White v. Danaher Corporation et al
Filing
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ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS 34 by Judge Otis D. Wright, II . (lc). Modified on 10/24/2018 (lc).
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United States District Court
Central District of California
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MICHAEL WHITE,
Plaintiff,
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v.
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Case No. 2:17-cv-03476-ODW (JCx)
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
THE SENIOR LEADERS SEVERANCE AND COSTS [34]
PAY PLAN OF DANAHER
CORPORATION AND ITS AFFILIATED
COMPANIES, an ERISA plan;
DANAHER CORPORATION, a
corporation; DOES 1 through 10,
inclusive,
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Defendants.
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Plaintiff Michael White claimed he was improperly denied severance benefits
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after his employer fired him. He sued his employer, Danaher Corporation, and The
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Senior Leaders Severance Pay Plan of Danaher Corporation (collectively, “Danaher”).
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(Compl., ECF No. 1.) On June 27, 2018, the Court granted Danaher’s Motion for
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Summary Judgment. (Order Granting Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“MSJ Order”), ECF
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No. 30.) Danaher now seeks its attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to ERISA’s1 civil
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Employee Retirement Income Securities Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1132.
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enforcement provision. (Mot. for Attorney Fees and Costs (“Mot.”) 5, ECF No. 34.)
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For the reasons below, the Court DENIES Danaher’s Motion.2
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I.
BACKGROUND
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The Court addressed the factual allegations and procedural history relevant to
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this case in its MSJ Order and incorporates that discussion here by reference. (See
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ECF No. 30.) After obtaining summary judgment in its favor, Danaher now seeks an
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award of attorneys’ fees of $94,733.60 and costs of $507.37. (Notice of Mot. 2.)3
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II.
LEGAL STANDARD
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Under ERISA’s civil enforcement provision, “the court in its discretion may
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allow a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs of action to either party.” 29 U.S.C.
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§ 1132(g)(1). A claimant is eligible to seek fees under section 1132(g)(1) if they have
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achieved “some degree of success on the merits.” Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life
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Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 245 (2010) (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680,
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694 (1983)).
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Once a fee claimant is found eligible, district courts must apply the factors
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articulated in Hummell v. S.E. Rykoff & Co., 634 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1980), in
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exercising their discretion to award fees.
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Disability Plan, 608 F.3d 1118, 1119 (9th Cir. 2010). The “Hummell factors” include:
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(1) the degree of the opposing parties’ culpability or bad faith; (2) the
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ability of the opposing parties to satisfy an award of fees; (3) whether
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an award of fees against the opposing parties would deter others from
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acting under similar circumstances; (4) whether the parties requesting
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fees sought to benefit all participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA
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Simonia v. Glendale Nissan/Infiniti
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After considering the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deems the matter
appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15.
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Danaher also seeks judicial notice of several documents relevant to the reasonableness of
Danaher’s submitted billing rates and hours. (Req. for Judicial Notice, ECF No. 34-4.) Because the
Court does not find a fee award appropriate, it is unnecessary to reach Danaher’s Request for
Judicial Notice. Accordingly, Danaher’s Request for Judicial Notice is DENIED as moot.
(ECF No. 34-4.)
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plan or to resolve a significant legal question regarding ERISA; and
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(5) the relative merits of the parties’ positions.
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Hummell, 634 F.2d at 453. No one factor is determinative, and some factors may be
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irrelevant depending on the case. Carpenters S. Cal. Admin. Corp. v. Russell, 726
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F.2d 1410, 1416 (9th Cir. 1984).
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“[A]pplication of the Hummell factors must recognize the remedial purpose of
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ERISA in favor of participants and beneficiaries.” Honolulu Joint Apprenticeship &
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Training Comm. of United Ass’n Local Union No. 675 v. Foster, 332 F.3d 1234, 1239
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(9th Cir. 2003). “While some Ninth Circuit authority may advise caution prior to the
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award of attorney’s fees against [an ERISA] plaintiff, such cases do not eliminate the
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possibility of an award of fees to a defendant generally.” Reilly v. Charles M. Brewer
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Ltd. Money Purchase Pension Plan & Tr., 349 F. App’x 155, 158 (9th Cir. 2009).
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The Ninth Circuit has long made clear that “the playing field is level” and the
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“analysis . . . must focus only on the Hummell factors, without favoring” either side.
