Walter Lee Williams v. United States of America et al
Filing
43
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 31 AND DISMISSING CASE by Judge Otis D. Wright, II. For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the United States' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 31). The Court DISMISSES the United States WITH PREJUDICE and DISMISSES the Individual Defendants WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Clerk of the Court shall close the case. ( MD JS-6. Case Terminated ) (lom)
O
JS-6
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
United States District Court
Central District of California
9
10
11
WALTER LEE WILLIAMS,
12
13
14
15
16
Case No.: 2:17-cv-03040-ODW-FFM
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,
ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS [31] AND DISMISSING
CASE
Defendants.
17
18
I.
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
INTRODUCTION
On April 21, 2017, Plaintiff Walter Lee Williams (“Plaintiff”) filed this action
against the United States of America (“Defendant” or “United States”) and eighteen
named and unnamed individuals (collectively, “Individual Defendants”) for various
constitutional and common-law torts, as well as a single civil RICO conspiracy claim.
(Compl. ¶¶ 22–40, ECF No. 1.) On May 24, 2017, under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(m), the Court ordered Plaintiff to serve the Complaint and Summons on
each defendant no later than August 22, 2017. (ECF No. 19.) To date, the United
States is the only defendant that has been served with the Complaint and Summons.
(ECF No. 23–29.)
1
On November 11, 2017, the United States moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s
2
Complaint in its entirety, or, in the alternative, to quash service of process because the
3
requisite filing fee was not paid. (Mot., ECF No. 31.) In his Opposition, Plaintiff
4
submitted exhibits demonstrating that the requisite filing fee was paid. (Opp’n Exs.
5
A, B; ECF No. 39.) In Reply, the United States retracted its argument that service of
6
the Complaint should be quashed. 1 (Reply 1 n.2; ECF No. 40.) For the reasons
7
discussed below, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss.2
II.
8
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
9
Plaintiff’s claims arise from two separate incidents that occurred while he was
10
incarcerated at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Los Angeles (“MDCLA”). The
11
first occurred on October 7, 2013, when Plaintiff was attacked by a fellow inmate (the
12
“October 2013 Attack”). (Compl. ¶ 71.) The second incident occurred on January 28,
13
2014, when Plaintiff slipped in a puddle of water in the halls of MDCLA and
14
sustained serious injuries (the “January 2014 Slip and Fall”). (Id. ¶¶ 84–85.)
15
Regarding the October 2013 Attack, Plaintiff alleges that he was brutally
16
attacked while in another inmate’s cell and that certain defendants conspired to allow
17
for the attack to occur. (Id. ¶¶ 71–73.) Plaintiff further alleges that certain defendants
18
failed to provide Plaintiff with adequate medical care following the attack. (Id. ¶¶ 76–
19
82.) Regarding the January 2014 Slip and Fall, Plaintiff contends that, after he fell, he
20
did not receive adequate medical treatment for his serious injuries. (Id. ¶¶ 86–89, 94,
21
111–12.)
22
Plaintiff claims that these two incidents demonstrate the existence of a civil
23
RICO enterprise conspiracy between a number of defendants to “willfully,
24
maliciously, intentionally, and wantonly harass and injure Plaintiff.” (Id. ¶¶ 330–37.)
25
26
1
27
28
Because the United States retracted its arguments on this issue, the Court DENIES the United
States’ Motion to Quash Service.
2
After carefully considering the papers filed in support of the Motion, the Court deemed the
matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15.
2
1
On December 28, 2014, Plaintiff submitted a Standard Form 95 (“SF-95”) to
2
the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). (Verified Compl., Ex. 16, ECF No. 5.) In his SF-95,
3
Plaintiff describes the January 2014 Slip and Fall, but makes no mention of the
4
October 2013 Attack.
5
administrative claim. (Id., Ex. 17.) The BOP informed Plaintiff that if he was “not
6
satisfied with this determination, [he was] afforded six months from the date of this
7
letter . . . to bring suit in the appropriate United States District Court.” (Id.) On
8
August 6, 2015 Plaintiff requested an appeal of the BOP’s denial of Plaintiff’s
9
administrative claim. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he never received a response to the
10
(Id.)
On June 25, 2015, the BOP rejected Plaintiff’s
administrative appeal. (Compl. ¶ 62.)
III.
11
LEGAL STANDARD
12
A court may dismiss a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
13
12(b)(6) for lack of a cognizable legal theory or insufficient facts pleaded to support
14
an otherwise cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d
15
696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need only
16
satisfy the minimal notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)—a short and plain
17
statement of the claim. Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003). The
18
factual “allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
19
level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). That is, the complaint
20
must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that
21
is plausible on its face.”
22
quotation marks omitted).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal
23
The determination of whether a complaint satisfies the plausibility standard is a
24
“context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
25
experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. A court is generally limited to the
26
pleadings and must construe all “factual allegations set forth in the complaint . . . as
27
true and . . . in the light most favorable” to the plaintiff. Lee v. City of Los Angeles,
28
250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). But a court
3
1
need not blindly accept conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of fact, and
2
unreasonable inferences. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th
3
Cir. 2001).
