Martha Elva Yanez v. County of Los Angeles, et al

Filing 29

MINUTES OF DEFENDANT COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT 11 ; PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND STATE LAW CLAIMS 12 before Judge George H. Wu: Court and counsel confer. The Tentative circulated and a ttached hereto, is adopted as the Courts Final Ruling. The Court would DENY Plaintiffs Motion to Remand without prejudice. The Court would continue Defendants Motion to Dismiss until July 6, 2017 at 8:30 a.m. to allow both sides to brief the motion in accordance with the applicable local rules. Plaintiff moved ex parte on June 8, 2017 for an order granting her procedural objection to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or an order continuing the June 12, 2017 hearing on Defendants' motion. In light of the above ruling said application is moot. Court Reporter: Katie Thibodeaux. (cr)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 17-2741-GW(JPRx)

Title

Martha Elva Yanez v. County of Los Angeles, et al.

Present: The Honorable

Date

June 12, 2017

GEORGE H. WU, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Javier Gonzalez

Katie Thibodeaux

Deputy Clerk

Court Reporter / Recorder

Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs:

Attorneys Present for Defendants:

Gerard L. Friend

William Keith Wyatt

PROCEEDINGS:

DEFENDANT COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES’S MOTION TO DISMISS
PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT [11];
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND STATE LAW CLAIMS [12]

Court and counsel confer. The Tentative circulated and attached hereto, is adopted as the Court’s Final
Ruling. The Court would DENY Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand without prejudice. The Court would
continue Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss until July 6, 2017 at 8:30 a.m. to allow both sides to brief the
motion in accordance with the applicable local rules. Plaintiff moved ex parte on June 8, 2017 for an
order granting her procedural objection to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or an order continuing the
June 12, 2017 hearing on Defendants' motion. In light of the above ruling said application is moot.

:
Initials of Preparer
CV-90 (06/04)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

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Page 1 of 1

Martha Yanez v. County of L.A., et al., Case No. CV 17-2741-GW-GJS
Tentative Ruling on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

