GHP Management Corporation et al v. City of Los Angeles

Filing 53

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS, 17 , 43 by Judge Dean D. Pregerson: The motions to dismiss are GRANTED. Plaintiffs Complaint is DISMISSED, with leave to amend. Any amended complaint shall be filed within twenty-one days of thedate of this Order. IT IS SO ORDERED. (shb)

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1 2 O 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 GHP MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, 12 Plaintiff, 13 14 v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, 15 Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. CV 21-06311 DDP (JEMx) ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS [Dkt 17, 43] 16 17 Presently before the court are two Motions to Dismiss 18 Plaintiffs’ Complaint, one filed by Defendant City of Los Angeles 19 (“the City”) and the other filed by Intervenors Alliance for 20 Community Empowerment (“ACCE”); Strategic Actions for a Just 21 Economy (“SAJE”); and Coalition for Economic Survival (“CES”) 22 (collectively, “Intervenors”). 23 of the parties, the court grants the motions and adopts the 24 following Order. 25 I. 26 Having considered the submissions Background At the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the City enacted 27 Ordinance No. 186585, which was later updated by Ordinance No. 28 186606 (collectively, the “Eviction Moratorium” or “Moratorium”). Plaintiffs allege that the Eviction Moratorium “effectively 1 precludes residential evictions.” (Complaint ¶ 45.) The 2 Moratorium prohibits landlords from terminating tenancies due to 3 COVID-related nonpayment of rent, any no-fault reason, certain 4 lease violations related to additional occupants and pets, or 5 removal of rental units from the rental market. 6 LAMC § 49.99.2, 49.99.4.)1 7 charging interest or late fees on COVID-related missed rent. 8 § 49.99.2(D).) 9 missed rent payments a one-year period to pay delayed rent, (Complaint ¶ 46; Landlords are also prohibited from (LAMC The Moratorium further allows tenants who have 10 starting from the end of the ongoing local emergency period. 11 (Compl. ¶ 46; LAMC § 49.99.2) 12 civil penalties for violations of the Moratorium. 13 LAMC § 49.99.7.) Tenants may sue landlords and seek (Compl. ¶ 49; 14 Plaintiffs, comprised of (1) thirteen limited liability 15 corporations or limited partnerships that own apartment buildings 16 and (2) the management company that manages the buildings, own or 17 manage nearly five thousand apartment units in Los Angeles. 18 Plaintiffs allege that the Moratorium constitutes an uncompensated 19 taking of private property in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s 20 Takings Clause, as well as the California Constitution’s Takings 21 Clause. 22 compensation,” costs, and attorney’s fees, but does not seek to 23 invalidate or enjoin enforcement of the Moratorium. 24 25 Plaintiffs’ Complaint seeks an award of “just Intervenors and the City now move separately to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint. 26 27 28 1 The City’s Request for Judicial Notice is granted. 2 1 II. 2 Legal Standard A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss when it 3 “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a 4 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 5 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 6 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 7 court must “accept as true all allegations of material fact and 8 must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the 9 plaintiff.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). 10 Although a complaint need not include “detailed factual 11 allegations,” it must offer “more than an unadorned, 12 the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 13 678. 14 statement of a legal conclusion “are not entitled to the assumption 15 of truth.” Id. at 679. In other words, a pleading that merely 16 offers “labels and conclusions,” a “formulaic recitation of the 17 elements,” or “naked assertions” will not be sufficient to state a 18 claim upon which relief can be granted. 19 internal quotation marks omitted). 20 Conclusory allegations or allegations that are no more than a Id. at 678 (citations and “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court 21 should assume their veracity and then determine whether they 22 plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 23 at 679. 24 their claims rise “above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 25 at 555-56. 26 claim for relief” is “a context-specific task that requires the 27 reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common 28 sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Plaintiffs must allege “plausible grounds to infer” that “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 3 1 III. Discussion 2 A. Per Se Taking 3 Movants contend that the Moratorium is not a permanent 4 physical invasion of Plaintiffs’ properties, and therefore does not 5 constitute a per se taking. 