Luis Villegas v. Wong-One, LLC et al

Filing 22

ORDER RE PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT, 18 by Judge Ronald S.W. Lew: The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs Application as to the ADA claim and ORDERSDefendant to provide ADA-compliant sales counters and dining surfaces. The Court awards $1,425.00 in attorneys fees and $530 in costs. The Court DECLINESto exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs Unruh Act claim and thereby DISMISSES the claim without prejudice. IT IS SO ORDERED. (shb)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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ORDER re: Plaintiff’s
Application for Default
Judgment [18]

Plaintiff,

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CV 20-7291-RSWL-AS

LUIS VILLEGAS,

v.
WONG-ONE, LLC, a
California Limited
Liability Company; DZUBAK
INVESTMENTS, LLC, a
California Limited
Liability Company; and
DOES 1 to 10,
Defendants.

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Plaintiff Luis Villegas (“Plaintiff”) claims

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Defendant Wong-One, LLC and Defendant Dzubak

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Investments, LLC, (collectively, “Defendants”) violated

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the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”) and

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California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act (the “Unruh Act”).

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Plaintiff filed this Application for Default Judgment

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[18] on March 5, 2021 (the “Application”).
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For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS

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Plaintiff’s Application as to the ADA claim and DECLINES

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to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

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Unruh Act Claim.
I.

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A.

BACKGROUND

Factual Background
Plaintiff is a paraplegic who uses a wheelchair for

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mobility.

Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1.

Defendant Wong-One,

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LLC owned or owns the real property located at 130 N.

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Robertson Blvd., Beverly Hills, California.

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Defendant Dzubak Investments, LLC owned or owns Beverly

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Hills Mercantile & Liquor (the “Store”), which is

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located at the subject property.

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Id. ¶¶ 2-3.

Id. ¶¶ 2—5.

On or about July 28, 2020, Plaintiff visited the

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Store with the intention to avail himself of its goods.

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Compl. ¶ 10; Pl.’s Appl. for Default J. (“Appl.”) Ex. 2

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(“Pl.’s Decl.”) ¶ 3, ECF No. 18-4.

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physical disabilities, however, Plaintiff alleges he was

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denied full and equal access to the property when he

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encountered no wheelchair accessible sales counters in

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compliance with ADA standards.

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As a result of his

Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 4.

On or about August 4, 2020, an investigator with

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the Center for Disability Access visited the Store to

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survey and photograph the property.

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Decl.”) ¶¶ 1—2, ECF No. 18-5.

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wheelchair accessible sales counters, the investigator

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2

Appl. Ex. 3 (“Louis

In addition to finding no

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discovered no wheelchair accessible dining surfaces. 1

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Id. ¶¶ 3—4.

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B.

Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed his Complaint [1] on August 13,

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2020, asserting violations of the ADA and Unruh Act.

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Plaintiff served Defendants [10, 13] on August 20, 2020.

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To date, Defendants have not appeared in the Action.

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Following Plaintiff’s Requests for Entry of Default [14,

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15], the Clerk entered default [16, 17] on September 15,

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2020.
On March 5, 2021, Plaintiff filed the present

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Application [18].

Plaintiff seeks an order requiring

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Defendants to provide ADA-compliant sales counters and

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dining surfaces.

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additionally seeks an award totaling $8,000.00 in

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statutory damages, plus $4,074.50 in attorneys’ fees and

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costs.

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Billing Summary, ECF No. 18-3.

Appl. 2:23—26, ECF No. 18.

Id. at 2:27—3:3; Appl. Ex. 1 (“Handy Decl.”),
II.

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A.

Plaintiff

DISCUSSION

Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 55(b)

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authorizes a district court to grant default judgment

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after the clerk enters default under Rule 55(a).

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R. Civ. P. 55(b).

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Fed.

