Azhar Lal v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation et al

Filing 9

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND by Magistrate Judge Douglas F. McCormick. For the reasons discussed above, the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and thus it must be dismissed. Because it is not absolute ly clear that the Complaint's deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment, dismissal is with leave to amend. Accordingly, if Plaintiff desires to pursue his claims, he must file a First Amended Complaint within thirty-five (35) days of the date of this Order, remedying the deficiencies discussed above. (jp)

Download PDF
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 WESTERN DIVISION 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 ) ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF ) ) CORRECTIONS AND ) ) REHABILITATION et al., ) ) ) Defendants. ) ) AZHAR LAL, No. CV 18-2056-CJC (DFM) ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 19 I. 20 INTRODUCTION 21 On March 13, 2018, Azhar Lal (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner at California 22 State Prison-Los Angeles County (“CSP-LA”), filed pro se this civil rights 23 action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and sought leave to proceed without 24 prepayment of filing fees. See Dkt. 1 (“Complaint”), 2. The Court granted 25 Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of filing fees. See Dkt. 5. The 26 Complaint also sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary 27 injunction, both of which the Court denied. See Dkt. 4. 28 The Complaint names the following defendants in their individual and 1 2 official capacity: (1) John Doe #1, Receive and Release Sergeant (“R&R 3 Sergeant”); (2) T. Rhodes; (3) D. Pixley; (4) D. Castro; and (5) John Doe #2, 4 Dr. Edwards. See Complaint at 3-4. The Complaint also names “John Does 3- 5 9.” Id. at 4. Plaintiff alleges claims of failure to protect and cruel and unusual 6 punishment under the Eighth Amendment and retaliation under the First 7 Amendment. See id. at 5. Injunctive relief aside, Plaintiff also seeks 8 compensatory and punitive damages. See id. at 24. 9 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, the Court must screen the 10 Complaint to determine whether it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a 11 claim on which relief might be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a 12 defendant who is immune from such relief. As discussed below, the Complaint 13 suffers from numerous deficiencies and must be dismissed. 14 II. 15 SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS 16 17 A. Plaintiff’s Double-Celling and Subsequent Injury Plaintiff alleges that dating back to 1994, he has had multiple fights with 18 his cell mates, has received multiple Rules Violation Reports (“RVRs”) for 19 refusing a cell partner, and has had multiple medical and mental evaluations 20 documenting his disposition to aggressive and assaultive behavior. See 21 Complaint at 5-13. Plaintiff also states that he was routinely placed in 22 administrative segregation for refusing double-celling. See id. at 6-8, 11-12. 23 On November 21, 2016, Plaintiff was transferred from Kern Valley State 24 Prison to CSP-LA, where he was assigned to a double cell. See id. at 11. 25 Plaintiff informed R&R Sergeant about his history of violence with his 26 previous cell mates, his receipt of numerous RVRs for refusing cell partners, 27 and his placement into administrative segregation and the behavioral 28 modification unit program for these refusals. See id. at 12. Plaintiff requested 2 1 assignment to a single cell, but R&R Sergeant told plaintiff that there was no 2 available bed space at that time and that he “better comply with the rules” or 3 he would be “removed from the EOP [Enhanced Outpatient Program] and 4 instead placed in Ad-Seg.” Id. Plaintiff reiterated that it would be unsafe to 5 house him in a double cell, but R&R Sergeant told Plaintiff that he “better 6 accept this housing assignment if [he] knew what was good for [him].” Id. 7 R&R Sergeant also assured Plaintiff that he would contact EOP staff to move 8 Plaintiff to a single cell once one becomes available. See id. 9 On November 22, 2016, Plaintiff and his cell mate got into a fight. See 10 id. at 12-13. After the fight was broken up, Plaintiff was issued another RVR 11 and was relocated to a separate housing unit, where Plaintiff observed 30-40 12 vacant cells. See id. Plaintiff learned from another inmate that these cells had 13 been vacant for “over a week or two.” Id. From his fight, Plaintiff suffered 14 lasting injuries to his right arm and lower back. See id. at 13. Legally, Plaintiff alleges that the R&R Sergeant failed to protect Plaintiff 15 16 in violation of the Eighth Amendment by failing to review adequately the 17 Inmate Central