Barton Wayne Fishback v. Santa Monica Mountains Conservancy et al

Filing 21

MINUTE ORDER IN CHAMBERS - COURT ORDER by Judge Percy Anderson remanding case to Los Angeles Superior Court, North Valley Judicial District, Case number PC057771. Case Terminated. Made JS-6. (mrgo)

JS-6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 17-4644 PA (RAOx)

Title

Barton Wayne Fishback v. Santa Monica Mountains Conservancy, et al.

Present: The
Honorable

Date

September 13, 2017

PERCY ANDERSON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Kamilla Sali-Suleyman

Not Reported

N/A

Deputy Clerk

Court Reporter

Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs:

Attorneys Present for Defendants:

None

None

Proceedings:

IN CHAMBERS – COURT ORDER

Plaintiff Barton Wayne Fishback (“Plaintiff”) filed this action in Los Angeles Superior
Court on May 23, 2017. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges claims against defendants Santa
Monica Mountains Conservancy (“SMMC”) and Mountains Recreation and Conservation
Authority (“MRCA”) (collectively “Defendants”) for: (1) quiet title of easement; (2) injunctive
relief; (3) declaratory relief; (4) violation of the 5th and 14th Amendment Takings Clause;
(5) violation of the California Constitution Takings Clause, Cal. Const., Art. 1, § 19;
(6) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage; and (7) intentional
interference with contractual relations.
Asserting that the Court possessed federal question subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1331 over the action as a result of the federal takings claim, MRCA filed a Notice of
Removal on June 23, 2017. On August 11, 2017, the Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause why
the federal takings claim asserted by plaintiff Barton Wayne Fishback (“Plaintiff”) should not be
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it is not ripe. The Court has now
reviewed the parties’ responses to the order to show cause.
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not “be
taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. Const. Amend. V. “As its text makes
plain, the Takings Clause does not prohibit the taking of private property, but instead places a
condition on the exercise of that power. In other words, it is designed not to limit the
governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the
event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking.” Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,
544 U.S. 528, 536-37, 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2080, 161 L. Ed. 2d 876 (2005) (internal quotations and
citation omitted).
“A federal takings claim is not ripe until a litigant has ‘[sought] compensation through the
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JS-6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 17-4644 PA (RAOx)

Date

September 13, 2017

Title

Barton Wayne Fishback v. Santa Monica Mountains Conservancy, et al.

procedures the State has provided for doing so.’” Spoklie v. Montana, 411 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th
Cir. 2005) (quoting Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,
473 U.S. 172, 194, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 3120, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1985)); see also Daniel v. Cnty. of
Santa Barbara, 288 F.3d 375, 382 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In a physical takings case, as in a regulatory
takings case, the property owner must have sought compensation for the alleged taking through
available state procedures.”). Numerous courts have concluded that California’s inverse
condemnation procedures are an adequate avenue to address Takings Clause claims. See, e.g.,
San Remo Hotel v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 145 F.3d 1095, 1102 (9th Cir. 1998); Gaxiola
v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 10-6632 AHM (FMO), 2011 WL 13152821, at *14 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 1, 2011). Where a plaintiff fails to seek compensation through a state’s procedures for
doing so prior to filing a federal action, the case is “not ripe for decision,” and must therefore be
“dismiss[ed] for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Jama Const. v. City of Los Angeles, 938
F.2d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 1991).
Plaintiff does not dispute that his operative Complaint fails to state a ripe federal takings
claim. However, Plaintiff contends that, if given leave to amend, he could allege facts
establishing that “any attempt to seek compensation through administrative procedures would be
futile, which is an exception to the threshold requirement for a takings claim.” (Docket No. 19
at 2:25-27.) The potential futility of Plaintiff’s administrative claim does not render California’s
inverse condemnation procedures inadequate and excuse Plaintiff from pursuing those state law
procedures before pursuing his federal takings claim. Instead, California’s procedures include
the filing of an inverse condemnation action in state court. See San Remo Hotel, 145 F.3d at
1102 (“Field has not filed an inverse condemnation action in state court, and therefore has not
been denied just compensation by California. It follows that Field’s facial takings
claim—insofar as it alleges the denial of the economically viable use of his property—is
unripe . . . .”); see also Christensen v. Yolo Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 995 F.2d 161, 164 (9th Cir.
1993) (“An action will be considered futile only if the plaintiff can show that ‘the state courts
establish that landowners may not obtain just compensation through an inverse condemnation
action under any circumstances.’ Compensation has been available under California law for
inverse condemnation claims based on regulatory takings since [1987]. Since the Christensens
did not seek compensation through an inverse condemnation action in state court before bringing
this action, the district court properly dismissed the claim as unripe.”) (quoting Austin v. City &
Cnty. of Honolulu, 840 F.2d 678, 681 (9th Cir. 1988)). The acrimony Plaintiff may anticipate at
the administrative claim phase does not render an inverse condemnation action litigated in state
court futile or inadequate. The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiff has not, and cannot,
allege facts that would allow him to avoid pursuing his takings claim in state court before
litigating a federal takings claim. As a result, Plaintiff’s federal takings claim is not ripe, and the
Court dismisses it without prejudice.
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JS-6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 17-4644 PA (RAOx)

