Prudenciano Flores v. Nissan North America, Inc.
Filing
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ORDER re: Motion to Remand 14 by Judge Ronald S.W. Lew. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion. This Action is hereby REMANDED to the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles. [MD JS-6. Case Terminated.] (et)
'O'
JS-6
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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ORDER re: Motion to Remand
[14]
Plaintiff,
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CV 21-09411-RSWL-PD x
PRUDENCIANO FLORES,
v.
NISSAN NORTH AMERICA,
INC.; DOWNEY IMPORT CARS,
INC.; and DOES 1-10,
Defendants.
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Plaintiff Prudenciano Flores (“Plaintiff”) brings
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this Action against Defendant Nissan North America, Inc.
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(“Nissan”) for violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer
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Warranty Act and against Defendant Downey Import Cars,
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Inc. (“Downey”) for negligent repair.
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the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand to Los Angeles
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County Superior Court (“Motion”) [14].
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all papers submitted pertaining to this Motion, the
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Court NOW FINDS AND RULES AS FOLLOWS: the Court GRANTS
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Plaintiff’s Motion.
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Currently before
Having reviewed
I.
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A.
BACKGROUND
Factual Background
Plaintiff is a resident of Los Angeles, California.
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First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) ¶ 2, ECF No. 11.
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corporation authorized to conduct business in
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California.
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under the laws of California and authorized to conduct
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business in California.
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Id. ¶ 3.
Nissan is a
Downey is a corporation organized
Id. ¶ 4.
On May 24, 2020, Plaintiff purchased a 2020 Nissan
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Sentra (“Vehicle”), which was manufactured and
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distributed by Nissan.
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express written warranty in which Nissan undertook to
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preserve or maintain the utility and performance of the
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Vehicle and to provide compensation if there was a
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failure in the Vehicle’s utility or performance for a
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specified period of time.
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provided that in the event a defect developed with the
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Vehicle during the warranty period, Plaintiff could
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deliver the Vehicle for repair services to a repair shop
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and the Vehicle would be repaired.
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Id. ¶ 6.
Plaintiff received an
Id. ¶ 10.
The warranty
Id.
During the warranty period, the Vehicle contained
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or developed defects that substantially impaired the
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use, safety, and value of the Vehicle.
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Plaintiff provided Nissan with sufficient opportunity to
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repair the Vehicle, but Nissan failed to repair the
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Vehicle within a reasonable number of attempts.
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¶¶ 14-15.
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Downey for repair on numerous occasions, but Downey
Id. ¶ 11.
Id.
Plaintiff also delivered the Vehicle to
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breached its duty to properly store and repair the
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Vehicle in accordance with industry standards.
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¶¶ 43-45.
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Downey’s negligence in failing to repair the Vehicle,
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Plaintiff was financially damaged.
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B.
Id.
Because of Nissan’s breach of warranty and
Id. ¶¶ 18, 47.
Procedural Background
On October 29, 2021, Plaintiff filed her Complaint
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[1-2] against Nissan in the Superior Court of
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California, County of Los Angeles.
On December 3, 2021,
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Nissan removed [1] the case to this Court.
Nissan
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stated that this Court had diversity jurisdiction over
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the case because Plaintiff is domiciled in California,
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while Defendant is a Delaware corporation with a
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principal place of business in Tennessee.
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Removal ¶¶ 13-14, ECF No. 1.
See Notice of
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Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”)
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[11] on December 22, 2021, which added a new cause of
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action for negligent repair against Downey.
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then filed the instant Motion to Remand [14] on January
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24, 2022, arguing that the case must be remanded because
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the addition of Downey destroys diversity.
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has not opposed the Motion.
II.
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A.
Plaintiff
Defendant
DISCUSSION
Legal Standard
Civil actions may be removed from state court if
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the federal court has original jurisdiction.
See
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Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 33
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(2002).
Diversity jurisdiction exists in all civil
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actions between citizens of different states where the
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amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of
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interest and costs.
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complete diversity of citizenship, meaning “each of the
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plaintiffs must be a citizen of a different state than
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each of the defendants.”
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Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing
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Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996)).
28 U.S.C. § 1332.
There must be
Morris v. Princess Cruises,
“The burden of establishing jurisdiction falls on
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the party invoking the removal statute, which is
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strictly construed against removal.”
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Affiliated Sec., Inc., 813 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th Cir.
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1987) (internal citations omitted).
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ambiguities “in favor of remand to state court.”
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v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir.
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2009) (citing Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566
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(9th Cir. 1992)).
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at any time before final judgment it appears that the
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district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.”
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U.S.C. § 1447(c).
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B.
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Sullivan v. First
Courts resolve all
Hunter
A removed case must be remanded “[i]f
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Discussion
The Court begins by noting that Defendants failed
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to oppose this Motion and offer no excuse for their
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failure to oppose.
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this reason.
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file any required document, or the failure to file it
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within the deadline, may be deemed consent to the
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granting or denial of the motion.”); Flores v. FCA US
The Motion is therefore GRANTED for
See C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-12 (“The failure to
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LLC, No. 2:20-cv-6278-ODW (KSx), 2020 WL 5549140 (C.D.