6 v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440 (1982) 7 (“We affirm the traditional rule that a permanent physical 8 occupation of property is a taking.”) In Loretto itself, the 9 Supreme Court recognized “that States have broad power to regulate 10 housing conditions in general and the landlord-tenant relationship 11 in particular without paying compensation for all economic injuries 12 that such regulation entails[,] . . . [s]o long as these 13 regulations do not require the landlord to suffer the physical 14 occupation of a portion of his building by a third party.” 15 Later, in Yee v. City of Escondido, Cal., 503 U.S. 519 (1992), the 16 Court held that a combination of rent control laws and eviction 17 protections that limited property owners’ ability to evict tenants 18 did not constitute governmental authorization of “a compelled 19 physical invasion of property” that would constitute a per se 20 taking. 21 (E.g., City Mot. at 15.) See Loretto Id. Yee, 503 U.S. at 527-28. In Yee, a local rent control ordinance limited a mobile home 22 park owners’ ability to raise rents, while a state law 23 simultaneously protected mobile home owners’ ability to transfer 24 mobile homes sited on rented mobile home park land. 25 The park owners alleged that the rent control scheme, against the 26 backdrop of the state law, constituted a physical taking of park 27 land, insofar as it granted tenants and their successors “the right 28 to physically permanently occupy and use the real property of 4 Id. at 524-25. 1 Plaintiff.” 2 decides to rent his land to tenants, the government may place 3 ceilings on the rents the landowner can charge, or require the 4 landowner to accept tenants he does not like, without automatically 5 having to pay compensation.” 6 omitted). 7 forced upon them by the government. . . . 8 be presented were the statute, on its face or as applied, to compel 9 a landowner over objection to rent his property or to refrain in 10 11 Id. at 525. The Court disagreed. “When a landowner Id. at 529 (internal citations “Petitioners’ tenants were invited by petitioners, not perpetuity from terminating a tenancy.” A different case would Id. at 528. In response to Movants’ arguments that Yee controls here, 12 Plaintiffs argue primarily that Yee is no longer good law because 13 “six members of the Supreme Court obviously disagree” with its 14 central premise: that once a landlord chooses to rent to tenants, 15 the government may regulate the landlord-tenant relationship 16 without automatically engaging in a per se taking. 17 Mot. at 18:17.) 18 the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Alabama Ass’n 19 of Realtors v. Department of Health & Human Services, 141 S. Ct. 20 2485 (2021), and Pakdel v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 141 S. Ct. 21 2226 (2021). 22 all, on the continued validity of Yee. 23 Realtors, the Supreme Court granted an emergency application to 24 vacate a stay of a judgment invalidating the Centers for Disease 25 Control and Prevention (“CDC”)’s eviction moratorium. 26 Ass’n of Realtors, 141 S.Ct. at 2486, 2490. 27 address any takings issue anywhere in its opinion. 28 Court did, citing Loretto, recognize that the right to exclude is (Opp. to City To support their assertion, Plaintiffs point to These cases bear only tangentially however, if at 5 In Alabama Association of Alabama The Court did not Although the 1 “one of the most fundamental elements of property ownership,” Yee 2 acknowledged the very same principle. 3 (“[T]he right to exclude is doubtless . . . one of the most 4 essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly 5 characterized as property . . . .”) (internal quotation marks 6 omitted). 7 Id.; Yee, 503 U.S. at 528 Pakdel did involve a takings claim, albeit a regulatory 8 takings claim rather than a per se claim. 9 2228. Pakdel, 141 S.Ct. at The Court’s opinion, however, was limited to the question 10 whether petitioners were required to exhaust local government 11 administrative procedures before filing suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 12 § 1983, even after the local government had rendered a final 13 regulatory decision. 14 in the negative, the Court stated in a footnote that “[o]n remand, 15 the Ninth Circuit may give further consideration to [merits] claims 16 in light of our recent decision in Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid.”2 17 Id. at 2229 n.1 (citation omitted). 18 concluded that a California law requiring farmers to grant union 19 organizers access to private property for up to three hours per 20 day, 120 days per year, constituted a per se physical taking. 21 Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2069, 2080 (2021). 22 Although the Court did cite Yee, it did so only once, and then only 23 as an example of a decision that has “described use restrictions 24 that go ‘too far’ as ‘regulatory takings.’” Id. at 2072. 25 then observed that the “regulatory takings” label can be misleading 26 where, as in Cedar Point, “a regulation results in a physical Id. In the course of answering that question In Cedar Point, the Court The Court 27 2 28 The district court in Pakdel did not reach the merits of the takings claims. Pakdel, 141 S.Ct. at 2228-29. 