Before a court can enter default

Plaintiff did not actually encounter the dining surfaces
in July 2020. Compl. ¶ 17; Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 5. Plaintiff learned
from the pre-filing investigator that the Defendants failed to
provide wheelchair accessible dining surfaces due to toe
clearance issues. Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 5; Louis Decl. ¶ 4.
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judgment against a defendant, the plaintiff must satisfy

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the procedural requirements set forth in Local Rule 55-

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1.

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judgment must submit a declaration establishing: (1)

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when and against which party the default was entered;

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(2) on which pleading the default was entered; (3)

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whether the defaulting party is a minor, incompetent

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person, or active service member; (4) that the

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Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 3931,

Pursuant to L.R. 55-1, the movant for default

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does not apply; and (5) that the defaulting party was

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properly served with notice.

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It is within the district court’s discretion to

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grant or deny an application of default judgment.

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Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092—93 (9th Cir.

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1980).

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proper, a court considers the “Eitel factors”: (1) the

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possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the

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merits of the plaintiff’s substantive claim; (3) the

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sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of money at

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stake; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning

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material facts; (6) whether the defendant’s default was

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due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy

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favoring decision on the merits.

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F.2d 1470, 1471—72 (9th Cir. 1986).

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In determining whether default judgment is

Eitel v. McCool, 782

After entry of default by the clerk, all factual

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allegations in the complaint, except those relating to

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damages, are assumed as true.

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v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917—18 (9th Cir. 1987)
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See TeleVideo Sys., Inc.

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(quoting Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560

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(9th Cir. 1977)).

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provide evidence of all damages he seeks to recover in

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the complaint.

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F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2002).

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judgment is granted, the relief reward “must not differ

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in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in

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the [complaint].”

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B.

Thus, the plaintiff is required to

See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238
When default

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c).

Discussion

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1.

Jurisdiction

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When a party moves for default judgment, a court

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must examine both subject matter and personal

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jurisdiction.

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1999).

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a.

In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir.

ADA Claim

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28

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U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 for violations of the ADA.

See

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Civil Rights Educ. & Enf’t Ctr. v. Hosp. Props. Tr., 867

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F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 2017).

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personal jurisdiction over Defendants because they have

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“minimum contacts” with California such that “the suit

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does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and

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substantial justice.’”

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788 (1984) (quotation omitted).

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Defendants own the real property and/or Store located at

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130 N. Robertson Blvd., Beverly Hills, California, where

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the incident giving rise to this Action occurred.

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Compl. ¶¶ 4—5; Appl. Ex. 9 (“Gutierrez Decl.”) ¶¶ 3—4,

Further, the Court has

Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783,

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More specifically,

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ECF No. 18-11.
b.

Unruh Act Claim

The court has supplemental jurisdiction over

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“claims that are so related to claims in the action

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within such original jurisdiction that they form part of

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the same case or controversy under Article III of the

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United States Constitution.”

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However, even if supplemental jurisdiction exists, the

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Court may exercise its discretion to decline

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

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supplemental jurisdiction “in exceptional circumstances”

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or where “there are other compelling reasons for

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declining jurisdiction.”

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28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4).

The Unruh Act provides that “[a]ll persons within

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the jurisdiction of [California] are free and equal, and

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no matter what their . . . disability . . . status are

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entitled to the full and equal accommodations,

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advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all

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business establishments of every kind whatsoever.”

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Civ. Code § 51(b).

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violation of the ADA constitutes a violation of § 51 of

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the Unruh Act.

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unlike the ADA, the Unruh Act allows a plaintiff to

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recover statutory damages for each offense.

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Code at § 52(a).

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Cal.

The Unruh Act also provides that any

Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f).

Moreover,
Cal. Civ.

In 2012, California adopted a heightened pleading

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standard for actions brought under the Unruh Act “to

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combat the influx of baseless claims and vexatious

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litigation in the disability access litigation sphere.”
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Langer v. Al Sunset, LLC, No. 2:21-CV-03594-FLA-AFM,

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2021 WL 2038372, at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 21, 2021).