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Cal. Sept. 15, 2020).
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remand is warranted on the merits as well.
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Nonetheless, the Court finds that
In its Notice of Removal, Defendant asserts that
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this Court has diversity jurisdiction over this Action
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because Plaintiff is a citizen of California and
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Defendant is a citizen of both Delaware and Tennessee.
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See Notice of Removal ¶¶ 13-14.
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remand is necessary because the addition of Downey to
Plaintiff argues that
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this Action destroys diversity.
Pl.’s Mem. P. & A. in
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Supp. of Mot. to Remand 1:14-18, ECF No. 14-1.
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Court agrees that the addition of Downey would destroy
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this Court’s diversity jurisdiction.
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appear to be diverse from Plaintiff because both are
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alleged to be California citizens, and neither Defendant
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has stated otherwise.
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Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1371 (stating that the burden is
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on the removing defendant to establish that subject
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matter jurisdiction is proper).
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must analyze whether Downey was properly joined to this
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Action to determine whether the case must be remanded
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for lack of jurisdiction.
The
Downey does not
See FAC ¶¶ 2, 4; see also
Therefore, the Court
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1.
Joinder
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Where a case has been removed from state court and
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the plaintiff attempts to amend its complaint to join
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nondiverse defendants that would destroy the federal
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court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the amendment must
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be scrutinized under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e).
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Clinco v.
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Roberts, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
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Section 1447(e) affords courts discretion to either deny
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joinder of the nondiverse defendant or to permit joinder
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and remand the action to state court.
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§ 1447(e).
18 U.S.C.
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In deciding whether to permit joinder, “a court
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should consider: (1) whether the party sought to be
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joined is needed for just adjudication and would be
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joined under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a); (2)
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whether the statute of limitations would prevent the
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filing of a new action against the new defendant should
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the court deny joinder; (3) whether there has been
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unexplained delay in seeking the joinder; (4) whether
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the joinder is solely for the purpose of defeating
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federal jurisdiction; and (5) whether the claim against
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the new party seems valid.”
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1082.
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Clinco, 41 F. Supp. at
The Court will address each factor in turn.
a.
Rule 19
“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 requires
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joinder of persons whose absence would preclude the
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grant of complete relief, or whose absence would impede
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their ability to protect their interests or would
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subject any of the parties to the danger of inconsistent
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obligations.”
Clinco, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1082; Fed. R.
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Civ. P. 19(a).
Courts consider whether a non-diverse
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defendant is a necessary party under Rule 19 when
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determining whether to allow a diversity-destroying
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amendment, but amendment under § 1447(e) is less
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restrictive than joinder under Rule 19.
IBC Aviation
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Servs., Inc. v. Compiana Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A. de
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C.V., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1011-12 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
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Under § 1447(e), joinder is proper when “failure to join
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will lead to separate and redundant actions.”
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1012.
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§ 1447(e)] is appropriate for the just adjudication of
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the controversy if there is a high degree of involvement
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by the defendant in the occurrences that gave rise to
Id. at
Moreover, “a court may find that joinder [under
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the plaintiff’s cause of action.”
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Am., LLC, No. CV 18-4897JFW(RAOx), 2018 WL 6177230, at
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*2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2018) (quoting McGrath v. Home
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Depot USA, Inc., 298 F.R.D. 601, 608 (S.D. Cal. 2014)).
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Yenokian v. BMW of N.
Here, Plaintiff’s claims against Nissan and Downey
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involve the same Vehicle, the same alleged defects in
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the Vehicle, and the same attempted repairs.
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¶¶ 10-18, 43-47.
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Plaintiff could deliver the Vehicle to a repair shop to
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be repaired, and Downey is the repair shop Plaintiff
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sought services from.
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a high degree of involvement in the occurrences giving
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rise to Plaintiff’s breach of warranty claims against
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Nissan.
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SJO (MRWx), 2017 WL 10433673, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9,
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2017) (finding repair facility necessary for just
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adjudication of claims against defendant because it was
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“a direct participant in the events and transactions
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giving rise to the case”); Forward-Rossi v. Jaguar Land
See FAC
Nissan’s warranty ensured that
Id. ¶¶ 10, 43.
Thus, Downey had
See Harris v. Ford Motor Co., No. CV 17-04964
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Rover N. Am., LLC, No. 2:16-cv-00949-CAS(KSx), 2016 WL
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3396925, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2016) (same).
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Moreover, resolution of Plaintiff’s claims against
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Nissan and Downey will likely require review of many of
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the same documents and witnesses.
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6177230, at *2.
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lead to separate and redundant actions, and this factor
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therefore weighs in favor of joinder.
b.
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See Yenokian, 2018 WL
Denying joinder of Downey here would
Statute of Limitations
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If a plaintiff could file an action against the
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joined defendant in state court, then there is less
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reason to permit joinder under § 1447(e).
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41 F. Supp. 2d at 1083.