6 1 appropriation of property.” 2 of Yee, let alone the principle that a regulation governing an 3 existing landlord-tenant relationship is distinguishable from a 4 regulation compelling physical occupation in the first instance, or 5 in perpetuity. 6 Court’s footnote in Pakdel, indicating that the Ninth Circuit 7 remains free to consider Cedar Point if and when the Ninth Circuit, 8 on remand, reaches merits issues that were never reached by the 9 district court, does little to vitiate Yee.3 10 Id. The Court made no further mention Thus, contrary to Plaintiffs’ suggestion, the This Court declines Plaintiffs’ invitation to read the tea 11 leaves, such as they are, in Alabama Association of Realtors, 12 Pakdel, and Cedar Point. 13 abrogate Yee or its prescription that laws that “merely regulate 14 [landlords’] use of their land by regulating the relationship 15 between landlord and tenant” do not constitute per se takings. 16 Yee, 503 U.S. at 528 (emphasis original). 17 18 None of those cases can be read to Plaintiffs also argue, briefly, that the Moratorium constitutes a per se taking even under Yee because it “requires 19 3 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 This Court acknowledges that in Heights Apartments, LLC v. Walz, the Eighth Circuit found Yee distinguishable and applied Cedar Point to sustain a per se takings challenge to an eviction moratorium. Heights Apartments, 30 F.4th 720, 733 (8th Cir. 2022). That has not, however, been the Ninth Circuit’s approach. In Ballinger v. City of Oakland, for example, the Ninth Circuit addressed a takings challenge to an ordinance requiring payments to tenants prior to an eviction, even for good cause. Ballinger, 24 F.4th 1287, 1292 (9th Cir. 2022), cert. denied sub nom. Ballinger v. City of Oakland, California, 142 S. Ct. 2777 (2022). Citing to both Cedar Point and Yee, the court applied the latter, concluding that even a regulation mandating payments from landlords to tenants constituted a regulation of the use of property, and not a per se taking, such as those described in Yee, compelling the creation of a new landlord-tenant relationship or barring the termination of a tenancy “in perpetuity.” Id. at 1293-94 (quoting Yee, 503 U.S. at 528). 7 1 the landowner to submit to the physical occupation of his land. 2 ‘This element of required acquiescence is at the heart of the 3 concept of occupation.’” 4 Yee, 503 U.S. at 527 (quoting FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 5 245, 252 (1987) (emphasis original)). 6 Moratorium does not swoop in out of the blue to force Plaintiffs to 7 submit to a novel use of their property. 8 present the type of different case, contemplated by Yee, where a 9 regulation compels a landowner to “refrain in perpetuity from (Opp. to Intervenors’ Mot. at 3:23-28.) But, as in Yee, the Nor does the Moratorium 10 terminating a tenancy.” 11 evictions for a limited, albeit indeterminate, time. 12 (discussing Cal.Civ.Code § 798.56(g) requirement of up to 12 months 13 notice prior to eviction). 14 required any physical invasion of petitioners’ property. [The] 15 tenants were invited by [the landlords], not forced upon them by 16 the government.” 17 F.4th at 1293 (No per se taking, even where regulation required 18 payment by landlord to tenants prior to eviction for good cause, 19 because landlord plaintiffs “voluntarily chose to lease their 20 property . . . .”). 21 relationship is not a per se taking. Id. at 528. The Moratorium only precludes Compare id. “Put bluntly, no government has Yee, 503 U.S. at 528; see also Ballinger, 24 A regulation affecting that pre-existing 22 B. 23 “[W]hile property may be regulated to a certain extent, if Regulatory taking 24 regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” 25 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 26 “[C]ompensation is required only if considerations such as the 27 purpose of the regulation or the extent to which it deprives the 28 owner of the economic use of the property suggest that the 8 1 regulation has unfairly singled out the property owner to bear a 2 burden that should be borne by the public as a whole.” 3 U.S. at 522–23 (citing Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York 4 City, 438 U.S. 104, 123–125 (1978)). 5 factors “include the regulation’s economic impact on the claimant, 6 the extent to which the regulation interferes with distinct 7 investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government 8 action.” 9 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2013). 10 Yee, 503 The relevant Penn Central MHC Fin. Ltd. P’ship v. City of San Rafael, 714 F.3d 1. Economic Impact 11 The Ninth Circuit discussed the Penn Central factors, 12 including the economic impact factor, at length in Colony Cove 13 Properties, LLC v. City of Carson, 888 F.3d 445 (9th Cir. 2018). 14 As the court explained, “[n]ot every diminution in property value 15 caused by a government regulation rises to the level of an 16 unconstitutional taking.” 17 Similarly, “the mere loss of some income because of regulation does 18 not itself establish a taking.” 