Prudenciano Flores v. Nissan North America, Inc.

Filing 20

ORDER re: Motion to Remand 14 by Judge Ronald S.W. Lew. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion. This Action is hereby REMANDED to the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles. [MD JS-6. Case Terminated.] (et)

'O'
JS-6

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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ORDER re: Motion to Remand
[14]

Plaintiff,

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CV 21-09411-RSWL-PD x

PRUDENCIANO FLORES,

v.
NISSAN NORTH AMERICA,
INC.; DOWNEY IMPORT CARS,
INC.; and DOES 1-10,
Defendants.

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Plaintiff Prudenciano Flores (“Plaintiff”) brings

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this Action against Defendant Nissan North America, Inc.

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(“Nissan”) for violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer

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Warranty Act and against Defendant Downey Import Cars,

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Inc. (“Downey”) for negligent repair.

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the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand to Los Angeles

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County Superior Court (“Motion”) [14].

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all papers submitted pertaining to this Motion, the

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Court NOW FINDS AND RULES AS FOLLOWS: the Court GRANTS

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Plaintiff’s Motion.
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Currently before
Having reviewed

I.

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A.

BACKGROUND

Factual Background
Plaintiff is a resident of Los Angeles, California.

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First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) ¶ 2, ECF No. 11.

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corporation authorized to conduct business in

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California.

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under the laws of California and authorized to conduct

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business in California.

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Id. ¶ 3.

Nissan is a

Downey is a corporation organized
Id. ¶ 4.

On May 24, 2020, Plaintiff purchased a 2020 Nissan

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Sentra (“Vehicle”), which was manufactured and

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distributed by Nissan.

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express written warranty in which Nissan undertook to

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preserve or maintain the utility and performance of the

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Vehicle and to provide compensation if there was a

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failure in the Vehicle’s utility or performance for a

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specified period of time.

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provided that in the event a defect developed with the

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Vehicle during the warranty period, Plaintiff could

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deliver the Vehicle for repair services to a repair shop

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and the Vehicle would be repaired.

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Id. ¶ 6.

Plaintiff received an

Id. ¶ 10.

The warranty

Id.

During the warranty period, the Vehicle contained

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or developed defects that substantially impaired the

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use, safety, and value of the Vehicle.

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Plaintiff provided Nissan with sufficient opportunity to

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repair the Vehicle, but Nissan failed to repair the

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Vehicle within a reasonable number of attempts.

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¶¶ 14-15.

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Downey for repair on numerous occasions, but Downey

Id. ¶ 11.

Id.

Plaintiff also delivered the Vehicle to

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breached its duty to properly store and repair the

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Vehicle in accordance with industry standards.

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¶¶ 43-45.

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Downey’s negligence in failing to repair the Vehicle,

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Plaintiff was financially damaged.

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B.

Id.

Because of Nissan’s breach of warranty and
Id. ¶¶ 18, 47.

Procedural Background
On October 29, 2021, Plaintiff filed her Complaint

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[1-2] against Nissan in the Superior Court of

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California, County of Los Angeles.

On December 3, 2021,

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Nissan removed [1] the case to this Court.

Nissan

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stated that this Court had diversity jurisdiction over

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the case because Plaintiff is domiciled in California,

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while Defendant is a Delaware corporation with a

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principal place of business in Tennessee.

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Removal ¶¶ 13-14, ECF No. 1.

See Notice of

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Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”)

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[11] on December 22, 2021, which added a new cause of

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action for negligent repair against Downey.

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then filed the instant Motion to Remand [14] on January

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24, 2022, arguing that the case must be remanded because

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the addition of Downey destroys diversity.

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has not opposed the Motion.
II.

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A.

Plaintiff

Defendant

DISCUSSION

Legal Standard
Civil actions may be removed from state court if

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the federal court has original jurisdiction.

See

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Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 33

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(2002).

Diversity jurisdiction exists in all civil
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actions between citizens of different states where the

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amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of

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interest and costs.

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complete diversity of citizenship, meaning “each of the

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plaintiffs must be a citizen of a different state than

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each of the defendants.”

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Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing

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Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996)).

28 U.S.C. § 1332.

There must be

Morris v. Princess Cruises,

“The burden of establishing jurisdiction falls on

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the party invoking the removal statute, which is

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strictly construed against removal.”

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Affiliated Sec., Inc., 813 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th Cir.

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1987) (internal citations omitted).

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ambiguities “in favor of remand to state court.”

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v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir.

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2009) (citing Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566

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(9th Cir. 1992)).

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at any time before final judgment it appears that the

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district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.”

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U.S.C. § 1447(c).

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B.

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Sullivan v. First
Courts resolve all
Hunter

A removed case must be remanded “[i]f
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Discussion
The Court begins by noting that Defendants failed

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to oppose this Motion and offer no excuse for their

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failure to oppose.

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this reason.

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file any required document, or the failure to file it

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within the deadline, may be deemed consent to the

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granting or denial of the motion.”); Flores v. FCA US

The Motion is therefore GRANTED for

See C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-12 (“The failure to

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LLC, No. 2:20-cv-6278-ODW (KSx), 2020 WL 5549140 (C.D.