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statute of limitations for a negligent repair claim is
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three years.
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v. Ford Motor Co., 362 F. Supp. 3d 837, 841 (C.D. Cal.
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2019).
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attempted repairs took place, but the statute of
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limitations could not have run because Plaintiff
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purchased the Vehicle on May 24, 2020.
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Because Plaintiff would not be time-barred from filing a
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new action against Downey in state court, this factor
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weighs against joinder.
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See Clinco,
Under California law, the
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 338(c)(1); Sabicer
Plaintiff does not specify the date on which the
c.
See FAC ¶ 6.
Unexplained Delay
“When determining whether to allow amendment to add
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a nondiverse party, courts consider whether the
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amendment was attempted in a timely fashion.”
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41 F. Supp. 2d at 1083.
Clinco,
“District courts generally
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measure delay from the date of removal to determine
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whether an unreasonable delay has occurred.”
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2018 WL 6177230, at *3.
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to include a claim against Downey less than three weeks
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after the case was removed to federal court.
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Plaintiff’s amendment was therefore timely.
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2017 WL 10433673, at *2 (finding amendment timely
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because it was sought less than three weeks after
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removal); Yenokian, 2018 WL 6177230, at *3 (finding
Yenokian,
Here, Plaintiff filed the FAC
See Harris,
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amendment timely when sought almost three months after
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removal).
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joinder.
d.
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This factor therefore favors permitting
Motive for Joinder
A court must look with particular care at a
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plaintiff’s motive for joining a nondiverse defendant to
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a removed case “when the presence of a new defendant
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will defeat the court’s diversity jurisdiction and will
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require a remand to state court.”
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at 1083.
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intended to defeat jurisdiction is intertwined with an
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assessment of the strength of the claims against the
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proposed new defendant.
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Clinco, 41 F. Supp.
The question of whether joinder is solely
McGrath, 298 F.R.D. at 608.
While it is possible that Plaintiff is motivated to
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defeat jurisdiction and have the case remanded, it is
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unlikely that this is Plaintiff’s sole motivation.
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explained below, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s
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negligent repair claim against Downey is at least
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facially valid.
Moreover, the FAC is substantively
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As
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different from Plaintiff’s original complaint because
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the negligent repair claim is distinct from Plaintiff’s
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claims against Nissan.
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1083 n.2 (finding improper motive where the original and
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first amended complaints were “substantially similar”),
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with Forward-Rossi, 2016 WL 3396925, at *4 (declining to
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impute an improper motive to plaintiff where she sought
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“to add two additional claims that, while relying on
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many of the same facts, [were] conceptually distinct
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from her two existing claims under the Song-Beverly
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Act”).
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Plaintiff’s sole motivation in alleging a claim against
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Downey is to defeat diversity jurisdiction, particularly
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where Plaintiff is simply exercising the right to amend
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the complaint “once as a matter of course.”
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v. FCA US, LLC, No. 2:16-cv-06639-CAS(RAOx), 2016 WL
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6581154, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2016); Fed. R. Civ. P.
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15(a)(1).
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slightly in favor of permitting joinder.
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Compare Clinco, 41 F. Supp. at
Accordingly, the Court cannot say that
e.
See Sabag
Therefore, the Court finds this factor weighs
Validity of Claim against Downey
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“The existence of a facially legitimate claim
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against the putative defendant weighs in favor of
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permitting joinder under § 1447(e).”
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2016 WL 3396925, at *4 (internal quotation marks and
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citation omitted).
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“seems valid,” which is a lower standard than what is
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required to survive a motion to dismiss or motion for
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summary judgment.
Forward-Rossi,
A claim is facially legitimate if it
Sabag, 2016 WL 6581154, at *6.
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Plaintiff alleges that the Vehicle was delivered to
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Downey on numerous occasions and that Downey breached
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its duty to use ordinary skill and care in the storage,
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preparation, diagnosis, and repair of the Vehicle in
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accordance with industry standards.
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These allegations establish, at minimum, a facially
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legitimate claim for negligent repair.
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Forest Indus., Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 422
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F.2d 1013, 1018 (9th Cir. 1970) (noting that, generally,
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“[o]ne who undertakes repairs has a duty arising in tort
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to do them without negligence”); see also Yenokian, 2018
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WL 6177230, at *4; Forward-Rossi, 2016 WL 3396925, at
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*4.
FAC ¶¶ 43-45.
See Southwest
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2.
Remand
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On balance, the Clinco factors weigh in favor of
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permitting joinder under § 1447(e).
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addition of Downey destroys complete diversity between
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the parties, this Court no longer has subject matter
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jurisdiction over this Action.
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GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand.
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§ 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it
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appears that the district court lacks subject matter
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jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”).
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///
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///
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///
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///
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///
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Because the
The Court therefore
See 28 U.S.C.
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III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS
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Plaintiff’s Motion.
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the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles.
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This Action is hereby REMANDED to
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 9, 2022
/s/ Ronald S.W. Lew
__________________________
HONORABLE RONALD S.W. LEW
Senior U.S. District Judge
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