I. Background
Plaintiff Martha Elva Yanez sues Defendants County of Los Angeles (“County”), Los
Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (“LASD”), and Does 1 through 250 inclusive for: (1)
federal civil rights violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; (2) negligence;
(3) intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (4) invasion of privacy. See
generally Amended Complaint (“Complaint”), Docket No. 1-3.
Plaintiff alleges the following:
Plaintiff was arrested in late 2014 and placed in the custody of LASD for an alleged
violation of law. Id. ¶ 19. Plaintiff was placed in the custody of LASD before and after trial and
was housed at the Century Regional Detention Facility (“CRDF”) in Lynwood, California. Id. ¶¶
20-21. On March 23, 2015, Plaintiff was transported to the Los Angeles Superior Court while in
the custody of LASD, shackled and in the seated position. Id. ¶ 23. Plaintiff believes that the
transport vehicle was owned and maintained by LASD, County, and various Doe Defendants.
Id.
When the transport vehicle arrived at Twin Towers Correctional Facility in Los Angeles,
California, it collided with one or more other vehicles. Id. ¶ 24. Plaintiff believes that the
transport vehicle was operated by County, LASD, and Doe Defendants, and was driven by a Doe
Defendant in the regular scope of his or her employment under County and or LASD. Id. At the
time of the collision, Plaintiff was unable to brace and protect herself due to being shackled in
the vehicle, resulting in a medical injury when Plaintiff struck her head and whiplashed forward.
Id. ¶¶ 25-27.
Plaintiff received medical care upon reporting her symptoms but was not provided with a
professional medical assessment and was only given an ice pack. Id. ¶ 28. On March 24, 2015,
Plaintiff saw a medical professional who only examined her in a cursory fashion and failed to
properly diagnose her. Id. ¶ 29. Also on March 24, 2015, Plaintiff filed a written request for a
copy of the full accident report and to report her injury more completely. Id. ¶¶ 30-31. She also
made a written complaint regarding her symptoms and urgently requested a neck brace. Id.
On March 25, 2015, Plaintiff filed a written complaint regarding her injury and
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requesting the opportunity to be seen by another medical professional and to be given a neck
brace and pain medication. Id. ¶ 32. Plaintiff was then accused of lying and was ridiculed by
LASD personnel. Id. Plaintiff filed another request for a neck brace on March 25, 2015 and
filed a written request to see a doctor and to get a neck brace on March 26, 2015. Id. ¶¶ 33-34.
On March 27, 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint for retribution for being forced to endure a long
period seated upright while waiting to be examined by a nurse. Id. ¶ 35.
On April 1, 2015, Plaintiff filed a request for a neck brace to enable her to appear in court
the following day without extreme pain. Id. ¶ 36. On April 13, 2015, Plaintiff requested an
examination by a medical doctor for reported pain, while also requesting over-the-counter pain
lotion. Id. ¶ 37. Pain medication was provided but Plaintiff still began to experience pain from
her untreated injury. Id. ¶ 38. On August 9, 2015, Plaintiff filed a report for strong back pain
after LASD stopped providing medication, while also requesting a medical exam. Id. On
August 28, 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint for chronic pain, citing non-compliance with a court
order that provided her with a lower cell bunk, for which she received threats of reprisal from
LASD personnel. Id. ¶ 39.
Plaintiff completed her rehabilitation and was released November 8, 2015, at which point
all prior requests were deemed to be denied. Id. ¶ 40. Upon release Plaintiff sought an
independent medical examination. Id. ¶ 45. On or after December 2, 2015, Plaintiff reviewed
the results of her examination and discovered that her injuries were more severe and chronic than
had been represented by the medical personnel employed or engaged by County or LASD. Id. ¶
46. The findings of injury were confirmed by a subsequent medical evaluation. Id.
Plaintiff first filed a complaint in Los Angeles Superior Court, Case No. BC 639970,
alleging a single cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See generally Notice of Removal
(“NOR”) Ex. 1, Docket No. 1. She later amended to add three state law claims. See generally
Complaint. Defendants timely removed the action on April 11, 2017. NOR. Defendants then
filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims on May 9, 2017. See Motion to Dismiss (“MTD”),
Docket No. 11. Two days later, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand the state claims. See Motion
to Remand (“MTR”), Docket No. 12. Both motions are now pending before the Court.
Plaintiff did not substantively oppose Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and instead moved
to strike it based on what she contends was Defendants’ failure to comply with the local rules’
meet and confer requirement. See Motion to Strike (“MTS”), Docket No. 18. Defendants
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opposed Plaintiff’s MTS. See Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike (“Opp’n MTS”), Docket
No. 23. As to the Motion to Remand, Defendants filed an Opposition (“Opp’n to MTR”),
Docket No. 15, and Plaintiff filed a Reply. See Docket No. 22.
II. Legal Standard
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint may be dismissed for failure
to state a claim for one of two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory or (2) insufficient
facts under a cognizable legal theory. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see
also Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Dismissal
under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or
sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.”).
In deciding a 12(b)(6) motion, a court “may generally consider only allegations contained
in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly subject to judicial
notice.” Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007). However, the doctrine of
incorporation by reference allows a court to consider documents whose contents are alleged in
the complaint and whose authenticity nobody questions, but which are not attached to the
pleading. Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1160 (9th Cir. 2012). Once a
document is deemed incorporated, a court may treat it as part of the complaint. Id.
Further, in deciding a 12(b)(6) motion the court must construe the complaint in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all allegations of material fact as true, and draw all
reasonable inferences from well-pleaded factual allegations. Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d
893, 896 (9th Cir. 2002); Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.),
amended on denial of reh’g, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001); Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80