Files, which demonstrated Plaintiff’s propensity for violence 18 and history of double-celling problems. See id. at 14. Plaintiff also contends 19 that R&R Sergeant lied about the prison having no single-cell housing 20 available. See id. These actions, Plaintiff claims, demonstrate R&R Sergeant’s 21 “total disregard for inmate safety as well as for [the] procedures for which he 22 was required to follow.” Id. 23 B. 24 Plaintiff’s Administrative Appeals In December 2016, before his annual review, Plaintiff filed a formal 25 request to be single-celled due to his history of in-cell violence. See id. Also 26 anticipating this meeting, Pixley, Plaintiff’s counselor, called Plaintiff into his 27 office and informed Plaintiff that he had already prepared Plaintiff’s committee 28 chronology report without Plaintiff’s single-cell request and that he “[did]n’t 3 1 want to change it,” as doing so “would only be creating more work for him for 2 no reason.” Id. Upon hearing Plaintiff’s objection, Pixley allegedly “got mad” 3 and reminded Plaintiff that the report was already written and that Plaintiff 4 needed to “learn how to comply with his directions otherwise [he] could find 5 [him]self in a far wo[rs]e situation for not listening.” Id. at 14-15. 6 Consequently, Plaintiff drafted a separate committee statement that 7 documented his prior instances of violence against cell mates. See id. at 15. 8 On January 24, 2017, at Plaintiff’s Unit Classification Committee 9 (“UCC”) meeting, Plaintiff allegedly gave Rhodes, another correctional 10 counselor, the separate committee statement. See id. Plaintiff alleges that 11 Rhodes was to give his statement to the facility captain, who was absent from 12 the UCC meeting. See id. Plaintiff’s single-celling request was eventually 13 denied, so Plaintiff filed an administrative grievance in which he sought 14 approval for single celling from the captain of his facility. See id. at 15-16. 15 Rhodes conducted the appeals interview and was allegedly “very upset,” 16 accusing Plaintiff of attempting to make him look bad. See id. Plaintiff further 17 alleges that Rhodes complained about the additional work created for him 18 because of Plaintiff’s “crying” for a single cell, “which [he] will probably never 19 get due to complaining.” Id. Plaintiff’s first-level appeal was denied on 20 February 17, 2017, see Dkt. 1-1 at 33-34, and Plaintiff filed an appeal at the 21 second level, see Complaint at 16. 22 On March 27, 2017, Plaintiff’s second-level appeal was partially granted, 23 and his grievance was remanded for further review on grounds that Plaintiff’s 24 mental health “was not considered during UCC.” Complaint at 16. 25 Accordingly, on April 11, 2017, Plaintiff appeared at a further committee 26 meeting before Captain Freeman, Rhodes, Pixley, Castro, and Dr. Edwards to 27 assess Plaintiff’s mental health needs. See id. at 17. At this meeting, the 28 committing members allegedly laughed at Plaintiff, warned him not to 4 1 complain, cry, or file any more complaints for the same grievance, and 2 informed him that he did not have sufficient in-cell violence to warrant 3 transferring him to a single cell. See id. Plaintiff’s first-level appeal was, again, 4 denied, and Plaintiff appealed to the second level—complaining that he was 5 never notified of the mental health component of the committee meeting and 6 thus could not bring someone from his own mental health team to participate. 7 See id. Plaintiff’s second-level appeal was denied, and Plaintiff filed a 8 subsequent third-level appeal, which was also denied. See id. at 17-18; see also 9 Dkt. 1-1 at 81-83. 10 As a matter of law, Plaintiff alleges that Rhodes, Pixley, Castro, and Dr. 11 Edwards violated his First Amendment rights by denying his single-celling 12 request in retaliation for his filing multiple grievances seeking the same. See 13 Complaint at 18. Plaintiff further claims that Defendants were “mad at [him]” 14 for appealing his January 24, 2017, committee action, which was later partially 15 overturned at the second level. See id. at 18. 16 III. 17 STANDARD OF REVIEW 18 A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for failure to state a 19 claim for two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable legal theory; or (2) insufficient 20 facts under a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 21 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In determining whether the complaint states 22 a claim on which relief may be granted, its allegations of material fact must be 23 taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Love v. 24 United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). Since Plaintiff is appearing 25 pro se, the Court must also construe the allegations of the complaint liberally 26 and afford Plaintiff the benefit of any doubt. See Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police 27 Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). However, “the liberal pleading 28 standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitzke v. 5 1 Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil 2 rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not 3 initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th 4 Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). 