Johnathon Trevino Roberts v. Steve Langford

Filing 6

ORDER DISMISSING HABEAS PETITION FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION by Judge Andre Birotte Jr. (See document for details). (ib)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JOHNATHON TREVINO ROBERTS,

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Petitioner,
v.

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STEVE LANGFORD, Warden,

Case No. CV 17-03820 AB (AFM)
ORDER SUMMARILY
DISMISSING HABEAS PETITION
FOR LACK OF SUBJECT
MATTER JURISDICTION

Respondent.

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INTRODUCTION

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On May 22, 2017, petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a

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Person in Federal Custody (28 U.S.C. § 2241). Petitioner is serving a sentence of

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201 months in federal prison pursuant to his convictions in the United States

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District Court for the District of Nevada for kidnapping and other crimes. In his

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sole ground for federal habeas relief, petitioner claims that he is entitled to a

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reduction of his sentence under Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).

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Petitioner currently has a pending action in the sentencing court under 28

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U.S.C. § 2255 for his Johnson claim. However, the sentencing court stayed the

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action pending a decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v.

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Begay, 14-10080, or pending further order from the sentencing court. Petitioner

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filed this Petition because, according to him, the sentencing court’s stay was

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improper and is unnecessarily delaying the resolution of his claim.

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As discussed below, this action is dismissed without prejudice for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.

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PROCEDURAL HISTORY

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The Court takes judicial notice of the docket from petitioner’s underlying

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criminal case in United States v. Gonzalez et al., 3:05-cr-00098-HDM-RAM-2. See

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Harris v. County of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012) (courts may take

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judicial notice of undisputed matters of public record, including documents on file

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in federal or state courts).

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In July 2007, petitioner was convicted in the United States District Court for

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the District of Nevada of conspiracy to commit kidnapping, kidnapping, and

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carrying a firearm during a crime of violence. He was sentenced to federal prison

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for 201 months. (Petition, Exhibit 2; Gonzalez, ECF No. 334.) In March 2009, the

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Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment. See United States v. Roberts, 319 F. App’x

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575 (9th Cir. 2009).

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In August 2010, petitioner filed a motion in the sentencing court under

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§ 2255 on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel and other claims.

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(Petition at 2; Gonzalez, ECF No. 377.) The sentencing court denied the motion in

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July 2012. (Petition at 2; Gonzalez, ECF No. 471.)

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In June 2015, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Johnson, 135 S. Ct.

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2551 (imposition of an increased sentence based on a prior violent felony

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conviction, under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, violates

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due process). In May 2016, petitioner sought leave to file a successive § 2255

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motion in the sentencing court challenging the legality of his sentence in light of

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Johnson. (Petition at 2; Gonzalez, ECF No. 529.) In June 2016, the Ninth Circuit

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granted him leave to file a successive § 2255 motion in the sentencing court.
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(Petition at 2; Gonzalez, ECF No. 531.) In its order, however, the Ninth Circuit

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stated that the sentencing court “may wish to stay proceedings pending this court’s

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decision in 14-10080, United States v. Begay.” (Gonzalez, ECF No. 531.)

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On the same day, the sentencing court stayed petitioner’s § 2255 action

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pending the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Begay. (Petition at 3; Gonzalez, ECF No.

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532.) In August 2016, petitioner’s counsel filed a motion to lift the stay because

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petitioner “cannot afford to wait” until Begay is decided: Assuming petitioner was

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entitled to relief under Johnson, he had already served any sentence that was legally

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authorized. (Petition at 3; Gonzalez, ECF No. 548.)

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In November 2016, the sentencing court continued the stay of proceedings

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until Begay is decided, noting that Begay will likely be dispositive. (Petition at 4;

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Gonzalez, ECF No. 556.)

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sentencing court ordered the parties in the meantime to file briefs on the merits of

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petitioner’s claims. (Id.) In January 2017, the government filed a response. (Id.,

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ECF No. 563.)

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supplement in March 2017. (Id., ECF Nos. 571 and 572.)

