likely more cost-effective for litigation to take place in
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Los Angeles.
Accordingly, this factor slightly favors transfer.
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7. Availability of Compulsory Process to Compel Witnesses
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No non-party witnesses have been identified as residing in
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Nevada.
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resides in California – Sharon Osbourne.
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not asserted or established that Sharon Osbourne would be an
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unwilling witness whose testimony would need to be compelled.
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other potential witnesses are outside the jurisdiction of either
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Nevada or California.
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transfer.
Defendants have identified one non-party witness who
However, defendants have
All
Accordingly, this factor slightly favors
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8. Access to Sources of Proof
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Blizzard US’s books and records are in California and England.
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None are in Nevada.
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in Nevada, though its relevance to these proceedings – if any – is
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not clear.
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discussed above, for those coming from abroad Los Angeles is an
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easier destination to reach.
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proof will be overall easier in California than in Nevada.
However, Blizzard US does have a bank account
All witnesses are in either California or abroad.
As
Accordingly, access to sources of
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factor therefore favors transfer.
9. Additional Factors
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i. Execution of Judgment
Daisley argues that any successful judgment against Blizzard
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US would be executed in Nevada, thus weighing against transfer.
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The court finds this argument unpersuasive.
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California may be executed in Nevada to the same degree as a
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judgment from Nevada, with only the additional step of registering
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the judgment with this court.
A judgment from
Daisley neglects to mention where a
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judgment would be executed against defendant Osbourne, but it seems
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most likely that it would be executed, at least in part, in
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California.
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foreign judgment wherever this case is tried, this factor is
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neutral.
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As Daisley would thus be required to register a
ii. Personal Jurisdiction
Finally, Osbourne argues that this court lacks personal
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jurisdiction over him.
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this issue because the action will be transferred,1 it is unlikely
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that Daisley could establish specific jurisdiction over Osbourne.
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In order to establish specific jurisdiction in a torts case, “the
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defendant allegedly must have (1) committed an intentional act, (2)
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expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the
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defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state.”
While the court declines to directly decide
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The court can transfer under § 1404(a) regardless of whether it has
personal jurisdiction over the defendants.
See Sinochem Int’l Co. v.
Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 425 (2007); Goldlawr, Inc. v.
Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466-67 (1962); Stanbury Elec. Eng’g, LLC v. Energy
Prod., Inc., 2016 WL 3255003, at *1 (W.D. Wash. June 13, 2016); Kawamoto v.
CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 225 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1211 (D. Haw. 2002) (“[T]his
court may transfer venue under . . .§ 1404(a) . . . without regard to
whether it has personal jurisdiction over” the defendant.).
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Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d 1124, 1128
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(9th Cir. 2010).
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connection to Nevada.
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effects of defendants’ alleged actions were otherwise felt in
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Nevada.
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specific jurisdiction over Osbourne is tenuous.
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the court might have general jurisdiction over Osbourne based on
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anything other than an alter ego theory is plainly without merit.
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Daisley’s allegations supporting the alter ego theory are largely
Daisley is a resident of Australia and has no
Daisley has not persuasively argued that the
Accordingly, Daisley’s contention that the court has
The argument that
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conclusory and do not make a “prima facie showing of jurisdictional
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facts to withstand the motion to dismiss.’”
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determination of the court’s jurisdiction would therefore require
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the parties to engage in jurisdictional discovery prior to
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discovery on the merits of the underlying action.
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costly and delay the resolution of this case.
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that judicial economy therefore favors transfer to a court that
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clearly has jurisdiction over both defendants.
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Id. at 1127.
A
This would be
The court concludes
After considering and weighing all the relevant factors in
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this case, the court concludes that on balance transfer to the
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Central District of California is appropriate.
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Conclusion
In accordance with the foregoing, defendants’ motion to
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transfer is GRANTED.
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District Court for the Central District of California.
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remaining motions raised in the defendants’ omnibus motion are
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denied without prejudice to renew.
This action is hereby transferred to the
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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DATED: This 22nd day of February, 2017.
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____________________________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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The
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