5 Moreover, with respect to Plaintiff’s pleading burden, the Supreme Court has 6 held that “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] 7 to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation 8 of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be 9 enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the 10 assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in 11 fact).” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations 12 omitted, alteration in original); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 13 (2009) (holding that to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint 14 must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 15 relief that is plausible on its face.’ A claim has facial plausibility when the 16 plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 17 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” (internal 18 citation omitted)). 19 If the Court finds that a complaint should be dismissed for failure to state 20 a claim, the Court has discretion to dismiss with or without leave to amend. 21 See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-30 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Leave 22 to amend should be granted if it appears possible that the defects in the 23 complaint could be corrected, especially if a plaintiff is pro se. See id. at 1130- 24 31; see also Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting 25 that “[a] pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint, and 26 some notice of its deficiencies, unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies 27 of the complaint could not be cured by amendment”) (citing Noll v. Carlson, 28 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987)). However, if, after careful consideration, 6 1 it is clear that a complaint cannot be cured by amendment, the Court may 2 dismiss without leave to amend. See Cato, 70 F.3d at 1105-06; see, e.g., Chaset 3 v. Fleer/Skybox Int’l, LP, 300 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that 4 “there is no need to prolong the litigation by permitting further amendment” 5 where the “basic flaw” in the pleading cannot be cured by amendment); Lipton 6 v. Pathogenesis Corp., 284 F.3d 1027, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that 7 “[b]ecause any amendment would be futile, there was no need to prolong the 8 litigation by permitting further amendment”). 9 IV. 10 DISCUSSION 11 12 A. Official Capacity The Complaint names each individual defendant in his or her official 13 capacity. See Complaint at 3-4. The Supreme Court has held that an “official- 14 capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against 15 the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985); see also Brandon 16 v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985); Larez v. City of L.A., 946 F.2d 630, 646 17 (9th Cir. 1991). Such a suit “is not a suit against the official personally, for the 18 real party in interest is the entity.” Graham, 473 U.S. at 166. Here, Defendants 19 are officers or agents of the California Department of Corrections and 20 Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). Therefore, all of Plaintiff’s claims against 21 Defendants in their official capacity are tantamount to claims against the 22 CDCR. 23 States, state agencies, and state officials sued in their official capacities 24 are not persons subject to civil rights claims for damages under 42 U.S.C. 25 § 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64-66 (1989); see 26 also Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27-30 (1991) (clarifying that the Eleventh 27 Amendment does not bar suits against state officials sued in their individual 28 capacities nor for prospective injunctive relief against state officials sued in 7 1 their official capacities). The CDCR is an agency of the State of California, 2 and is therefore entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Brown v. Cal. 3 Dep’t of Corrs., 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009). To overcome the Eleventh Amendment bar on federal jurisdiction over 4 5 suits by individuals against a State and its instrumentalities, either the State 6 must have “unequivocally expressed” its consent to waive its sovereign 7 immunity or Congress must have abrogated it. See Pennhurst State School & 8 Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1984). California has consented to 9 be sued in its own courts pursuant to the California Tort Claims Act, but such 10 consent does not constitute consent to suit in federal court. See BV Eng’g v. 11 Univ. of Cal., L.A., 858 F.2d 1394, 1396 (9th Cir. 1988). Furthermore, 12 Congress has not abrogated sovereign immunity against suits under 42 U.S.C. 13 § 1983. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979). Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against the 14 15 Defendants in their official capacity, the Eleventh Amendment bars such 16 claims. 17 B. 18 Failure to Protect Prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect inmates 19 from physical abuse. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). To 20 establish a violation of this duty, the prisoner must establish that prison 21 officials were deliberately indifferent to a serious threat to the inmate’s safety. 22 See id. at 834. The question under the Eighth Amendment is whether prison 23 officials, acting with deliberate indifference, exposed a prisoner to a sufficiently 24 substantial risk of serious damage to his future health. See id. at 843 (citing 25 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993)). The Supreme Court has 26 explained that “deliberate indifference entails something more than mere 27 negligence . . . [but] something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose 28 of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Id. at 835. The 8 1 Court defined this “deliberate indifference” standard as equal to 2 “recklessness,” in which “a person disregards a risk of harm of which he is 3 aware.” Id. at 836-37. 4 The deliberate indifference standard involves both an objective and a 5 subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, 6 “sufficiently serious.” Id. at 834. Second, subjectively, the prison official must 7 “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 8 837; Anderson v. Cty. of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1313 (9th Cir. 1995). To prove 9 knowledge of the risk, however, the prisoner may rely on circumstantial 10 evidence; in fact, the very obviousness of the risk may be sufficient to establish 11 knowledge. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842; Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 12 1077 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Cranford v. Ahlin, 610 F. App’x 714, 714 (9th 13 Cir. 2015) (to state a failure to protect claim, a plaintiff must allege facts “to 14 show that defendants knew of any threats to his safety or deviated from 15 professional standards by disregarding known unsafe conditions”). 16 Here, Plaintiff alleges that R&R Sergeant was deliberately indifferent to 17 Plaintiff’s safety because he failed to review adequately the Inmate Central 18 Files and because he lied about the available bed space for single-cell housing. 19 See Complaint at 14. At most, the Complaint pleads a claim for negligence, 20 not rising to the level of deliberate indifference. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. 21 Plaintiff states that “R&R Sergeant did not adequately review both of the 22 Inmate Central Files during th[e] Housing Assignment”—files that would have 23 demonstrated Plaintiff’s propensity for violence against cell mates. Complaint 24 at 14. This allegation suggests that R&R Sergeant was merely negligent in his 25 review and execution of the Inmate Housing Assignment Guidelines. 26 Moreover, while Plaintiff alleges that he verbally informed R&R Sergeant of 27 his prior RVR and cellmate fight history, nothing in the Complaint suggests 28 that R&R Sergeant acted recklessly by “temporarily” housing Plaintiff with a 9 1 cellmate pending a move to a vacant cell once one became available. Id.; see 2 also id. at 12. Indeed, R&R Sergeant’s suspicion of potential harm alone does 3 not plausibly show that he responded with deliberate indifference under the 4 circumstances. See Roberts v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs. & Rehab., No. 16-1929, 5 2017 WL 3635175, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2017) (finding suspicion of 6 possibility of violence between inmates as insufficient to show knowledge of 7 substantial risk of serious harm for deliberate indifference claim); see also Berg 8 v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986) (prison officials “must have 9 more than a mere suspicion that an attack will occur” before they are obligated 10 to take steps to prevent an inmate assault) (citations and internal quotation 11 marks omitted). Plaintiff also alleges, in conclusory fashion, that R&R 12 Sergeant lied about the availability of other vacant cells. See id. at 14. But 13 Plaintiff states no facts to show that R&R Sergeant knew of the cell vacancies 14 and chose to lie to Plaintiff. To the contrary, the Complaint states that R&R 15 Sergeant promised to “contact EOP Staff” and “make arrangements with them 16 that [Plaintiff] be moved immediately once a vacant cell becomes available[,] 17 which should be no longer than a week if not earlier.” Id. at 12. This transfer 18 never could have occurred, however, because Plaintiff and his cellmate fought 19 the very next day. See id. Because Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to 20 show that R&R Sergeant knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to 21 Plaintiff’s health and safety, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for failure to protect. 