Date

September 13, 2017

Title

Barton Wayne Fishback v. Santa Monica Mountains Conservancy, et al.

In their response to the order to show cause, Defendants request that the Court retain
jurisdiction over this action because Plaintiff has expressed an intention to amend his Complaint
to assert a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has not identified the nature of such a
claim, and merely alleging his federal takings claim as being brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 would not cure the ripeness issues the Court has already addressed. Additionally, the
Court notifies the parties that, were Plaintiff to ever assert a viable § 1983 claim in this action, to
avoid juror confusion concerning the differences between the state and federal claims, and to
preserve the comity between state and federal courts, it is the Court’s standard practice, and one
it would intend to follow in this instance, to try only the federal claims. Once the federal claims
are resolved, the Court would decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law
claims. To the extent the state law claims were not resolved as a result of the outcome of the
federal claims or because those claims are otherwise duplicative of the federal claims, Plaintiff
would then be free to pursue the state law claims in state court. To the extent the parties seek a
single forum in which to litigate their dispute, that forum may very well be the Los Angeles
Superior Court.1/
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s federal takings claim
without prejudice. The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law
claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Once supplemental jurisdiction has been established under
§ 1367(a), a district court “can decline to assert supplemental jurisdiction over a pendant claim
only if one of the four categories specifically enumerated in section 1367(c) applies.” Exec.
Software v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 24 F.3d 1545, 1555–56 (9th Cir. 1994).
The Court may decline supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c) if: “(1) the claim raises a
novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or
claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court dismissed all
claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other
compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.”
The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Consistent with Plaintiff’s request that the Court remand the action

1/

As at least one other Court in this District has already concluded in a similar action
involving this same Plaintiff and what appears to be the same general dispute, there may be other
jurisprudential reasons for this Court to defer to the ongoing litigation involving Plaintiff that is
pending in Los Angeles Superior Court. See Fishback v. Antonovich, Case No. CV 15-5719
JFW (RAOx) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2016) (staying action pursuant to Burford, Younger, and
Colorado River abstention).
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JS-6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 17-4644 PA (RAOx)

Date

September 13, 2017

Title

Barton Wayne Fishback v. Santa Monica Mountains Conservancy, et al.

rather than dismiss it and require Plaintiff to re-file the action in Los Angeles Superior Court, the
Court further exercises its discretion to remand the action. See Albingia Versicherungs A.G. v.
Schenker Int’l Inc., 344 F.3d 931, 938 (9th Cir. 2003); Harrell v. 20th Century Ins. Co., 934 F.2d
203, 205 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[A] district court has discretion to remand a properly removed case to
state court when none of the federal claims are remaining.”). The Court remands this action to
Los Angeles Superior Court, North Valley Judicial District, Case No. PC057771.
The Court vacates the Scheduling Conference currently calendared for September 18,
2017.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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