Lorena David v. C.H. Robinson International, Inc., et al

Filing 14

MINUTE (In Chambers) Order Remanding Action by Judge Fernando M. Olguin: IT IS ORDERED that: (1) The above-captioned action shall be remanded to the Superior Court of the State of California Los Angeles County, 111 N. Hill St., Los Angeles, CA 90012, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 USC section 1447(c). (2) The Clerk shall send a certified copy of this Order to the state court. (Made JS-6 Case Terminated.) (jp)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JS-6

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 17-5210 FMO (Ex)

Title

Lorena David v. C.H. Robinson International, Inc.

Present: The Honorable

Date

July 25, 2017

Fernando M. Olguin, United States District Judge

Vanessa Figueroa

None

None

Deputy Clerk

Court Reporter / Recorder

Tape No.

Attorney Present for Plaintiff:

Attorney Present for Defendant:

None Present

None Present

Proceedings:

(In Chambers) Order Remanding Action

On June 16, 2017, Lorena David (“plaintiff”) filed a Complaint in the Los Angeles County
Superior Court against C.H. Robinson International, Inc. (“defendant”). (See Dkt. 1, Notice of
Removal (“NOR”) at ¶ 1; Dkt. 1-1, Exhibit A (“Complaint”)). On July 14, 2017, defendant removed
that action on diversity jurisdiction grounds pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441. (See Dkt.
1, NOR at ¶ 8). Having reviewed the pleadings, the court hereby remands this action to state
court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
LEGAL STANDARD
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized
by Constitution and statute[.]” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114
S.Ct. 1673, 1675 (1994). The courts are presumed to lack jurisdiction unless the contrary appears
affirmatively from the record. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n. 3, 126
S.Ct. 1854, 1861 (2006). Federal courts have a duty to examine jurisdiction sua sponte before
proceeding to the merits of a case, see Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583, 119
S.Ct. 1563, 1569 (1999), “even in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Arbaugh v. Y&H
Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 1244 (2006).
“The right of removal is entirely a creature of statute and a suit commenced in a state court
must remain there until cause is shown for its transfer under some act of Congress.” Syngenta
Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32, 123 S.Ct. 366, 369 (2002) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Where Congress has acted to create a right of removal, those statutes, unless

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 17-5210 FMO (Ex)

Date

Title

Lorena David v. C.H. Robinson International, Inc.

July 25, 2017

otherwise stated, are strictly construed against removal jurisdiction.1 See id. Unless otherwise
expressly provided by Congress, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the
defendants, to the district court[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); see Dennis v. Hart, 724 F.3d 1249, 1252
(9th Cir. 2013) (same). A removing defendant bears the burden of establishing that removal is
proper. See Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006) (per
curiam) (noting the “longstanding, near-canonical rule that the burden on removal rests with the
removing defendant”); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The strong
presumption against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of
establishing that removal is proper.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, if there is any
doubt regarding the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, the court must resolve those doubts
in favor of remanding the action to state court. See Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566 (“Federal jurisdiction
must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.”).
“Under the plain terms of § 1441(a), in order properly to remove [an] action pursuant to that
provision, [the removing defendant] must demonstrate that original subject-matter jurisdiction lies
in the federal courts.” Syngenta Crop Protection, 537 U.S. at 33, 123 S.Ct. at 370. Failure to do
so requires that the case be remanded, as “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction may not be waived, and.
. . the district court must remand if it lacks jurisdiction.” Kelton Arms Condo. Owners Ass’n, Inc.
v. Homestead Ins. Co., 346 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003). Indeed, “[i]f at any time before final
judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be
remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1194 n. 2
(9th Cir. 1988) (“It is elementary that the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court is not a
waivable matter and may be raised at anytime by one of the parties, by motion or in the
responsive pleadings, or sua sponte by the trial or reviewing court.”); Washington v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 2009 WL 1519894, *1 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (a district court may remand an action where
the court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction either by motion or sua sponte).
DISCUSSION
The court’s review of the NOR and the attached state court Complaint makes clear that this
court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the instant matter. In other words, plaintiff
could not have originally brought this action in federal court, as plaintiff does not competently
allege facts supplying diversity jurisdiction.2 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(1)-(2) (A district court has
diversity jurisdiction “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, . . .

