Katrina Wynn Warren v. Universal City Studios LLC et al

Filing 12

MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER REMANDING ACTION by Judge Fernando M. Olguin. The above-captioned action shall be remanded to the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles, 111 N. Hill St., Los Angeles, CA 90012, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1447(c). Case Terminated. Made JS-6 (iv)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JS-6

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 19-8124 FMO (Ex)

Title

Katrina Wynn-Warren v. Universal City Studios, LLC, et al.

Present: The Honorable

Date

October 8, 2019

Fernando M. Olguin, United States District Judge

Cheryl Wynn

None

None

Deputy Clerk

Court Reporter / Recorder

Tape No.

Attorney Present for Plaintiff:

Attorney Present for Defendant:

None Present

None Present

Proceedings:

(In Chambers) Order Remanding Action

On July 30, 2019, Katrina Wynn-Warren (“plaintiff”) filed a Complaint in the Los Angeles
County Superior Court against Universal City Studios LLC and related entities (“defendants”)
asserting claims related to plaintiff’s employment. (See Dkt. 1, Notice of Removal (“NOR”) at ¶
1; Dkt. 1-1, Exh. A (“Complaint”)). On September 19, 2019, defendants removed that action on
diversity jurisdiction grounds pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (See Dkt. 1, NOR at p. 2). Having
reviewed the pleadings, the court hereby remands this action to state court for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
LEGAL STANDARD
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized
by Constitution and statute[.]” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114
S.Ct. 1673, 1675 (1994). The courts are presumed to lack jurisdiction unless the contrary
appears affirmatively from the record. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n.
3, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 1861 (2006). Federal courts have a duty to examine jurisdiction sua sponte
before proceeding to the merits of a case, see Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574,
583, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 1569 (1999), “even in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Arbaugh
v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 1244 (2006).
“The right of removal is entirely a creature of statute and a suit commenced in a state court
must remain there until cause is shown for its transfer under some act of Congress.” Syngenta
Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32, 123 S.Ct. 366, 369 (2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Where Congress has acted to create a right of removal, those statutes, unless
otherwise stated, are strictly construed against removal jurisdiction.1 See id. Unless otherwise
expressly provided by Congress, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district

1

For example, an “antiremoval presumption” does not exist in cases removed pursuant
to the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). See Dart Cherokee Basin
Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 135 S.Ct. 547, 554 (2014).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 19-8124 FMO (Ex)

Date

Title

Katrina Wynn-Warren v. Universal City Studios, LLC, et al.

October 8, 2019

courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the
defendants, to the district court[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); see Dennis v. Hart, 724 F.3d 1249, 1252
(9th Cir. 2013) (same). A removing defendant bears the burden of establishing that removal is
proper. See Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006) (per
curiam) (noting the “longstanding, near-canonical rule that the burden on removal rests with the
removing defendant”); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The strong
presumption against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of
establishing that removal is proper.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, if there is any
doubt regarding the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, the court must resolve those doubts
in favor of remanding the action to state court. See Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566 (“Federal jurisdiction
must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.”).
“Under the plain terms of § 1441(a), in order properly to remove [an] action pursuant to that
provision, [the removing defendant] must demonstrate that original subject-matter jurisdiction lies
in the federal courts.” Syngenta Crop Prot., 537 U.S. at 33, 123 S.Ct. at 370. Failure to do so
requires that the case be remanded, as “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction may not be waived, and. . .
the district court must remand if it lacks jurisdiction.” Kelton Arms Condo. Owners Ass’n, Inc. v.
Homestead Ins. Co., 346 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003). Indeed, “[i]f at any time before final
judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be
remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1194 n. 2
(9th Cir. 1988) (“It is elementary that the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court is not a
waivable matter and may be raised at anytime by one of the parties, by motion or in the
responsive pleadings, or sua sponte by the trial or reviewing court.”); Washington v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 2009 WL 1519894, *1 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (a district court may remand an action where
the court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction either by motion or sua sponte).
DISCUSSION
The court’s review of the NOR and the attached Complaint makes clear that this court does
not have subject matter jurisdiction over the instant matter. In other words, plaintiff could not have
originally brought this action in federal court, as plaintiff does not competently allege facts
supplying diversity jurisdiction.2 Therefore, removal was improper. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a);
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429 (1987) (“Only state-court
actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by
the defendant.”) (footnote omitted).
Defendants bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
amount in controversy meets the jurisdictional threshold. See Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d
1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004); Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th

2

Defendants seek only to invoke the court’s diversity jurisdiction. (See, generally, Dkt. 1,

NOR).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 19-8124 FMO (Ex)

Date

Title

Katrina Wynn-Warren v. Universal City Studios, LLC, et al.