19 whether a regulation is “functionally equivalent to the classic 20 taking in which government directly appropriates private property 21 or ousts the owner from his domain.”4 22 Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005)). 23 threshold is high. 24 diminution in property value as high as 92.5% does not constitute a 25 taking, and no court has found a taking where the diminution of 26 value does not exceed 50%. Colony Cove, 888 F.3d at 451. Id. Rather, courts look to Id. (quoting Lingle v. Accordingly, the Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has observed that a Id. 27 4 28 This same fundamental inquiry underpins analyses of per se takings. See Lingle, 544 U.S. 538-39. 9 1 To determine a diminution in value for purpose of evaluating 2 the economic impact on a plaintiff, courts “compare the value that 3 has been taken from the property with the value that remains in the 4 property.” 5 Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987)). 6 Here, however, Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not allege any particular 7 diminution in value, or specific pre- or post-Moratorium values 8 from which a level of diminution could be calculated. Colony Cove, 888 F.3d at 451 (quoting Keystone 9 Plaintiffs assert that this pleading deficiency is not fatal, 10 and that they need not allege any quantitative facts pertaining to 11 valuation, because the Ninth Circuit’s Colony Cove opinion is 12 wrong. 13 contend that because the Penn Central factor analysis is 14 “essentially ad hoc,” the allegation that Plaintiffs have lost 15 rents as a result of the Moratorium is alone sufficient to satisfy 16 the economic impact factor. 17 (Opp. to Intervenors’ Mot. at 6:1-4, 7 n.4.) Plaintiffs See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. Even if this Court were to agree with the substance of 18 Plaintiffs’ arguments, the court could not simply disregard Colony 19 Cove and excuse Plaintiffs of their burden to allege and show the 20 requisite adverse economic impact. 21 circuit authority . . . has no choice but to follow it, even if 22 convinced that such authority was wrongly decided.” 23 Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1175 (9th Cir. 2001). 24 allegation that their tenants are $20 million in arrears is 25 presented in a vacuum, and cannot alone demonstrate a significant 26 economic impact, notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ vague and conclusory 27 allegation that “the economic impact of the Eviction Moratorium is 28 severe and ruinous.” (Compl. ¶ 71.) “A district court bound by 10 Hart v. Plaintiffs’ 1 2 2. Interference with investment-backed expectations The next Penn Central factor is “the extent to which the 3 regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed 4 expectations.” 5 mean to anticipate or look forward to, but it can also mean ‘to 6 consider probable or certain,’ and ‘distinct’ means capable of 7 being easily perceived, or characterized by individualizing 8 qualities.” 9 Cir. 2010) (en banc). Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. “To ‘expect’ can Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 638 F.3d 1111, 1120 (9th “To form the basis for a taking claim, a 10 purported distinct investment-backed expectation must be 11 objectively reasonable.” 12 Connolly v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 226 (1986). 13 “[W]hat is relevant and important in judging reasonable 14 expectations is the regulatory environment at the time of the 15 acquisition of the property.” 16 Comm’n, 950 F.3d 610, 634 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks 17 and citation omitted). 18 field cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by 19 subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative end.” 20 Concrete Pipe & Prod. of California, Inc. v. Constr. Laborers 21 Pension Tr. for S. California, 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993) (quoting 22 FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958)) (internal 23 alterations omitted). 24 Colony Cove, 888 F.3d at 452; see also Bridge Aina Le’a, LLC v. Land Use “[T]hose who do business in [a] regulated Movants argue that Plaintiffs knowingly chose to invest in the 25 highly-regulated rental housing market, and that any subjective 26 expectations Plaintiffs may have had that the regulatory 27 environment would remain static were and are objectively 28 unreasonable. The City raised, and this Court rejected, a similar 11 1 argument in the context of a Contracts Clause challenge to the same 2 Moratorium at issue here. 3 Cnty., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 500 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1095 4 (C.D. Cal. 2020), aff’d, 10 F.4th 905 (9th Cir. 2021), cert. 5 denied, 212 L. Ed. 2d 595, 142 S. Ct. 1699 (2022). 6 acquired their rental properties in the midst of the pandemic, 7 Movants’ argument might be more compelling. 8 environment existing prior to the pandemic, however, gave 9 Plaintiffs little reason to expect that they might be barred from See Apartment Ass’n of Los Angeles Had Plaintiffs The regulatory 10 evicting tenants for nonpayment of rent. 11 F.3d at 634. 