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heightened pleading requirements apply to actions

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alleging “construction-related accessibility claims,”

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which California law defines as “any civil claim in a

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civil action with respect to a place of public

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accommodation . . . based wholly or in part on an

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alleged violation of any construction-related

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accessibility standard.”

These

Cal. Civ. Code § 55.52(a)(1).

Moreover, California law imposes additional

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limitations on “high-frequency litigants,” defined as “a

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plaintiff who has filed ten or more complaints alleging

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construction-related accessibility violation within the

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twelve-month period immediately preceding the filing of

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the current complaint alleging a construction-related

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accessibility violation.”

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425.55(b)(1).

Cal. Civ. Code §

By enacting restrictions on the filing of

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construction-related accessibility claims, district

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courts have expressed their interest in limiting the

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financial burdens California businesses may face for

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claims of statutory damages against them under the Unruh

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Act.

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al., No. 8:21-CV-00740-JLS-KES, 2021 WL 2073478, at *1

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(C.D. Cal. May 21, 2021).

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consider fairness and comity when determining whether to

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exercise supplemental jurisdiction over construction-

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related claims under the Unruh Act.

See Ghadiri v. Tacos Queretaro Mexican Food et
Thus, district courts should

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See, e.g., Schutza

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v. Cuddeback, 262 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1031 (S.D. Cal.

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2017) (“[T]he Court finds it improper to allow Plaintiff

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to use federal court as an end-around to California’s

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pleading requirements. Therefore, as a matter of comity,

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and deference to California’s substantial interest in

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discouraging unverified disability discrimination

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claims, the Court declines supplemental jurisdiction

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over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act Claim.”).

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frequency litigant seeking relief under the Unruh Act,

For a high-

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it would be improper to allow a plaintiff to use federal

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court as an “end-around” to California’s heightened

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pleading requirements.

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Id.

Here, Plaintiff is a high-frequency litigant who

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has filed 134 cases in the Central District, including

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twenty-five complaints in the twelve-month period

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immediately preceding the filing of this current

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Action. 2

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As such, and because of California’s

See Villegas v. Van Chau et al., No. 2:20-CV-07292-VAP-PD
(filed Aug. 13, 2020); Villegas v. Farsight, Inc., No. 2:20-CV05090-RSWL-PD (filed June 9, 2020); Villegas v. Attina Co. et
al., No. 2:20-CV-03301-DMG-SK (filed Apr. 9, 2020); Villegas v.
Whittier, LLC et al., No. 2:20-CV-00728-CJC-MAA (filed Jan. 24,
2019); Villegas v. Snow et al., No. 2:19-CV-10768-SK (filed Dec.
20, 2019); Villegas v. Zagros Inv., LLC et al., No. 2:19-CV10456-ODW-JC (filed Dec. 11, 2019); Villegas v. Rashid et al.,
2:19-CV-09847-DMG-KS (filed Nov. 18, 2019); Villegas v. Ora
Prop., LLC et al., No. 2:19-CV-09616-ODW-FFM (filed Nov. 8,
2019); Villegas v. Haroon et al., No. 2:19-CV-09224-SVW-AFM
(filed Oct. 28, 2019); Villegas v. Tran et al., No. 2:19-CV09223-MWF-RAO (same); Villegas v. Tedwin S & B, LLC et al., No.
2:19-CV-09191-SVW-AGR (filed Oct. 25, 2019); Villegas v. Baltagi
Enter., LLC et al., No. 2:10-CV-09145-JAK-SK (filed Oct. 24,
2019); Villegas v. 310 E. Manchester Ave. Assoc., LLC et al., No.
2:19-CV-09055-JFW-FFM (filed Oct. 21, 2019); Villegas v. Weiss et
al., No. 2:19-CV-09054-CJC-AFM (same); Villegas v. Webb Energy
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substantial interest in discouraging unverified

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discrimination claims, the Court declines to exercise

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supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act

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claim.