In order to avoid any undue delay, however, the

Petitioner’s counsel filed a Reply in February 2017 and a

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In the interim, petitioner filed a pro se appeal of the continued stay in the

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Ninth Circuit. (Petition at 4; Gonzalez, ECF No. 558.) The Ninth Circuit dismissed

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the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the sentencing court’s order continuing

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the stay was not an appealable order. (Petition at 4; Gonzalez, ECF No. 564.)

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Petitioner filed this pro se Petition on May 22, 2017. The crux of the Petition

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is that petitioner is entitled to relief under Johnson and that the sentencing court’s

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order continuing the stay of his action is unlawful.

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DISCUSSION

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“Generally, motions to contest the legality of a sentence must be filed under

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§ 2255 in the sentencing court, while petitions that challenge the manner, location,

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or conditions of a sentence’s execution must be brought pursuant to § 2241 in the
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custodial court.” Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2008). “There is

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an exception, however, set forth in § 2255: A federal prisoner may file a habeas

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petition under § 2241 to challenge the legality of a sentence when the prisoner’s

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remedy under § 2255 is ‘inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his

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detention.’” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255). “We refer to this section of § 2255 as

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the ‘savings clause,’ or the ‘escape hatch.’” Id. (citation omitted).

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A § 2241 petition may be brought under § 2255’s “savings clause” when a

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petitioner (1) makes a claim of actual innocence, and (2) has not had an

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“unobstructed procedural shot” at presenting that claim. See Harrison, 519 F.3d at

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959; Stephens v. Herrera, 464 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2006).
The second requirement for application of the savings clause has not been

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satisfied here.

In light of the fact that the Ninth Circuit has granted him

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authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion in the sentencing court, petitioner

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cannot argue that he will never get an opportunity to present his Johnson claim. Cf.

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Stephens, 464 F.3d at 898 (petitioner did not have an unobstructed procedural shot

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where claim based on recent legal authority did not satisfy criteria for a successive

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§ 2255 motion, thereby foreclosing his ability to ever raise the claim). Indeed,

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petitioner currently has a pending Johnson claim in the sentencing court. The fact

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that petitioner is dissatisfied with the sentencing court’s order continuing the stay of

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his action does not give him grounds to bring an action in this Court. District

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courts lack jurisdiction to review the rulings and decisions of other district courts.

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See Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 313 (1995) (“We have made clear that

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[i]t is for the court of first instance to determine the question of the validity of the

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law, and until its decision is reversed for error by orderly review, either by itself or

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by a higher courts, it orders based on its decisions are to be respected.”) (internal

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quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original); Prentice v. U.S. Dist. Court, 307

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F. App’x 460 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“[T]he U.S. District Court for the District of

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Columbia properly determined it lacked jurisdiction to review action taken by the
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U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (Southern Division).”).

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The only remaining question is whether this action should be transferred to

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any other court in which the action could have been brought. See 28 U.S.C. § 1631.

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“Because the statute’s language is mandatory, federal courts should consider

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transfer without motion by the parties.” Cruz-Aguilera v. I.N.S., 245 F.3d 1070,

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1074 (9th Cir. 2001). “Transfer is appropriate under § 1631 if three conditions are

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met: (1) the transferring court lacks jurisdiction; (2) the transferee court could have

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exercised jurisdiction at the time the action was filed; and (3) the transfer is in the

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interest of justice.” Id. Here, the interest of justice would not be served by

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transferring this action to any other court because petitioner already has a pending

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§ 2255 motion in the sentencing court based on Johnson. See Puri v. Gonzales, 464

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F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 2006) (district court did not err in failing to transfer

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action under § 1631 to the Ninth Circuit where petitioner already had a pending

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petition for review); Hill v. U.S. Air Force, 795 F.2d 1067, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1986)

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(district court did not err in failing to transfer action under § 1631 to district court

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where petitioner already had a pending action arising from the same incidents).

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ORDER

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IT THEREFORE IS ORDERED that this action is summarily dismissed
without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

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DATED: September 1, 2017

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ANDRÉ BIROTTE JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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