Taylor Briest v. Nissan North America Inc. et al

Filing 31

ORDER by Judge Dale S. Fischer GRANTING Motion to Remand (Dkt. #19 ). The case is REMANDED to the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles. (MD JS-6. Case Terminated.) (jp)

JS-6

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TAYLOR BRIEST,
Plaintiff,
v.

2:23-cv-7688-DSF-SSCx
Order GRANTING Motion to
Remand (Dkt. 19)

NISSAN NORTH AMERICA,
INC.,
Defendant.

This case was removed from state court on September 14, 2023,
on the basis of diversity. On September 30, 2023, Plaintiff filed a First
Amended Complaint that added a non-diverse defendant to the case.
Defendant Nissan North America, Inc. now moves to strike the FAC
and Plaintiff moves to remand the case. The Court deems this matter
appropriate for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78;
Local Rule 7-15. The hearing set for November 13, 2023, is removed
from the Court’s calendar.
Even assuming that the motion to strike the FAC naming the
non-diverse defendant should be granted, Nissan has failed to establish
diversity jurisdiction based on the complaint at the time of removal.
“The removal statute is strictly construed against removal
jurisdiction” and, when challenged, “[t]he defendant bears the burden
of establishing that removal is proper.” Provincial Gov’t of Marinduque
v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2009). If a
defendant fails to meet its burden of establishing the Court has subject
matter jurisdiction, the suit is remanded. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

Nissan’s evidence regarding Plaintiff’s citizenship is stale. This
case was filed on August 11, 2023 and removed on September 14, 2023.
The sales contract for the vehicle at issue was entered in California in
2018. The invoices provided for work on the vehicle in California are
from March 2021 and September 2022. See Notice of Removal, Ex. C,
D. No other evidence relating to Plaintiff’s citizenship is provided.
Nissan also fails to establish even its own citizenship. The Court
is satisfied that Nissan is incorporated in Delaware, but Nissan
provides virtually no evidence regarding its principal place of business.
A corporation is the citizen of the state where it is incorporated
and the state where it has its principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. §
1332(c)(1). The principal place of business of a corporation is where the
“nerve center” of the business is – where the corporation’s high-level
officers direct and control its activities. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S.
77, 80-81 (2010).
The allegations in the Notice of Removal recite the correct
standard, see Notice of Removal ¶¶ 18-19, but the cited evidence does
not establish anything relevant about Nissan’s principal place of
business. Instead, the only evidence provided is a declaration of
outside counsel who, in conclusory fashion, states:
Nissan is organized under the laws of the State of
Delaware, with its principal place of business in the State
of Tennessee and was not and is not organized under the
laws of the State of California, wherein this action was
brought. Thus, Nissan is a citizen of Delaware and
Tennessee for jurisdictional purposes.
Doudar Decl. ¶ 3.
In the opposition to the motion to remand, the only additional
evidence provided for principal place of business is a statement filed by
Nissan with the California Secretary of State designating a “business
address” in Tennessee. See Remand Opp’n, Ex. A. None of this comes

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close to establishing that Nissan’s high-level officers direct the
corporation’s activities from Tennessee.
The motion to remand is GRANTED. The case is REMANDED to
the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: November 6, 2023

___________________________
_______________
_____________
Dale
S. Fi
Fischer
D
l S
h
United States District Judge

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