Lloyd Mosley v. Hastings Village Investment Company LP, et al

Filing 9

MINUTES (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER REMANDING ACTION by Judge Fernando M. Olguin. The above-captioned action shall be remanded to the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles, 600 E Broadway, Glendale, CA 91206, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1447(c). Case Terminated. Made JS-6 (iv)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 20-8258 FMO (MRWx)

Title

Lloyd Mosley v. Hastings Village Investment Company, L.P.

Present: The Honorable

Date

October 16, 2020

Fernando M. Olguin, United States District Judge

Vanessa Figueroa

None

None

Deputy Clerk

Court Reporter / Recorder

Tape No.

Attorney Present for Plaintiff:

Attorney Present for Defendant:

None Present

None Present

Proceedings:

(In Chambers) Order Remanding Action

On August 3, 2020, Lloyd Mosley (“plaintiff”) filed a Complaint in the Los Angeles County
Superior Court against Hastings Village Investment Company, L.P. (“defendant”) asserting statelaw disability discrimination claims. (See Dkt. 1, Notice of Removal (“NOR”) at ¶ 1 & Exhibit
(“Exh.”) A (“Complaint”)). On September 9, 2020, defendant removed that action on federal
question grounds pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (See Dkt. 1, NOR at ¶ 3). Having reviewed the
pleadings, the court hereby remands this action to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
LEGAL STANDARD
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized
by Constitution and statute[.]” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114
S.Ct. 1673, 1675 (1994). The courts are presumed to lack jurisdiction unless the contrary appears
affirmatively from the record. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n. 3, 126
S.Ct. 1854, 1861 (2006). Federal courts have a duty to examine jurisdiction sua sponte before
proceeding to the merits of a case, see Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583, 119
S.Ct. 1563, 1569 (1999), “even in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Arbaugh v. Y&H
Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 1244 (2006).
“The right of removal is entirely a creature of statute and a suit commenced in a state court
must remain there until cause is shown for its transfer under some act of Congress.” Syngenta
Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32, 123 S.Ct. 366, 369 (2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Where Congress has acted to create a right of removal, those statutes, unless otherwise
stated, are strictly construed against removal jurisdiction.1 See id. Unless otherwise expressly
provided by Congress, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the

1

For example, an “antiremoval presumption” does not exist in cases removed pursuant
to the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). See Dart Cherokee Basin
Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 135 S.Ct. 547, 554 (2014).
CV-90 (06/04)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 20-8258 FMO (MRWx)

Date

Title

Lloyd Mosley v. Hastings Village Investment Company, L.P.

October 16, 2020

United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to
the district court[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); see Dennis v. Hart, 724 F.3d 1249, 1252 (9th Cir. 2013)
(same). A removing defendant bears the burden of establishing that removal is proper. See
Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (noting the
“longstanding, near-canonical rule that the burden on removal rests with the removing defendant”);
Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The strong presumption against removal
jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is
proper.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, if there is any doubt regarding the
existence of subject matter jurisdiction, the court must resolve those doubts in favor of remanding
the action to state court. See Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566 (“Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there
is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.”).
For purposes of removal based on federal question jurisdiction, the well-pleaded complaint
rule “provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face
of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Smallwood v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 660 F.3d 1115,
1120 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429
(1987)). “As the master of the complaint, a plaintiff may defeat removal by choosing not to plead
independent federal claims.” ARCO Envt’l Remediation, L.L.C. v. Dep’t of Health & Envt’l Quality
of Montana, 213 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000).
DISCUSSION
The court’s review of the NOR and the attached Complaint makes clear that this court does
not have subject matter jurisdiction over the instant matter. In other words, plaintiff could not have
originally brought this action in federal court, as plaintiff does not competently allege facts
supplying federal question jurisdiction.2 Therefore, removal was improper. See 28 U.S.C. §
1441(a); Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429 (1987) (“Only
state-court actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal
court by the defendant.”) (footnote omitted).
The Complaint asserts only state-law claims under the Unruh Act. (See Dkt. 1-1,
Complaint). Defendant, however, asserts in conclusory fashion that federal question jurisdiction
exists because “it appears from the Complaint that this is a civil rights action alleging violations
of the Americans with Disabilities Act[.]” (Dkt. 1, NOR at ¶ 4). However, the fact that plaintiff relies
in part on ADA violations as the basis for his state claims, (see Dkt. 1-1, Complaint at ¶¶ 16, 17,
20); Bell v. Retail Servs. & Sys., Inc., 2018 WL 3455811, *2 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (“[T]he Unruh Act [
] incorporate[s] the ADA, such that the ADA may serve as a ‘hook’ for an alleged violation of state
law.”), is insufficient to confer federal question jurisdiction. See, e.g., Pizarro v. CubeSmart, 2014
WL 3434335, *2 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (remanding action asserting Unruh Act and CDPA claims for lack

2

Defendant seeks only to invoke the court’s federal question jurisdiction. (See, generally,
Dkt. 1, NOR at ¶¶ 3-4).
CV-90 (06/04)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Page 2 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 20-8258 FMO (MRWx)

Date

Title

Lloyd Mosley v. Hastings Village Investment Company, L.P.

October 16, 2020

of federal question jurisdiction); Bell, 2018 WL 3455811, at *2 (same); Rios v. New York and
Company, Inc., 2017 WL 3575220, *2 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (finding plaintiff’s reliance on ADA
violations as a hook for violation of the Unruh Act did not confer federal question jurisdiction);
Thurston v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 2017 WL 3034333, *1 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (granting plaintiff’s
motion to remand Unruh Act claim premised on ADA violations); see also Franchise Tax Bd. of
the State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 27-28, 103 S.Ct. 2841,
2856 (1983), superseded by statute on other grounds, as recognized in DB Healthcare, LLC v.
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Arizona, Inc., 852 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Congress has given
the lower federal courts jurisdiction to hear, originally or by removal from state court, only those
cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of
action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial
question of federal law.”).
In short, given that any doubt regarding the existence of subject matter jurisdiction must be
resolved in favor of remanding the action to state court, see Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566, the court is
not persuaded, under the circumstances here, that defendant has met its burden. Therefore, there
is no basis for federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
This order is not intended for publication. Nor is it intended to be included in or
submitted to any online service such as Westlaw or Lexis.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that:
1. The above-captioned action shall be remanded to the Superior Court of the State of
California for the County of Los Angeles, 600 E Broadway, Glendale, CA 91206, for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
2. The Clerk shall send a certified copy of this Order to the state court.

Initials of Preparer

CV-90 (06/04)

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

vdr

Page 3 of 3