Lily Cassandra Alphonsis v. Century Regional Detention Facility et al

Filing 5

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND by Magistrate Judge Douglas F. McCormick. 1 (twdb)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

WESTERN DIVISION

11

LILY CASSANDRA ALPHONSIS, ) No. CV 17-03650-ODW (DFM)

12

Plaintiff,

13

v.

14
15

CENTURY REGIONAL
DETENTION FACILITY, et al.,

16

Defendants.

17

)
)
) MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
)
) DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH
) LEAVE TO AMEND
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

18
19

I.

20

BACKGROUND

21

On May 15, 2017, Lily Cassandra Alphonsis (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner at

22

Century Regional Detention Facility in Lynwood, California, filed a pro se

23

civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dkt. 1 (“Complaint”). She names as

24

defendants the Century Regional Detention Facility and Sheriff Jim

25

McDonnell in his official capacity only.1

26
27
28

Plaintiff mentions the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department in the
Complaint’s caption, but this appears to be part of her naming Sheriff
1

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, the Court must

1
2

screen the Complaint to determine whether the action is frivolous or malicious;

3

fails to state a claim on which relief might be granted; or seeks monetary relief

4

against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

5

II.

6

SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS

7

A.

Allegations Related to Illness from Food

8

In November 2015, Plaintiff collapsed at dinner. Complaint at 5.

9

“Defendants” had put milk in her food, even though the prison kitchen

10

department knew milk would trigger anaphylactic shock. Id. Later, the

11

“Defendants” gave her creamer which “tore through” her skin. Id. She

12

reported this to the medical department. Id. In late February 2017, “the

13

Defendant” gave Plaintiff a breakfast that made her sick. Id. She was sent to

14

the clinic, and was either told that no doctor was available or saw a doctor

15

who refused to treat her. Id. “The Defendant” removed Plaintiff from the

16

Education Based Incarceration Program and took away credits she had earned

17

toward her release date. Id. at 6.

18

B.

19

Allegations Related to Court Mail
On August 25, 2016, Plaintiff handed her California Supreme Court

20

habeas petition to “Deputy Gutierrez.” Id. He sealed the envelope and

21

indicated that he would place it in the mail. Id. Plaintiff contacted the

22

California Supreme Court in mid-September 2016; the clerk confirmed receipt

23

of the envelope but stated that “the documents inside the envelope seemed like

24

a joke, as the documents were some papers that were marked Exhibit,” and

25

that he had returned the envelope to the prison. Id. Plaintiff’s Complaint is

26

hard to understand, but it appears that she claims that the California Supreme

27
28

McDonnell as a defendant. See Complaint at 1, 3.
2

1

Court dismissed her petition because letters from that court were withheld

2

from her. Id. at 6-7. She attaches to the Complaint a summary dismissal of her

3

habeas petition by the California Supreme Court, dated January 18, 2017. Id.

4

at 17. Plaintiff also claims that the “Defendants” interfered with her sending

5

and receiving mail from a Minnesota probate court, in a case where she claims

6

that she and the late musician Prince collaborated on a song. Id. at 7-8.

7

C.

Allegations Related to Cellmate

8

In January 2017, “the Defendant” housed Celine Martelleur with

9

Plaintiff. Id. at 8. On February 12, Martelleur, who had been in the news for

10

stalking actress Jodie Foster, hit and scraped herself against the cell wall. Id.

11

Plaintiff tried to alert deputies by pressing an alarm for help, but Martelleur

12

attacked Plaintiff to stop her. Id. After Plaintiff pushed the alarm, Martelleur

13

was removed from the cell. Id. That evening, Plaintiff was sent to solitary

14

confinement and accused of attacking Martelleur. Id. at 8-9. After eleven days,

15

a sergeant reviewed Plaintiff’s side of the story and released her from solitary.

16

Id. at 9.

17

D.

18

Allegations Related to Release Date
In March 2017, “one of the defendants Sergeant” looked into Plaintiff’s

19

“minute order” and told her that her release date was incorrect. Id. Plaintiff

20

submitted a grievance, was told by “the defendant’s deputy Afaro” that “the

21

county percentage will kick in whenever it kicks in,” and she was referred to

22

“Senior Vasquez.” Id. Vasquez confirmed that Plaintiff’s sentence calculation

23

was inaccurate, but Plaintiff’s subsequent grievance was ignored. Id. On

24

March 18, “the defendant” handed Plaintiff a warrant that prevented Plaintiff’s

25

release from prison. Id. On March 20, Plaintiff appeared in court and learned

26

that the warrant was related to the incident with Martelleur. Id. After a month,

27

that case was dismissed. Id. Plaintiff again requested a correction of her release

28

date, but her request was ignored. Id.
3

1
2

E.