October 8, 2019

Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“Where it is not facially evident from the complaint that more than $75,000
is in controversy, the removing party must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
amount in controversy meets the jurisdictional threshold. Where doubt regarding the right to
removal exists, a case should be remanded to state court.”) (footnotes omitted). Here, there is
no basis for diversity jurisdiction because the amount in controversy does not appear to exceed
the diversity jurisdiction threshold of $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 3
As an initial matter, the amount of damages plaintiff seeks cannot be determined from the
Complaint, as the Complaint does not set forth a specific amount. (See, generally, Dkt. 1-1, Exh.
A, Complaint). Given plaintiff’s modest hourly wage and part-time status, (see Dkt. 1, NOR at ¶
33), defendants rely heavily on her request for emotional distress damages. (See id. at ¶ 34).
However, defendants fail to provide any analogous cases with substantially similar factual
scenarios to guide the court as to the amount of emotional distress damages that might be
recovered in this case. (See, generally, id.); see, e.g., Mireles v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 845
F.Supp.2d 1034, 1055 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (remanding where defendants “proffer[ed] no evidence
that the lawsuits and settlements alleged in the complaint are factually or legally similar to
plaintiffs’ claims”); Dawson v. Richmond Am. Homes of Nevada, Inc., 2013 WL 1405338, *3 (D.
Nev. 2013) (remanding where defendant “offered no facts to demonstrate that the [proffered
analogous] suit is factually identical [to plaintiffs’ suit]”).
Defendants’ reliance on plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees and punitive damages, (Dkt.
1, NOR at ¶¶ 35-36), is similarly unpersuasive. Defendants fail to adequately show that attorney’s
fees in this case would place the amount in controversy over $75,000, (see id. at ¶ 35), and also
fail to point the court to punitive damages awards in factually similar cases. (See id. at ¶ 36);
Burk v. Med. Savs. Ins. Co., 348 F.Supp.2d 1063, 1069 (D. Ariz. 2004) (“[T]he mere possibility
of a punitive damages award is insufficient to prove that the amount in controversy requirement
has been met.”); id. at 1070 (defendant “failed to compare the facts of Plaintiff’s case with the
facts of other cases where punitive damages have been awarded in excess of the jurisdictional
amount”); Killion v. AutoZone Stores Inc., 2011 WL 590292, *2 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (“Defendants cite
two cases . . . in which punitive damages were awarded, but make no attempt to analogize or
explain how these cases are similar to the instant action. . . . Simply citing these cases merely
illustrate[s] that punitive damages are possible, but in no way shows that it is likely or probable
in this case. Therefore, Defendants’ inclusion of punitive damages in the calculation of the
jurisdictional amount is speculative and unsupported.”) (citation omitted).
In sum, given that any doubt regarding the existence of subject matter jurisdiction must be
resolved in favor of remanding the action, see Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566, the court is not persuaded,

3

In relevant part, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) provides that a district court has diversity jurisdiction
“where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, . . . and is between . . .
citizens of different States” or “citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state[.]” 28
U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(1)-(2).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 19-8124 FMO (Ex)

Date

Title

Katrina Wynn-Warren v. Universal City Studios, LLC, et al.

October 8, 2019

under the circumstances here, that defendants have met their burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy meets the jurisdictional threshold.
See Matheson, 319 F.3d at 1090 (“Where it is not facially evident from the complaint that more
than $75,000 is in controversy, the removing party must prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the amount in controversy meets the jurisdictional threshold. Where doubt
regarding the right to removal exists, a case should be remanded to state court.”) (footnotes
omitted); Valdez, 372 F.3d at 1117.
This order is not intended for publication. Nor is it intended to be included in or
submitted to any online service such as Westlaw or Lexis.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that:
1. The above-captioned action shall be remanded to the Superior Court of the State of
California for the County of Los Angeles, 111 N. Hill St., Los Angeles, CA 90012, for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
2. The Clerk shall send a certified copy of this Order to the state court.

Initials of Preparer

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