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Id. (quoting Estate of Shockley v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 130 F.3d 403, 408 (9th
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Cir. 1997); see also Cline v. Indus. Maint. Eng’g & Contracting Co., 200 F.3d 1223,
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1236 (9th Cir. 2000) (recognizing the “level playing field” and affirming denial of
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fees).
III.
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DISCUSSION
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Having obtained summary judgment in their favor, no question exists that
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Danaher succeeded on the merits. After considering the Hummell factors, however,
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the Court finds that a fee award is not appropriate.
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A.
Bad Faith
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“[T]o avoid a finding of bad faith under the Hummell factors, plaintiffs must
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have a reasonable belief that they could prove an actionable ERISA claim.” Cline,
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200 F.3d at 1236. White claimed that Danaher abused its discretion in finding he was
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terminated for cause and consequently denying him severance benefits. The operative
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question is then whether he had a reasonable belief that he could prove his claim.
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White asserted several arguments in support of his claim. (See e.g., MSJ Order 11,
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15–16 (including that Danaher reviewed improper summaries when reviewing his
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claim, failed to provide specific reasons for denying his benefits, and operated under a
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structural conflict of interest warranting increased scrutiny).) White’s claim may have
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been marginal, but that does not make it unreasonable.
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unsuccessful, after reviewing the record, the Court cannot find White’s claim to have
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been brought in bad faith. Thus, this factor weighs against awarding fees.
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B.
Although ultimately
Ability to Satisfy Fee Award
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The second Hummell factor considers the ability of the opposing party to satisfy
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the fee award. 634 F.2d at 453. Neither party disputes its ability to pay Defendants’
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fees. In such circumstances, the Ninth Circuit has found this factor to be neutral. See
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Foster, 332 F.3d at 1239; see also Reilly, 349 F. App’x at 157.
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C.
Deterrence
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Deterrence is more appropriately considered respecting a fee award to an
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ERISA plaintiff, and thus is of less significance here. See Tingey v. Pixley-Richards
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W., Inc., 958 F.2d 908, 910 (9th Cir. 1992). The interest in deterrence must be
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“balanced against the interest in ensuring that plan participants are not overdeterred
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from pursuing the prompt enforcement of their rights under a plan.” Black v. Greater
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Bay Bancorp Exec. Supplemental Comp. Benefits Plan, No. 16-CV-00486-EDL, 2018
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WL 1510084, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-1570 (9th Cir.
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Apr. 26, 2018). The cost of litigation and unlikelihood of success generally deter
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ERISA plaintiffs from frivolous litigation. Sanjiv Goel, M.D., Inc. v. Motion Picture
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Indus. Pension & Health Plan, No. CV 14-2056 PSG (CWX), 2015 WL 13376563, at
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*4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2015). There is no need for additional deterrence where a fee
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award would “tend to deter marginal but meritorious” claims. Corder v. Howard
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Johnson & Co., 53 F.3d 225, 232 (9th Cir. 1994). Because the Court does not find
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that White acted in bad faith, there is no need to further deter similar claims.
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Accordingly, this factor weighs against awarding fees.
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D.
Benefit to All
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“A lawsuit that benefits all plan participants or leads to the resolution of
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important legal questions regarding ERISA can support the award of fees.” Goel,
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2015 WL 13376563, at *4. As with deterrence, this factor is more appropriately
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considered respecting a fee award to an ERISA plaintiff, not a defendant. See id.
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(citing Tingey, 958 F.2d at 910). White sought to recover severance benefits for
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himself, not to benefit other plan participants or resolve important legal questions.
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However, neither is the Court convinced that Danaher’s motivation was anything
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more than a desire to avoid a severance payment to White. Thus, this factor is neutral.
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E.
Relative Merits
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The final Hummell factor is the “relative merits of the parties’ positions.” 634
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F.2d at 453. There is no question that Danaher prevailed on all issues. Thus, this
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factor favors a fee award.
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Reviewing the Hummell factors, two factors weigh against, two factors are
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neutral, and one factor favors a fee award. Only when a litigant has achieved some
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success on the merits and the Hummell factors weigh in favor is a fee award
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appropriate. Danaher obtained summary judgment in its favor, but the Hummell
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factors do not favor a fee award. Accordingly, the Court denies Danaher’s motion for
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attorneys’ fees and costs.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Court DENIES Danaher’s motion for attorneys’ fees
and costs. (ECF No. 34.)
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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October 22, 2018
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____________________________________
OTIS D. WRIGHT, II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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