1

For example, an “antiremoval presumption” does not exist in cases removed pursuant
to the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). See Dart Cherokee Basin
Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 135 S.Ct. 547, 554 (2014).
2

Defendant seeks only to invoke the court’s diversity jurisdiction. (See, generally, Dkt. 1,

NOR).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 17-5210 FMO (Ex)

Date

Title

Lorena David v. C.H. Robinson International, Inc.

July 25, 2017

and is between . . . citizens of different States” or “citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of
a foreign state[.]”). Therefore, removal was improper. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Caterpillar Inc.
v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429 (1987) (“Only state-court actions that
originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by the
defendant.”) (footnote omitted).
Defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount
in controversy meets the jurisdictional threshold. See Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115,
1117 (9th Cir. 2004); Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir.
2003) (per curiam) (“Where it is not facially evident from the complaint that more than $75,000 is
in controversy, the removing party must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
amount in controversy meets the jurisdictional threshold. Where doubt regarding the right to
removal exists, a case should be remanded to state court.”) (footnotes omitted). Here, there is
no basis for diversity jurisdiction because the amount in controversy does not appear to exceed
the diversity jurisdiction threshold of $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The amount of damages
plaintiff seeks cannot be determined from the Complaint, as the Complaint does not set forth a
specific amount. (See, generally, Dkt. 1-1, Complaint at 13-14).
At the time the NOR was filed, defendant estimated that plaintiff’s lost wages were
$58,708.80. (See Dkt. 1, NOR at ¶ 20). Defendant contends, however, that the amount in
controversy threshold is met by aggregating all of plaintiff’s estimated “recoverable damages,
including emotional distress damages, punitive damages, statutory penalties, and attorneys’ fees.”
(See id. at ¶ 18).
The court declines to take into account defendant’s estimate of plaintiff’s emotional distress
damages, (see Dkt. 1, NOR at ¶ 21), for amount in controversy purposes. Even if emotional
distress damages are recoverable, plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege any specific amount for
emotional distress damages (or as general damages), (see, generally, Dkt. 1-1, Complaint), and
therefore it would be speculative to include these damages in the total amount in controversy. See
Cable v. Merit Life Ins. Co., 2006 WL 1991664, *3 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (Defendant’s argument that
emotional distress damages exceeded the jurisdictional threshold was insufficient when
“[d]efendant provide[d] no reliable basis for determining the amount of emotional distress damages
likely to be recovered in this case.”). Further, defendant fails to explain how the cases it cited are
factually or legally similar to the instant case, so as to guide the court in determining the amount
of emotional distress damages that might be at issue in this case. (See, generally, Dkt. 1, NOR
at ¶ 21); see, e.g., Mireles v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 845 F.Supp.2d 1034, 1055 (C.D. Cal. 2012)
(remanding where defendants “proffer[ed] no evidence that the lawsuits and settlements alleged
in the complaint are factually or legally similar to plaintiffs’ claims”); Dawson v. Richmond Am.
Homes of Nevada, Inc., 2013 WL 1405338, *3 (D. Nev. 2013) (remanding where defendant
“offered no facts to demonstrate that the [proffered analogous] suit is factually identical [to
plaintiffs’ suit]”).
Defendant also contends that plaintiff’s request for punitive damages should be considered
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 17-5210 FMO (Ex)

Date

Title

Lorena David v. C.H. Robinson International, Inc.