Relief Requested
Plaintiff requests the following relief:

3

 “Healthy foods” and medical care;

4

 The ability to send mail without interference;

5

 Enrollment in prison programs and recalculation of her credits toward

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

her release date;
 Actual custody credit, including relief from being “sentenced to a crime
[she] did not commit”; and
 Classification as a non-violent inmate.
Id. at 10.
III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court’s screening of the Complaint under the foregoing statutes is

14

governed by the following standards: A complaint may be dismissed for failure

15

to state a claim for two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory; or (2)

16

insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

17

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In determining whether the

18

complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, its allegations of

19

material fact must be taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to

20

Plaintiff. Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). Since

21

Plaintiff is appearing pro se, the Court must construe the allegations of the

22

complaint liberally and afford Plaintiff the benefit of any doubt. Karim-Panahi

23

v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). However, “the

24

liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.”

25

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation

26

of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that

27

were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251,

28
4

1

1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268

2

(9th Cir. 1982)). A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his

3

‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a

4

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual

5

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,

6

on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if

7

doubtful in fact).” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

8

(citations omitted); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

9

(holding that to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must

10

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that

11

is plausible on its face.’ A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

12

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

13

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” (citation omitted)).
If the Court finds that a complaint should be dismissed for failure to state

14
15

a claim, the Court may dismiss with or without leave to amend. Lopez v.

16

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-30 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The Court should

17

grant leave to amend if it appears possible that the defects in the complaint

18

could be corrected, especially if a plaintiff is pro se. Id. at 1130-31; see also

19

Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that “[a] pro

20

se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint, and some notice

21

of its deficiencies, unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the

22

complaint could not be cured by amendment”). However, if, after careful

23

consideration, it is clear that a complaint cannot be cured by amendment, the

24

Court may dismiss without leave to amend. Cato, 70 F.3d at 1105-06.

25

///

26

///

27

///

28

///
5

1

IV.

2

DISCUSSION

3

Plaintiff’s Complaint suffers from numerous deficiencies, as detailed

4

below.

5

A.

Heck-Barred Claims

6

In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the United States Supreme

7

Court addressed “whether a state prisoner may challenge the constitutionality

8

of his conviction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,” id. at 478, and held:

9

[T]o recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or

10

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness

11

would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must

12

prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,

13

expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal

14

authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a

15

federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. . . . A claim for

16

damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has

17

not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.

18

Id. at 486-87; see also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (holding

19

that Heck doctrine applies regardless of type of relief sought if success in action

20

would necessarily demonstrate invalidity of confinement or its duration).

21

To the extent Plaintiff seeks to challenge her underlying conviction and

22

sentence or the loss of custody credits, such claims are barred by Heck. See

23

Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997) (holding that “claim for

24

declaratory relief and money damages, based on allegations . . . that

25

necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed,” including

26

deprivation of good-time credits, “is not cognizable under § 1983”); Heck, 512

27

U.S. at 487 (holding that if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would

28

necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence . . . the complaint
6

1

must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or

2

sentence has already been invalidated”).

3

B.

4

Lack of Cognizable Legal Theories and Insufficient Facts
In order to state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must show: (1) the

5

defendants acted under color of law, and (2) their conduct deprived her of a

6

constitutional right. Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985)

7

(en banc). Plaintiff refers to “human rights” (see, e.g., Complaint at 3) but fails

8

to invoke any cognizable legal theories with respect to her rights under the

9

Constitution. With respect to her food and medical care, and being housed

10

with Martelleur, she may mean to allege deliberate indifference under the

11

Eighth Amendment. If that is the case, she has not stated such a claim. See

12

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (holding that to establish Eighth

13

Amendment claim that prison authorities provided inadequate medical care,

14

prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence

15

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, but inadvertent failure to

16

provide adequate medical care, mere negligence or medical malpractice, mere

17

delay in medical care (without more), or difference of opinion over proper

18

medical treatment are insufficient); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834

19

(1994) (holding that to violate Eighth Amendment, deprivation alleged must

20

objectively be sufficiently serious and prison official must subjectively have

21

sufficiently culpable state of mind).

22

Plaintiff mentions “discrimination” and the Americans with Disabilities

23

Act (“ADA”) (see Complaint at 6). Title II of the ADA provides that “no

24

qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be

25

excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,

26

programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by

27

any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. To state a claim under Title II of the

28

ADA, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that he is an individual with a disability; (2)
7

1

that he is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some

2

public entity’s services, programs, or activities; (3) that he was either excluded

3

from participation in or denied the benefits of the public entity’s services,

4

programs or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public

5

entity; and (4) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by

6

reason of the plaintiff’s disability. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th

7

Cir. 2002). Even assuming that Plaintiff’s alleged allergy is a disability,

8

Plaintiff has not alleged anything to suggest that prison officials discriminated

9

against her because of those allergies.

10

Plaintiff does not explain what constitutional right she has to a particular

11

inmate classification. See Hernandez v. Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th

12

Cir. 1987) (“Magistrate Burgess correctly concluded that ‘a prisoner has no

13

constitutional right to a particular classification status.’”).

14

As for the alleged interference with and review of Plaintiff’s mail: The

15

“policy of diverting publications through the property room is reasonably

16

related to the prison’s interest in inspecting mail for contraband.” Crofton v.