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Cal. Sept. 15, 2020).

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remand is warranted on the merits as well.

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Nonetheless, the Court finds that

In its Notice of Removal, Defendant asserts that

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this Court has diversity jurisdiction over this Action

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because Plaintiff is a citizen of California and

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Defendant is a citizen of both Delaware and Tennessee.

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See Notice of Removal ¶¶ 13-14.

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remand is necessary because the addition of Downey to

Plaintiff argues that

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this Action destroys diversity.

Pl.’s Mem. P. & A. in

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Supp. of Mot. to Remand 1:14-18, ECF No. 14-1.

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Court agrees that the addition of Downey would destroy

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this Court’s diversity jurisdiction.

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appear to be diverse from Plaintiff because both are

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alleged to be California citizens, and neither Defendant

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has stated otherwise.

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Sullivan, 813 F.2d at 1371 (stating that the burden is

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on the removing defendant to establish that subject

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matter jurisdiction is proper).

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must analyze whether Downey was properly joined to this

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Action to determine whether the case must be remanded

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for lack of jurisdiction.

The

Downey does not

See FAC ¶¶ 2, 4; see also

Therefore, the Court

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Joinder

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Where a case has been removed from state court and

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the plaintiff attempts to amend its complaint to join

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nondiverse defendants that would destroy the federal

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court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the amendment must

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be scrutinized under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e).
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Clinco v.

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Roberts, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 1999).

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Section 1447(e) affords courts discretion to either deny

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joinder of the nondiverse defendant or to permit joinder

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and remand the action to state court.

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§ 1447(e).

18 U.S.C.

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In deciding whether to permit joinder, “a court

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should consider: (1) whether the party sought to be

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joined is needed for just adjudication and would be

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joined under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a); (2)

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whether the statute of limitations would prevent the

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filing of a new action against the new defendant should

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the court deny joinder; (3) whether there has been

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unexplained delay in seeking the joinder; (4) whether

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the joinder is solely for the purpose of defeating

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federal jurisdiction; and (5) whether the claim against

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the new party seems valid.”

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1082.

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Clinco, 41 F. Supp. at

The Court will address each factor in turn.
a.

Rule 19

“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 requires

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joinder of persons whose absence would preclude the

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grant of complete relief, or whose absence would impede

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their ability to protect their interests or would

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subject any of the parties to the danger of inconsistent

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obligations.”

Clinco, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1082; Fed. R.

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Civ. P. 19(a).

Courts consider whether a non-diverse

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defendant is a necessary party under Rule 19 when

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determining whether to allow a diversity-destroying

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amendment, but amendment under § 1447(e) is less
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restrictive than joinder under Rule 19.

IBC Aviation

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Servs., Inc. v. Compiana Mexicana de Aviacion, S.A. de

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C.V., 125 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1011-12 (N.D. Cal. 2000).

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Under § 1447(e), joinder is proper when “failure to join

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will lead to separate and redundant actions.”

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1012.

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§ 1447(e)] is appropriate for the just adjudication of

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the controversy if there is a high degree of involvement

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by the defendant in the occurrences that gave rise to

Id. at

Moreover, “a court may find that joinder [under

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the plaintiff’s cause of action.”

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Am., LLC, No. CV 18-4897JFW(RAOx), 2018 WL 6177230, at

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*2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2018) (quoting McGrath v. Home

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Depot USA, Inc., 298 F.R.D. 601, 608 (S.D. Cal. 2014)).

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Yenokian v. BMW of N.

Here, Plaintiff’s claims against Nissan and Downey

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involve the same Vehicle, the same alleged defects in

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the Vehicle, and the same attempted repairs.

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¶¶ 10-18, 43-47.

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Plaintiff could deliver the Vehicle to a repair shop to

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be repaired, and Downey is the repair shop Plaintiff

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sought services from.

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a high degree of involvement in the occurrences giving

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rise to Plaintiff’s breach of warranty claims against

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Nissan.

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SJO (MRWx), 2017 WL 10433673, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9,

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2017) (finding repair facility necessary for just

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adjudication of claims against defendant because it was

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“a direct participant in the events and transactions

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giving rise to the case”); Forward-Rossi v. Jaguar Land

See FAC

Nissan’s warranty ensured that

Id. ¶¶ 10, 43.

Thus, Downey had

See Harris v. Ford Motor Co., No. CV 17-04964

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Rover N. Am., LLC, No. 2:16-cv-00949-CAS(KSx), 2016 WL

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3396925, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2016) (same).

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Moreover, resolution of Plaintiff’s claims against

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Nissan and Downey will likely require review of many of

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the same documents and witnesses.

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6177230, at *2.

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lead to separate and redundant actions, and this factor

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therefore weighs in favor of joinder.
b.

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See Yenokian, 2018 WL

Denying joinder of Downey here would

Statute of Limitations

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If a plaintiff could file an action against the

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joined defendant in state court, then there is less

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reason to permit joinder under § 1447(e).

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41 F. Supp. 2d at 1083.

