Linda Moore v. General Motors LLC et al

Filing 11

MINUTE (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER REMANDING ACTION by Judge Fernando M. Olguin. The above-captioned action shall be remanded to the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1447(c). Case Terminated. Made JS-6 (iv)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
JS-6
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 23-7631 FMO (PVCx)

Title

Linda Moore v. General Motors LLC, et al.

Present: The Honorable

Date

October 2, 2023

Fernando M. Olguin, United States District Judge

Vanessa Figueroa

None

None

Deputy Clerk

Court Reporter / Recorder

Tape No.

Attorney Present for Plaintiff:

Attorney Present for Defendant:

None Present

None Present

Proceedings:

(In Chambers) Order Remanding Action

On July 17, 2023, Linda Moore (“plaintiff”) filed a form Complaint in the Los Angeles County
Superior Court against General Motors LLC (“GM”) and AM General LLC (collectively,
“defendants”), asserting claims for negligence, strict product liability, and breach of warranty
claims. (See Dkt. 1, Notice of Removal (“NOR”) at ¶¶ 1-2); (Dkt. 1-5, Complaint). On September
13, 2023, GM removed that action on diversity jurisdiction grounds pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a). (See Dkt. 1, NOR at ¶¶ 4-17). Having reviewed the NOR and the pleadings, the court
hereby remands this action to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §
1447(c).
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized
by Constitution and statute[.]” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114
S.Ct. 1673, 1675 (1994). The courts are presumed to lack jurisdiction unless the contrary
appears affirmatively from the record. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n.
3, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 1861 n. 3 (2006). Federal courts have a duty to examine jurisdiction sua
sponte before proceeding to the merits of a case, see Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S.
574, 583, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 1569 (1999), “even in the absence of a challenge from any party.”
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 1244 (2006).
“Under the plain terms of § 1441(a), in order properly to remove [an] action pursuant to that
provision, [the removing defendant] must demonstrate that original subject-matter jurisdiction lies
in the federal courts.” Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 33, 123 S.Ct. 366, 370
(2002); Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam)
(noting the “longstanding, near-canonical rule that the burden on removal rests with the removing
defendant”); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The strong presumption
against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that
removal is proper.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). If there is any doubt regarding the
existence of subject matter jurisdiction, the court must resolve those doubts in favor of remanding

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
JS-6
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 23-7631 FMO (PVCx)

Title

Linda Moore v. General Motors LLC, et al.

Date

October 2, 2023

the action to state court.1 See Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566 (“Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if
there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.”).
The court’s review of the NOR and the attached Complaint makes clear that the court does
not have subject matter jurisdiction over the instant matter. In other words, plaintiff could not have
originally brought this action in federal court, as plaintiff does not competently allege facts
establishing diversity jurisdiction.2 Therefore, removal was improper. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a);
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429 (1987) (“Only state-court
actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by
the defendant.”).
Defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
amount in controversy meets the jurisdictional threshold. See Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d
1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004); Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th
Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“Where it is not facially evident from the complaint that more than $75,000
is in controversy, the removing party must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
amount in controversy meets the jurisdictional threshold. Where doubt regarding the right to
removal exists, a case should be remanded to state court.”) (footnote omitted). Here, there is no
basis for diversity jurisdiction because the amount in controversy does not appear to exceed the
diversity jurisdiction threshold of $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 3
As an initial matter, the amount of damages plaintiff seeks cannot be determined from the
Complaint, as the Complaint does not set forth a specific amount. (See, generally, Dkt. 1-5,
Complaint). Moreover, GM cites only to plaintiff’s claims and requested forms of relief as proof,
ipso facto, that the amount plaintiff seeks meets the amount in controversy requirement. (See id.).
Such unsubstantiated assertions cannot satisfy the amount in controversy requirement of §
1332(a). See, e.g., Gaus, 980 F.2d at 567 (remanding for lack of diversity jurisdiction where
defendant “offered no facts whatsoever. . . . [to] overcome[ ] the strong presumption against
removal jurisdiction, [and did not] satisf[y defendant’s] burden of setting forth . . . the underlying
facts supporting its assertion that the amount in controversy exceeds $[75],000”) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original).

1

An “antiremoval presumption” does not exist in cases removed pursuant to the Class
Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). See Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC
v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89, 135 S.Ct. 547, 554 (2014).
2

GM seeks only to invoke the court’s diversity jurisdiction. (See, generally, Dkt. 1, NOR).

3

In relevant part, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) provides that a district court has diversity jurisdiction
“where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, . . . and is between . . .
citizens of different States” or “citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state[.]” 28
U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(1)-(2).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
JS-6
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No.

CV 23-7631 FMO (PVCx)

Date

Title

Linda Moore v. General Motors LLC, et al.

October 2, 2023

In sum, given that any doubt regarding the existence of subject matter jurisdiction must be
resolved in favor of remanding the action, see Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566, the court is not persuaded,
under the circumstances here, that GM has met its burden of showing by a preponderance of the
evidence that the amount in controversy meets the jurisdictional threshold. See Matheson, 319
F.3d at 1090 (“Where it is not facially evident from the complaint that more than $75,000 is in
controversy, the removing party must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount
in controversy meets the jurisdictional threshold. Where doubt regarding the right to removal
exists, a case should be remanded to state court.”) (footnote omitted); Valdez, 372 F.3d at 1117.
This order is not intended for publication. Nor is it intended to be included in or
submitted to any online service such as Westlaw or Lexis.
Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that:
1. The above-captioned action shall be remanded to the Superior Court of the State of
California for the County of Los Angeles, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c).
2. The Clerk shall send a certified copy of this Order to the state court.

Initials of Preparer

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