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District of California and elsewhere have similarly

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declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

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construction-related claims asserted by high-frequency

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litigants. 3

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A significant number of judges in the Central

Moreover, the Court will not be depriving Plaintiff

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of any remedies because his ADA claim remains pending

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before the Court.

Appl. 2:23.

If Plaintiff so chooses,

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Holdings, LLC et al., No. 2:19-CV-09024-VAP-MRW (same); Villegas
v. Azalea Joint Venture, LLC et al., No. 2:19-CV-09022-AB-AS
(same); Villegas v. Park et al., No. 2:19-CV-09021-PSG-RAO
(same); Villegas v. Montebello Ctr., No. 2:19-CV-07760-CBM-AS
(filed Sept. 9. 2019); Villegas v. Glendale I Mall Assoc., LP et
al., No. 2:19-CV-07720-PSG-MAA (filed Sept. 6, 2019); Villegas v.
G & M GAPCO, LLC et al., No. 2:19-CV-07530-JFW-AGR (filed Aug.
30, 2019); Villegas v. Thrifty Payless, Inc et al., No. 2:19-CV07186-AB-PJW (filed Aug. 19, 2019); Villegas v. White et al., No.
8:19-CV-01564-JVS-KES (filed Aug. 14, 2019); Villegas v.
Valaskantzis et al., 2:19-CV-07019-VAP-AS (filed Aug. 13, 2019);
Villegas v. Teshima et al., No. 2:19-CV-07012-AB-RAO (same);
Villegas v. Conzonire et al., No. 2:19-CV-07011-FMO-GJS (same).
See, e.g., Lammy v. Leung et al., No. CV 19-4579-GW-ASX,
2020 WL 7861967 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2020) (Wu, J.); Marquez v.
Carwood Ctr., LLC et al., No. 2:20-CV-05948-VAP-JEMX, 2020 WL
8816340 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2020) (Phillips, J.); Madriz v.
Villalobos et al., No. CV 20-00202-CJC(KKX), 2020 WL 4006524
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2020) (Carney, J.); see also Langer v.
Petras, No. 19-cv-1408-CAB-BGS, 2019 WL 3459107 (S.D. Cal. July
31, 2019) (Bencivengo, J.); Reyes v. Flourshings Plus, Inc., No.
19cv261 JM (WVG), 2019 WL 1958284 (S.D. Cal. May 2, 2019)
(Miller, J.); Schutza v. Alessio Leasing, Inc., No. 18cv2154LAB(AGS), 2019 WL 1546950 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2019) (Burns, J.).
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he may pursue his Unruh Act claim in state court. 4

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2.

Local Rule 55-1

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Plaintiff has satisfied the procedural requirements

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for entry of default judgment under Local Rule 55-1.

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See Gutierrez Decl.

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Defendants on September 15, 2020 for failure to respond

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to Plaintiff’s Complaint.

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infants, incompetent persons, or exempted under the

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Servicemembers Civil Relief Act.

The Clerk entered default against
Id. ¶ 5.

Defendants are not

Id. ¶ 2.

Lastly,

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Plaintiff served Defendants with notice of this

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Application on March 5, 2021.

Id. ¶ 6.

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3.

Requested Relief

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When seeking default judgment, a Plaintiff “is

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required to prove all damages sought in the

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[C]omplaint.”

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Prods., 219 F.R.D. 494, 498 (C.D. Cal. 2003).

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Plaintiff seeks an injunction, damages, and attorneys’

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fees and costs.
a.

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Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld
Here,

Injunctive Relief

Under the ADA, a plaintiff is entitled to

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injunctive relief to make “facilities readily accessible

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to and usable by individuals with disabilities.”

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U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2).