12 reasonable probability, like expecting rent to be paid, not starry 13 eyed hope of winning the jackpot if the law changes. 14 buys land burdened by lease-holds in order to acquire a stream of 15 income from rents and the possibility of increased rents or resale 16 value in the future.” 17 added). 18 COVID-19 pandemic, and of the public health measures necessary to 19 combat it, have no precedent in the modern era, and [] no amount of 20 prior regulation could have led landlords to expect anything like 21 the blanket Moratorium.” 22 F.Supp. 3d at 1096; see also Baptiste v. Kennealy, 490 F. Supp. 3d 23 353, 390 (D. Mass. 2020). 24 interferes with Plaintiffs’ reasonable expectations thus weighs in 25 favor of a regulatory taking. 26 27 28 Bridge Aina Le’a, 950 “‘Distinct investment-backed expectations’ implies A landlord Guggenheim, 638 F.3d at 1120 (emphases As this Court has stated, “the scope and nature of the 3. Apartment Ass’n of Los Angeles, 500 The extent to which the Moratorium Character of the Moratorium “A ‘taking’ may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by 12 1 government than when interference arises from some public program 2 adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the 3 common good.” 4 control ordinances intended to shield residents from “excessive 5 rent increases,” have been found to constitute “precisely such a 6 program.” 7 doubt the Moratorium is geared toward promoting the common good. 8 Indeed, the Moratorium is predicated on the City’s findings that 9 “[t]he COVID-19 pandemic threatens to undermine housing security Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. Colony Cove, 888 F.3d at 454. For example, rent Here, there can be little 10 and generate unnecessary displacement of City residents.” 11 49.99.) 12 protections, significant numbers of tenants with COVID-related loss 13 of income would have been evicted, resulting not only in the harms 14 typical of mass displacements, but exacerbating the spread of 15 COVID-19 as well, to the detriment of all. 16 addressing similar regulations, have reached the same conclusion. 17 See, e.g., Baptiste, 490 F. Supp. At 390 (D. Mass. 2020); S. 18 California Rental Hous. Ass’n v. Cty. of San Diego, No. 19 3:21CV912-L-DEB, 2021 WL 3171919, at *9 (S.D. Cal. July 26, 2021). 20 (LAMC § There can be little dispute that, absent the Moratorium’s Other courts, With respect to the “character” factor, Plaintiffs largely 21 reiterate their argument, rejected above, that the Moratorium is a 22 per se taking. 23 although rent control schemes may qualify as sufficiently public- 24 oriented, the Moratorium “is far different and significantly more 25 serious.” 26 not, however, explain how a regulation intended to minimize the 27 displacement of financially vulnerable tenants in the midst and as 28 a result of a public health emergency unprecedented in modern Beyond that, Plaintiffs contend in a footnote that, (Opp. to Intervenors’ Mot. at 9 n.5.) 13 Plaintiffs do 1 history is less protective of the common good than are rent control 2 ordinances. 3 bearing the “seriousness” of the Moratorium has on the public 4 nature of its purpose. 5 emphasize the shifting of financial burdens from tenants to 6 landlords, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that commonplace 7 regulations, including rent control, zoning schemes, and other land 8 use restrictions, “can also be said to transfer wealth from the one 9 who is regulated to another.” As to seriousness, it is not clear to the court what To the extent Plaintiffs intend to Yee, 503 U.S. at 529. And, to the 10 extent Plaintiffs use the word “serious” to refer to the degree of 11 the Moratorium’s financial effects, they have failed, as discussed 12 above, to plead any facts establishing a “serious” economic impact. 13 4. 14 Balance of Penn Central factors Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that the Moratorium has 15 interfered with the reasonable, investment-backed expectations 16 Plaintiffs had when they acquired their rental properties. 17 Complaint does not, however, allege any diminution in value, let 18 alone a diminution high enough to function as the equivalent of a 19 classic taking. 20 the common good, the balance of the Penn Central factors weighs 21 heavily against a determination that the Moratorium constitutes a 22 regulatory taking. 23 IV. 24 25 The Because the Moratorium also indisputably promotes Conclusion For the reasons stated above, the motions to dismiss are GRANTED.5 Plaintiffs’ Complaint is DISMISSED, with leave to amend. 26 5 27 28 Having determined that Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to allege either a per se or regulatory taking, the court does not reach the City’s arguments that any takings claims are unripe, or that (continued...) 14 1 Any amended complaint shall be filed within twenty-one days of the 2 date of this Order. 3 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 7 Dated: November 17, 2022 DEAN D. PREGERSON United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 5 28 (...continued) Plaintiffs lack standing to assert any such claims. 15

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