Mathew Moore v. Petrochem Insulation, Inc., et al
Filing
13
MINUTES OF IN CHAMBERS - ORDER RE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY CASE SHOULD NOT BE REMANDED by Judge Dolly M. Gee: The Court incorporates its discussion of the procedural background from its Order to Show Cause ("OSC") why the action should not be remanded to state court 8 . The Court REMANDS this action to Los Angeles County Superior Court, Case Number BC655712, due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. ( Case Terminated. Made JS-6 ) Court Reporter: Not Reported. (gk)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
Case No.
Date
CV 17-3418 DMG (JCx)
Title Matthew Moore v. Petrochem Insulation, Inc.
Present: The Honorable
REMAND / JS-6
July 31, 2017
Page
1 of 4
DOLLY M. GEE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
KANE TIEN
Deputy Clerk
NOT REPORTED
Court Reporter
Attorneys Present for Plaintiff(s)
None Present
Attorneys Present for Defendant(s)
None Present
Proceedings: IN CHAMBERS - ORDER RE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY CASE
SHOULD NOT BE REMANDED
The Court incorporates its discussion of the procedural background from its Order to
Show Cause (“OSC”) why the action should not be remanded to state court. (“May 11, 2017
Order”) [Doc. # 8.] Having reviewed the parties’ responses to the OSC, the Court REMANDS
this action to Los Angeles County Superior Court.
I.
LEGAL STANDARD
A defendant may remove an action brought in state court to a federal district court where
the action is pending if the district court has original jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. §
1441. A federal district court has original jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, law, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Ninth Circuit “strictly
construe[s] the removal statute against removal jurisdiction.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564,
566 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 698 (9th Cir.
2005) (“removal statutes should be construed narrowly in favor of remand to protect the
jurisdiction of state courts.”). There is a “strong presumption against removal jurisdiction,” and
courts must reject it “if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.”
Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka ex rel. Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir.
2010) (emphasis added). Generally, a federal claim must appear on the face of a well-pleaded
complaint for federal question jurisdiction. Lyons v. Alaska Teamsters Employer Serv. Corp.,
188
F.3d
1170,
1171
(9th
Cir.
1999).
//
CV-90
CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
Initials of Deputy Clerk KT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
Case No.
REMAND / JS-6
Date
CV 17-3418 DMG (JCx)
Title Matthew Moore v. Petrochem Insulation, Inc.
July 31, 2017
Page
2 of 4
II.
ANALYSIS
A. Section 301 LMRA Preemption
The Court incorporates its articulation of the Burnside two-part test for determining
Section 301 preemption from its May 11, 2017 Order.
1. Right Conferred by State Law
Rest and meal breaks, and recovery of overtime pay claims brought pursuant to
California Labor Code sections 226.7 and 1198, are pure state law claims. See, e.g., Castillo v.
Long Beach Mem’l Med. Ctr., 132 F. Supp. 3d 1194, 1199 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (rest and meal break
claims, and claims for recovery of unpaid wages “derive from violations of California state law,
not violations of the CBA.”). If the right is conferred on individual employees as a matter of
state law, “it is the legal character of a claim . . . and not whether a grievance arising from
‘precisely the same set of facts’ could be pursued, that decides whether a state cause of action
may go forward.” Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 124 (1994).
Here, Plaintiff Mathew Moore’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) “does not allege any
violation of a [Collective Bargaining Agreement] or seek redress for such violation.” Moore
Resp. at 3 [Doc. # 12]. Instead, his wage and hour claims brought under the California Labor
Code and the California Unfair Competition Law exist independently of any CBA and are not
preempted under the first prong of the Burnside test.
Nevertheless, Defendant Petrochem Insulation, Inc. contends that certain California
Labor Code sections at issue in this case do not apply to employees covered by a CBA. Def.
Resp. at 3 (citing Cal. Lab. Code §§ 510, 512, 514). Because of these statutory exemptions,
Petrochem asserts that Moore “has no valid statutory claims for daily overtime, meal breaks, or
rest breaks” against it. Id. at 6. Petrochem’s argument, however, raises an affirmative defense
that does not alter the fact that Moore’s claims arise under state law. See Vasserman v. Henry
Mayo Newhall Mem’l Hosp., 65 F. Supp. 3d 932, 955 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (“Even if [defendant’s] §
514 [exemption] defense ultimately prevails, [plaintiff’s] claim is premised on state law rights
afforded by § 510, not on rights created by the CBA.”).
//
CV-90
CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
Initials of Deputy Clerk KT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
Case No.
CV 17-3418 DMG (JCx)
Title Matthew Moore v. Petrochem Insulation, Inc.
REMAND / JS-6
Date
July 31, 2017
Page
3 of 4
2. Right Not “Substantially Dependent” on Collective Bargaining Agreement
A state law right is “substantially dependent” on the terms of a CBA if a court must
“interpret” rather than merely “look to” the CBA in resolving the claim. Burnside, 481 F.3d at
1060. The distinction “is not always clear or amenable to a bright-line test.” Cramer v. Consol.
Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683, 691 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended (Aug. 27, 2001). “[N]ot every
claim which requires a court to refer to the language of a labor-management agreement is
necessarily preempted [and] the bare fact that a collective-bargaining agreement will be
consulted in the course of state-law litigation plainly does not require the claim to be
extinguished.” Valles v. Ivy Hill Corp., 410 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005).
Here, Petrochem only points to one specific provision of the CBA that supposedly
requires interpretation of the CBA to resolve the state-law claim. This provision states that
“[r]est periods need not be authorized in limited circumstances when the disruption of
continuous operations would jeopardize the product or process of the work.” See Doc #1-14 at 5
(collective bargaining agreement). According to Petrochem, it “anticipates that, to the extent
[Moore] (or other putative class members) missed any rest breaks, it will assert that it was
because the disruption of his work would have jeopardized the product or process of work. . . .”
Def. Resp. at 8.
The fact that the Court may refer to the CBA or one its provisions is not tantamount to
interpreting that CBA provision. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Calportland Co., 2015 WL 6513640, at *4
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2015) (“No ‘interpretation’ is needed of the CBA at issue—which is
straightforward and clear—to determine whether it provides an employee with the rights listed in
sections 512(e) and 514.”); Vasserman, 65 F. Supp. 3d at 956 (where CBA is “straightforward
and clear” and “no interpretation is required to determine the applicability of the exemption,”
plaintiffs’ claims are not preempted). In this case, while there may be a dispute as to the
underlying facts, none of the parties dispute the meaning of the CBA rest-period provision and
the Court need not interpret the CBA to resolve Moore’s rest-period claim.
In sum, the substantive claims in this action are not substantially dependent on the CBA
and therefore the LMRA does not preempt this action.
//
CV-90
CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
Initials of Deputy Clerk KT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
Case No.
REMAND / JS-6
Date
CV 17-3418 DMG (JCx)
Title Matthew Moore v. Petrochem Insulation, Inc.
July 31, 2017
Page
4 of 4
III.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the Court REMANDS this action to Los Angeles County
Superior Court due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
CV-90
CIVIL MINUTES—GENERAL
Initials of Deputy Clerk KT
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