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Here, Plaintiff requests an order

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Plaintiff encountered the barrier on July 28, 2019. Pl.’s
Decl. ¶ 3. The statute of limitations has not yet lapsed, and
Plaintiff is able to bring his Unruh Act claim in state court.
See Harris v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. CV 18-924-BTM-AHG, 2019 WL
6683367, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2019) (finding that Unruh Act
claims “are subject to a two-year statute of limitations”).
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requiring Defendants to comply with the ADA by providing

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wheelchair accessible sales counters and dining

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surfaces.

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require Defendants to provide wheelchair accessible

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sales counters in compliance with the ADA.

Thus, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request to

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To prove discrimination stemming from failure to

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remove an architectural barrier, however, the fourth

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factor requires a plaintiff to actually encounter the

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architectural barrier that precluded him or her full and

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equal access to the facility.

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Inv’rs, LLC, SACV-18-00371-CJC-JDEX, 2019 WL 4238872, at

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*2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2019).

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actually encounter the non-ADA compliant dining

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surfaces.

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to meet this factor, one form of discrimination is

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failure to remove architectural barriers unless they are

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not readily achievable to remove.

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12182(b)(2)(A)(iv); Grove v. De La Cruz, 407 F. Supp. 2d

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1126, 1130 (C.D. Cal. 2005).

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to appear and argue whether the architectural barriers

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were readily achievable to remove, the Court GRANTS

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Plaintiff’s request to require Defendants to provide

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wheelchair accessible dining surfaces. 5

Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 5.

See Ho v. Mlynarski
Here, Plaintiff did not

Although Plaintiff failed

See 42 U.S.C. §

Because Defendants failed

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The dining services include one foldable table and two
foldable chairs. Even if Defendants had appeared and answered to
Plaintiff’s complaint, it is hard to imagine that the Court would
find these architectural barriers as not readily achievable to
remove. See Appl. Ex. 4 at 33, ECF No. 18-6.
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b.

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Damages

Plaintiff seeks a total of $8,000.00 in statutory

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damages for Defendants’ alleged violation of the Unruh

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Act.

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supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act

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claim, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for

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statutory damages.

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Because the Court declines to exercise

c.

Attorneys’ Fees & Costs

The ADA authorizes attorneys’ fees in this matter.

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42 U.S.C. § 12205; Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a); see also

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Jankey v. Poop Deck, 537 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2008)

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(“A prevailing plaintiff under the ADA should ordinarily

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recover an attorney’s fee unless special circumstances

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would render such an award unjust.”) (internal quotation

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marks omitted).

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fees are determined by reference to the lodestar method.

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Vogel v. Harbor Plaza Center, LLC, 893 F.3d 1152 (9th

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Cir. 2018) (finding that it was an abuse of discretion

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for the district court to treat the Local Rule 55-3 fee

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schedule, which is ordinarily used in instances of

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default judgment, as presumptively reasonable, rather

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than using a lodestar approach to calculate attorneys’

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fees for ADA and Unruh civil rights cases).

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“must first determine the presumptive lodestar figure by

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multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on

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the litigation by the reasonable hourly rate.”

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S.A. v. Wuxi Shenxi Constr. Mach. Co., 668 F.3d 677, 689

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(9th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted).

For ADA cases, reasonable attorneys’

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A court

Secalt

The fee applicant

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must “produce satisfactory evidence—in addition to the

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attorney’s own affidavits—that [his] requested [hourly]

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rates [were] in line with those prevailing in the

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community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably

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comparable skill, experience and reputation.”

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Wells Fargo Fin. Cal., Inc., 606 F.3d 577, 583 (9th Cir.

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2010) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n.11

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(1984)).

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documenting the appropriate hours expended in the

Grove v.

The fee applicant bears “the burden of

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litigation” and of “submit[ting] evidence in support of

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those hours worked.”

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Hourly-Rated Emps. of ASARCO, Inc., 512 F.3d 555, 565

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(9th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted).

