LaShaonda Hammond v. Sutherland Global Services, Inc. et al

Filing 14

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND 9 by Judge Otis D. Wright, II (lc)

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United States District Court
Central District of California

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LaSHONDA HAMMOND,

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Plaintiff,

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Case № 2:21-cv-02999-ODW (AFMx)

v.
SUTHERLAND GLOBAL SERVICES,
INC., and DOES 1–50, inclusive,

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
REMAND [9]

Defendants.

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I.

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INTRODUCTION

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Plaintiff LaShonda Hammond moves to remand this wrongful termination case

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to California State Court following removal by Defendant Sutherland Global Services,

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Inc. (“Sutherland”). (Mot. to Remand (“Mot.”), ECF No. 9.) The matter is fully

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briefed. (See Opp’n, ECF No. 11; Reply, ECF No. 12.) For the reasons discussed

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below, the Motion is DENIED. 1
II.

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Hammond worked for Sutherland as a Collection Specialist beginning in

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BACKGROUND

April 2012.
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(Decl. of Heather D. Hearn Ex. A (“Compl.”) ¶ 5, ECF No. 1-2.)

After carefully considering the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deemed the
matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15.

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Hammond’s health challenges led to repetitive absences from work including an

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eleven-month worker’s compensation leave between December 2018 and November

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2019 for carpal tunnel syndrome.

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terminated Hammond’s employment. (Id. ¶ 10.) On February 26, 2021, Hammond

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filed her complaint against Sutherland alleging six causes of action: (1) discrimination

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based on physical disability in violation of California Government Code

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section 12940(a); (2) failure to accommodate in violation of California Government

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Code section 12940(m); (3) failure to engage in the interactive process in violation of

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California Government Code section 12940(n); (4) failure to prevent discrimination

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and harassment in violation of California Government Code section 12940(k);

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(5) retaliation in violation of California Government Code section 12940(k); and

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(6) wrongful termination in violation of public policy. (See id. ¶¶ 14–64.)

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(Id. ¶¶ 7–8.)

In January 2020, Sutherland

Sutherland removed the action to this Court based on alleged diversity of

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citizenship.

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Sutherland alleges it is a citizen of New York and Hammond is a citizen of California.

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(Id. ¶¶ 6–7.) Hammond moves to remand, arguing Sutherland has not established

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complete diversity of citizenship. (See Mot. 2–3)

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(See Notice of Removal (“NOR”), ECF No. 1.)

III.

As relevant here,

LEGAL STANDARD

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Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction only as authorized by the

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Constitution and Congress. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also Kokkonen v.

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Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). A suit filed in state court

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may be removed to federal court only if the federal court would have had original

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jurisdiction over the suit.

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jurisdiction where an action arises under federal law or where each plaintiff’s

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citizenship is diverse from each defendant’s citizenship and the amount in controversy

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exceeds $75,000. Id. §§ 1331, 1332(a).

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

Federal courts have original

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The removal statute is strictly construed against removal, and “[f]ederal

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jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first

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instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). The party seeking

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removal bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. Id.
IV.

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DISCUSSION

Hammond seeks remand to state court, arguing Sutherland has not sufficiently

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established diversity of citizenship for federal jurisdiction.

Sutherland alleges

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Hammond is a California citizen and that it is a citizen of New York because it is

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incorporated and has its principal place of business there. (NOR ¶¶ 6–7.) Although

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Hammond does not contest her California citizenship, she argues that Sutherland fails

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to establish New York as its principal place of business. (Mot. 7.) She suggests

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Sutherland may be a citizen of California instead, which would destroy diversity. (Id.)

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To remove a case from state court to federal court, the defendant must file a

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notice of removal in the federal court “containing a short and plain statement of the

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grounds for removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). The notice of removal’s “short and

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plain” statement need not include evidentiary submissions. See Dart Cherokee Basin

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Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 84 (2014). If a defendant’s assertion of

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diversity is challenged, “both sides submit proof and the court decides, by a

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preponderance of the evidence, whether [subject matter jurisdiction] has been

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satisfied.” Id. at 88.

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As relevant here, “a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of every

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State . . . by which it has been incorporated and of the State . . . where it has its

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principal place of business.” 3123 SMB LLC v. Horn, 880 F.3d 461, 462–63 (9th Cir.

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2018) (alterations in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1)).

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principal place of business is a single place, typically a corporation’s headquarters,

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often referred to as “the nerve center.” See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 80–81

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(2010). The nerve center is “the place where the corporation’s high level officers

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direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities.” Id.

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A corporation’s

Here, Hammond argues that Sutherland fails to prove its principal place of
business is in New York.

(Mot. 7.)

For support, Hammond points only to

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Sutherland’s website, which lists the locations of Sutherland’s three corporate

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offices: New York, San Francisco, and London. (Decl. of Scott Houtz ¶ 3, Ex. 1, ECF

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No. 9.)

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California and therefore the Court lacks jurisdiction for want of complete diversity.

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This, of course, makes no sense. By Hammond’s logic, a corporation would be a

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citizen of every place where it has an office. The Ninth Circuit has clearly found this

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is not so, limiting citizenship to only the state of incorporation and the state

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encompassing the principal place of business. 3123 SMB, 880 F.3d at 462–63.

With nothing more, Hammond asserts that Sutherland is a citizen of

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Sutherland establishes it is a citizen of New York. Sutherland alleges that it is

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incorporated in New York and maintains its principal place of business in New York.

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(NOR ¶¶ 6–7.) It supports these allegations with the declaration of René Lafferty,

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Associate Vice President and Senior Principal of Human Resources Operations and

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Shared Services for Sutherland, attesting to the same. (Decl. of René Lafferty ISO

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NOR ¶ 8, ECF No. 1.) As the Ninth Circuit and other Central District courts have

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found, this declaration evidence sufficiently supports Sutherland’s allegations of

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citizenship. See Bashir v. Boeing Co., 245 F. App’x 574, 575 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding

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a statement of diversity in the removal petition, supported by a signed declaration of

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the corporation’s attorney, “established diversity by a preponderance of the

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evidence”); Gonzalez v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., No. 16-1068-

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GW (JEMx), 2016 WL 1611576, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2016) (collecting cases)

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(finding a paralegal’s declaration on personal knowledge sufficient to establish the

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citizenship of the corporation).

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Sutherland also submits a supplemental declaration of René Lafferty attesting to

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personal knowledge of the operations conducted at Sutherland’s offices. (Suppl. Decl.

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of René Lafferty ISO Opp’n ¶¶ 3–4, ECF No. 11-1.) Lafferty states unequivocally,

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“[T]he principal place of business for [Sutherland] is in Pittsford, New York.” (Id.

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¶ 4.) Indeed, the “majority of [Sutherland’s] executive team is based out of the

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Pittsford, New York location . . . In addition, the vice-presidents of legal, finance,

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