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statute of limitations for a negligent repair claim is

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three years.

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v. Ford Motor Co., 362 F. Supp. 3d 837, 841 (C.D. Cal.

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2019).

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attempted repairs took place, but the statute of

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limitations could not have run because Plaintiff

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purchased the Vehicle on May 24, 2020.

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Because Plaintiff would not be time-barred from filing a

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new action against Downey in state court, this factor

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weighs against joinder.

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See Clinco,

Under California law, the

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 338(c)(1); Sabicer

Plaintiff does not specify the date on which the

c.

See FAC ¶ 6.

Unexplained Delay

“When determining whether to allow amendment to add

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a nondiverse party, courts consider whether the

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amendment was attempted in a timely fashion.”

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41 F. Supp. 2d at 1083.

Clinco,

“District courts generally
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measure delay from the date of removal to determine

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whether an unreasonable delay has occurred.”

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2018 WL 6177230, at *3.

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to include a claim against Downey less than three weeks

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after the case was removed to federal court.

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Plaintiff’s amendment was therefore timely.

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2017 WL 10433673, at *2 (finding amendment timely

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because it was sought less than three weeks after

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removal); Yenokian, 2018 WL 6177230, at *3 (finding

Yenokian,

Here, Plaintiff filed the FAC

See Harris,

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amendment timely when sought almost three months after

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removal).

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joinder.
d.

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This factor therefore favors permitting
Motive for Joinder

A court must look with particular care at a

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plaintiff’s motive for joining a nondiverse defendant to

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a removed case “when the presence of a new defendant

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will defeat the court’s diversity jurisdiction and will

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require a remand to state court.”

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at 1083.

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intended to defeat jurisdiction is intertwined with an

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assessment of the strength of the claims against the

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proposed new defendant.

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Clinco, 41 F. Supp.

The question of whether joinder is solely

McGrath, 298 F.R.D. at 608.

While it is possible that Plaintiff is motivated to

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defeat jurisdiction and have the case remanded, it is

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unlikely that this is Plaintiff’s sole motivation.

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explained below, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s

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negligent repair claim against Downey is at least

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facially valid.

Moreover, the FAC is substantively
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As

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different from Plaintiff’s original complaint because

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the negligent repair claim is distinct from Plaintiff’s

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claims against Nissan.

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1083 n.2 (finding improper motive where the original and

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first amended complaints were “substantially similar”),

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with Forward-Rossi, 2016 WL 3396925, at *4 (declining to

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impute an improper motive to plaintiff where she sought

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“to add two additional claims that, while relying on

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many of the same facts, [were] conceptually distinct

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from her two existing claims under the Song-Beverly

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Act”).

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Plaintiff’s sole motivation in alleging a claim against

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Downey is to defeat diversity jurisdiction, particularly

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where Plaintiff is simply exercising the right to amend

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the complaint “once as a matter of course.”

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v. FCA US, LLC, No. 2:16-cv-06639-CAS(RAOx), 2016 WL

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6581154, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2016); Fed. R. Civ. P.

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15(a)(1).

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slightly in favor of permitting joinder.

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Compare Clinco, 41 F. Supp. at

Accordingly, the Court cannot say that

e.

See Sabag

Therefore, the Court finds this factor weighs
Validity of Claim against Downey

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“The existence of a facially legitimate claim

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against the putative defendant weighs in favor of

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permitting joinder under § 1447(e).”

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2016 WL 3396925, at *4 (internal quotation marks and

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citation omitted).

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“seems valid,” which is a lower standard than what is

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required to survive a motion to dismiss or motion for

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summary judgment.

Forward-Rossi,

A claim is facially legitimate if it

Sabag, 2016 WL 6581154, at *6.
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Plaintiff alleges that the Vehicle was delivered to

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Downey on numerous occasions and that Downey breached

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its duty to use ordinary skill and care in the storage,

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preparation, diagnosis, and repair of the Vehicle in

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accordance with industry standards.

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These allegations establish, at minimum, a facially

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legitimate claim for negligent repair.

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Forest Indus., Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 422

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F.2d 1013, 1018 (9th Cir. 1970) (noting that, generally,

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“[o]ne who undertakes repairs has a duty arising in tort

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to do them without negligence”); see also Yenokian, 2018

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WL 6177230, at *4; Forward-Rossi, 2016 WL 3396925, at

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*4.

FAC ¶¶ 43-45.
See Southwest

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2.

Remand

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On balance, the Clinco factors weigh in favor of

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permitting joinder under § 1447(e).

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addition of Downey destroys complete diversity between

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the parties, this Court no longer has subject matter

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jurisdiction over this Action.

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GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand.

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§ 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it

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appears that the district court lacks subject matter

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jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”).

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///

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///

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///

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///

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///
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Because the

The Court therefore
See 28 U.S.C.

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III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS

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Plaintiff’s Motion.

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the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles.

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This Action is hereby REMANDED to

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 9, 2022

/s/ Ronald S.W. Lew
__________________________
HONORABLE RONALD S.W. LEW
Senior U.S. District Judge

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