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requests deviation from the default fee schedule in

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Local Rule 55-3, seeking $3,244.50 in attorneys’ fees

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and $830.00 in costs, totaling $4,074.50.

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Decl., Billing Summary.

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USW v. Ret. Income Plan for
Here, Plaintiff

See Handy

Here, Plaintiff’s counsel staffed four attorneys on

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this case: Russell Handy (“Handy”), Mark Potter

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(“Potter”), Amanda Seabock (“Seabock”), and Faythe

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Gutierrez (“Gutierrez”).

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seeks hourly rates of $595.00 for partner-level senior

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attorneys Handy and Potter, $450.00 for Seabock, and

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$400.00 for Gutierrez.

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Plaintiff relies on the declarations by Handy,

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highlighting the attorneys’ qualifications by their

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experience in disability litigation, other legal

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experience, success in law school, and involvement in

Handy Decl. ¶¶ 3—6.

Id.

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Plaintiff

In support of this request,

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disability-related organizations.

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submits declarations from Richard Pearl and John

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O’Connor, two attorneys’ fees experts, as well as

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excerpts from the 2018 Real Rate Report, to support the

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fees requested. 6

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18-10.

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Id.

Plaintiff also

See Appl. Exs. 6—8, ECF Nos. 18-8 to

This Action is a routine ADA case in which

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Plaintiff’s counsel has reused the same documents and

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“carbon-copy complaints” in other cases.

Tate v. Deoca,

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No. CV 14-08739-SJO-MRW, 2018 WL 5914220, at *8 (C.D.

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Cal. July 31, 2018).

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the filings in this case with the filings in thousands

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of other cases filed by Plaintiff’s counsel in this

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district reveals almost no original work.”

Indeed, “[a] simple comparison of

Id.

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This Court is guided not by the amount requested

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but by the “fees awarded by other judges in the same

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locality in similar cases.”

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Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1115 (9th Cir. 2008)

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(citation omitted).

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be nearly identical to the thousands of other cases

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filed by Plaintiff’s counsel, and after reviewing awards

Moreno v. City of

Given that this Action appears to

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Other district courts have found these reports limited in
use. See Johnson v. Jun, 19-CV-06474-BLF, 2020 WL 6507995, at *9
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2020) (finding that Pearl’s declaration and
the Real Rate Report failed to consider the nature of work done
and the skill or reputation of the attorneys in each case);
Johnson v. Cortese, 5:19-CV-02671-EJD, 2020 WL 7495164, at *9
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2020) (finding Pearl’s report “to be of
limited use in determining the prevailing market rate”) (quoting
Johnson v. Progreso Dev., LLC, No. 5:20-CV-02167-EJD, 2020 WL
6136093, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2020)).
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in similar cases, the Court reduces Plaintiff’s

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requested hourly rates as follows: $425.00/hour for both

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Handy and Potter, $350.00/hour for Seabock, and

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$250.00/hour for Gutierrez. 7

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The next issue is whether the hours billed in this

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Action are reasonable.

“[A] district court should

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exclude hours ‘that are excessive, redundant, or

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otherwise unnecessary.’”

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5565 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hensly v.

McCown v. City of Fontana,

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Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)).

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submitted an itemized billing statement which reflects

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that Plaintiff’s attorneys spent 6.5 hours on this case.

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See Handy Decl., Billing Summary at 1.

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Plaintiff

Potter, a senior attorney and founding partner,

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billed 0.7 hours for using “[G]oogle satellite images,

16

street view, website and/or [Y]elp” to examine the Store

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in order to inform the investigator which photos and

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measurements he wanted to obtain.

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online research is excessive given the site’s relatively

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small size and “the obvious and blatant nature of the

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barriers.”

Compl. ¶ 21.

Id. at 2.

