Carlos Morales v. Amazon.com, LLC et al

Filing 63

ORDER REMANDING ACTION AND DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AS MOOT 56 by Judge Otis D. Wright, II. For the reasons discussed above, the Court REMANDS this action to the Superior Court of California, Alameda County, George E. McDonal d Hall of Justice, 2233 Shoreline Drive, Alameda, California 94501. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as MOOT. Case remanded to Superior Court of California Los Angeles County, Case number RG16832863. Case Terminated. Made JS-6 (lom)

JS-6

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

United States District Court
Central District of California

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

CARLOS MORALES, on behalf of
himself, all others similarly situated, and
the general public,
Plaintiff,

Case № 2:17-CV-01981-ODW (JEMx)
ORDER REMANDING ACTION
AND DENYING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS AS MOOT
[56]

v.
AMAZON.COM LLC, a Delaware
corporation; PEACH, INC., DBA
ACTION MESSENGER SERVICE, a
California corporation; and DOES 1–50,
inclusive,
Defendants.

22
23
24

I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff initiated this wage-and-hour action in the Superior Court of California,

25

Alameda County.

26

Defendants removed the matter to the United States District Court, Northern District

27

of California, based on federal question subject matter jurisdiction, as Plaintiff’s

28

Complaint asserted a cause of action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”),

(Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1.)

On November 4, 2016,

1

29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff subsequently amended his Complaint

2

and removed the FLSA claim. (First Am. Compl. (“FAC”), ECF No. 13.) Thereafter,

3

the action was transferred to the Central District of California and assigned to this

4

Court. (Stip. and Order to Transfer Venue, ECF Nos. 35, 36.) Following this Court’s

5

Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and

6

Motion to Strike, Plaintiff amended his Complaint for a second time on August 29,

7

2018, removing all class allegations and alleging only California state-law claims.

8

(Order on Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 52; Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”) 1–2, ECF No. 53.)
II.

9

DISCUSSION

10

Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction only as authorized by the

11

Constitution and Congress. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also Kokkonen v.

12

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A suit filed in state court

13

may be removed to federal court only if the federal court would have had original

14

jurisdiction over the suit.

15

jurisdiction where an action arises under federal law or where each plaintiff’s

16

citizenship is diverse from each defendant’s citizenship and the amount in controversy

17

exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a). Federal courts have supplemental

18

jurisdiction over state law claims that are “so related to claims in the action with such

19

original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C.

20

§ 1367(a). “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks

21

subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see also

22

United Inv’rs Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2004)

23

(“[T]he district court had a duty to establish subject matter jurisdiction over the

24

removed action sua sponte, whether the parties raised the issue or not.”).

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

Federal courts have original

25

“Dismissal of the federal claims does not deprive a federal court of the power to

26

adjudicate the remaining pendent state claims. However, ‘pendent jurisdiction is a

27

doctrine of discretion . . . .’” Nishimoto v. Federman-Bachrach & Assocs., 903 F.2d

28

709, 715 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726

2

1

(1966)) (internal citations omitted). There is a “distinction between the power of a

2

federal court to hear state-law claims and the discretionary exercise of that power.”

3

Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 349–50 (1988). “[I]n the usual case

4

in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors

5

[judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity] . . . will point toward declining

6

to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Id. at 350 n.7; Harrell v.

7

20th Century Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 203, 205 (9th Cir. 1991); Weintraub v. Sotheby’s Int’l

8

Realty, Inc., No. 18-cv-6922-AB (KSx), 2019 WL 1125343, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 12,

9

2019). “[T]hese factors usually will favor a decision to relinquish jurisdiction when

10

‘state issues substantially predominate, whether in terms of proof, of the scope of the

11

issues raised, or of the comprehensiveness of the remedy sought.’” Carnegie–Mellon,

12

484 U.S. at 350 n.7 (quoting United Mine Workers, 383 U.S. at 726).

13

Plaintiff initiated this action in state court, and the sole basis for Defendants’

14

removal was federal question jurisdiction based on Plaintiff’s FLSA claim. Plaintiff

15

has since eliminated the FLSA claim; thus, federal question jurisdiction no longer

16

exists. Further, diversity jurisdiction is not available, as both Plaintiff and Defendant

17

Peach Inc. are citizens of California. (See SAC ¶¶ 4, 6.)

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

After carefully considering the Carnegie–Mellon factors, the Court declines to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction. State law issues substantially predominate in this
action: Plaintiff asserts claims and seeks remedies exclusively under California law.
(See SAC 6, 8, 10, 12, 15, 16 (asserting causes of action under only the California
Labor Code).) Further, although the case has been in federal court for two years, it
remains in the pleading stage, well before trial, and the Court has not expended
substantial judicial resources toward resolving the merits of the dispute. Finally, the
Carnegie-Mellon factors, particularly comity and the economic use of federal court
resources, favor litigation of this state law matter in state court rather than federal

28

3

1

court. See Weintraub, 2019 WL 1125343, at *3 (finding that the balance of factors

2

favored remand).

3
4

Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and
remands this action to the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda.

5

III.

CONCLUSION

6

For the reasons discussed above, the Court REMANDS this action to the

7

Superior Court of California, Alameda County, George E. McDonald Hall of Justice,

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

2233 Shoreline Drive, Alameda, California 94501. Accordingly, the Court DENIES
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as MOOT. (ECF No. 56.)
IT IS SO ORDERED.
April 2, 2019
____________________________________
OTIS D. WRIGHT, II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

4