22 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s alleged Eighth Amendment violation must be 23 dismissed. 24 C. 25 Retaliation Allegations of retaliation against an inmate’s First Amendment rights 26 may support a § 1983 claim. See Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 27 1985). A retaliation claim requires “five basic elements: (1) an assertion that a 28 state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that 10 1 prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s 2 exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably 3 advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 4 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted); accord Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 5 1108, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2012); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 6 2009). To satisfy the causation element, plaintiff must show that his 7 constitutionally-protected conduct was a “substantial” or “motivating” factor 8 for the alleged retaliatory action. Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1271 (quoting 9 Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989)). 10 Plaintiff bears the burden of pleading and proving the absence of legitimate 11 correctional goals for the conduct of which he complains. See Pratt v. 12 Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995). 13 Here, Plaintiff alleges that Rhodes, Pixley, Castro, and Dr. Edwards 14 retaliated against Plaintiff by denying him single celling because he filed too 15 many grievances seeking the same relief and because Defendants were mad at 16 Plaintiff for appealing his January 24, 2017, committee action. See Complaint 17 at 18. While Plaintiff raises several instances where certain individual 18 defendants were allegedly frustrated—e.g., Rhodes being “upset” that Plaintiff 19 was trying to make him look bad, see id. at 16, and Pixley getting “mad” 20 because he did not want to amend Plaintiff’s UCC chronology, see id. at 14- 21 15—Plaintiff has not satisfied the causation element necessary to state a 22 retaliation claim under § 1983. Importantly, Plaintiff fails to state how 23 Defendants’ alleged frustration with Plaintiff or with his multiple grievances 24 was a substantial or motivating factor in denying him single-celling. Instead, 25 the Complaint states that Defendants told Plaintiff that he did not have 26 “enough in-cell violence” to justify single-celling him. Id. at 17. Causation 27 aside, Plaintiff also fails to state how his denial of single celling did not 28 reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal or was otherwise arbitrary or 11 1 capricious. See Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68; Watison, 668 F.3d at 1115. 2 Absent allegations in support of these two elements, Plaintiff fails to state a 3 claim for retaliation. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim against Rhodes, Pixley, 4 Castro, and Dr. Edwards also must be dismissed. 5 V. 6 CONCLUSION 7 For the reasons discussed above, the Complaint fails to state a claim 8 upon which relief may be granted, and thus it must be dismissed. Because it is 9 not absolutely clear that the Complaint’s deficiencies cannot be cured by 10 amendment, dismissal is with leave to amend. Accordingly, if Plaintiff desires 11 to pursue his claims, he must file a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) within 12 thirty-five (35) days of the date of this Order, remedying the deficiencies 13 discussed above. The FAC should bear the docket number assigned in this 14 case, be labeled “First Amended Complaint,” and be complete in and of itself 15 without reference to the prior complaints or any other pleading, attachment, or 16 document. The Clerk is directed to send Plaintiff a blank Central District civil 17 rights complaint form, which Plaintiff is encouraged to use. 18 Plaintiff is admonished that if he fails to timely file a timely FAC this 19 action may be dismissed with prejudice for failure to diligently prosecute and 20 for the reasons discussed in this Order. 21 22 Dated: August 31, 2018 23 ______________________________ DOUGLAS F. McCORMICK United States Magistrate Judge 24 25 26 27 28 12

Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.


Why Is My Information Online?