Potter’s

Accordingly, the Court reduces

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23
24
25
26
27
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See Garcia v. Padilla, No. 2:20-cv-03033-SVW-JPR, 2020 WL
8027786, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2020) (reducing hourly rates
to $425.00 for Handy and Potter, $350.00 for Seabock, and $250.00
for Gutierrez.); Langer v. Anaya, No. CV19-01075 PA(SHKx), 2020
WL 687611, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2020) (same for Handy,
Potter, and Seabock); Lopez v. Silvia, No. CV18-4813 PSG(JEMx),
2020 WL 2619163, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2020) (granting
$250/hour for similarly experienced attorneys as Gutierrez at
Counsel’s firm); Langer v. Garcia, No. 218CV02374VAPFFMX, 2019 WL
8013124, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2019) (same).
7

15

1
2

this time to 0.4 hours.
Handy, another senior attorney and founding

3

partner, billed 0.8 hours to review the investigator’s

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report and photographs and to “greenlight complaint

5

drafting or give investigator further instructions.”

6

Handy Decl., Billing Summary at 2.

7

Handy’s billed hours are excessive based on his ADA

8

expertise and the simple nature of the claim.

9

therefores reduce this billed time to 0.4 hours.

The Court finds that
The Court
See

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Chalmers v. City Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th

11

Cir. 1986) (stating that billing hours may be reduced

12

“if the case was overstaffed and the hours duplicated”

13

or “if the hours are deemed excessive or otherwise

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unnecessary”).

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Handy then billed 0.3 hours in which he conducted

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“[p]ublic records research to determine the identity of

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the responsible parties and to determine if there had

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been alterations or modifications that would have

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triggered stricter Title 24 obligations for this

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property.”

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“[a] basic public records search to identify the owner

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of the Property is not the type of legal work that

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should be billed by an attorney at $425.00 per hour.”

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Love, 2017 WL 2927429, at *4.

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was not “reasonably expended,” the Court excludes it

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from the attorneys’ fee award.

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Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983) (“The district

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court...should exclude from [its] initial fee

Handy Decl., Billing Summary at 2.

16

However,

Because this billing item
See Hensley v.

1

calculation hours that were not ‘reasonably

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expended’...hours that are excessive, redundant, or

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otherwise unnecessary.”).

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Lastly, Handy billed 0.6 hours to “draft [the]

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complaint and related initial filing doc[ument]s &

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prepare interoffice barrier memo and service

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instructions.”

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Given that Plaintiff’s counsel files nearly identical

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complaints and other related documents in all of its

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cases, save for a few distinguishing details of fact,

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the Court finds 0.6 hours to draft the complaint and

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other related documents and instructions to be

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unreasonable.

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19-7244-RSWL-SS, 2020 WL 1068246, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Jan.

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31, 2020) (reducing billing item to 0.4 hours when the

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Court found that 0.7 hours to draft the complaint and

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interoffice memo was unreasonable).

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Court reduces this billing item to 0.3 hours.

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See Handy Decl., Billing Statement at 2.

See Arroyo v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., CV

Accordingly, the

Seabock billed 0.3 hours for reviewing court-issued

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documents such as the Notice of Assignment and Notice to

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Parties regarding ADA Disability Access Litigation.

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Handy Decl., Billing Summary at 2.

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counsel files a significant amount of similar cases in

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this district, and considering Seabock’s experience

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working with seasoned ADA-litigation attorneys Handy and

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Potter since 2012, see Handy Decl. ¶ 5, the Court finds

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this time expended reviewing routine and boilerplate

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court notices excessive and reduce it accordingly to 0.1
17

Because Plaintiff’s

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2

hours.
Gutierrez billed 1.5 hours for “[a]mend[ing] the

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default judgment template with all component[] parts.”

4

Handy Decl., Billing Summary at 3.

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time excessive, but it is redundant with the two

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additional entries totaling 1.1 hours for “select[ing]

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photos to be used in the default judgment packet” and

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“work[ing] on declaration[s]” filed in support of the

9

instant Application.

Id.

Not only is this

Therefore, the Court reduces

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the total time spent on the instant Application from 2.6

11

hours to 1.8 hours.