IV.
4
5
A.
DISCUSSION
United States’ Motion to Dismiss
6
The United States argues that Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed for several
7
reasons. First, the claims regarding the October 2013 Attack were not raised with the
8
BOP during the administrative presentment process, and are therefore barred by the
9
United States’ sovereign immunity. (Mot. 4–6.) Second, the claims regarding the
10
January 2014 Slip and Fall are barred because the plaintiff failed to file his complaint
11
within the time limit mandated by the Federal Torts Claims Act (“FTCA”). (Id. at 6–
12
7.) The Court will address each argument in turn.
13
1.
Sovereign Immunity Regarding the October 2013 Attack
14
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the United States “is immune from
15
suit save as it consents to be sued, . . . and the terms of its consent to be sued in any
16
court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” United States v. Sherwood,
17
312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) (citations omitted); see also Chadd v. United States, 794
18
F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2015).
19
The FTCA provides a limited waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity
20
with respect to certain common-law tort claims. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2679(a);
21
Duggard v. United States, 835 F.3d 915, 918–19 (9th Cir. 2016). When the United
22
States waives its sovereign immunity, it may impose conditions on that waiver and,
23
when it does, those conditions “must be strictly observed.” Lehman v. Nakshian, 453
24
U.S. 156, 161 (1981). One of the conditions for waiver under the FTCA is that a
25
plaintiff must exhaust their administrative remedies before bringing suit. McNeil v.
26
United States, 508 U.S. 106, 108 (1993). Any tort claim against the United States
27
shall be “forever barred” if a plaintiff does not submit his or her administrative claim
28
within two years of the claim accruing. 28 U.S.C. § 2401. A plaintiff’s failure to
4
1
comply with either of these conditions denies the Court of jurisdiction, and, therefore,
2
is grounds for dismissal under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). McNeil,
3
508 U.S. at 113.
4
Here, Plaintiff has yet to file an administrative claim with the BOP concerning
5
the October 2013 Attack. While Plaintiff did file an administrative complaint with the
6
BOP concerning the January 2014 Slip and Fall, that complaint did not include or
7
refer to any events that took place during the October 2013 attack. (Verified Compl.,
8
Ex. 16, ECF No. 5.) In Plaintiff’s opposition, he incorrectly equates notifying the
9
BOP of “systemic efforts by BOP staff to ignore serious injuries to Plaintiff” with
10
properly submitting an administrative claim, thereby putting the BOP on notice of the
11
October 2013 Attack. (Opp’n 4.) In addition, “[a] tort claim against the United States
12
shall be forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal
13
agency within two year after such claim accrues . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (emphasis
14
added).
15
Plaintiff has yet to submit an administrative claim regarding the incident. Plaintiff has
16
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Therefore, the Court lacks jurisdiction.
17
Because this defect cannot be cured through amendment, the Court GRANTS the
18
United States’ Motion to Dismiss with regard to the October 2013 Attack, without
19
leave to amend. Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 2003).
More than two years have accrued since the October 2013 Attack and
20
2.
Statute of Limitations Regarding the January 2014 Slip and Fall
21
The United States argues the Plaintiff’s FTCA claims have all expired. A
22
district court may dismiss claims if the running of the statute of limitations is apparent
23
on the face of the complaint and “the assertions of the complaint, read with the
24
required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.”
25
Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1045 (9th Cir. 2011)
26
(quoting Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980)).
27
“A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless . . . action
28
is begun within six months after the date of mailing, by certified or registered mail, or
5
1
notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was presented.” 28 U.S.C.
2
§ 2401; see also Long v. United States, No. CIV. 05-6383-AA, 2006 WL 1142969, at
3
*1 (D. Or. Apr. 25, 2006) (“The burden of proving that the agency actually received a
4
request for reconsideration rests with the plaintiff.”). If the claimant files a written
5
request with the agency for reconsideration prior to the expiration of the six-month
6
period provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2401, the claimant’s statute of limitation “shall not
7
accrue until 6 months after the filing of a request for reconsideration.” 28 C.F.R.
8
§ 14.9(b); Berti v. V.A. Hosp., 860 F.2d 338, 340 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that a timely
9
administrative appeal “tolls the six-month limitation period until either the [agency]
10
responds or six more months pass”) (emphasis added).
11
The BOP denied Plaintiff’s administrative claim on June 25, 2015. (Verified
12
Compl., Ex. 17, ECF No. 5.) The Plaintiff sought reconsideration of that denial on
13
August 6, 2015. (Id.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s option to file suit in district court
14
accrued on February 6, 2016, “6 months after the filing of a request for
15
reconsideration.” 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(b). Plaintiff had six months from that date—until
16
August 6, 2016—to file suit in district court. However, Plaintiff did not file suit until
17
April 21, 2017, more than 250 days after the deadline to do so. Therefore, Plaintiff’s
18
claims against the United States regarding the January 2014 Slip and Fall, are barred
19
as untimely and must be dismissed.
