Chrispin Garcia v. People of The State of California et al

Filing 13

ORDER ACCEPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS by Judge John W. Holcomb for Report and Recommendation 9 . IT IS ORDERED that the Petition is denied and Judgment shall be entered dismissing this action with prejudice. (see document for further details) (hr)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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CHRISPIN GARCIA,

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Petitioner,
v.

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W.L. MONTGOMERY, Warden,

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Case No. CV 20-7849 JWH (PVC)
ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS,
CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF UNITED
STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Respondent.

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Court has reviewed the Petition, all of the records

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and files herein, the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, and Petitioner’s

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objections. After having made a de novo determination of the portions of the Report and

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Recommendation to which the objections were directed, the Court concurs with and

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accepts the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge.

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In his objections, Petitioner argues in part that he is entitled to equitable tolling

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because he is uneducated in the law; had limited access to the law library, a problem

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which was compounded by new restrictions imposed during the COVID-19 pandemic;

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and speaks “little English.” (Obj. at 3-4). A petitioner bears the burden of proving he is

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entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations by showing: “(1) that he has been

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pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his

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way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). The conditions Petitioner cites

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are common to many, if not most, prisoners, and do not constitute “extraordinary

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circumstances” warranting equitable tolling.

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The Ninth Circuit instructs that “a pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is

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not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.” Rasberry v.

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Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Ford v. Pliler, 590 F.3d 782, 789

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(9th Cir. 2009) (equitable tolling “standard has never been satisfied by a petitioner’s

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confusion or ignorance of the law alone”); Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008,

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1013 n.4 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A] pro se petitioner’s confusion or ignorance of the law is not,

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itself, a circumstance warranting equitable tolling.”). Furthermore, ordinary prison

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limitations on law library access do not warrant equitable tolling. See Ramirez v. Yates,

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571 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Ordinary prison limitations on Ramirez’s access to

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the law library and copier . . . were neither ‘extraordinary’ nor made it ‘impossible’ for

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him to file his petition in a timely manner.”); Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th

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Cir. 2001) (recognizing that lack of access to library materials does not automatically

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qualify as grounds for equitable tolling). Additionally, Petitioner’s purported lack of law

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library access due to COVID restrictions in 2020 does not explain why he failed to file a

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federal habeas petition during the AEDPA limitations period, which in his case expired on

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June 20, 2017.

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While Petitioner summarily claims that he speaks “little English,” this conclusory

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assertion, unsupported by any facts showing that his language skills made it impossible

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for him to file a timely petition, does not warrant equitable tolling. According to the

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Ninth Circuit, “[l]ack of English proficiency can constitute an extraordinary circumstance

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for equitable tolling purposes, but only when the petitioner is unable to procure legal

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materials in his own language or to obtain translation assistance.” Yow Ming Yeh v.

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Martel, 751 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065,

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1070 (9th Cir. 2006)). Petitioner makes no such showing, and in fact, the fluency he

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displays in his Petition and the objections to the Report and Recommendation appears to

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belie his claim to poor language skills. See Williams v. Dexter, 649 F. Supp. 2d 1055,
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