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Considering Plaintiff’s counsel’s familiarity with

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ADA cases, the simple nature of this case for

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experienced attorneys, the redundancy of the work

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involved, and the complete lack of opposition, the Court

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reduces the total hours billed by Plaintiff’s counsel by

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2.3 hours. 8

18

CV 19-7016 PA (ASX), 2020 WL 6106314, at *3 (C.D. Cal.

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Aug. 10, 2020) (finding that Plaintiff’s counsel “has

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repeatedly misrepresented and hidden from all of the

21

courts in which it applied for fees the deceptive nature

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of its billing practices,” which include intentionally

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not keeping contemporaneous billing records and

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“seek[ing] fees for work performed by paralegals at

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hourly rates for work performed by attorneys”).

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Therefore, the Court awards $1,425.00 in attorneys’

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28

See Arroyo v. Raspados Xpress LA, Inc., No.

0.8 hours billed by Potter, 1.0 hours billed by Handy, 0.6
hours billed by Seabock, and 1.8 hours billed by Gutierrez.
8

18

1
2

fees.
Finally, as the prevailing party, Plaintiff is also

3

entitled to costs.

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54(d)(1); C.D. Cal. Local Rule 54-2.

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recover $830.00 in costs, which includes $400.00 in

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filing fees, $30.00 in service costs, and $400.00 for an

7

investigator.

8
9

29 U.S.C. § 1920, Fed. R. Civ. P.
Plaintiff seeks to

Handy Decl., Billing Summary at 1.

In recent similar cases, Plaintiff’s firm submitted
investigator costs of $100.00, as opposed to the

10

quadrupled amount of $400.00 in this present Action. 9

11

Moreover, in cases where Plaintiff’s firm has submitted

12

investigator costs of $400.00, this Court has routinely

13

reduced these costs to $100.00. 10

14

not provided any other supporting evidence to support

15

the quadrupled investigator expense besides the billing

16

statement, the Court awards Plaintiff $530.00 in costs.

Because Plaintiff has

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18
19
20
21
22
23

See Uriarte-Limon v. Torres, No. 2:20-CV-02862-SVW-JC,
2020 WL 5260480, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2020; Marquez v.
Chateau Hosp., Inc., No. CV200107FMORAOX, 2020 WL 5118077, at *8
(C.D. Cal. June 11, 2020); Whitaker v. Westside Properties-2, LLC
et al., No. 2:19-CV-07946-AB-RAO, 2020 WL 2614623, at *5 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 2, 2020); Lammey v. Plaza Segundo, LLC, No.
LACV1904484JAKPLAX, 2019 WL 8638804, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 20,
2019); Sherfield v. Brite Spot, LLC, No. CV 19-6181-MWF-KS, 2019
WL 8160897, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2019).
9

24
25
26
27
28

See Cagle v. Multani, No. CV 20-3038-MWF (PDX), 2020 WL
7861969, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2020). Garcia v. Mouannes, No.
CV2002591ABAGRX, 2020 WL 6064024, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2020);
Garcia v. Nouk, No. CV 20-2565-MWF-GJS, 2020 WL 6064029, at *3
(C.D. Cal. July 21, 2020); Garcia v. Sanchez, No. CV 20-18484MWF-PVC, 2020 WL 6064025, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2020).
10

19

III.

1
2

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS

3

Plaintiff’s Application as to the ADA claim and ORDERS

4

Defendant to provide ADA-compliant sales counters and

5

dining surfaces.

6

attorneys’ fees and $530 in costs.

7

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

8

Unruh Act claim and thereby DISMISSES the claim without

9

prejudice.

The Court awards $1,425.00 in
The Court DECLINES

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11

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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DATED: July 15, 2021

_____________________________
/s/ Ronald S.W. Lew
HONORABLE RONALD S.W. LEW
Senior U.S. District Judge

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