F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). The court is not required to accept as true legal conclusions
couched as factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Where a plaintiff
facing a 12(b)(6) motion has pled “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” the motion should be denied.
Id.; Sylvia Landfield Trust v. City of L.A., 729 F.3d 1189, 1191 (9th Cir. 2013). But if “the wellpleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged – but it has not show[n] . . . the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v.
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Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (citations omitted).
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” and have subject matter jurisdiction
only to the extent “authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.
of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citing Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136-137 (1992);
Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986)). “It is to be presumed that
a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests
upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 11
(1799); McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 182-83 (1936)). The removal
statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction, and “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be
rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” See Gaus v. Miles,
Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Boggs v. Lewis, 863 F.2d 662, 663 (9th Cir. 1988);
Takeda v. Northwestern Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 765 F.2d 815, 818 (9th Cir. 1985); Libhart v. Santa
Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 1979)).
III. Analysis
A. Defendants’ Failure to Meet and Confer
Plaintiff did not substantively oppose Defendants’ Rule 12(b)6 motion. Rather, Plaintiff
moves to strike Defendants’ motion based on what she contends was Defendants’ failure to meet
and confer at least seven days prior to filing their motion as required by Local Rule 7-3. See
MTS at 3:1-16.
Local Rule 7-3 provides:
In all cases not listed as exempt in L.R. 16-12, and except in
connection with discovery motions (which are governed by L.R.
37-1 through 37-4) and applications for temporary restraining
orders or preliminary injunctions, counsel contemplating the filing
of any motion shall first contact opposing counsel to discuss
thoroughly, preferably in person, the substance of the contemplated
motion and any potential resolution. The conference shall take
place at least seven (7) days prior to the filing of the motion. If the
parties are unable to reach a resolution which eliminates the
necessity for a hearing, counsel for the moving party shall include
in the notice of motion a statement to the following effect: “This
motion is made following the conference of counsel pursuant to
L.R. 7-3 which took place on (date).”
L.R. 7-3.
Here, Defendants’ Notice of Motion states that this required conference of counsel took
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place on May 9, 2017, the same day the Motion to Dismiss was filed. MTD at 2:9-10. Thus, on
their face, Defendants’ moving papers fail to comply with Local Rule 7-3. Defendants provide
no written correspondence that demonstrates otherwise, and Defense Counsel does not explicitly
deny Plaintiff’s charge that Defendants failed to properly meet and confer. Declaration of Keith
Wyatt (“Wyatt Decl.”) ¶ 8, Docket No. 19. Instead, Defense Counsel Keith Wyatt states that
“Plaintiff’s objection regarding the failure to confer regarding the motion to dismiss is possibly
accurate with respect to the contention that I failed to discuss the motion to dismiss prior to May
2, 2017, but I do not believe that is accurate.” Id. The Court would find Defendants failed to
comply with Local Rule 7-3 before filing their Motion to Dismiss. As a result, the Court would
continue the motion to dismiss until July 6, 2017 to allow Plaintiff to oppose the motion on
substantive grounds.
B. Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand
“Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in
a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be
removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the
district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
Upon removal, if the action contains claims “not within the original or supplemental jurisdiction
of the district court or a claim that has been made nonremovable by statute…the court shall
sever” such claims and “remand the severed claims to state court.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(c)(1-2).
Here, Defendants removed Plaintiff’s action to federal court, invoking Federal Question
jurisdiction for Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim, and supplemental jurisdiction for Plaintiff’s state
claims. NOR at 2:20-21:15. Plaintiff now argues that the Court must sever the state claims and
remand them to state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections 1441(c)(1-2). MTR at 5:5-15.
Plaintiff’s motion will fail if the Court can properly exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her
state law claims because the mandatory remand provisions contained in Section 1441(c) would
not apply. See Nelson vs. City of Rochester, NY 492 F.Supp.2d 282, 287 (2007) (noting and
agreeing with the “substantial authority…that § 1441(c) does not apply to cases that have been
properly removed under § 1441(a)”); see also 28 U.S.C. Sections 1441(c)(1)(B) (limiting
severance provision contained in Section 1441(c)(2) to actions involving claims “not within the
original or supplemental jurisdiction of the district court or [claims] that [have] been made
nonremovable by statute”).
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i. Supplemental Jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state claims
A federal district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state claims provided
the federal and state claims “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.” United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Supplemental
jurisdiction is also proper where a “plaintiff’s claims are such that [he or she] would ordinarily
be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding…assuming substantiality of the federal
issues.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.
Here, the Court has original jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s first cause of action brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim is based on
allegations that Plaintiff sustained injuries while in Defendants’ custody in a March 23, 2015
automobile accident that occurred while Plaintiff was being transported by Defendants or
Defendants’ agents. FAC ¶¶ 22-27, 60. Plaintiff further alleges Defendants repeatedly failed to
properly diagnose and treat the injuries that resulted from that accident in violation of her
constitutional protection against cruel and unusual punishment. Id. ¶¶ 28-75. Plaintiff also