July 25, 2017

in the amount in controversy determination. (See Dkt. 1, NOR at ¶ 21). While punitive damages
may be included in the amount in controversy calculation, see Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d
927, 945 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1104 (2002), plaintiff’s request for such damages
does not aid defendant. “[T]he mere possibility of a punitive damages award is insufficient to
prove that the amount in controversy requirement has been met.” Burk v. Med. Savs. Ins. Co.,
348 F.Supp.2d 1063, 1069 (D. Ariz. 2004); accord Geller v. Hai Ngoc Duong, 2010 WL 5089018,
*2 (S.D. Cal. 2010); J. Marymount, Inc. v. Bayer Healthcare, LLC, 2009 WL 4510126, *4 (N.D. Cal.
2009). Rather, a defendant “must present evidence that punitive damages will more likely than
not exceed the amount needed to increase the amount in controversy to $75,000.” Burk, 348
F.Supp.2d at 1069. A removing defendant may establish “probable punitive damages, for
example, by introducing evidence of jury verdicts in analogous cases.” Id.
Here, because defendant has not provided evidence of punitive damages awards in
factually similar cases, (see, generally, Dkt. 1, NOR at ¶ 21), inclusion of punitive damages in the
amount in controversy would be improper. See Burk, 348 F.Supp.2d at 1070 (defendant “failed
to compare the facts of Plaintiff’s case with the facts of other cases where punitive damages have
been awarded in excess of the jurisdictional amount”); Killion v. AutoZone Stores Inc., 2011 WL
590292, *2 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (“Defendants cite two cases . . . in which punitive damages were
awarded, but make no attempt to analogize or explain how these cases are similar to the instant
action. . . . Simply citing these cases merely illustrate[s] that punitive damages are possible, but
in no way shows that it is likely or probable in this case. Therefore, Defendants’ inclusion of
punitive damages in the calculation of the jurisdictional amount is speculative and unsupported.”)
(citation omitted).
Finally, defendant relies on plaintiff’s claim for attorney’s fees. (See Dkt. 1, NOR at ¶ 22).
“[W]here an underlying statute authorizes an award of attorneys’ fees, either with mandatory or
discretionary language, such fees may be included in the amount in controversy.” Lowdermilk v.
U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 479 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2007), overruled on other grounds as
recognized by Rodriguez v. AT & T Mobility Servs. LLC, 728 F.3d 975, 976-77 (9th Cir. 2013).
“[C]ourts are split as to whether only attorneys’ fees that have accrued at the time of removal
should be considered in calculating the amount in controversy, or whether the calculation should
take into account fees likely to accrue over the life of the case.” Hernandez v. Towne Park, Ltd.,
2012 WL 2373372, *19 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (collecting cases); see Reames v. AB Car Rental Servs.,
Inc., 899 F.Supp.2d 1012, 1018 (D. Or. 2012) (“The Ninth Circuit has not yet expressed any
opinion as to whether expected or projected future attorney fees may properly be considered ‘in
controversy’ at the time of removal for purposes of the diversity-jurisdiction statute, and the
decisions of the district courts are split on the issue.”). The court is persuaded that “the better
view is that attorneys’ fees incurred after the date of removal are not properly included because
the amount in controversy is to be determined as of the date of removal.” Dukes v. Twin City Fire
Ins. Co., 2010 WL 94109, *2 (D. Ariz. 2010) (citing Abrego Abrego, 443 F.3d at 690). Indeed,
“[f]uture attorneys’ fees are entirely speculative, may be avoided, and are therefore not ‘in
controversy’ at the time of removal.” Dukes, 2010 WL 94109, at *2; accord Palomino v. Safeway
Ins. Co., 2011 WL 3439130, *2 (D. Ariz. 2011).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 17-5210 FMO (Ex)

Date

Title

Lorena David v. C.H. Robinson International, Inc.

July 25, 2017

Here, defendant provides no evidence of the amount of attorney’s fees incurred as of the
time of removal. (See, generally, Dkt. 1, NOR at ¶ 22). Thus, defendant have not shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that the inclusion of attorney’s fees in the instant case would cause
the amount in controversy to reach the $75,000 threshold. See Walton v. AT & T Mobility, 2011
WL 2784290, *2 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (declining to reach the issue of whether future attorney’s fees
could be considered in the amount in controversy because the defendant “did not provide any
factual basis for determining how much attorney’s fees have been incurred thus far and will be
incurred in the future[, and] [b]ald assertions are simply not enough.”).
In sum, given that any doubt regarding the existence of subject matter jurisdiction must be
resolved in favor of remanding the action to state court, see Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566, the court is
not persuaded, under the circumstances here, that defendant has met its burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy meets the jurisdictional threshold.
See Matheson, 319 F.3d at 1090 (“Where it is not facially evident from the complaint that more
than $75,000 is in controversy, the removing party must prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the amount in controversy meets the jurisdictional threshold. Where doubt
regarding the right to removal exists, a case should be remanded to state court.”) (footnotes
omitted); Valdez, 372 F.3d at 1118 (same). Therefore, there is no basis for diversity jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
This order is not intended for publication. Nor is it intended to be included in or
submitted to any online service such as Westlaw or Lexis.
Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that:
1. The above-captioned action shall be remanded to the Superior Court of the State of
California Los Angeles County, 111 N. Hill St., Los Angeles, CA 90012, for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
2. The Clerk shall send a certified copy of this Order to the state court.

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