20
a.
Equitable Tolling
21
Plaintiff argues that the Court should apply equitable tolling principles to allow
22
his claims to proceed. “Equitable tolling allows a plaintiff to prevent the statute of
23
limitations from running during a particular period” if the plaintiff establishes “(1) that
24
he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary
25
circumstance stood in his way.” Henson v. Fidelity Nat’l Fin. Co., No. 2:14-cv-
26
01240-ODW (RZx), 2014 WL 1246222, at *5, (C.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2014) (citing Pace
27
v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). The Ninth Circuit has previously held
28
that “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling . . . is very high, lest the
6
1
exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir.
2
2002) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000)).
3
Additionally, equitable tolling is a rarity that only applies in “extraordinary
4
circumstances.” Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2009).
5
Moreover, application of equitable tolling is only warranted where the defendant has
6
“induced the plaintiff to delay filing until after the statute of limitations has run.”
7
Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1127 (9th Cir. 2008).
8
Plaintiff alleges that he pursued his administrative remedies with the BOP
9
diligently. (Opp’n. 4.) However, as previously mentioned, the June 25, 2015 claim-
10
denial letter plainly stated that Plaintiff was “afforded six months from the date of the
11
mailing of th[e] letter . . . to bring suit in the appropriate United States District Court.”
12
(Verified Compl., Ex. 17, ECF No. 5.) From the date of the letter, June 25, 2015, to
13
the date of filing suit, April 21, 2017, Plaintiff failed to pursue this matter in federal
14
court, as advised.
15
Plaintiff further alleges that during the lapse in time from seeking his
16
administrative appeal to the filing of the suit in district court he was transferred to five
17
different facilities. (Opp’n 4.) Plaintiff states that he was unable to file suit due to his
18
poor medical condition and lack of access to proper electronic typing equipment. (Id.)
19
These facts, however, do not amount to “extraordinary circumstances.” See, e.g.,
20
Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 90 (1990) (holding that equitable
21
tolling is not available for “garden variety claim[s] of excusable neglect”); Pace, 544
22
U.S. at 418 (holding that a related pending state claim did not constitute
23
“extraordinary circumstances,” that warranted equitable tolling for the plaintiffs
24
federal claim); cf. Viridian v. Holder, 646 F.3d 1230, 1232 (9th Cir. 2011) (ruling that
25
the fraudulent deceit by an immigration consultant can constitute an “extraordinary
26
circumstance.”). Plaintiff has also not alleged any facts that plausibly suggest that the
27
United States’ alleged actions induced Plaintiff to postpone filing this claim until the
28
statute of limitations expired.
Plaintiff’s circumstances did not amount to an
7
1
“extraordinary circumstance,” and, as such, equitable tolling does not apply in this
2
case.
3
Moreover, “[w]hile we have insisted that the pleadings prepared by prisoners
4
who do not have access to counsel be liberally construed, and have held that some
5
procedural rules must give way because of the unique circumstance of incarceration,”
6
the Court has never suggested that rules of civil procedure should be ignored simply
7
because there is a pro se plaintiff.
8
omitted). As noted by the United States Supreme Court, “in the long run, experience
9
teaches that strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the
10
legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law.” Mohasco
11
Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980).
McNeil, 508 U.S. at 108 (internal citations
For these reasons, the Court GRANTS the United States’ Motion to Dismiss
12
13
with regard to the January 2014 Slip and Fall.
14
B.
Failure to Serve Individual Defendants
15
On May 24, 2017, the Court advised Plaintiff that service of the Summons and
16
Complaint must be accomplished on each named defendant within 90 days after the
17
filing of the complaint. (ECF No. 19.) The Court extended the 90-day period to
18
commence on May 22, 2017 and expire on August 22, 2017. (Id.) The Court warned
19
that “failure to effect service by that date may result in the dismissal of the action
20
without prejudice as to any unserved defendant(s) by reason of [P]laintiff’s failure to
21
prosecute . . . .” (Id.)
22
On September 20, 2017, proof of service of the Complaint as to Defendant
23
United States of America was filed.
(ECF No. 24.)
To date, Plaintiff has not
24
submitted proof of service as to the remaining Individual Defendants.
25
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) requires that “[i]f a defendant is not
26
served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court—on motion or on its own
27
after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action without prejudice against that
28
defendant or order that service be made within a specified time.” The Court provided
8
1
notice to Plaintiff of this requirement to serve Defendants by August 22, 2017, and
2
Plaintiff failed to provide the Court with proof of service regarding the Individual
3
Defendants.
4
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES the Individual Defendants
V.
5
6
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the United States’ Motion to
7
Dismiss (ECF No. 31).
8
PREJUDICE
9
PREJUDICE. The Clerk of the Court shall close the case.
and
The Court DISMISSES the United States WITH
DISMISSES
the
Individual
Defendants
10
11
IT IS SO ORDERED.
12
February 21, 2018
13
14
15
____________________________________
OTIS D. WRIGHT, II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
9
WITHOUT
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?