alleges that she suffered retaliation when she sought additional treatment for her injuries. Id. ¶
68.
Plaintiff’s second of action is for motor vehicle negligence, also based on the March 23,
2015 accident. Id. ¶¶ 76-87. Likewise, Plaintiff’s third cause of action for Negligent/Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress is based on Defendants’ alleged denial of proper treatment
following the same automobile accident, and subsequent retaliation. Id. ¶¶ 88-95. Because both
the second and third claim are based on many, if not all of the same factual allegations as
Plaintiff’s federal claim, the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over them and therefore the
mandatory severance provision cited by Plaintiff does not apply. See Nelson, 492 F.Supp.2d at
287; see also 28 U.S.C. Section 1441(c)(1).
The precise factual underpinnings of Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for invasion of
privacy are unclear. Plaintiff appears to base this claim on allegations that Defendants’ agents
took inappropriate photographs of Plaintiff while she was in a state of undress at some point
during her custody. Id. ¶¶ 98-99. Plaintiff does not allege when during her incarceration this
occurred or if it was related to medical treatment or the injuries she first sustained in the March
23, 2015 accident. However, in pleading her fourth claim, Plaintiff incorporates all of her
previous factual allegations by reference. Id. ¶ 96. Thus it appears, that at least in Plaintiff’s
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view, that facts she alleges in support of her other three causes of action also support her fourth
claim. Further, even if the alleged invasion of privacy was not directly related to Plaintiff’s
injuries and subsequent treatment, all four of her claims will undoubtedly involve common
witnesses, common evidence of Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement, and common evidence of
Defendants’ policies. Further, the alleged invasion of privacy took place under the same threat
of retaliation Plaintiff contends entitles her to the various tolling doctrines she has pled in
support of her state law claims. See id. ¶¶ 47-55. For these reasons, Plaintiff’s fourth cause of
action, like her two other state law claims, arises out of the same common nucleus of fact as her
federal claim, or would be expected to be brought in a similar action as her federal claim. As a
result, the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over all of Plaintiff’s state claims.
Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. First, Plaintiff argues that her state
claims are “distinguishable from the claim and fact pattern at-issue in the First Cause of Action.”
Mot. at 4:14-18. While some factual and legal distinctions are inevitable between different legal
claims, the law does not require an identical set of factual allegations, only a common nucleus of
operative fact. Gilder v. PGA Tour, Inc., 936 F.2d 417, 421 (9th Cir. 1991). For the reasons
stated above, all three state claims arise out of many, if not all of the same factual circumstances
as Plaintiff’s federal claim.
Plaintiff also attempts to argue that because her state law claims do not implicate the
same primary right as her federal claim, supplemental jurisdiction is not proper. Mot. 5:16-22.
Plaintiff cites a pair of 80-year-old Supreme Court decisions, neither of which state such a rule.
Indeed, district courts in the Ninth Circuit routinely exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state
tort claims brought alongside Section 1983 actions even where the state claims are not
constitutional in nature. See, e.g., Alston v. Cnty. Of Sacramento Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 2:13-CV1488 DAD, 2015 WL 6689636, *4. (E.D. Cal. October 29, 2015) (exercising supplemental
jurisdiction over state negligence claim brought alongside Section 1983 claim); Bondurant v.
City of Battleground, No. 3:15-CV-05719-KLS, 2016 WL 6973267, *7 (W.D. Wash. November
28, 2016) (exercising supplemental jurisdiction over state tort claims for false imprisonment,
false arrest and assault brought alongside Section 1983 claims); Lefebvre v. County of L.A., No.
CV-08-3761-AHM, 2009 WL 592862, *19-20 (C.D. Cal. March 6, 2009) (recognizing but
declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims including negligence,
wrongful imprisonment, and IIED brought alongside a Section 1983 claim for unlawful arrest);
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Palazzo v. Bonaventura, No. 2:12-CV-00562-MMD-VCF, 2012 WL 2132279, *2 (D. Nev. June
12, 2012 (exercising supplemental jurisdiction over state contract claims brought alongside 1983
claims).
ii. Consideration of Judicial Economy
The Plaintiff also reminds the Court that the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is
discretionary. MTR at 6:6-17. Plaintiff argues that the Court should exercise this discretion to
decline supplemental jurisdiction because factual and legal distinctions between the causes of
action will involve separate evidentiary burdens and separate expert witnesses. Id. Even if
Plaintiff is correct that her claims require proof of different factual elements, the Court would
still find that the principle of judicial economy would be best served by keeping all of Plaintiff’s
claims in front of a single court given that all derive from the same set of facts and are likely to
involve many of the same fact witnesses and documents. See Brady v. Brown, 51 F.3d 810, 816
(9th Cir. 1995) (“The decision to retain jurisdiction over state law claims is within the district
court’s discretion, weighing factors such as economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.”).
Plaintiff also argues novel state law issues are “anticipated.” Id. However, the Court does not
believe Plaintiff’s “anticipated” issues are likely to predominate over Plaintiff’s federal claim to
such a degree that supplemental jurisdiction would be inappropriate. See Schmidt v. County of
Nev., No. 2:10-CV-03022-FCD, 2011 WL 445836 (E.D. Cal. February 8, 2011) (“When a
plaintiff alleges a violation of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it is highly unlikely
that state law tort claims will substantially predominate.”).
In sum, the Court would find that this case was properly remanded and that the Court is
not required to sever and remand Plaintiff’s state law claims, nor would it exercise its discretion
to do so at this time.
IV. Conclusion
The Court would DENY Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand without prejudice. The Court
would continue Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss until July 6, 2017 to allow both sides to brief the
motion in accordance with the applicable local rules.
Plaintiff moved ex parte on June 8, 2017 for an order granting her procedural objection
to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or an order continuing the June 12 hearing on Defendants'
motion. See Docket No. 26. In light of the above ruling said application is moot.

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