17

Roe, 170 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 1999). Prisoners enjoy a First Amendment

18

right to send and receive mail. Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir.

19

1995). Temporary delay or isolated incident of delay in mail processing does

20

not violate a prisoner’s First Amendment rights. Crofton, 170 F.3d at 961.

21

Plaintiff alleges that her access to the courts has been interfered with, but her

22

allegations are too conclusory and vague to address. Why could she not obtain

23

copies of her California Supreme Court habeas exhibits and what efforts did

24

she make to obtain them? What letters from the California Supreme Court

25

were withheld from her, and by whom? Why does she believe that her habeas

26

petition was dismissed for failure to respond to these “letters,” rather than for

27

some other reason? Did Plaintiff suffer any prejudice from the delay in

28

receiving letters in her probate case? What legal mail was “withheld” in Case
8

1

No. 16-7927 (C.D. Cal.), and by whom, and what prejudice did she suffer?2

2

See Complaint at 6-7.
It is unclear what constitutional right Plaintiff believes was violated with

3
4

respect to her eleven days in solitary confinement following the incident with

5

Martelleur. Her allegations do not suggest that she was placed in solitary

6

confinement for any improper reason such as retaliation, and she was released

7

“immediately” after an investigation. See Complaint at 9.
Throughout her Complaint, Plaintiff makes only generalized allegations

8
9

against the “Defendant” or the “Defendants.” Under § 1983, she must

10

demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of

11

her rights. See Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

12

C.

13

Claims against the Century Regional Detention Facility
Section 1983 provides, in relevant part, that “[e]very person who, under

14

color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage . . . subjects . . .

15

any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,

16

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the

17

party.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “The term ‘persons’ encompasses state and local

18

officials sued in their individual capacities, private individuals, and entities

19

which act under the color of state law and local governmental entities.” Vance

20

v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 995–96 (N.D. Cal. 1996). A local jail

21

is not a proper defendant under § 1983. Id. at 996 (“Naming a municipal

22

department as a defendant is not an appropriate means of pleading a § 1983

23

action against a municipality.”). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff alleges that the

24

“Century Regional Detention Facility” violated her constitutional rights, her

25

Complaint fails to state a claim because this entity is not a “person” under §

26
27
28

This case was dismissed because Plaintiff failed to submit an IFP
Request or prepay the filing fees. See Case No. 16-7927 (C.D. Cal.), Dkt. 6.
2

9

1

1983.

2

D.

3

Official Capacity Claims against Sheriff Jim McDonnell
An “official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated

4

as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985).

5

Here, the entity would be Los Angeles County (the “County”). Municipalities

6

are “persons” subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where official policy

7

or custom causes a constitutional tort. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs.,

8

436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). However, the County “may not be sued under §

9

1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is only

10

when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its

11

lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent

12

official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible

13

under § 1983.” Id. at 694 (1978). Thus, the County may not be held liable for

14

the alleged actions of its employees or agents unless “the action that is alleged

15

to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance,

16

regulation, or decision officially adopted or promulgated by that body’s

17

officers,” or if the alleged constitutional deprivation was “visited pursuant to a

18

governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received formal

19

approval through the body’s official decisionmaking channels.” Id. at 690-91.

20

Here, Plaintiff has failed to identify any policy statements or regulations

21

of the County, or any officially adopted or promulgated decisions, the

22

execution of which inflicted the alleged injuries. She has also not alleged

23

sufficient facts for the Court to “draw the reasonable inference” that the

24

County has a governmental custom of committing the illegal acts alleged. The

25

Court therefore concludes that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts for

26

the Court to “draw the reasonable inference” that the County has a custom of

27

engaging in the kind of illegal conduct that Plaintiff alleges occurred here. See

28

Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Liability for improper
10

1

custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be

2

founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that

3

the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.”).

4

V.

5

CONCLUSION

6

Because of the pleading deficiencies identified above, the Complaint is

7

subject to dismissal. Because it appears to the Court that some of the

8

Complaint’s deficiencies are capable of being cured by amendment, it is

9

dismissed with leave to amend. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31 (holding that

10

pro se litigant must be given leave to amend complaint unless it is absolutely

11

clear that deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment). If Plaintiff still desires

12

to pursue her claims against Defendants, she shall file a First Amended

13

Complaint within thirty-five (35) days of the date of this Order remedying the

14

deficiencies discussed above. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint should bear

15

the docket number assigned in this case; be labeled “First Amended

16

Complaint”; and be complete in and of itself without reference to the original

17

Complaint or any other pleading, attachment or document. The Clerk is

18

directed to send Plaintiff a blank Central District civil rights complaint form,

19

which Plaintiff is strongly encouraged to utilize.

20

Plaintiff is admonished that, if she fails to timely file a First Amended

21

Complaint, the Court will recommend that this action be dismissed with

22

prejudice for failure to diligently prosecute.

23
24

Dated: June 21, 2017

25

______________________________
DOUGLAS F. McCORMICK
United States Magistrate Judge

26
27
28
11